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China’s	   ascent	   up	   the	   echelon	   of	   the	   contemporary	   interstate	   system	   is	   often	  
debated	  by	   reference	   to	   its	   implications	   for	   the	  US	  designed	  neoliberal	  world	  
order.	  	  A	  ‘cauldron	  of	  anxiety’	  appears	  to	  be	  brewing	  around	  what	  is	  said	  to	  be	  a	  
potentially	  contesting	  force	  that	  is	  at	  best	  shallowly	  integrated	  and	  at	  worse	  set	  
on	   institutional	   reconstitution.	   US	   anxiety	   over	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   order	   she	  
landscaped	   and	   from	   which	   she	   benefits	   may	   be	   understood	   insofar	   as	  
insufficient	   submission	   signifies	   the	   risk	  of	   a	   rising	  untamed	  competitor.	   	   Yet,	  
against	   the	   background	   of	   China’s	   participation	   in	   the	   international	   financial	  
institutions,	  membership	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organisation	  and	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
a	  prolific	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  (BITs)	  program,	  in	  what	  way	  can	  she	  be	  
said	  to	  have	  remained	  resistant	  and	  untamed?	  This	  work	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  
the	  debate	  by	  looking	  at	  it	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  discourse.	   	  It	  examines	  two	  
interrelated	  discursive	  structures	  -­‐	  those	  of	  paradigm	  and	  law.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  
former	   it	   looks	   at	   the	   US	   engendered	   neoliberal	   worldview	  more	   specifically	  
formulated	  as	  a	  Washington	  Consensus	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  China’s	  vision	  of	  a	  
harmonious	  world	  of	   lasting	  peace	  and	  prosperity	  on	   the	  other.	   In	   relation	   to	  
the	   latter,	   juridical	   institutions	   furnish	   legitimising	  mechanisms	   and	   the	   rules	  
by	   which	   paradigms	   are	   to	   be	   practiced.	   	   Since	   treaties	   form	   part	   of	   the	   US	  
designed	   world	   order,	   this	   work	   applies	   BITs	   as	   a	   prism	   through	   which	   the	  
interiors	   of	   paradigms	  may	   be	   unpacked.	   BITs	   are	   creatures	   of	   the	   capitalist	  
paradigm	  in	  its	  neoliberal	  configuration	  in	  that	  they	  articulate	  and	  provide	  rules	  
for	   the	   material	   realisation	   of	   a	   homogenised	   world	   in	   which	   the	   spatial	  
movement	  of	  capital	  is	  free	  of	  impediments	  and	  sovereign	  rights	  are	  subjugated	  
to	  property	  rights.	  By	  contrast	  they	  are	  not	  creatures	  of	  the	  harmonious	  world	  
paradigm	  with	   its	   resurrection	  of	   indigenous	  heritage.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  China	  
they	  represent	  processes	  of	  importation	  and	  adaptation	  originally	  triggered	  by	  
forcible	   rupture.	   Against	   this	   construct	   of	   two	   different	   paradigms	   that	  
nevertheless	   share	   a	   juridical	   structure	   this	   work	   concludes	   that	   China	   does	  
aspire	   to	   a	   reformed	   world	   order.	   However,	   only	   time	   will	   tell	   whether	  
reformative	   ambitions	   can	   survive	   own	   integration	   and	   the	   expansive	  




This	  work	  represents	  the	  culmination	  of	  years	  of	  association	  with	  the	  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China.	  I	  am	  yet	  to	  decipher	  the	  route	  that	  led	  me	  to	  this	  distant	  land	  
and	  the	  logic	  of	  its	  language,	  culture	  and	  history.	  Yet,	  it	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  privilege.	  
For	  it	  opened	  up	  a	  new	  and	  intricate	  landscape	  in	  which	  differences	  fused	  with	  
similarities	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  learning	  loomed	  large.	  For	  this	  gift	  I	  owe	  a	  debt	  
of	  gratitude	  to	  the	  people	  of	  China	  and	  to	  my	  Chinese	  friends	  who	  opened	  their	  
doors	  and	  hearts	  to	  me	  and	  shared	  with	  me	  -­‐	  a	  stranger	  -­‐	  their	  wisdom,	  hopes,	  
disappointments	  and	  the	  art	  of	  endurance.	  	  	  
I	  also	  thank	  Queen	  Mary	  University	  for	  their	  financial	  and	  intellectual	  support.	  I	  
hope	   I	   have	  not	  disappointed.	   I	  would	  never	  have	   embarked	  on	   this	   research	  
but	  for	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  taught	  by	  Professor	  Janet	  Dine	  as	  part	  of	  my	  LLM	  
studies.	   Thereafter,	   I	   could	   not	   have	   hoped	   for	   a	   better	   supervisor.	   Professor	  
Dine’s	  guidance	  and	  comments	  were	  invaluable.	  Her	  encouragement	  sustained	  
me	  along	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
Introduction	  
A	  Particularly	  US	  Order	  
There	   is	   recognition	   in	   academic	   circles	   that	   our	   global	   eco-­‐political	   ecology	  
represents	   a	   systemic	   configuration.	   In	   other	   words,	   our	   predicament	   –	   a	  
dangerous	  world	  space	  that	  accommodates	  what	  Beck	  conceptualises	  as	   ‘large	  
inequalities’	   (as	   opposed	   to	   small	   inequalities	   that	   are	   located	   within	   the	  
nation-­‐state)1	  -­‐	   is	   not	   a	   random	  phenomenon.	  There	   is	   an	   international	   order	  
that	   is	   informed	   by	   American	   dominion	   and	   realised	   through	   the	  
instrumentalities	   of	   institutions.2 	  A	   statement	   to	   this	   effect	   by	   Richard	   S.	  
Williamson,	   former	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   International	  Organisation	  Affairs	  at	  
the	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  may	  not	  be	  as	  powerful	  as	  Gowan	  and	  Barnett	  and	  
Duvall’s	   scholarly	   analysis,	   particularly	   when	   made	   in	   a	   private	   capacity.	  
Nevertheless,	   it	   merits	   citing	   given	   that	   Williamson	   served	   in	   senior	   foreign	  
policy	   positions	   under	   both	   President	   Regan	   and	   President	   Bush	   and	   can	   be	  
said	  to	  have	  enjoyed	  the	  authority	  that	  comes	  with	  being	  a	  government	  insider.	  
Williamson	   summed	   up	   the	   post-­‐World	  War	   II	   (WWII)	   order	   as	   ‘the	   treaties,	  
multilateral	   institutions,	   and	   norms	   developed	   largely	   with	   United	   States	  
leadership’.3	  Acknowledgement	  of	   the	   existence	  of	   a	  world	  order	   is	   important	  
since,	  were	   the	  predicament	  of	   large	   inequalities	   to	  be	  merely	  a	   spontaneous,	  
inevitable	   consequence	   of	   forces	   beyond	   our	   control,	   this	   enquiry	   into	  
paradigms,	   rules	   and	   the	   rationality	   that	   produces	   them	  might	  well	   prove	   an	  
exercise	  in	  futility.	  
	  
One	  institution,	  which	  forms	  part	  of	  this	  order,	  is	  that	  of	  international	  law	  (IL).	  
The	  view	  of	  law	  as	  an	  institution	  is	  discussed	  further	  below	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Ulrich	  Beck	  (trs),	  Power	  in	  the	  Global	  Age	  (Polity	  Press	  2005)	  25-­‐26.	  
2	  See	  for	  example	  Peter	  Gowan,	  ‘US:UN’	  (2003)	  24	  New	  Left	  Review	  5;	  Michael	  Duvall	  and	  
Raymond	  Duvall,	  ‘Power	  in	  International	  Politics’	  (2005)	  59	  1	  International	  Organisation	  39.	  
3	  Ambassador	  Richard	  S.	  Williamson,	  ‘China,	  America	  and	  a	  new	  World	  Order’	  [2010]	  The	  
online	  Magazine	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Enterprise	  Institute	  
<www.american.com/archive/.../china-­‐america-­‐and-­‐a-­‐new-­‐world-­‐order>	  accessed	  9	  Oct	  2010.	  	  
11	  
	  
research	  question	  and	  revisited	   in	   chapter	  5.	  For	  now,	   let	  us	   say	   that	   there	   is	  
much	   scholarly	   engagement	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   institutions	   and	   that	   which	  
they	  produce,	   alternatively	   constrain.4	  	  Diversity	  nevertheless	   shares	  a	  degree	  
of	   common	   ground.	   It	   may	   be	   found	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   institutions	   as	  
made	  up	  of	  norms	  and	  rules,	  the	  exercise	  of	  power,	  and	  codes	  of	  behaviour	  that	  
prescribe	  practice.	  When	  institutional	  actors	  have	  a	  material	  expression,	  in	  the	  
forms	   of	   members,	   financial	   and	   spatial	   resources	   and	   a	   legal	   status,	   the	  
institution	  may	  be	  said	  to	  have	  taken	  on	  an	  organisational	  form.	  5	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  
law	   is	   an	   institution	   with	   appended	   organisations	   e.g.	   courts	   and	   arbitral	  
institutions.	  6	  IL	   is	   the	   institution	   of	   law	   that	   prescribes	   rules	   and	   codes	   of	  
behaviour	  for	  international	  practice.	  	  
International	  economic	  law	  (Economic	  IL)	  is	  a	  division	  within	  the	  institution	  of	  
IL.	  It	  regulates	  cross-­‐border	  economic	  practice	  -­‐	  specifically	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
this	  enquiry,	  cross-­‐border	  investment.	  	  At	  its	  core	  lies	  an	  expansive	  network	  of	  
bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  (BITs),	  which,	  following	  its	  inception	  in	  1959,	  now	  
includes	   almost	   every	   country	   around	   the	   globe.7	  	   Its	   main	   protagonists	   are	  
states	  and	  transnational	  corporations	  (TNCs),	  the	  latter	  being	  one	  of	  the	  actors	  
in	   what	   may	   collectively	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   institution	   of	   capital.8	  	   BITs’	  
organisational	   expression	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   the	   International	   Centre	   for	   the	  
Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  (ICSID),	  an	  arbitral	  institution	  established	  in	  
1966	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Beck	  posits	  that	  it	  is	  an	  actor	  within	  
the	  collective	  that	  forms	  institutional	  capital.9	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  for	  example	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  2;	  Stephan	  W.	  Schill,	  The	  Multilateralization	  of	  International	  
Investment	  Law	  (CUP	  2009)	  2;	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall,	  ‘Power	  in	  global	  
governance’	  in	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall	  (eds),	  Power	  in	  Global	  Governance	  
(Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  International	  Relations	  (CUP	  2005)	  18;	  Andrew	  Hurrell,	  ‘Power,	  
institutions,	  and	  the	  production	  of	  inequality’	  in	  ibid	  33-­‐58.	  
5	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  2.	  
6	  Schill,	  ibid.	  
7	  ibid	  8;	  the	  pace	  of	  BITs	  signing	  increased	  dramatically	  in	  the	  1990s.	  See	  for	  example	  Andre	  T	  
Guzman,	  ‘Why	  LDCs	  Sign	  Treaties	  that	  Hurt	  Them:	  Explaining	  the	  Popularity	  of	  Bilateral	  
Investment	  Treaties’	  (1998)	  38	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  639,	  652.	  	  
8	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  15.	  
9 ibid; the	  inclusion	  of	  general	  consent	  to	  arbitration	  became	  the	  rule	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Gas	  Van	  
Harten,	  Investment	  Treaty	  Arbitration	  and	  Public	  Law	  (Oxford	  Monographs	  in	  International	  Law,	  




BITs	  are	  treaties	  entered	  into	  between	  two	  states	  whereby	  each	  undertakes	  to	  
treat	  investors	  and	  their	  investments	  in	  accordance	  with	  prescribed	  standards.	  
Substantively,	   they	   engage	   the	   neoliberal	   vision	   of	   a	   homogenised	   world	   in	  
which	   the	  spatial	  movement	  of	   capital	   is	   freed	  of	   impediments,	  and	  sovereign	  
rights	   are	   subjugated	   to	   property	   rights.10	  With	   private	   foreign	   investment	  
propagated	   as	   a	   developmental	   imperative,	   states	   take	   on	   the	   role	   of	  
competitive	   entities	   in	   a	   race	   to	   attract	   investors.11	  Often	   it	   is	   a	   race	   to	   the	  
bottom	  whereby	  capital	  is	  enticed	  by	  a	  promise	  of	  a	  market	  environment	  that	  is	  
conducive	   to	   profit	   maximisation. 12 	  Economic	   IL	   is	   engaged	   through	   the	  
externalisation	   of	   standards	   of	   treatment,	   choice	   of	   law	   and	   the	   forum	   for	  
dispute	   resolution.	   	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	   Schill,	   the	   treaties	   provide	   the	  
institutional	  framework	  necessary	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  a	  market-­‐based	  global	  
economy.13	  
Viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  hegemony,	  BITs	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  spread	  globally	  
by	  means	  of	  a	  Gramscian	  dialectical	  interaction	  of	  coercion	  and	  consent,	  so	  as	  to	  
maintain	   the	   flow	   of	   global	   tributaries	   from	   the	   peripheries	   of	   the	   interstate	  
order	   to	   its	   core.14	  	  As	  will	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   following	   chapter,	   from	  a	  historical	  
perspective,	  they	  may	  be	  posited	  as	  representing	  the	  continuation	  of	  imperialist	  
unequal	  treatification	  whereby	  IL	  is	  utilised	  to	  endow	  expansionist	  capital	  with	  
juridical	   rights.	   In	   sum,	   BITs	   are	   creatures	   of	   capitalist	   progression	   to	   its	  
contemporary	   neoliberal	   expression.	   They	   provide	   rules	   for	   the	   material	  
realisation	  of	  ‘a	  particularly	  American	  conception	  of	  investment	  rights’. 15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  the	  relationship	  between	  neoliberalism	  and	  BITs,	  see	  for	  example	  M	  Sornarajah,	  ‘The	  
Neo-­‐Liberal	  Agenda	  in	  Investment	  Arbitration:	  Its	  Rise,	  Retreat	  and	  Impact	  on	  State	  
Sovereignty’	  in	  Wenhua	  Shan	  Penelope	  Simons	  and	  Dalvinder	  Singh	  (eds),	  Redefining	  
Sovereignty	  In	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (studies	  In	  International	  Law	  Vol	  7,	  Hart	  Publishing	  
2008)	  199-­‐224.	  
11	  See	  for	  example	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  ‘ICSID	  Convention	  Regulations	  and	  Rules’	  
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp>	  accessed	  29	  Jan	  2010.	  	  
12	  For	  the	  growing	  inequality	  between	  countries	  see	  Janet	  Dine,	  Companies	  International	  Trade	  
and	  Human	  Rights	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  Corporate	  Law,	  CUP	  2005)	  8-­‐9.	  
13	  Schill,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  8.	  
14	  David	  Harvey,	  The	  New	  Imperialism	  (OUP	  2003)	  37-­‐38;	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  The	  Long	  Twentieth	  
Century:	  Money,	  Power	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Times	  (Verso	  2010)	  29.	  
15	  James	  Petras	  and	  Henry	  Veltmeyer,	  Multinationals	  on	  Trial:	  Foreign	  investment	  Matters	  




More	  recently,	  a	  newcomer	  has	  stepped	  into	  this	  world	  order	  and	  appears	  to	  be	  
edging	  her	  way	   in	  the	  direction	  of	   its	  core.	  After	  almost	   two	  hundred	  years	  of	  
life	   in	  the	  periphery,	  China	   is	  re-­‐emerging	  as	  a	  major	  power	  forecasted	  by	  the	  
CIA	   to	   surpass	   the	   size	   of	   the	   US	   economy	   by	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	  
century.	  16	  	  This	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  economic	  power,	  says	  Li	  Mingqi,	  ‘is	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  important	  developments	  at	  the	  current	  world-­‐historical	  conjuncture’.17	  It	  
is	   a	   far	   cry	   from	  Henry	   Kissinger’s	   assurance	   to	   Nixon	   following	   his	  meeting	  
with	  Chairman	  Mao	  in	  1972	  that	  Chinese	  trade	  would	  never	  amount	  to	  much.18	  	  
It	  seems	  then	  that	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  China	  entailed	  unexpected	  consequences	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  empowerment.	  The	  responses	  they	  provoked	  
vary.	  Nevertheless,	  one	  may	  point	  to	  a	  broad	  shift	  in	  Western	  discourse	  from	  its	  
traditional	   formulation	   –	   how	   can	   an	   integrated	   Chinese	   economy	   be	   best	  
harnessed	  –	   to	  concerns	  about	  China’s	  global	   impact	  and	  the	   imperative	  of	   its	  
containment.	  Among	  the	  various	  statements	  expressing	  such	  concerns,	  perhaps	  
the	   most	   famous	   is	   Robert	   Zoellick’s,	   the	   then	   US	   Deputy	   Secretary	   of	   State,	  
observation	   of	   ‘a	   cauldron	   of	   anxiety	   about	   China’.19	  Susan	   Shirk,	   a	   former	  
deputy	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   responsible	   for	   China	   and	   an	   academic,	  
advises	  that	  to	  avoid	  a	  US-­‐China	  confrontation,	  Americans	  need	  to	  understand	  
the	   frailty	   of	   the	   CCP	   regime.20	  This	   statement	  may	  well	   be	   no	  more	   than	   an	  
expression	   of	   US	   penchant	   for	   preoccupation	   with	   other	   countries’	   internal	  
arrangements.	   Still,	   military	  muscles	   flexing	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   ‘pacific	   pivot’	   is	  
compounded	   by	   attempts	   at	   containment	   in	   the	   economic	   sphere.	   The	  
Transatlantic	   Trade	   Partnership	   (TTP),	   currently	   being	   negotiated,	   excludes	  
China.	  The	  US-­‐EU	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Partnership	  (TTIP)	  is	  said	  to	  prescribe	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Susan	  L.	  Shirk,	  China	  Fragile	  Superpower	  (OUP	  2007)	  4,13-­‐20.	  
17	  Mingqi	  Li,	  The	  Rise	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Demise	  of	  the	  Capitalist	  World	  Economy	  (Pluto	  Press	  2008)	  
1;	  see	  also	  Jonathan	  Fenby,	  China	  Today,	  How	  It	  Got	  There	  and	  Where	  It	  is	  Heading:	  Tiger	  Head	  
Snake	  Tails,	  (Simon	  and	  Schuster	  2012)	  1-­‐2.	  
18	  Fenby,	  ibid	  235.	  
19	  Robert	  Zoellick,	  ‘Whither	  China:	  From	  Membership	  to	  Responsibility?’	  [21	  September	  2005]	  
<http://www.asiaing.com/whither-­‐china-­‐from-­‐membership-­‐to-­‐responsibility.html>	  accessed	  
28	  Dec	  2010. 
20	  Shirk,	  ibid	  (n	  16)	  generally.	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Western	  approach	  to	  China.	  Both	  agreements	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  defensive	  moves	  
against	  her	  ascent.21	  	  
	  	  
The	  reasons	  why	  unexpected	  consequences	  should	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  anxiety	  are	  
not	   immediately	   apparent.	   China	   is	   incorporated	   into	   the	  post-­‐WWII	   order	   of	  
international	   financial	   institutions	   (IFIs)	   and	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organisation	  
(WTO).22	  	  Her	  integration	  into	  the	  investment	  protection	  legal	  regime	  is	  verging	  
on	   the	   spectacular.	   	   Since	   the	   country’s	   first	   BIT	   with	   Sweden	   in	   1982	   she	  
signed	  some	  139	  BITs	  and	  is	  second	  only	  to	  Germany	  in	  the	  number	  of	  treaties	  
concluded.23	  	   As	   shall	   be	   seen	   later,	   following	   on	   the	   trail	   of	   global	   trends,	  
quantitative	   augmentation	  was	   supplemented	   by	   geographical	   expansion	   and	  
normative	  evolution	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  greater	   foreign	   investors’	  protection.24	  
Further,	   at	   least	   for	   the	   time	   being,	   Chinese	   corporations	   pose	   only	   a	   limited	  
threat,	   if	   any,	   to	  Western	   corporate	   global	   domination.	   	   As	   Chen	   Jian,	   China’s	  
Vice	  Minister	  of	  Commerce	  pointed	  out	   in	   a	  press	   conference	  on	  1	  November	  
2010,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2009	  the	  country’s	  outbound	  investment	  accounted	  for	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  On	  the	  US	  Asia	  ‘pivot’	  see	  for	  example	  Bonnie	  G.	  Glaser,	  ‘Prepare	  for	  Unintended	  
Consequences’	  [2012]	  Global	  Forecast	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  International	  Studies	  22	  
<http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_glaser.pdf>	  accessed	  19	  Feb	  2013;	  on	  the	  TTIP	  
see	  DB	  Research,	  ‘An	  Early	  Good	  Luck	  to	  the	  US-­‐EU	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement’	  Deutsche	  Bank	  
<http://www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?addmenu=false&document=PROD00000
00000301841&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_DE-­‐>	  accessed	  26	  Feb	  
2013.	  	  
22	  China	  joined	  the	  IMF	  in	  1945	  as	  one	  of	  its	  35	  original	  members.	  The	  PRC	  assumed	  
responsibility	  for	  relationship	  with	  the	  IMF	  in	  April	  1980.	  China’s	  voting	  power	  increased	  from	  
2.19	  to	  2.95%	  in	  February	  2001.	  It	  increased	  again	  substantially	  as	  part	  of	  IMF	  reforms	  effective	  
since	  3	  March	  2011.	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  [31	  March	  2013]	  	  ‘Factsheet	  IMF	  Quotas’	  
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm>	  accessed	  27	  May	  13;	  the	  IMF	  holds	  
annual	  Article	  IV	  consultations	  with	  China	  on	  economic	  developments	  and	  policy	  issue.	  ‘At	  a	  
Glance’	  [2004]	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  
Glance’.<http://www.imf.org/External/country/CHN/rr/glance.htm>	  accessed	  18	  Dec	  2010;	  an	  
increase	  in	  China’s	  voting	  share	  in	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  April	  2010	  puts	  her	  behind	  the	  US	  and	  
Japan	  but	  above	  Germany,	  Britain	  and	  France.	  ‘China	  Gains	  Clout	  In	  World	  Bank	  Vote	  Shift’	  	  [25	  
Apr	  2010]	  Reuters	  <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63O1RQ20100425>	  accessed	  19	  
Dec	  2010;	  China	  acceded	  to	  the	  WTO	  in	  2001.	  
23	  Leon	  Trakman,	  ‘Enter	  the	  Dragon	  IV:	  China’s	  Proliferating	  Investment	  Treaty	  Program’	  
<http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/deterrence/public-­‐v-­‐private-­‐enforcement/enter-­‐
dragon-­‐iv-­‐chinas-­‐proliferating-­‐investment-­‐treaty-­‐program>	  accessed	  27	  May	  2013.	  
24	  	  China’s	  BITs	  network	  now	  covers	  most	  continents	  including	  40	  out	  of	  the	  forty-­‐four	  Asian	  
countries,	  76%	  of	  European	  states,	  31	  out	  of	  fifty	  three	  African	  states,	  thirteen	  South	  American	  
states	  and	  Pacific	  states	  including	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  Norah	  Gallagher	  and	  Wenhua	  
Shan,	  Chinese	  Investment	  Treaties:	  Policies	  and	  Practice	  (Oxford	  International	  Arbitration	  Series	  
OUP	  2009)	  2,	  32.	  	  
15	  
	  
1.3%	  of	   the	  world’s	   total	   foreign	   investment,	  with	  Chinese	   companies	   lagging	  
behind	   Western	   multinationals	   in	   terms	   of	   international	   and	   managerial	  
experience,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  compete	  in	  high-­‐end	  industries.	  As	  of	  2013	  
China’s	  foreign	  assets	  are	  valued	  at	  US$	  70	  billion	  compared	  with	  the	  US$	  3.36	  
trillion	   of	   UK	   foreign	   assets.25	  According	   to	   the	   Economist	   2013	   report,	  while	  
the	  US	  economic	  position	  seems	  precarious,	  its	  global	  clout	  remains	  secure.26	  
It	  may	  be	   that	   the	  search	   for	  a	  clue	   to	   the	  China	   ‘threat’	   theory	  requires	  us	   to	  
move	   away	   from	   facts	   and	   statistics	   and	   step	   into	   the	   discursive	   sphere.27	  At	  
first	   blush,	   China’s	   quest	   for	   modernity	   seems	   to	   conform	   to	   Harvey’s	   two	  
phases	  pattern	  of	  capitalist	  accumulation.28	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  she	  appears	  to	  
reject	   capitalist	   logic,	   insists	   on	   preserving	   her	   socialist	   credentials,	   and	  
maintains	   that	   systemic	  equilibrium	  and	  a	  peaceful	   rise	   that	   turns	  away	   from	  
expansionary	   and	   hegemonic	   ambitions	   are	   within	   collective	   grasp.	   	   Despite	  
appearing	   at	   times	   to	   follow	   the	   Western	   path,	   China	   also	   asserts	   a	   new	  
paradigm	  of	  a	  harmonious	  world	  (HWP)	  that	   is	  premised	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  
different	  outcomes	  from	  those	  produced	  by	  her	  predecessors.29	  	  	  
At	  its	  core,	  the	  HWP	  is	  a	  statement	  about	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  globalisation	  
–	  its	  potential	  to	  produce	  peace	  and	  common	  prosperity,	   its	  reality	  of	  unequal	  
access	  to	  wealth	  and	  conflicts	  that	  are	  attendant	  on	  hegemonic	  ambitions,	  and	  
the	  way	   the	   latter	  may	  be	   rectified	   through	   correct	  management.	   	   It	   is	   in	   the	  
WHP’s	   promotion	   of	   pluralistic	   multipolarity	   that	   it	   is	   arguably	   at	   its	   most	  
systemically	  challenging.	  For	  multipolarity	  and	  diversity	  implicate	  a	  rejection	  of	  
the	  ‘one	  size	  fits	  all’	  US	  dominated	  neoliberal	  model	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  new	  design	  of	  
diffused	  power,	  numerous	  centers	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  ‘Assets	  of	  China’s	  Overseas	  Enterprises	  Exceed	  1	  Trillion	  USD’	  [1	  Nov	  2010]	  People’s	  Daily	  
Online	  <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/7183957.html>	  accessed	  28	  Dec	  
2010;Long	  Yongtu,	  talk	  to	  the	  China	  Association,	  London	  28	  June	  2013.	  
26	  S.C	  and	  D.H.,	  ‘Chinese	  and	  US	  GDP	  Forecasts	  Catching	  the	  Eagle’	  [2	  may	  2014]	  The	  Economist	  	  	  	  
27	  Jenny	  Clegg,	  China’s	  Global	  Strategy:	  Towards	  a	  Multipolar	  World	  (Pluto	  Press	  2009)	  4.	  
28	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  34,	  94-­‐95,	  125-­‐27.	  
29	  See	  for	  example	  Yongnian	  Zheng	  and	  Sow	  Keat	  Tok,	  ‘“Harmonious	  Society”	  and	  “Harmonious	  
World”:	  China’s	  Policy	  Discourse	  Under	  Hu	  Jintao’	  (2007)	  Briefing	  Series	  –	  Issue	  26	  The	  
University	  of	  Nottingham	  China	  Policy	  <Institute	  
http://nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-­‐26-­‐harmonious-­‐society-­‐and-­‐
harmonious-­‐world.pdf>	  accessed	  27	  Oct	  2012.	  
16	  
	  
particularities.	  It	  is	  of	  little	  surprise	  then	  that	  in	  2003,	  as	  the	  US	  was	  preparing	  
to	  invade	  Iraq,	  and	  China,	  Russia	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  drew	  closer	  in	  their	  
joint	  opposition	  to	  the	  proposed	  war,	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  hit	  back	  by	  describing	  
multipolarity	   as	   ‘a	   theory	   of	   rivalry‘.30	  A	   visit	   to	   Beijing	   in	   May	   2010	   led	  
Williamson	  to	  conclude	  that	  China	  would	  not	  embrace	  the	  US	  constituted	  world	  
order.	  Appended	  to	  this	  conclusion	  was	  the	  spectre	  of	  US	  interests	  at	  peril.31	  	  
Yet,	  the	  type	  of	  reaction	  evinced	  in	  Rice	  and	  Williamson’s	  statements	  does	  not	  
make	   for	  a	  complete	  picture.	   In	   this	  respect,	   the	  Western	  conceptualisation	  of	  
the	  HWP	  in	  Ramo’s	  Beijing	  Consensus	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  interest.	  At	  the	  time	  
of	  writing	  Ramo	  was	  advisor	  to	  Goldman	  Sachs	  and	  had	  his	  essay	  published	  by	  
the	  Tony	  Blair	  founded	  UK	  Foreign	  Policy	  Centre.	  32	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Beijing	  
Consensus	  came	  out	  of	  powerful	  neoliberal	  institutions	  and,	  indeed,	  is	  couched	  
in	  neoliberal	  discourses.33	  Nevertheless,	   it	   conveys	   a	   sympathetic	   approach	   to	  
the	  HWP.	  It	  may	  be,	  as	  argued	  by	  Dirlik,	  that	  the	  Beijing	  Consensus	  is	  primarily	  
a	   ‘sales	   gimmick’	   intended	   to	   promote	   China	   to	   the	  world	   and	   the	   concept	   of	  
development	   to	   the	   Chinese	   leadership. 34 	  However,	   it	   did	   gain	   currency,	  
including	   among	   developing	   countries.	  35	  	   It	   is	   thus	   sufficiently	   significant	   to	  
merit	   examination,	   particularly	   as	   it	   may	   be	   said	   to	   be	   expressing	  
conceptualisation	   of	   the	   HWP	   from	   a	   neoliberal	   perspective.	   The	   HWP,	  
including	  its	  interface	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  paradigm,	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  chapter	  5.	  
The	  following	  is	  therefore	  by	  way	  of	  a	  brief	  discussion	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  way	  
the	   Beijing	   Consensus’	   representation	   of	   the	   HWP	   relates	   to	   China’s	   own	  
statements.	  	  
The	   Beijing	   Consensus’	   conceptualisation	   of	   Chinese	   power	   as	   being	  
‘asymmetric’	  is	  absent	  from	  the	  HWP.	  Similarly	  absent	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  China	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  ibid	  (n	  27)	  3.	  
31	  Williamson,	  ibid	  (n	  3).	  	  
32	  Joshua	  Cooper	  Ramo,	  The	  Beijing	  Consensus	  (The	  Foreign	  Policy	  Centre	  2004).	  
33	  Arif	  Dirlik,	  ‘Beijing	  Consensus:	  Beijing	  “Gongshi.”	  Who	  Recognizes	  whom	  and	  to	  What	  End’	  
Globalization	  and	  Autonomy	  
<http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/position.jsp?index=PP_Dirlik_BeijingConsensus.xml>	  





a	   superpower.	   Both	   appear	   to	   be	   more	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   neoliberal	   lexicon.	  
Beyond	   this,	   the	   Beijing	   Consensus	   and	   the	   HWP	   nevertheless	   converge	   in	  
Ramo’s	  imaging	  of	  China	  as	  a	  rising	  power	  for	  whom	  peaceful	  multilateralism	  is	  
to	  replace	  military	  control	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  global	  arena.36	  This	  is	  also	  
confirmed	  for	  example,	  in	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  China’s	  former	  Foreign	  Minister,	  
Qian	  Qichen:	  ’even	  when	  China	  becomes	  a	  strong	  and	  developed	  country,	  it	  will	  
continue	   to	  refrain	   from	  aggressions	  and	  expansion’.37	  	  China,	  wrote	   the	   think	  
tank	  scholar,	  Wang	  Yizhou	  in	  1999	  ‘(…)	  will	  enter	  the	  twenty	  first	  century	  with	  
the	   image	   of	   a	   responsible	   big	   power.	  With	   the	   passing	   of	   time,	   the	   so-­‐called	  
‘China	  Threat	  Theory’	  will	  be	  defeated	  automatically’.38	  
The	  HWP	   and	   the	   Beijing	   Consensus	   also	  meet	   in	   their	   articulation	   of	   a	   shift	  
from	   past	   solidarity-­‐based	   collective	   resistance	   to	   emphasis	   on	   individual	  
national	   empowerment.	   Such	   emphasis	   is	   also	   found,	   for	   example,	   in	   Deng	  
Xiaoping’s	  January	  1980	  address	  regarding	  the	  tasks	  of	  opposing	  hegemony	  and	  
preserving	  world	  peace.	  ‘Everything’,	  he	  said,	  ‘depends	  on	  our	  doing	  the	  work	  in	  
our	   country	   well’.39	  	   Similarly,	   in	   Ramo’s	   Consensus	   the	   national	   domain	   is	  
where	  new	  ideas	  are	  to	  take	  root	  first.40	  	  The	  presumption	  is	  that	  success	  at	  the	  
state	  level	  will	  then	  evolve	  so	  as	  to	  reconstitute	  the	  interstate	  space.	  However,	  
the	  HWP	  supplements	  this	  chronological	  order	  with	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  for	  
global	   institutional	   reforms.41	  	   It	  does	  not	  altogether	   foreclose	   the	  proposition	  
that	  the	  predicaments	  to	  be	  addressed	  are	  structural	  rather	  than	  contingent,	  so	  
that	  the	  particular	  and	  individual	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  blossom	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
preceding	  collective	  action.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Ramo,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  37;	  Halper	  similarly	  considers	  that	  the	  Beijing	  Consensus	  does	  not	  purport	  
to	  challenge	  the	  West	  militarily	  or	  economically	  but	  conceptually	  and	  politically.	  Stefan	  Halper,	  
The	  Beijing	  Consensus:	  How	  the	  Chinese	  Authoritarian	  Model	  will	  Dominate	  the	  21st	  Century	  
(Basic	  Books	  2010)	  generally.	  	  
37	  Shirk,	  ibid	  (n	  16)	  106.	  
38	  ibid	  107.	  
39	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  (trs),	  ‘The	  Present	  Situation	  and	  the	  Task	  Before	  Us’	  in	  Selected	  Works	  of	  Deng	  
Xiaoping	  (1975-­‐1982)	  (University	  Press	  of	  the	  Pacific	  2001)	  225.	  
40	  Ramo,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  33.	  
41	  Hu	  Jintao,	  ‘Hold	  High	  the	  Great	  Banner	  of	  Socialism	  with	  Chinese	  Characteristics	  and	  Strive	  
for	  New	  Victories	  in	  Building	  a	  Moderately	  Prosperous	  Society’	  [15	  Oct	  2007]	  Report	  to	  the	  17th	  
National	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  17.	  
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>	  accessed	  22	  Aug	  2012	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Further	  by	  way	  of	  divergence,	  Ramo’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  consensus	  may	  be	  helpful	  
for	   the	   purpose	   of	   positing	   China’s	   paradigm	   as	   a	   counter	   discourse	   to	   the	  
Washington	  Consensus.	  However,	  in	  itself	  the	  word	  may	  be	  read	  as	  hegemonic	  
in	   that	   it	   encapsulates	   neoliberal	   delegitimisation	   of	   that	   which	   is	   conflictual	  
and	   diverges	   from	   a	   purported	   universal	   rationality.42	  	   By	   contrast,	   the	   HWP	  
opposes	  hegemony	  and	  upholds	  diversity.	  Indeed,	  Dirlik	  is	  correct	  to	  point	  out	  
that	  the	  concept	  of	  common	  recognition	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  Chinese	  equivalent	  
word	  (gongshi)	  is	  slightly	  different	  from	  ‘consensus’.43	  	  
When	  Ramo	  distinguished	  between	  the	  Beijing	  and	  the	  Washington	  Consensus	  
by	  reference	  to	  the	  citizen	  and	  the	  individual	  rather	  than	  corporate	  interests	  as	  
the	  starting	  point	  for	  policies,	  he	  may	  have	  overlooked	  an	  important	  if	  discreet	  
aspect	  of	   the	  HWP.44	  	  The	  concept	  of	   the	  citizen	   implicates	  a	   liberal	   individual	  
subjectivity.45	  	  Such	  subjectivity	  is	  eligible	  for	  citizenship	  but	  only	  when	  socially	  
prescribed	  criteria	  are	  met.46	  	  Its	  propensity	  is	  therefore	  towards	  exclusivity.	  In	  
socialist	   ideology	   individual	   citizenship	   is	   replaced	   with	   the	   collective	   and	  
inclusive	   subjectivity	   of	   the	  whole	   of	   the	   people	   in	   their	   social	   interactions.47	  	  
The	   two	   therefore	   articulate	   different	   and	   potentially	   conflictual	   notions.	  
Contrary	   to	   Ramo’s	   proposition	   that	   China’s	   paradigm	   begins	   with	   the	  
individual,48	  the	   language	  mostly	   used	   by	  Hu	   Jintao	   in	   his	   address	   to	   the	   17th	  
Party	  Congress	   is	   that	  of	  people.	   In	  other	  words,	   as	  with	   the	   interstate	  order,	  
the	   collective	   remains	   integral	   to	   the	   HWP.	   The	   possible	   implications	   of	   this	  
choice	  of	  words	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
Finally,	   the	   Beijing	   Consensus	   has	   little	   to	   say	   about	   China’s	   vision	   of	   an	  
emerging	  multipolar	  world	  order,	  notwithstanding	  the	  centrality	  of	   this	  vision	  
to	  the	  HWP.	  As	  seen	  above,	  it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  contestation	  is	  at	  
its	  most	  evident.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Dirlik,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  2.	  
43	  ibid	  
44	  Ramo,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  29-­‐30,	  60.	  
45	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein,	  After	  Liberalism	  (The	  New	  Press	  1995)	  78-­‐79.	  
46	  ibid;	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Empire	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  2000)	  50-­‐51.	  
47	  Wallerstein,	  ibid,	  (n	  45)	  80-­‐81.	  
48	  Ramo,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  55.	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In	  sum,	  the	  Beijing	  Consensus	  appears	  to	  fit	  within	  the	  camp	  of	  Shirk’s	  type	  of	  
responses	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  China,	  whereby	  the	  avoidance	  of	  confrontation	  is	  made	  
contingent	  on	  China’s	  otherness	  being	  made	  to	  fade	  away.	  It	  illustrates	  the	  way	  
neoliberal	  discourse	  may	  select	  and	  adjust	  HWP	  statements	  so	  as	  to	  abate	  the	  
paradigm’s	   conflictual	   potential,	   and	   thus	   enable	   its	   incorporation	   into	   the	  
neoliberal	  strategy.	  This	  interpretation	  is	  consistent	  with	  Foucault’s	  idea	  that,	  a	  
strategy	   can	   accommodate	   different	   discourses.	   They	   can	   ‘circulate	   without	  
changing	   their	   form	   to	   another,	   opposing	   strategy’.49	  	   Further,	   the	   HWP	   is	  
vulnerable	   to	   such	   manipulation,	   given	   its	   combination	   of	   convergence	   and	  
divergence,	   its	  attempt	  at	  being	  simultaneously	   in	  and	  out,	  and	  perhaps,	  more	  
significantly,	  the	  inconsistency	  in	  its	  interior.	  It	  is	  this	  that	  preoccupies	  much	  of	  
this	  work.	  
	  
Research	  Question	  Statement	  
This	   work	   seeks	   to	   examine	   the	   logic	   of	   capital	   and	   the	   way	   it	   frames	   the	  
development	   of	   Economic	   IL	   in	   a	   globalised	  world.	   In	   other	  words,	   it	   aims	   to	  
delve	   below	   the	   surface	   of	   contingencies	   in	   order	   to	   probe	   the	   capitalist	  
rationality,	  including	  its	  neoliberal	  progression,	  as	  it	  operates	  in	  the	  interiors	  of	  
systemic	   structuring,	   and	   reveals	   itself	   institutionally	   and	   discursively.	   The	  
examination	  is	  undertaken	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  a	  newcomer,	  
one	  who	   appears	   to	   ‘pick	   and	   choose’,	   accept	   some	   aspects	   of	   this	   rationality	  
and	  reject	  others,	  with	  resulting	  discursive	  and	  institutional	  inconsistency.	  	  The	  
work	   therefore	   questions	   what	   it	   is	   that	   this	   newcomer	   finally	   proffers:	   a	  
reproduction	  of	  a	  capitalist	   logic	  or	  an	  alternative	  model	  capable	  of	  displacing	  
it.	   Put	   differently,	   this	   is	   an	   enquiry	   into	   whether	   a	   discourse	   that	   partially	  
converges	   with	   and	   partially	   diverges	   from	   capitalist	   logic	   may	   nevertheless	  
amount	   to	   a	   counter	   discourse.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   internal	   inconsistency,	  might	   it	  
nevertheless	   produce	   an	   alternative	   whole,	   capable	   of	   interrupting	   the	  
discourse	  that	  currently	  dominates	  our	  thinking?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  M	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality:	  Introduction	  (Pantheon	  Books	  1990)	  101-­‐02.	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Attempts	  at	  understanding	  the	  significance	  of	  China’s	   interface	  with	  the	  world	  
order	  are	  not	  new	  to	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  country.	  Opinions	  differ.	  Focusing	  
on	  China’s	  advocacy	  of	  a	  new	  multipolar	  order,	  Clegg,	  for	  example,	  sees	  her	  rise	  
as	   heralding	   a	   new	   constellation	  of	   power	   and	   rationality.	  50	  Wang	   and	  Zheng	  
assert	   that	   the	   country	   indeed	   calls	   for	   a	   new	   order,	   yet	   she	   remains	   an	  
important	   connection	   in	   the	   chain	   of	   global	   capitalism.	   51 	  For	   Dirlik,	   the	  
purported	  Chinese	  model	  represents	  a	  rescue	  plan	  rather	  than	  an	  alternative	  to	  
a	  deleterious	  capitalist	  model.52	  From	  a	  political	  economy	  perspective,	  some	  go	  
as	   far	   as	   arguing	   that	   in	   reality	   China’s	   ascent	   plays	   a	   significant	   role	   in	  
maintaining	   systemic	   status	   quo.	   For	   Westra,	   for	   example,	   the	   country’s	  
incorporation	   into	   the	   global	   supply	   chains	   of	   low	   cost	   consumers’	   goods,	  
bondage	   like	   labour	   practices	   and	   investment	   of	   surplus	   capital	   in	  US	   dollars	  
facilitate	   the	   insidious	  ways	   by	  which	  Washington	   batters	  weaker	   economies	  
into	  submission	  and	  link	  China	  inextricably	  to	  existing	  global	  trends.53	  Similarly,	  
Li	   Mingqi	   postulates	   that,	   but	   for	   China’s	   contribution,	   the	   neoliberal	   project	  
would	   have	   been	   short-­‐lived. 54 	  Coming	   from	   a	   world-­‐system	   theoretical	  
standpoint,	  the	  question	  he	  raises	  is	  whether	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  is	  merely	  another	  
episode	   in	   the	   continuum	  of	   systemic	   cyclical	   renewals,	   or	  whether	   it	   signals	  
something	  fundamentally	  different.	  55	  	  
This	   is	   an	   important	   debate	   about	   what	   Wallerstein	   calls	   ‘the	   strategy	   of	  
transformation’.56	  	  As	  he	  points	  out,	  what	  we	  do	  in	  these	  times	  of	  transition	  will	  
determine	   whether	   the	   world-­‐system	   that	   will	   eventually	   emerge	   will	   be	   a	  
better	  one.57	  My	  hope	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  debate	  by	  offering	  a	  new	  approach;	  
one	  that	  searches	  for	  clues	  in	  the	  spheres	  of	  discourse	  and	  institutions.	  I	  seek	  to	  
unpack	   paradigms	   by	   observing	   their	   rendering	   into	   juridical	   rules.	   In	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Clegg,	  ibid	  (n	  27)	  generally.	  
51	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian	  
(eds)	  China	  and	  the	  New	  International	  Order	  (Routledge	  2008)	  6,10.	  
52	  Dirlik,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  2.  
53	  Richard	  Westra,	  The	  Evil	  Axis	  of	  Finance:	  the	  US-­‐Japan-­‐China	  Stranglehold	  of	  the	  Global	  
Future	  (Clarity	  Press	  2012)	  19,	  146-­‐73.	  
54	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  60-­‐72.	  
55	  ibid	  1.	  
56	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  45)	  4.	  
57	  ibid	  68.	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words,	  I	  look	  at	  paradigms	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  law,	  specifically	  Economic	  IL,	  
and	  within	  it,	  BITs.	  	  
Why	   is	   the	   law	   a	   suitable	   lens	   through	   which	   discursive	   surfaces	   may	   be	  
examined?	   The	   answer	   is	   threefold.	   First,	   law	   expresses	   capitalist	   rationality	  
with	   starkness	   rarely	   found	   elsewhere.	   In	   a	   way	   that	   leaves	   little	   room	   for	  
subterfuge,	  legal	  rules	  unmask	  the	  realities	  of	  where	  power	  lies,	  whose	  benefit	  
is	  being	  served	  and	  how	  this	  is	  achieved.	  By	  way	  of	  an	  example,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
BITs,	  Economic	  IL	  abandons	  principles	  such	  as	  ‘separate	  legal	  personality’	  and	  
‘limited	   liability’	   that	   lie	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   company	   law.	   These	   principles	   are	  
nevertheless	   retained	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   harm	   caused	   by	   TNCs	   to	   populations	  
and	  the	  environment.	  	  In	  all	  instances,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  protect	  corporations	  being	  
the	  leading	  actors	  within	  capital.58	  	  	  
Second,	   law	   and	   the	   HWP	   relate	   to	   each	   other	   by	   virtue	   of	   both	   being	  
Foucauldian	   discursive	   formations.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   each	   represents	   a	   body	   of	  
language,	  concepts	  and	  meanings.59	  	  Third,	  law	  is	  also	  an	  institution.	  Indeed	  IL	  
is	  arguably	  ‘the	  critical	  institution	  of	  an	  international	  society	  and	  the	  mark	  that	  
relations	   among	   states	   embody	   shared	   rules	   and	   norms’.	  60As	   such	   it	   fulfils	  
three	   main	   functions:	   it	   provides	   the	   rules	   that	   translate	   the	   discourse	   into	  
practice,	   locks	   in	   norms	   so	   that	   they	   are	  not	   easily	   deviated	   from	  and,	   finally	  
legitimises	  the	  power	  structures	  that	  formulated	  the	  discourse	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
It	   follows	   that	   paradigm	   and	   law	   should	   form	   a	   single	   and	   consistent	  
governmental	   organism,	   a	   Foucauldian	   eco-­‐political-­‐juridical	   ensemble	   of	  
mutual	  legitimisation.61	  	  But	  is	  this	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  HWP?	  	  
The	  HWP’s	  high	  level	  of	  linguistic	  abstraction,	  its	  fusion	  of	  indigenous	  logic	  with	  
imported	   ideas,	   and	   its	   temporal	   proximity	   combine	   to	   induce	   uncertainty.	   	   I	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conclude	  that,	  as	  yet,	  it	  may	  be	  too	  early,	  indeed	  unhelpful	  to	  draw	  conclusions.	  
However,	   given	   the	   specificity	   of	   capitalist/neoliberal	   social	   relations,	   the	  
compulsion	  for	  expansion	  and	  power	  accumulation	  that	  is	  attendant	  on	  its	  logic	  
and	  the	  fault	  line	  that	  problematizes	  the	  HWP,	  at	  this	  juncture	  the	  possibility	  of	  
an	   interruption	  seems	  unlikely.	  Furthermore,	  China’s	  participation	   in	   the	  BITs	  
network	   indicates	   an	   engagement	  with	   the	   existing	   order,	   a	  willingness	   to	   be	  
institutionally	   locked	   in	   in	   a	   way	   that	   may	   ultimately	   override	   the	   country’s	  
commitment	   to	  divergence.	  As	  will	   be	   seen	   in	   chapter	  4,	   in	  both	  China’s	  BITs	  
program	   and	   the	   HWP	   a	   pattern	   may	   be	   observed,	   one	   that	   combines	   a	  
trajectory	   towards	   the	   absorption	   of	   Western	   practices	   with	   preservation	   of	  
diversity.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   they	  appear	   to	  display	  unity.	  However,	   it	   is	  a	  
unity	  that	  is	  founded	  on	  an	  internal	  contradiction.	  Thus,	  the	  HWP	  may	  prove	  a	  
different	   discourse	   that	   nevertheless	   remains	   within	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	  
same	  strategy.	  
Since	   I	   undertake	   this	   enquiry	   with	   one	   eye	   to	   the	   future,	   two	   points	   merit	  
highlighting.	  First,	   I	  do	  not	  propose	   to	  engage	   in	  predictions.	   In	   this,	   I	   seek	   to	  
avoid	   a	   Kahneman	   type	   illusion	   that	   knowledge	   of	   the	   past	   also	   makes	   the	  
future	  knowable.	  62	  Second,	  while	  conclusions	  are	  drawn,	  they	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  
articulate	   any	   final	   word	   on	   the	   subject.	   Indeed,	   temporal	   proximity	   and	   the	  
complexity	   of	   the	   processes	   at	   work	  mean	   that	   a	   claim	   to	   incontrovertibility	  
would	  be	  misplaced.	  	  
	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  and	  Methodology	  
The	  paradigms	  under	  examination	  are	  those	  of	  neoliberalism	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  
and	  the	  HWP	  on	  the	  other.	  The	   juridical	  structure	  selected	   is	   that	  of	  BITs.	   	  As	  
seen	  in	  the	  introductory	  section	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  BITs	  are	  rooted	  in	  
the	   long-­‐term	   development	   of	   capitalism	   and	   its	   dynamic.	   They	   provide	   the	  
rules	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  its	  neoliberal	  progression.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  HWP	  is	  the	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product	  of	  rapturous	  historical	  processes.	  It	  articulates	  the	  indigenous	  heritage	  
of	   Confucian	   philosophy	   and	   an	   ancient	   tributary	   system,	   one	   that	   has	  
nevertheless	  become	  intermingled	  with	  internalised	  exogenous	  discourse.	  	  Low	  
level	  of	  consistency	  with	  BITs	  should	  thus	  come	  as	  no	  surprise.	  We	  find	  it,	   for	  
example,	   in	   HWP	   principles	   such	   as	   sovereignty,	   civilizational	   and	  
developmental	  diversity,	  global	  co-­‐operation,	  localism	  and	  common	  prosperity,	  
all	   of	  which	   fits	   ill	   with	   BITs’	   impulses	   for	   sovereignty	   reduction,	   uniformity,	  
globalised	   competition	   and	   developmental	   disparities.	   This	   fault	   line	   of	  
incongruence	  in	  the	  interiors	  of	  the	  HWP	  may	  provide	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  shape	  
of	  things	  to	  come.	  	  
	  
In	  what	  follows	  I	  elucidate	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  selection.	  The	  argument	  for	  the	  
choice	  of	  BITs	  was	  alluded	  to	  above,	  namely	  that	  being	  a	  juridical	  structure	  they	  
are	   both	   a	   discourse	   and	   an	   institution.	   As	   a	   discourse	   they	   voice	   capitalist	  
rationality	  in	  its	  neoliberal	  progression.	  As	  an	  institution	  they	  provide	  rules	  and	  
codes	  of	  behaviour	  for	  its	  practice.	  What	  makes	  BITs	  of	  particular	  interest	  is	  the	  
fact	   they	   operate	   at	   both	   the	   national	   and	   international	   levels.	   Similarly,	   they	  
straddle	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  domains.	  They	  mesh	  the	  national	  with	  the	  
international	   and	   the	   public	   with	   the	   private	   in	   a	   way	   that	   dispenses	   with	  
hitherto	   established	   boundaries.	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	   they	   represent	   a	  
global	   institution	   that	   nevertheless	   operates	   in	   the	   national	   sphere.	  63	  Their	  
expression	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   logic	   of	   enhanced	   private	   authority	   through	  
statalisation	   of	   private	   capital	   and	   privatisation	   of	   the	   state	   is	   not	   only	  
linguistic,	  but	  also	  structural.	  
	  	  	  	  
There	  are	  three	  main	  reasons	  why	  China	  was	  selected.	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  
her	   empowerment.	   Her	   economic	   rise	   is	   hardly	   controversial	   and	   amply	  
recorded.	  Her	  outward	  direct	   investment	  (ODI)	  –	  of	  particular	   interest	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	   this	  work	   -­‐	  may	  be	   still	   relatively	   small.	  However,	   its	   trajectory	   is	  
significant.	  Chinese	  ODI	  has	  grown	  fourteen	  folds	  between	  2003	  and	  2009,	  with	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expansion	  continuing	  throughout	  2009	  despite	  overall	  decrease	  in	  total	  ODI	  of	  
over	  30%	  in	  that	  year.64	  	  With	  eight	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  (M&As)	  and	  nine	  
greenfield-­‐investments	   in	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2013,	   Chinese	   ODI	   in	   the	   US	   is	  
strengthening.65	  	  Economic	  empowerment	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  move	  up	  the	  
hierarchical	  ladder	  of	  the	  interstate	  system	  and	  a	  greater	  proximity	  to	  its	  core.	  
This	  move	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  possibility	  of	  new	  capacities	  and	  outcomes.	  	  
Second,	   China	   straddles	   both	   the	   camp	   of	   the	   developed	   and	   the	   developing.	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  purely	  economic	  measurements,	  she	  is	  still	  developing	  
and	  may	   indeed	   be	   said	   to	   be	   a	   poor	   country.66	  However,	   if,	   as	   suggested	   by	  
world-­‐system	  analysts	  such	  as	  Wallerstein	  and	  Hardt	  and	  Negri,	  development	  is	  
to	   be	   measured	   by	   a	   country’s	   place	   within	   the	   capitalist	   world-­‐system’s	  
hierarchy,	  she	  is	  fast	  joining	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  developed.67	  	  In	  other	  words,	  she	  
has	   a	   foot	   in	   each	   camp	   with	   access	   to	   different	   landscapes	   of	   interests	   and	  
concerns.	   	   Third,	   China	   experienced	   being	   colonised.	   Her	   incorporation	   into	  
modernity	  was	  violent.	  She	   thus	  brings	   to	   the	   table	   the	  perspective	  of	  a	  semi-­‐
colony’s	  humiliation,	  a	  perspective	  that	  continues	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  her	  
responses,	  her	  discourse	  and	  her	  outwards	  projections.	  	  
	  
This	  thematic	  triangulation	  is	  constructed	  using	  similarly	  triangular	  theoretical	  
scaffoldings	  that	  comprise	  systems	  and	  their	  social	  structures,	  agency,	  and	  the	  
power	  they	  mediate.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Capitalist	  System	  
The	   word	   ‘system’	   refers	   to	   a	   set	   of	   things	   working	   together	   as	   part	   of	   an	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interconnected	  network.68	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  an	  integrated	  unitary	  whole	  that	  
is	   made	   up	   of	   interconnected	   components,	   and	   is	   delineated	   by	   spatial	   and	  
temporal	   boundaries.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   this	   work,	   the	   unitary	   whole	   is	  
capitalism	  -­‐	  a	  network	  of	  human	  relationships	  that	  takes	  the	  ‘fantastic’	  form	  of	  
relations	  between	  ‘things’.	  69	  It	  has	  its	  own	  singular	  and	  specific	  logic.	  Such	  logic	  
is	  expressed	  in	  hierarchical	  structures	  that	  are	  characterised	  by	  the	  dominance	  
of	  the	  economic	  instance	  over	  the	  political	  and	  ideological	  one,	  the	  primacy	  of	  
the	  market	   as	   a	   compulsion	   and	   a	  mediator	   of	   truths,	   and	   the	   imperatives	   of	  
constitutive	  rules	  of	  competition	  and	  profit	  maximisation.	  The	  structures’	  basic	  
objective	   is	   the	   endless	   accumulation	   of	   capital	   and	   its	   self-­‐expansion.	  70	  This	  
focus	  on	  the	  essence	  of	  capitalism	  does	  not	  exclude	  the	  plurality	  of	   forms	  and	  
typologies	   found	   in	   the	   literature.	  71	  It	   merely	   proposes	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  
overarching	   logic	   and	   certain	   prerequisites	   for	   a	   system	   to	   qualify	   as	  
capitalistic.	  
Capitalism’s	   temporal	   and	  material	   beginnings,	   its	   substance	   and,	   indeed,	   the	  
mere	   fact	  of	   its	  existence,	  are	  shrouded	   in	  controversy.	  Frank	  doubts	  whether	  
there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  capitalism	  at	  all.72	  In	  adopting	  the	  view	  of	  capitalism	  as	  
canvassed	   here	   namely,	   a	   delineated	   system	   in	   possession	   of	   a	   distinct	  
rationality,	   beginnings	   and	   therefore	   a	   possible	   end,	   I	   follow	   scholars	   such	   as	  
Wood	  and	  Amin.	  For	  Amin,	  capitalism	  is	  exclusive	  to	  modernity	  and	  was	  absent	  
from	  the	  earlier,	   tributary	  order.	   In	   issue	   is	   the	  specificity	  of	  appropriation	  by	  
economic	  means.	  The	  difference	  associated	  with	  such	  specificity,	  he	  argues,	   is	  
‘qualitative	   and	   decisive’.73 	  This	   view	   departs	   from	   what	   Wood	   terms	   the	  
‘commercialization	  model’	  according	  to	  which	  capitalist	   impulses	  were	  always	  
there,	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   human	   essence	   -­‐	   an	   eternal	   law	   of	   nature	   that	  
stretches	   back	   to	   infinity	   and	   was	   merely	   prevented	   by	   political	   constraints	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  Press	  2011)	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71	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  63)	  11-­‐31.	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Press	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from	  revealing	  itself	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  economic	  actors	  and	  
the	   free	   expression	   of	   economic	   rationality.74	  The	  model	   assumes	   varied	   and	  
refined	   theoretical	   forms,	  down	  to	  Polanyi.	  Polanyi	  was	  exceptional	   in	   that	  he	  
did	   acknowledge	   the	   capitalist	   reversal	   of	   markets’	   role	   from	   secondary	   to	  
primary,	   and	   took	   issue	   with	   the	   belief	   in	   ‘spontaneous	   progress’.	   75	  
Nevertheless,	  he	  too	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  a	  market	  society	  as	  both	  inevitable	  
and	   natural.76	  Given	   the	   controversy	   over	   how	   capitalism	   came	   to	   be,	   it	   is	  
hardly	   surprising	   that	   its	   temporal	   beginnings	   are	   similarly	   polemical.	   They	  
vary	  from	  the	  early	  16th	  to	  the	  19th	  century.77	  Arrighi	  considers	  the	  city-­‐state	  of	  
Venice	   a	   prototype	   of	   a	   capitalist	   formation	   within	   a	   medieval	   system.78	  My	  
focus	   is	  on	   the	  18th	  and	  19th	  centuries	  as	  a	   fitting	   temporal	   framework	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  this	  discussion.	  For	  it	  was	  around	  this	  time	  that	  capitalism	  matured	  
into	   its	   industrialised	   form.	  79	  It	   was	   also	   the	   moment	   when	   Polanyi’s	   ‘Great	  
Transformation’	   collided	   with	   China’s	   ‘Great	   Divergence’,	   and	   propelled	   the	  
country	   via	   a	   ‘century	   of	   humiliation’	   towards	   her	   own	   rupture:80	  from	   the	  
centre	   to	   the	   periphery	   of	   the	   world-­‐system,	   from	   a	   thriving	   and	   innovative	  
civilization	   to	   the	   ‘sick	  man	  of	  East	  Asia’	   and	   from	  a	  diffuser	   to	   a	   recipient	  of	  
norms	  and	  systemic	  structures.	  81	  
	  
Two	   points	  merit	   highlighting.	   First,	   in	   this	  work	   capitalism	   is	   understood	   as	  
implicating	  a	  break	  with	  earlier	  systems	  of	  social	  relations,	  a	  qualitative	  rupture	  
rather	   than	   merely	   a	   quantitative	   increment.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   a	  
qualitative	  rupture	  that	  it	  interrupts	  quantitative	  processes.	  It	  operates	  so	  as	  to	  
inject	  a	  new	  rationality	  into	  the	  motion	  of	  accumulative	  development	  and	  divert	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it	   in	   a	   new	   direction.	   As	   will	   be	   seen	   later,	   the	   capitalist	   rupture	   involved	   a	  
transformation	  of	  structures,	  their	  agents	  and	  the	  power	  they	  mediate.	  Second,	  
the	   break	  was	   neither	   unavoidable	   nor	   natural.	   Systemic	   similarities	   and	   the	  
operation	  in	  China	  between	  the	  16th	  and	  19th	  centuries	  of	  what	  both	  Arrighi	  and	  
Wong	  identify	  as	  Smithian	  processes	  did	  not	  produce	  the	  same	  developmental	  
trajectory	   as	   that	   of	   Europe.	  82	  Rather,	   the	   country	   was	   forcibly	   incorporated	  
into	   the	   capitalist	   order.	   	   In	   contrast,	   in	   16th	   century	   England,	   new	   property	  
relations	   came	   into	  being	   through	  a	   co-­‐constitutive	  dynamic	   that	   engaged	   the	  
state,	  landlords	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  economic	  powers.83	  	  
	  
The	   evolution	   of	   capitalism	   into	   an	   expansive	   capitalist	   world-­‐system	   of	  
accumulation	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  spatial	  reconstitution	  of	  the	  world,	  
and	  its	  partitioning	  into	  nation-­‐states.84	  Yet,	  the	  relationship	  between	  systemic	  
agents	  –	  states	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  actors	  of	  capital	  on	  the	  other	  -­‐	  was	  to	  prove	  
an	   uneasy	   one.	   The	   two	   grew	   together.	   Actors	   of	   capital	   did	   and	   continue	   to	  
turn	  to	  the	  state	  for	  assistance	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  global	  space	  so	  as	  to	  
reduce	   excessive	   competition	   and	   remove	   national	   impediments	   to	   their	  
expansion.	   Yet,	   simultaneously	   they	   also	   resisted	   and	   continue	   to	   resist	   the	  
extension	  of	  states’	  involvement.85	  	  
	  
BITs	  exemplify	  this	  combination	  of	  alliance	  and	  contradictions	  that	  inhabits	  the	  
state-­‐capital	   binary.	   	   They	   provide	   Economic	   IL’s	   rules	   for	   the	   penetration	   of	  
foreign	   investment	   into	   the	   national	   space.	   These	   rules	   buttress	   a	   vision	   of	   a	  
global	   spatial	   totality,	   one	   that	   is	   governed	   by	   transnational	   norms,	   and	   in	  
which	   capital	   can	   be	  mobile	   and	   unhindered	   by	   the	   permutations	   that	   reside	  
within	   territorial	   boundaries.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   state’s	   assistance	   is	   enlisted,	  
notwithstanding	   that	   at	   the	   same	   time	   the	   state	   is	   also	   required	   to	   accept	   a	  
reduction	   in	   its	  sovereignty	  and	  regulatory	  space.	  Such	  reduction	   implicates	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  R.	  Bin	  Wong,	  China	  Transformed:	  Historical	  Change	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  European	  Experience	  
(Cornell	  University	  Press	  1997)	  15,17-­‐22;	  Giovanni	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  (Academic	  
Press	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renouncement	   of	   difference,	   so	   as	   to	   enhance	   the	   normative	   uniformity	  
necessary	   for	   capital’s	   smooth	   cross-­‐border	   expansion.	   Anghie’s	   ‘dynamic	   of	  
difference’	  alludes	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  annihilating	  cultural	  divergence.86	  	  However,	  IL	  
is	  included	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  culture.	  Indeed,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  difference	  is	  
examined	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   IL	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   colonial	  
encounter.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  BITs	  and	  ICSID	  are	  but	  a	  chapter,	  the	  logical	  
next	   step	   in	   a	   centuries-­‐old	   process	   of	   reconstitution	   which,	   though	  
evolutionary	   in	   terms	  of	  narrative	   and	  material	   realisation,	   is	   also	  marked	  by	  
the	   constancy	   of	   its	   perspective	   and	   aim	   -­‐	   that	   of	   ‘normalising	   the	   aberrant	  
society’	  by	  the	  universal	  institutionalisation	  of	  Westerncentric	  IL.87	  	  
With	   endless	   capital	   accumulation	   as	   the	   primary	   and	   arguably	   the	   only	  
objective	   of	   economic	   activity,	   the	   capitalist	   world-­‐system	   ‘can	   and	   must	  
constantly	  expand	  in	  ways	  and	  degrees	  unlike	  any	  other	  social	  form’.88	  	  Its	  logic	  
being	   different,	   the	   logic	   of	   its	   expansion	   is	   equally	   novel.	   In	   what	   Arrighi	  
conceptualises	  as	  non-­‐capitalist	  territorial	  logic,	  wealth	  is	  either	  the	  means	  for,	  
or	   the	  by-­‐product	   of	   expansion.	   	  By	   contrast,	   in	   the	   capitalist	   logic,	   territorial	  
acquisitions	   are	   the	   means	   and	   by-­‐product	   of	   the	   dictates	   of	   capital	  
accumulation.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  purpose	   is	  not	   size,	   but	   rather	   content,	   e.g.	  
resources	  and	  markets.89	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  territory	  must	  also	  be	  prized	  open	  
and	   transformed	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	  unfettered	   access.90	  	   Prizing	  open	   requires	   a	  
design	   –	   one	   of	   Doyle’s	   warning	   signs	   of	   imperial	   power.91	  It	   also	   requires	  
control	  that	  is	  ideally	  informal	  –	  e.g.	  through	  trade	  –	  so	  as	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  
of	   disruptive	   resistance. 92 	  To	   this	   IL	   adds	   a	   layer	   of	   legitimisation	   by	  
transcribing	  incursions	  into	  the	  language	  of	  rules	  of	  universalised	  normativity.	  
And	   so,	   as	   capitalism	   began	   its	   expansion	   into	   new	   territories,	   jurists	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correspondingly	   began	   to	   assert	   IL	   protection	   for	   the	   rights	   of	   travelling	   and	  
trading	   aliens.93	  With	   the	   dissemination	   of	   European	   sovereignty	   to	   formerly	  
colonised	   territories,	   BITs	   emerged	   as	   part	   of	   a	   corporations-­‐driven	   tactical	  
response	   to	   the	   threat,	   which	   former	   colonised	   countries’	   newly	   found	  
sovereignty	   posed	   to	   their	   traditional	   arrangements	   with	   colonial	  
governments.94 	  	   Yet,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   lack	   of	   reciprocity	   and	   their	  
treatment	  of	  consent	  as	  divorced	  from	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  was	  given,	  
BITs	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   continuation	   of,	   rather	   than	   a	   break	   from	   colonial	  
unequal	  treaties.	  Such	  continuation,	  however,	  is	  evolutionary.	  Statements	  about	  
the	   civilizing	  mission	  were	   transformed	   into	   a	   discourse	   of	   development.	   For	  
BITs	   signaled	   a	   conceptual	   shift	   from	   IL’s	   traditional	   function	   of	   protecting	  
aliens	   and	   their	   property	   to	   a	   notion	   of	   protection	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
development.95	  	   In	   the	  sphere	  of	  political	  economy,	  BITs	  were	   instrumental	   in	  
bringing	  about	  fragmentation	  of	  Third	  World	  postcolonial	  solidarity.	  They	  were	  
a	  fitting	  tool	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  imperial	  design	  since,	  as	  previously	  
noted,	  one	  of	  their	  effects	  is	  to	  turn	  states	  into	  competitive	  entities.	  Thereafter,	  
they	  continued	  to	  spread	  as	  part	  of	   ‘new	  imperialism’s	  aim	  to	  bring	  the	  whole	  
surface	  of	  the	  world	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  market-­‐based	  economic	  imperatives. 	  
	  
	  
Agency	  and	  Power	  
	  
Let	   me	   start	   with	   a	   caveat.	   In	   law,	   agency	   refers	   to	   the	   acts	   of	   a	   person	  
authorised	  by	  another,	  the	  principal,	  to	  act	  on	  her	  behalf.	  This	  definition	  has	  a	  
role	   to	   play	   in	   the	   interplay	   between	   structures	   (principal)	   and	   the	  
institutions/organisations	   (agents)	   that	   interpret	   structures	   to	  
produce/reproduce	  social	  reality.	  However,	  what	  follows	  involves	  social	  science	  
and	  philosophical	  theories	  that	  are	  highly	  complex,	  polemical	  and	  form	  part	  of	  a	  
discipline	  that	  is	  outside	  my	  area	  of	  expertise.	  I	  hope	  I	  have	  done	  them	  justice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Andrew	  Newcombe	  and	  Louis	  Paradell,	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  Investment	  Treaties:	  Standards	  of	  
Treatment	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2009)	  4.	  	  
94	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  86)	  226-­‐43.	  




The	  developments	  alluded	  to	  above	  may	  be	  theorised	  as	  taking	  place	  within	  a	  
productive	  space	  that	  may	  be	  national	  or	  international	  and	  comprises	  a	  duality	  
of	  social	  structures	  and	  agents.	  Structures	  are	  internal	  relationships	  that	  come	  
into	   being	   by	   reference	   to	   structural	   positions.96	  Duality	   is	   double	   faceted.	   It	  
alludes	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  space	  is	  divided	  between	  structures	  and	  agents,	  as	  well	  
as	   to	   the	   dynamic	   by	   which	   the	   two,	   including	   their	   constitutive	   elements	  
engage	   with	   each	   other.	   The	   agents	   internalise	   social	   structures,	   and	   then	  
externalise	   them	   in	   the	   form	   of	   interpretive	   social	   actions.	   Conversely,	   the	  
structures	   contain	   the	   agents	   and/or	   are	   the	   product	   of	   their	   past	   actions.	   In	  
other	  words,	   agents	   are	   a	  medium	   through	  which	   structures	   pass,	   to	   become	  
social	  actions	   that	  may	   in	   turn	  be	   incorporated	  back	   into	  structures.	  They	  are	  
simultaneously	   the	   outcome	   of	   internalised	   structures	   and	   occupy	   a	   position	  
within	  them.97	  Thus,	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  two	  are	  fluid,	  with	  agents	  and	  
structures	   traveling	   back	   and	   forth	   in	   a	   co-­‐constitutive,	   circular,	   evolutionary	  
flow,	  the	  movement	  of	  which	  and	  its	  direction	  is	  not	  easily	  deciphered.	  Agents	  
construct	   structures	   through	   their	   actions,	   but	   are	   also	   constructed	   by	   them.	  
They	  are	  both	  autonomous	  and	  determined.	  In	  other	  words,	  ‘structures	  cannot	  
(re)	  produce	  themselves	  in	  abstraction	  from	  agency;	  nor	  is	  agency	  reducible	  to	  
structural	  determination’.98	  	  
	  
	  The	   space	   is	   productive	   because	   the	   end	   result	   is	   an	   order	   that	   may	   be	  
evolutionary,	  but	   in	  which	   structures	   and	  agents,	   including	   their	   foundational	  
power	   allocation	   and	   interpretations	   are	   stable.	   Occasionally,	   the	   order	  
experiences	   a	   rupture,	   such	   as	   the	   capitalist	   one	   and	   China’s	   Great	  
Transformation.	   The	   rupture	   engenders	   what	   Foucault	   refers	   to	   as	  
‘displacements	   and	   transformations	   of	   concepts’. 99 	  	   In	   other	   words,	   it	  
represents	  a	  change	  in	  structural	  positions,	  and	  a	  corresponding	  re-­‐formulation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Mark	  Rupert,	  ‘Class	  powers	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  global	  governance’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  
(n	  4)	  209;	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  19.	  
97	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Society:	  Outline	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Structuration	  (Polity	  
Press	  1984)	  17and	  generally;	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  Central	  Problem	  in	  Social	  Theory:	  Action,	  
Structure	  and	  Contradiction	  in	  Social	  Analysis	  (University	  of	  California	  Press	  1979)	  5;	  Rupert,	  
ibid	  (n	  96).	  
98	  Rupert,	  ibid	  (n	  96).	  
99	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  59)	  4-­‐5.	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of	   discourse.	   So,	   for	   example,	   the	   capitalist	   break	   implicated	   elevation	   in	   the	  
structural	   position	   of	   markets	   from	   subordination	   to	   a	   site	   of	   command,	  
resulting	   in	   their	  discursive	   re-­‐conceptualisation.	   	  The	  order	  occasionally	  also	  
falls	  into	  chaos,	  as	  in	  Arrighi’s	  periods	  of	  systemic	  chaos.	  100	  	  	  
	  
At	   the	   international	   level	   it	   is	  embodied	   in	  a	  world-­‐system,	  which	  Wallerstein	  
conceptualises	   as	   a	   hierarchical	   interstate	   arrangement	   that	   comprises	   core,	  
semi-­‐peripheral	   and	   peripheral	   countries.	   Their	   relationship	   is	   one	   of	   power	  
and	   takes	   place	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   structures	   of	   dominance	   and	  
competitive	   actualisation.	   Core	   states	   safeguard	   their	   dominance.	   Semi-­‐
peripheral	   states	  aspire	   to	   the	   core	  and	   seek	   to	  ensure	   that,	   at	   the	  very	   least,	  
they	   do	   not	   slip	   down	   the	   ladder.	   Broadly,	   peripheral	   states	   internalise	  
structures	   and	   actions	   externalised	   by	   core	   states.101	  In	   an	   imperial	   context	  
such	  actions	  will	  form	  part	  of	  a	  design	  that	  in	  turn	  provokes	  resistance.102	  
	  
In	   this	   structures-­‐agents	   duality,	   agents	   represent	   human	   action	   that	   takes	  
place	  in	  a	  social,	  structural	  context.103	  They	  are	  composed	  of	  organisations	  and	  
institutions	  that	  may	  be	  formal	  or	   informal,	  depending	  on	  their	  organisational	  
level.	  Of	  these,	  states	  and	  transnational	  institutions/organisations,	  TNCs	  (being	  
organisations	  within	   the	   institution	  of	   capital)	   and	   the	   law,	   including	   IL,	   form	  
the	   main	   interest	   of	   this	   work.	   Other	   actors	   include	   think	   tanks,	   academia,	  
transnational	   elites	   and	   people.	   There	   are	   different	   views	   as	   to	   the	   way	   the	  
dynamic	  of	  agents’	  engagement	  with	  each	  other	  is	  mediated.	  They	  range	  from	  a	  
methodology	  of	  consequences	  with	  its	  games	  theory	  and	  neo-­‐classical	  economy,	  
to	  Beck’s	  	  ‘logic	  of	  the	  rule	  change’	  104	  and	  to	  Krasner’s	  logic	  of	  appropriateness,	  
pursuant	   to	   which	   political	   actions	   are	   the	   product	   of	   power,	   identities	   and	  
roles.	  These	  engender	  appropriate	  behaviour	  in	  given	  situations.105	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  generally.	  
101	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  67)	  generally.	  
102	  Doyle,	  ibid	  (91)	  22-­‐30.	  
103	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  13.	  
104	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  3	  
105	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  3;	  Stephen	  D	  Krasner,	  ‘State	  Power	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  International	  Trade’	  
in	  Jeffry	  A.	  Friedman	  and	  David	  A.	  Lake	  (eds),	  International	  Political	  Economy:	  Perspectives	  on	  
Global	  Power	  and	  Wealth	  (Routledge	  2000)	  19-­‐36.	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Power	  is	  mediated	  in	  a	  multiplicity	  of	   forms,	   is	  spatially	  mobile	  and	  not	  easily	  
contained. 106 	  Simply	   defined,	   it	   is	   the	   capacity	   for	   action	   that	   produces	  
outcomes.	  Such	  capacity	  is	  socially	  structured,	  operates	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  socially	  
structured	   relations	   and	   is	   exercised	   by	   their	   human	   participants.107 	  This	  
feature	  of	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  behaviour	  of	  others	  meets	  the	  legal	  approach	  
to	  power,	  namely	  the	  differential	  that	  exists	  in	  the	  parties’	  bargaining	  position,	  
which	  shapes	  the	  outcome	  of	  their	  negotiations.	  Thus,	  BITs	  are	  said	  to	  be	  power	  
instruments	  because	   the	  parties’	   capacities	   to	  dictate	   terms	  and	  enforce	   them	  
are	   unequal.	   The	   treaties	   are	   thus	   formally	   symmetric	   and	   balanced	   but	  
substantively	  imbalanced	  and	  asymmetric.108	  
This	  is	  a	  thesis	  about	  law	  and	  so,	  its	  theoretical	  framework	  is	  informed	  by	  this	  
basic	   approach	   to	   power.	   However,	   it	   also	   seeks	   to	   socially	   and	   politically	  
contextualise	  law,	  which	  necessitates	  bringing	  in	  other	  perspectives.	  For	  power	  
may	   not	   be	   limited	   to	   the	   ability	   to	   influence	   others.	   It	  may	   also	   refer	   to	   the	  
actors’	   capacities	   to	   produce	   effects	   that	   determine	   their	   own	   circumstances	  
and	   identity.109	  In	   both	   instances,	   power	   is	   mediated	   in	   and	   through	   social	  
relations.	   Agents	   and	   structures	   convey	   to	   each	   other	   the	   boundaries	   of	  
legitimacy	   and	   the	   hierarchical	   order,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   normative	   content	   of	  
concepts,	  identities	  and	  strategies.	  Again,	  the	  dynamic	  is	  dual	  and	  generative.	  At	  
the	   level	   of	   institutions,	   the	   main	   containers	   of	   power	   are	   transnational	  
institutions,	   states	   and	   capital.	   In	   terms	   of	   their	  mutual	   engagement,	   as	   seen	  
above,	   states	   and	   capital	   form	   a	   dialectical	   binary.	   Capital	   harnesses	   states’	  
assistance,	  but	  at	   the	   same	   time	  develops	   strategies	   for	   the	   reduction	  of	   their	  
ability	  to	  mediate	  power.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  regime,	  TNCs	  rely on	  
core	   states	   to	   convey	   power	   so	   as	   to	   exert	   control	   over	   the	  world	   interstate	  
system	   and	   launch	   it	   on	   a	   market-­‐centered,	   pro-­‐corporate	   program	   of	  
privatization	   and	   commodification.110	  	   However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Mills,	  ibid	  (n	  59)	  34.	  
107	  Jeffrey	  Isaac,	  Power	  and	  Marxist	  Theory:	  A	  Realist	  View	  (Cornell	  University	  1987)	  7,9.	  
108	  M	  Sornarajah,	  The	  International	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  (3rd	  edn,	  CUP	  2010)	  77.	  
109	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  3.	  
110	  On	  the	  transnational	  nature	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  state	  see	  David	  Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  
Neoliberalism	  (OUP	  2005)	  79-­‐81.	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seek	  to	  break	  out	  of	  the	  state	  ‘institutional	  box’	  and	  thereby	  put	  its	  survival	  at	  
risk.	  111	  	  
Particularly	  helpful	  to	  the	  theorization	  of	  the	  different	  ways	  by	  which	  power	  is	  
mediated	   is	   Barnett	   and	   Duvall’s	   taxonomy	   of	   compulsory,	   institutional,	  
structural	   and	   productive	   power.112	  Institutional	   power	   focuses	   on	   the	   way	  
institutions,	   working	   through	   the	   rules	   by	  which	   they	   are	   defined,	   shape	   the	  
actions/non-­‐actions	   and	   conditions	   of	   existence	   of	   others.113	  Its	   focus	   is	   on	  
constraints	  -­‐	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  social	  capacities	  and	  interests	  associated	  
with	  a	  structural	  position.	  While	  structural	  power	  has	  a	  productive	  function,	  it	  
is	   nevertheless	   different	   from	   productive	   power	   in	   an	   important	   respect:	   the	  
first	   produces	   patterned	   structures	   of	   domination/subjugation;	   the	   other	  
constructs	  subjectivities	  through	  broad	  and	  related	  systems	  of	  knowledge	  and	  
discourse,	   the	   latter	   being	   a	   system	   of	   signification	   that	   produces	   social	  
identities	  and	  capacities	  and	  give	  them	  meaning.114	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  line	  with	  
Foucault’s	   critique	   of	   the	   ‘repressive	   hypothesis’,	   power	   is	   not	   thought	   about	  
only	   in	   terms	   of	   restriction	   on	   freedom	   of	   action.115	  The	   interaction	   between	  
institutional	   and	   productive	   power	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   question	   that	  
preoccupies	   this	   work.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   can	   the	   two	   operate	   in	   tandem,	   yet	  
produce	  different	  outcomes?	  Put	  differently,	  where	  an	  agent	  is	  locked	  in	  by	  the	  
exercise	  of	  institutional	  power,	  might	  productive	  power	  nevertheless	  engender	  
a	  different	  identity?	  China	  is	  locked	  into	  the	  WTO	  and	  BITS.	  Yet,	  she	  sees	  herself	  
as	   a	   leader	   of	   developing	   countries,	   and	   a	   country	   in	   the	   primary	   stage	   of	  
socialism	   with	   a	   working	   class	   led	   and	   workers	   and	   peasant	   alliance-­‐based	  
democratic	  dictatorship.	  116	  	  
	  
The	  various	  ways	  by	  which	  power	  is	  mediated	  tend	  to	  get	  conflated.	  While	  the	  
first	  stage	  of	  neoliberal	  destruction	  may	  gravitate	  towards	  compulsory	  power,	  
producing	   an	   enduring	   desired	   alternative	   to	   that	   which	   has	   been	   destroyed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  3	  
112	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  13-­‐22.	  
113	  ibid	  15.	  
114	  ibid	  18,	  20-­‐21.	  
115	  Mills,	  ibid	  (n	  59)	  17.	  
116	  ‘Judicial	  Reform	  in	  China’	  [Oct	  2012]	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  The	  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China	  1,	  2.	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may	   call	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   other	   three	   forms	   of	   power.	   Thus,	   the	  
‘creative	   destruction’	   of	   Chile	   in	   1973	   and	   Iraq	   in	   2003	   implicated	   the	   use	   of	  
compulsory	   power	   followed	   by	   institutional	   power,	   so	   as	   to	   reconfigure	   the	  
state.	   China	   was	   besieged	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   guns	   and	   discourse	   in	   which	  
capital’s	  notion	  of	  ‘progress’	  was	  used	  to	  depict	  her	  temporary	  weakness	  as	  an	  
inherent	  condition;	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  backwardness	  that	  was	  the	  antithesis	  
of	   historically	   codified	   Western	   progress. 117 	  The	   effect	   of	   this	   fusion	   of	  
compulsory	  and	  productive	  power	  was	  to	  depattern	  China’s	  identity	  and	  make	  
her	  receptive	  to	  a	  new	  one,	  this	  time	  constructed	  for	  her	  by	  the	  West.118	  By	  way	  
of	  a	  footnote,	  this	  approach	  to	  identity	  as	  constructed	  and	  delineated	  by	  power	  
differs	  in	  a	  fundamental	  way	  from	  the	  Chinese/Confucian	  understanding	  of	  the	  
process	  by	  which	  identities	  are	  formed.	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
	  
To	   observe	   the	   nature	   and	   formation	   of	   empires,	   I	   turn	   to	   Doyle’s	  
understanding	  of	  power	  whereby	  design	  and	  resistance	  are	  the	  two	  indicators	  
for	   distinguishing	   a	   truly	   independent	   act	   from	   one	   that	   is	   only	   nominally	  
independent.119	  Such	  understanding	  focuses	  on	  differentials	   in	  actors’	  capacity	  
to	   determine	   their	   own	   circumstances	   and	   destiny,	   and	   take	   social	   action.	  
However,	  much	  like	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  Doyle	  goes	  beyond	  overt	  power	  to	  take	  
account	  of	  its	  covert	  and	  informal	  manifestations.	  Viewed	  from	  this	  perspective,	  
BITs	   are	   instrumental	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   design	   of	   a	   contemporary	  
‘empire	  of	  capital’	  that	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  informal	  an	  opaque	  power	  of	  economic	  
dynamics.120	  The	  specificity	  of	  capitalist	  power	  is	  considered	  through	  concepts	  
such	   as	   Arrighi’s	   logic	   of	   capitalist,	   as	   opposed	   to	   territorial	   power;	   Ardent’s	  
observation	   of	   the	   fundamental	   difference	   between	   the	   localised,	   predictable	  
power	  politics	   of	   national	   conquests	   and	   imperialism’s	   limitless	   accumulation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Gregory	  Blue,	  ‘China	  and	  Western	  Social	  Thought	  in	  the	  Modern	  Period’	  in	  Gregory	  Blue	  and	  
Timothy	  Brook	  (eds),	  China	  and	  Historical	  Capitalism:	  Genealogies	  of	  Sinological	  Knowledge	  
(Studies	  in	  Modern	  Capitalism	  Series,	  CUP	  1999)	  74,	  77.	  
118	  On	  ‘depatterning’	  in	  shock	  therapy	  see	  Naomi	  Klein,	  The	  Shock	  Doctrine:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Disaster	  
Capitalism	  (Allen	  Lane	  2007)	  25-­‐38.	  
119	  Doyle,	  ibid	  (91)	  45.	  
120	  Ellen	  Meiksins	  Wood,	  The	  Empire	  of	  Capital	  (Verso	  2005)	  generally.	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of	  power	  for	  accumulation	  sake;	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  Harvey’s	  classification	  of	  
collective	  as	  opposed	  to	  distributive	  power.121	  	  	  
	  
Finally,	   law	   is	   an	   instrument	   of	   power.122 	  	   As	   an	   institution	   it	   mediates	  
institutional	   power.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   locks	   other	   agents	   into	   prescribed	   rules	  
and	   codes	   of	   behaviour.	   As	   a	   discourse,	   it	   mediates	   productive	   power.	   It	  
conveys	  the	  difference	  between	  that	  which	  is	  lawful	  and	  that	  which	  is	  unlawful.	  
As	  an	  institution	  it	  provides	  the	  rules	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  such	  difference.	  Agents,	  
specifically	   states,	   internalise	   the	   difference	   and	   then	   externalise	   it	   in	   acts	   of	  
governmentality	  and	  through	  their	  monopoly	  over	   legislation.	  Such	  monopoly,	  
however,	  is	  not	  hermetic.	  For,	  the	  boundaries	  between	  institutions	  are	  porous.	  
Cutler,	   for	   example,	   traces	   transnational	   merchant	   law	   to	   private	   origins.123	  	  
Sornarajah	  posits	  the	  IL	  concept	  of	  state	  responsibility	  for	  injury	  to	  aliens	  as	  an	  
instance	   of	   normative	   content	   that	   was	   shaped	   predominantly	   by	   private	  
power.124	  	  One	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  order’s	  features	  is	  capital’s	  drive	  for	  a	  merger	  
with	  both	  the	  state	  and	  the	  law.	  It	   is	  a	  strategy	  of	   legal	   legitimization	  through,	  
for	   example,	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	   autonomous	   dispute	   resolution	  
organisation	  such	  as	  ICSID.	  125	  
	  
Methodology	  
This	   being	   a	   largely	   legal	   thesis,	   it	   was	   deemed	   by	   the	   department’s	   course	  
instructors	   that	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	   require	   a	   dedicated	   methodology	  
section.	  However,	   considering	   that	   the	   thesis	  also	  engages	  other	  disciplines,	   it	  
seems	  pertinent	  to	  say	  a	  few	  words	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (14)	  35-­‐37;	  Hanna	  Ardent,	  Imperialism:	  Part	  Two	  of	  the	  Origins	  of	  
Totalitarianism	  (A	  Harvest/HBJ	  Book)	  v,	  vi;	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  139-­‐40.	  
122	  Colin	  Gordon,	  Michel	  Foucault	  Power/Knowledge:	  Selected	  Interviews	  &	  Other	  Writing	  1972-­‐
1977	  (Vintage	  Book	  1972)	  140-­‐41.	  
123	  A.	  Claire	  Cutler,	  Private	  Power	  and	  Global	  Authority:	  Transnational	  Law	  in	  the	  Global	  Political	  
Economy	  (Cambridge	  University	  International	  Relations	  Series,	  CUP	  2003)	  generally.	  	  
124	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  10)	  37.	  
125	  Beck,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  121,	  126.	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The	  methodological	   approach	   in	   this	   work	   has	   entailed	   a	   critical	   survey	   of	   a	  
vast	   range	   of	   texts	   representing	   different	   genres,	   both	   Chinese	   and	  Western.	  	  
They	  include	  primary	  sources	  in	  the	  form	  of	  statistical	  information,	  BITs,	  ICSID	  
decisions,	  statements	  made	  by	  IFIs	  and	  think	  tanks	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
the	   Mont	   Pelerin	   Society,	   legislation	   and	   governmental	   policy	   statements,	   as	  
well	  secondary	  sources	  such	  as	  academic	  publications	  and	  media	  reports.	  The	  
reasons	   why	   BITs	   and	   the	   HWP	   were	   selected	   as	   case	   studies	   were	   set	   out	  
above.	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   principal	   legal	   analysis,	   this	   thesis	   employs	   a	   discursive	  
approach	  to	  the	  above	  texts.	  References	  were	  made	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  the	  
meaning	  of	  discourse.	  As	  noted	  above,	  a	  discourse	  is	  a	  system	  of	  meaning	  that	  
entails	  rules,	  practices	  and	  strategies,	  and	  which	  constructs	  as	  well	  as	  reflects	  
the	   object	   it	   describes.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   hegemonic	   discourses	  
associated	  with	   the	   neoliberal	   project	   and	   the	   potentially	   counter	   hegemonic	  
discourse	  embodied	   in	   the	  HWP,	   this	   thesis	  employs	  a	  broadly	  deconstructive	  
approach.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   seeks	   to	   interrogate	   and	   disrupt	   dominant	  
capitalist	   logic	   and	   its	   constitutive	   parts	   in	   the	   form	   of	   BITs.	   Influenced	   by	  
Foucault,	   I	   too	  see	  an	   intimacy	  between	   truth	  and	  power,	  which	  regulates	   the	  
way	   we	   speak	   about,	   for	   example,	   development	   and	   the	   law.	   Similarly,	   this	  
analysis	   posits	   discourse	   as	   a	   time	   and	   space	   specific	   phenomenon.	   ‘Each	  
society	  has	   its	   regime	  of	   truth,	   it	   ‘general	  politics’	  of	   truth:	   that	   is,	   the	   type	  of	  
discourse	   which	   it	   accepts	   and	   makes	   function	   as	   true;	   the	   mechanism	   and	  
instances	  which	  enable	   to	  distinguish	  true	  and	   false	  statements,	   the	  means	  by	  
which	  each	  is	  sanctioned,	  the	  techniques	  and	  procedures	  accorded	  value	  in	  the	  
acquisition	   of	   truth;	   the	   status	   of	   those	   who	   are	   charged	   with	   saying	   what	  
counts	   as	   true’.	  126	  In	   this	   sense,	   this	   thesis	   aims	   to	   understand	   the	   regime	   of	  
truth	  produced	  by	   capitalism	   including	   its	  neoliberal	  progression.	   In	   applying	  
deconstruction,	  the	  texts	  described	  above	  were	  chosen	  for	  their	  representative	  
nature;	   I	   considered	   the	   status	   of	   the	   statement	  makers,	   the	  mechanism	   and	  
strategies	   employed	   by	   agents	   to	   diffuse	   these	   statements,	   and	   the	  means	   by	  
which	  they	  are	  internalised,	  adapted	  or	  rejected.	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  Michel	  Foucault,	  Power/Knowledge	  	  (Pantheon	  Books	  1980)	  131-­‐3.	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Adopting	   a	   political	   economy	   approach	   to	   contextualisation,	   this	   thesis	  
examines	   ‘	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   social	   relations	   organized	   around	   power,	   or	   the	  
ability	   to	   control	   other	   people,	   processes,	   and	   things,	   even	   in	   the	   face	   of	  
resistance’.127	  This	   approach	   views	   economic,	   social	   and	   political	   system	   as	  
temporally	   and	   spatially	   contingent.	   It	   therefore	   considers	   them	   both	  
independent	   and	  dependent	   variables	   in	  need	  of	   explanation;	   in	   other	  words,	  
capable	  of	  explaining	  but	  simultaneously	  in	  need	  of	  explanation.	  	  	  
	  
Literature	  Review	  
As	  part	   of	   the	  PhD	   training	   I	   attended	   as	  part	   of	   the	  degree	   course,	   attention	  
was	   drawn	   to	   a	   recent	   change	   in	   the	   approach	   to	   the	   way	   a	   thesis	   is	   to	   be	  
structured.	  The	  point	  was	  made	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  obligatory	  for	  it	  to	  include	  a	  
dedicated	  literature	  review	  section	  since	  such	  review	  runs	  throughout	  the	  work	  
in	  any	  event.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  hope	  the	  following	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  guidance	  to	  
the	  way	  this	  work	  engages	  with	  the	  literature	  including	  its	  novel	  contribution.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  research	  undertaken	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  work	  occurred	  primarily	  in	  the	  
period	  of	  registration	  under	  supervision	  for	  the	  degree,	  namely	  between	  2010	  
and	  2014.	  It	  cuts	  across	  disciplinary	  boundaries	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  this	  will	  enable	  
the	  analysis	  of	  texts	  liberated	  from,	  what	  Foucault	  observed,	  are	  the	  constraints	  
of	   a	   narrow	   framework.128	  	   The	   literature	   I	   have	   chosen	   reflects	   this	   multi-­‐
disciplinary	   approach.	   It	   ranges	   from	   law	   to	   political	   economy,	   including	  
international	  relations,	  philosophy	  and	  China	  studies.	  	  
The	   work	   similarly	   cuts	   across	   the	   geographical,	   historical	   and	   cultural	  
(understood	  here	  in	  its	  broadest	  sense)	  boundaries	  that	  delineate	  China	  and	  the	  
West.	   Thus,	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   focus	   on	   the	   Western	   perspective.	  
Correspondingly,	  the	  research	  centers	  on	  Western	  literature.	  The	  gaze	  turns	  to	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  Vincent	  Mosco,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Communication	  (Sage	  Publications	  1996)	  24.	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  Andrew	  Cutrofello,	  Discipline	  and	  Critiques:	  Kant,	  Poststructuralism	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  
Resistance	  (State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press	  1994)	  132.	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China	   in	   chapters	  4	  and	  5.	  Here,	   the	   research	   combines	  Western	  with	  China’s	  
own	  literature.	  The	  only	  ICSID	  case	  to	  date	  involving	  a	  Chinese	  BIT	  is	  analysed	  
at	   some	   length	   to	  demonstrate	  my	   critique	  of	   Snyder’s	   version	  of	   global	   legal	  
pluralism,	  specifically	  its	  failure	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  and	  
related	   discourse	   in	   the	   dialogue	   between	   different	   sites	   of	   governance.	   	   The	  
overall	  aim	  is	  to	  explore	  China	  as	  an	  agent	  that	  participates	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  world	  order	  but	  nevertheless	  exercises	  a	  selection	  as	  to	  that	  which	  is	  to	  be	  
internalised	  and	   that	  which	   is	   to	  be	   rejected.	  To	   this	  end,	   chapter	  4	  draws	  on	  
both	   Western	   and	   Chinese	   legal	   and	   political	   economy	   literature	   so	   as	   to	  
highlight	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Western	  perspectives	  of	  BITs,	  
including	   the	   systemic	   implications	   of	   the	   country’s	   participation	   in	   them.	  An	  
emphasis	  on	  Chinese	  sources	  enables	  me	  to	  explore	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Potter’s	  
‘selective	   adaptation’	   animates	   China’s	   interaction	   with	   imported	   Western	  
concepts	   such	   as	   the	   ‘rule	   of	   law’,	   property	   rights	   and	   the	   use	   of	   external	  
standards	   to	   appraise	   domestic	   institutions.	   Qin	   Yaqing’s	   elucidation	   of	   the	  
Confucian	   specificity	   that	   distinguishes	   Chinese	   approach	   to	   international	  
relations	  guides	  me	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  HWP’s	  philosophical	  framework	  
and	  the	  way	  it	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  and	  legitimize	  contemporary	  positions.	  
Thematically,	  the	  literature	  may	  be	  divided	  into	  BITs,	  considered	  in	  the	  context	  
of	   the	  development	  of	   capitalism	   including	   its	  neoliberal	  progression,	   and	   the	  
Chinese	  trajectory.	  
In	  this	  work,	  BITs	  are	  posited	  within	  the	  developed/developing	  demarcation,	  
thereby	  departing	  from	  Schill’s	  view	  that	  the	  dichotomy	  is	  overstated.	  	  Such	  
view,	  found	  also	  for	  example	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Schwebel	  and	  Vandevelde,	  is	  
associated	  with	  a	  perception	  of	  BITs	  as	  representing	  a	  global	  consensus	  and	  a	  
coherent	  body	  of	  law.	  This	  surfaces	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  New	  
International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  and	  its	  related	  General	  Assembly	  
resolutions	  (Resolutions)	  in	  chapter	  2.	  Scholarly	  debate	  focuses	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  Resolutions’	  contribution	  to	  the	  normative	  content	  of	  Economic	  IL	  and	  
whether	  they	  represent	  its	  rejection	  or	  a	  reformative	  attempt.	  This	  work	  
engages	  with	  the	  Resolutions	  by	  raising	  two	  different	  points.	  First,	  I	  question	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the	  validity	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  Economic	  IL	  is	  a	  cohesive	  body	  of	  law	  
representative	  of	  a	  discursive	  consensus.	  The	  second	  takes	  issue	  with	  the	  
reference	  to	  ‘general	  practice’	  often	  found	  in	  the	  literature.	  I	  contend	  that,	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  Resolutions,	  this	  term	  exemplifies	  the	  way	  power	  shapes	  language	  
rather	  than	  being	  a	  reflection	  of	  an	  objective	  reality	  	  (chapter	  4).	  Here,	  I	  Join	  
Sornarajah	  and	  Brownlie	  in	  asserting	  that	  the	  Resolutions	  remain	  a	  source	  of	  
Economic	  IL,	  one	  that	  is	  superior	  to	  the	  decisions	  of	  private	  arbitrators.	  
	  
In	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  BITs	  in	  chapter	  2,	  I	  am	  guided	  by	  the	  linkage	  that	  
Anghie	  posits	  between	  the	  origins	  of	  Economic	  IL	  and	  the	  colonial	  encounter,	  
and	  the	  ‘dynamic	  of	  difference’	  that	  runs	  through	  its	  evolution.	  I	  broaden	  this	  
contention	  by	  introducing	  a	  systemic	  contextualisation	  to	  explain	  Economic	  IL’s	  
enduring	  faithfulness	  to	  its	  origins.	  In	  other	  words,	  rather	  than	  a	  revolutionary	  
occurrence,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Subedi	  and	  Montt,	  I	  view	  BITs	  as	  representing	  a	  
systemic	  continuity,	  a	  discursive	  and	  institutional	  strategy	  precipitated	  by	  the	  
dissemination	  of	  sovereignty	  to	  formerly	  colonised	  territories	  (chapters	  2	  and	  
3).	  Here	  I	  follow	  Wood	  and	  Amin	  and	  depart	  from	  Frank	  in	  positing	  capitalism	  
as	  a	  system	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  has	  its	  distinct	  logic	  and	  historically	  specific	  
origins	  (chapter	  5).	  Foucault	  refers	  to	  such	  logic	  in	  terms	  of	  markets	  as	  the	  site	  
of	  truth.	  Polanyi	  conceptualises	  the	  break	  from	  non-­‐capitalist	  societies	  as	  a	  
moment	  of	  ‘great	  transformation’,	  characterised	  by	  economic	  ‘disembedding’–	  
society’s	  detachment	  from	  economic	  imperatives	  and	  its	  subordination	  to	  
purportedly	  self-­‐regulating	  markets	  (chapters	  3	  and	  5).	  I	  view	  neoliberalism	  
through	  the	  same	  lens,	  namely	  a	  systemic	  inflection,	  a	  drive	  for	  a	  return	  to	  form,	  
rather	  than	  Postpone’s	  revolutionary	  occurrence.	  Such	  drive	  is	  executed	  
through	  the	  agency	  of	  institutional	  and	  discursive	  power	  of	  which	  BITs	  are	  one	  
manifestation.	  
	  
Polanyi	  characterizes	  capitalism’s	  existential	  need	  for	  territorial	  expansion	  and	  
power	   accumulation	   as	   analogue	   internal	   and	   externalized	   processes.	   I	   term	  
these	   processes	   ‘home’	   and	   ‘abroad’.	   I	   apply	   them,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	  
continuity/break	   dichotomy,	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   China’s	   encounter	   with	   the	  
capitalist	  world	  order	   and	  her	   route	   to	   contemporary	   incorporation.	   	   I	   follow	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Wang	  Hui	   in	   understanding	   such	   incorporation	   as	   linked	   to	   the	   specificity	   of	  
modernity’s	   preoccupation	   with	   the	   universalisation	   of	   economic	   relations,	  
including	  the	  power	  employed	  to	  this	  end	  (chapter	  5).	  At	  the	  point	  of	  encounter,	  
power	  structures	  produced	  new	  discourses.	  Thus,	  Blue	  and	  Brook	  assign	  to	  the	  
era	   of	   colonialism	  and	   imperialism	   the	   reversal	   in	  European	   consensus	   about	  
China	  -­‐	  from	  a	  model	  to	  be	  studied	  to	  an	  example	  of	  immanent	  backwardness.	  
China	   internalised	   this	   discourse	   and	   responded	   by	   revisiting	   her	   past	   and	  
reviewing	  her	  present	  (chapter	  5).	  The	  work	  questions	  whether	  the	  country	  is	  
already	   capitalist/in	   the	   course	   of	   a	   capitalist	   trajectory.	   It	   examines	   Chinese	  
BITs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  these	  broader	  questions.	  	  
	  
This	  work	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   briefly	   summarised	   above	   by	  
bringing	   paradigms	   and	   law	   together.	   There	   are	   numerous	   writings	   on	   the	  
discourse	  of	  law.	  However,	  there	  is	  little,	  if	  any,	  examination	  of	  BITs	  as	  forming	  
part	  of	  a	  hegemonic	  discourse.	  Similarly,	  the	  HWP	  is	  discussed	  both	  in	  Chinese	  
and	  Western	   literature,	   primarily	   from	   an	   international	   relations	   perspective.	  
There	   is	  no	  attempt	   to	  decipher	   its	   abstract	   language	  by	  observing	   it	   through	  
the	  lens	  of	  the	  law.	  This	  work	  aims	  to	  fill	  this	  lacuna	  by	  assessing	  the	  coherence	  
of	  HWP	  in	  the	  context	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  BITs	  regime.	  	  
	  
	  
Structure	  and	  Chapters	  Summary	  	  
The	   work	   is	   in	   two	   parts,	   each	   replicating	   structurally	   the	   other.	   	   The	   first	  
comprises	   Chapter	   1	   and	   2.	   Its	   focus	   is	   on	   BITs	   and	   the	   neoliberal	   paradigm	  
respectively.	   	  The	  second	  contains	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  and	  examines	  the	  Chinese	  
BITs	   program	   and	   the	   HWP.	   At	   the	   forefront	   of	   contextualisation	   is	   the	  
phenomenon	   of	   outward	   direct	   investment	   (ODI).	   	   ODI	   is	   not	   unavoidably	  
corporatised.	  	  China	  invested	  in	  infrastructure	  projects	  in	  Africa	  also	  during	  her	  
revolutionary	   era.	   However,	   these	   investments	   tended	   to	   be	   motivated	   by	  
ideological	  driven	  solidarity	  in	  which	  profit	  maximisation	  played	  little	  part.	  The	  
Tazara	  railway	  that	  began	  in	  1965	  was	  a	  ‘friendship’	  project,	  in	  which	  resonated	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Maoist	   repertoire	   of	   comradeship	   and	   shared	   commitment	   to	   true	   national	  
independence.129	  	  The	  discourse	  of	  mutual	  benefit	   is	  now	  embedded	   in	  a	   shift	  
towards	   that	  which	  makes	   profit.130	  	   Thus,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   discussion,	  
ODI	  refers	  to	  investment	  in	  its	  Western	  capitalist	  sense.	  It	  alludes	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  
capital	  from	  a	  home	  to	  a	  host	  country,	  primarily	  via	  TNCs,	  who	  may	  represent	  
either	  private	  or	  state	  capital,	  but	  in	  any	  event	  are	  guided	  by	  market	  and	  profit	  
imperatives.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   question	   with	   which	   I	   grapple	   is	   examined	  
against	   a	   baseline	   of	   rapprochement	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   going	   global.	   In	   this	  
context,	   liberalism,	   capitalism	   and	   its	   neoliberal	   progression	   are	   used	  
interchangeably.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   terms	   such	   as	   Third	   World,	   Global	  
South/North,	  and	  developed/developing.	  
Chapter	   two	  charters	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	  BITs	  program	  as	  an	   instance	  of	   IL	  
exceptionalism	   and	   capacious	   jurisprudence.	   It	   locates	   the	   treaties	   within	   a	  
broader	   history	   of	   the	   colonialist	   encounter,	   the	   fracturing	   of	   Global	   South	  
solidarity	  and	  the	  continuities	  of	  power-­‐based	  imperialist	  design.	  Contestation	  
by	  developing	  countries	  and	   the	  exercise	  of	  power	   to	   secure	  consent	   call	   into	  
question	  the	  validity	  of	  claims	  to	  consensus,	  cohesion	  and	  universalism.	  
Chapter	   3	   takes	   the	   reader	   from	   the	   juridical	   landscape	   to	   its	   paradigmical	  
ecology.	   It	   builds	   on	   the	   themes	   of	   continuities,	   power-­‐based	   outcomes	   and	  
imperial	  design	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  but	  adds	  another	  –	  that	  of	  the	  
analogues	   processes	   that	   self-­‐replicate	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   As	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
BITs,	  it	  posits	  the	  neoliberal	  paradigm	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  continuity	  rather	  than	  
interruption.	   The	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   three	   main	   issues:	   the	   origins	   and	  
durability	   of	   neoliberalism,	   the	   two	   stages	   of	   the	  Washington	   Consensus,	   and	  
the	   way	   in	   which	   BITs	   are	   incorporated	   into	   both	   the	   theoretical	   and	   policy	  
aspects	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  state-­‐market	  interaction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Julia	  C.	  Strauss,	  ‘The	  Past	  in	  the	  Present:	  Historical	  and	  Rhetorical	  Lineages	  in	  China’s	  
Relations	  with	  Africa’	  in	  Julia	  C.	  Strauss	  and	  Martha	  Saavedra,	  China	  and	  Africa:	  Emerging 
Patters in	  Globalization	  and	  Development	  (The	  China	  Quarterly	  Special	  Issues	  New	  Series	  No	  9	  
CUP	  2009)	  235-­‐39.	  
130	  Julia	  C.	  Strauss	  and	  Martha	  Saavedra,	  ‘Introduction:	  China,	  Africa	  and	  Internationalization’	  in	  
Strauss	  and	  Saavedra,	  ibid	  (n	  129)	  6.	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Following	  the	  review	  of	  BITs	  in	  a	  Westerncentric	  context	  in	  chapter	  2,	  chapter	  4	  
turns	   to	  BITs	  with	  Chinese	  characteristics.	   It	  examines	   the	   integration	  of	  BITs	  
into	   Chinese	   political	   economy.	   The	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   different	   stages	   of	  
China’s	   adoption,	   re-­‐contextualization,	   and	   strategic	   reorientation	   of	   her	   BITs	  
program,	   identifying	   a	   trajectory	   towards	  Western	   practice	   that	   is	   combined	  
with	  diversity.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  only	  Chinese	  BIT-­‐based	  ICSID	  award	  to	  date,	  
demonstrates	   how	   an	   ICSID	   tribunal	   employs	   functionalist	   interpretative	  
methodology,	   one	   that	   is	   informed	  by	   the	  aim	  of	   imposing	  pro-­‐private	   capital	  
perspectives	  on	  the	  country’s	  public	  policy.	  
Chapter	  5	   follows	  on	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  HWP	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  China’s	  
self-­‐image	  of	  a	   rising	  power	   that	   is	   intent	  of	  peaceful	   cooperation	  rather	   than	  
imperialist	  resort	  to	  coercion.	  The	  chapter	  examines	  the	  way	  the	  HWP	  applies	  
Confucian	  philosophy	  to	  assert	   the	  possibility	  of	  harmonious	   interactions,	  and	  
then	  contextualise	  it	  historically	  so	  as	  to	  highlight	  the	  two	  forces	  that	  animate	  
the	   country’s	   attempts	   at	   being	   simultaneously	   the	   same	   and	   different,	  
incorporated	   and	   reformist	   –	   China’s	   ancient	   identity	   and	   the	   process	   of	   her	  
adaptation	   to	   Westernised	   modernity.	   The	   HWP	   is	   then	   posited	   against	   the	  












CHAPTER	  2:	  THE	  LEGAL	  LANDSCAPE	  
	  
Introduction	  
The	   treaty	   arbitration	   instituted	   by	   Société	   Générale	   de	   Surveillance	   (SGS)	  
against	  Pakistan	  in	  2001	  took	  Makhdoom	  Ali	  Khan,	  the	  then	  Pakistan’s	  Attorney	  
General	  by	  surprise.1	  	   ‘To	  be	  perfectly	  honest’,	  he	  said	  in	  2009	  on	  the	  occasion	  
of	  the	  world’s	  first	  bilateral	  investment’s	  50th	  anniversary,	  ‘I	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clue,	  
so	  I	  had	  to	  look	  it	  up	  on	  Google’.2	  
The	  reason	  for	  this	  state	  of	  unawareness,	  explained	  Mr	  Khan,	  was	  the	  length	  of	  
time	   that	   elapsed	   between	   treatification	   and	   its	   consequence.3	  Indeed,	   it	   took	  
time	   for	   bilateral	   investment	   treaties	   (BITs)	   to	   gain	  momentum	   and	   for	   their	  
implications	   to	   unfold,	   so	   as	   to	   disabuse	   host	   states	   signatories	   of	  
misapprehensions.	   Thus,	   the	   International	   Centre	   for	   the	   Settlement	   of	  
investment	  Disputes	  (ICSID)	  Convention	  came	  into	  effect	  only	  some	  seven	  years	  
after	   the	   first	   BIT	   had	   been	   concluded.4	  The	   aim	  was	   to	   provide	   facilities	   for	  
conciliation	  and	  arbitration	  of	  investor-­‐state	  disputes	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  SGS	  Societe	  Generale	  de	  Surveillance	  S.A.	  v	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  Decision	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  
on	  Objections	  to	  Jurisdiction	  ICSID	  Case	  No.	  ARB/01/13	  
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docId=DC622_En&caseId=C205>	  accessed	  13	  April	  2013.	  The	  term	  ‘treaty	  arbitration’	  is	  short	  
for	  ‘treaty	  investment	  protection	  arbitration’.	  The	  assumption	  is	  that	  protection	  leads	  to	  
promotion;	  Kenneth	  J	  Vandevelde,	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties:	  History,	  Policy,	  and	  
Interpretation	  (OUP	  2010)	  4-­‐5.	  	  	  	  
2	  Lauge	  Skovgaard	  Poulsen	  and	  Damon	  Vis-­‐Dunbar,	  ‘Reflections	  on	  Pakistan’s	  Investment-­‐
Treaty	  Program	  After	  50	  Years:	  An	  Interview	  With	  the	  Former	  Attorney	  General	  of	  Pakistan,	  
Makhdoom	  Ali	  Khan’	  [16	  March	  2009]	  Investment	  Treaty	  News	  <http://www.ii	  
wh.org/itn/2009/03/16/pakistans-­‐standstill-­‐in-­‐investment-­‐treaty-­‐making-­‐an-­‐interview-­‐with-­‐
the-­‐former-­‐attorney-­‐general-­‐of-­‐pakistan-­‐makhdoom-­‐ali-­‐khan/>	  accessed	  11	  Feb	  2011.	  
3	  ibid.	  	  




World	  Bank.5	  	  Inter	  alia,	  the	  facilities	  were	  to	  draw	  on	  BITs	  and	  on	  international	  
law	  (IL)	  for	  the	  supranational	  source	  of	  adjudications.	  	  
For	   the	   following	   three	   decades	   treatification	   and	   its	   related	   arbitration	  
mechanism	   remained	   relatively	   dormant.6	  	   It	   was	   only	   on	   or	   about	   the	   mid-­‐
1990s	  that	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  global	  investment	  protection	  landscape	  by	  means	  
of	   international	   investment	   agreements	   (IIAs)	   fortified	   by	   ICSID	   provisions	  
began	  in	  earnest.	  However,	  once	   in	  motion,	   the	  spread	  of	   IIAs	  proved	  rapid.	  A	  
growth	  spurt	  brought	  the	  number	  of	  concluded	  BITs	  from	  422	  in	  1990	  to	  1,149	  
in	  1995	  and	  1,916	  in	  2,000.7	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2011	  the	  number	  of	  BITs	  swelled	  to	  
2,833	  and	  the	  number	  of	  other	  IIAs	  stood	  at	  3318	  with	  most	  countries	  being	  a	  
party	   to	   at	   least	   one	   BIT.9	  	   ICSID	   too	   assumed	   prominence	   as	   a	   forum	   for	  
investor-­‐state	   dispute	   settlement.	   By	   2008,	   317	   known	   treaty	   claims	   were	  
brought	   by	   investors	   against	   states.10	  	   This	   compares	   with	   166	   cases	   in	   the	  
years	   1996	   to	   2005,	   and	   mere	   35	   in	   the	   previous	   30	   years.11	  	   In	   2011	   the	  
number	  of	  investor-­‐state	  cases	  increased	  by	  at	  least	  46,	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  
known	  treaty	  disputes	  ever	   filed	   in	  one	  year.12	  	  As	  of	  31	  December	  2012,	  419	  
cases	  were	  registered	  under	  the	  ICSID	  Convention	  and	  its	  Additional	  Facility.13	  
Investment	  protection	  has	  thus	  moved	  central	  stage	  in	  the	  furthering	  of	  a	  vision	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Art	  17	  ‘Convention	  on	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Disputes	  between	  States	  and	  Nationals	  of	  Other	  States’	  
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-­‐final.pdf>	  accessed	  11	  
Feb	  2012.	  	  
6	  	  Surya	  P	  Subedi,	  International	  Investment	  Law:	  Reconciling	  Policy	  and	  Principle	  (Hart	  
Publishing	  2008)	  1.	  Subedi	  dates	  the	  first	  investment	  arbitration	  brought	  under	  a	  BIT	  to	  1987.	  	  
7	  Santiago	  Montt,	  State	  Liability	  in	  Investment	  Treaty	  Arbitration:	  Global	  Constitutional	  and	  
Administrative	  Law	  in	  the	  BIT	  Generation	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2009)	  84.	  	  
8	  UNCTAD,	  ‘World	  Investment	  Report	  2012:	  Toward	  a	  New	  Generation	  of	  Investment	  Policies’	  
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  April	  
2013.	  	  
9	  Amnon	  Lehavi	  and	  Amir	  N	  Licht,	  ‘BITs	  and	  Pieces	  of	  Property’	  (2010)	  36	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law	  115	  at	  118	  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554926>	  
accessed	  10	  April	  2011.	  
10	  UNCTAD,	  ‘IIA	  Monitor	  No	  1	  (2009):	  Latest	  Developments	  in	  Investors-­‐State	  Dispute	  
Settlement’	  <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf>	  accessed	  15	  April	  
2010.	  
11	  Gus	  Van	  Harten,	  Investment	  Treaty	  Arbitration	  and	  Public	  Law	  (Oxford	  Monographs	  in	  
International	  Law,	  OUP	  2007)	  4	  footnote	  11.	  
12	  UNCTAD,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  86.	  
13	  ICSID,	  ‘The	  ICSID	  Caseload	  –	  Statistics	  (Issue	  2013-­‐1)’	  
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Show
Document&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English41>	  accessed	  13	  April	  2013.	  The	  ICSID	  
Additional	  Facility	  Rules	  provides	  ICSID	  jurisdiction	  for	  arbitration	  and	  conciliation	  proceedings	  
where	  either	  of	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  is	  not	  a	  party	  to	  the	  ICSID	  Convention.	  See	  ICSID	  
Additional	  Facility	  Rules	  art	  2(a).	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of	  a	  global	  spatial	  totality	  in	  which	  private	  capital	  could	  be	  mobile,	  unhindered	  
by	  territorial	  boundaries	  and	  supported	  by	  transnational	  normativity.	  	  
These	   cross-­‐fertilising	   phenomena	   of	   treatification	   and	   supranational	  
arbitration	   are	   often	   alluded	   to	   as	   revolutionary	   occurrences.14	  	   Subedi,	   for	  
example,	  refers	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  ICSID	  as	  the	  ‘silent	  revolution’.15	  	  Montt	  
talks	  about	  the	  ‘BITs	  revolution’.16	  	  That	  the	  significance	  of	  BITs	  and	  ICSID	  was	  
and	  remains	  far-­‐reaching	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  can	  hardly	  be	  denied.	  Yet	  can	  they	  
be	  said	  to	  be	  revolutionary	  in	  any	  ontic	  or	  epistemic	  sense?	  Do	  they	  represent	  
an	  instance	  of	  structural	  reconstitution?	  	  
Here	  I	  am	  assisted	  by	  Anghie’s	  observation	  of	  a	  ‘dynamic	  of	  difference’	  that,	  he	  
argues,	  runs	  through	  the	  evolution	  of	  IL	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter.	  	  
It	   denotes	   ‘the	   endless	   process	   of	   creating	   a	   gap	   between	   two	   cultures,	  
demarcating	  one	  as	   ‘universal’	   and	   ‘civilized’	   and	   the	  other	  as	   ‘particular’	   and	  
uncivilized,	   and	   seeking	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   by	   developing	   techniques	   to	  
normalize	   the	   aberrant	   society’.17	  	   Seen	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   this	   dynamic,	   the	  
BITs	  and	  ICSID	  generation	  is	  but	  a	  chapter,	  the	  logical	  next	  step	  in	  a	  centuries-­‐
old	  process	  of	  reconstitution	  which,	   though	  evolutionary	   in	  terms	  of	  narrative	  
and	  material	  realisation,	  is	  also	  marked	  by	  the	  constancy	  of	  its	  perspective	  and	  
aim;	  that	  of	  ‘normalising	  the	  aberrant	  society’	  by	  the	  universal	  application	  of	  a	  
Westerncentric	   IL	   that	   in	   turn	   institutionalises	   colonial	   and	   post-­‐colonial	  
structures.18 	  Deconstruction	   of	   contemporary	   discourse,	   such	   as	   ‘economic	  
development	  contracts’19	  and	  ‘general	  principles	  of	  law’	  unmasks	  its	  linkage	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  In	  relation	  to	  cross	  fertilisation	  Montt	  argues	  that	  investment	  arbitration	  was	  made	  possible	  
by	  the	  network	  of	  investment	  treaties.	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  82;	  by	  contrast,	  Subedi	  views	  ICSID	  as	  
the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  BITs.	  Subedi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  32.	  
15	  Subedi,	  ibid	  32-­‐33.	  
16	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  85.	  
17	  Anthony	  Anghie,	  Imperialism,	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  International	  Law	  (Cambridge	  
Studies	  in	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law,	  CUP	  2004)	  4.	  
18	  See	  also	  M	  Sornarajah,	  The	  International	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  (3rd	  edn,	  CUP	  2010)	  51	  
arguing	  that	  the	  linkage	  between	  investment	  IL	  and	  development	  entrenches	  ‘the	  division	  
between	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries’.	  	  
19	  Pierre-­‐Marie	  Dupuy	  coined	  the	  term	  ‘economic	  development	  contracts’	  in	  the	  Texaco	  v	  Libya	  
arbitration	  to	  describe	  long-­‐term	  agreements	  requiring	  considerable	  investment	  by	  the	  foreign	  
party	  and	  forming	  part	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  progress	  of	  the	  host	  country.	  Texaco	  Overseas	  
petroleum	  Co.	  and	  California	  Asiatic	  Oil	  Co.	  v.	  Libya	  (1977)	  53	  I.L.R	  389;	  (1978)	  17	  I.L.M	  1.	  This	  
differentiation	  enabled	  a	  reasoning	  that	  such	  a	  contract	  is	  subject	  to	  IL.	  See	  also,	  for	  example	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Vitoria’s	  civilized/backward	  binary.	  General	  principles	  of	  law,	  for	  example,	  are	  
capable	   of	   dislodging	   contractually	   agreed	   municipal	   law	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	  
acceptable	   to	   civilized	  nations.	  20	  	   If	   ‘general	   principles	   of	   law’	   equate	   the	   law	  
adopted	  by	  civilized	  nations,	  and	   if	  civilized	  nations	  equate	   the	  West,	   then	  we	  
are	   substantially	   back	   to	   the	   colonial	   assertion	   that	   European	   investors	   are	  
entitled	  to	  extraterritoriality	  because	  they	  carry	  with	  them	  the	  superior	  law	  of	  
their	  nationality.	  The	  other	  facet	  of	  this	  ‘dynamic	  of	  difference’,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  is	  
the	   ‘dynamic	   of	   sameness’	  whereby	   the	   attainment	   of	   equality	   is	   intertwined	  
with	  a	  race	  to	  sameness,	  a	  race	  in	  which	  the	  tortoise	  can	  never	  quite	  catch	  up	  
with	   the	   hare,	   since	   it	   is	   the	   latter	   who	   defines	   and	   redefines	   the	   contest’s	  
parameters.	  	  
This	   chapter	   begins	  with	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   rise	   and	   consolidation	   of	  BITs	   and	  
ICSID	  as	  isles	  of	  exceptionalism	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  IL,	  indeed	  by	  reference	  
to	   most	   Western	   and	  Western-­‐modelled	   systems	   of	   municipal	   law.	   It	   argues	  
that	  these	  outcomes	  are	  not	  a	  natural	  and	  therefore	  unavoidable	  consequence	  
of	   globalised	   commercial	   interactions.	   Rather,	   BITs	   and	   ICSID	   represent	   a	  
discursive	  and	  institutional	  design	  of	  man-­‐made	  origins.	  The	  chapter	  will	  then	  
proceed	  to	  trace	  the	  genealogy	  of	  this	  design,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  power	  in	  bringing	  
it	  about.	  Temporally,	  genealogy	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  colonialist	  encounter,	  when	  
investment	   IL	   was	   forged	   by	   the	   tension	   between	   colonised	   and	   colonisers	  
followed	   by	   developing	   and	   developed.	   For	   standards	   of	   protection	   can	   be	  
traced	   back	   to	   as	   early	   as	  Medieval	   Ages.21	  However,	   it	  was	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Revere	  Copper	  and	  Brass	  Inc.	  v	  OPIC	  (1978)	  17	  ILM	  1321	  where	  the	  arbitrator	  held	  that	  because	  
a	  foreign	  investor	  would	  not	  have	  invested	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  but	  for	  the	  guarantee	  of	  IL,	  
the	  mere	  fact	  of	  such	  investment	  is	  sufficient	  to	  internationalise	  the	  contract.	  
20	  By	  Article	  38.1	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  ICJ	  ‘the	  Court,	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  decide	  in	  accordance	  
with	  IL	  such	  disputes	  as	  are	  submitted	  to	  it,	  shall	  apply:	  (…)	  c.	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  
recognized	  by	  civilized	  nations’.	  The	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (1945)	  
<http://www.icj-­‐cij.org>;	  in	  the	  Texaco	  arbitration	  Pierre-­‐Marie	  Dupuy	  opined	  that	  ‘the	  
reference	  to	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  [in	  its	  proper	  law]	  is	  always	  regarded	  to	  be	  a	  sufficient	  
criterion	  for	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  a	  contract”.	  Texaco	  v	  Libya,	  ibid	  para	  40.	  	  
21	  Bjorklunk	  dates	  national	  treatment	  obligations	  back	  to	  the	  Hanseatic	  League	  treaties	  of	  the	  
12th	  and	  13th	  centuries.	  Other	  protection	  standards	  such	  as	  MFN	  and	  minimum	  standard	  of	  
treatment	  were	  accorded	  to	  foreign	  merchants	  during	  the	  middle	  ages.	  Andrea	  K	  Bjorklunk,	  
‘National	  Treatment’	  in	  August	  Reinisch	  (ed),	  Standards	  of	  Investment	  Protection	  (OUP	  2008)	  
30-­‐31;	  the	  Roman	  Emperor	  promised	  the	  City	  of	  Mantova	  that	  it	  would	  always	  enjoy	  any	  
privilege	  he	  granted	  to	  ‘whatsoever	  other	  town’;	  Andreas	  R.	  Ziegler,	  ‘Most	  Favoured	  Nations	  
(MFN)	  Treatment’	  in	  Reinisch,	  ibid	  61; Francioni	  refers	  to	  the	  development	  of	  special	  
extraterritorial	  legal	  regimes	  for	  commercial	  establishments,	  trade	  centers	  and	  warehouses 
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emerging	  European	  statehood,	  overseas	  expansion,	  and	   the	  works	  of	  17th	  and	  
18th	  century	  scholars	  such	  as	  Hugo	  Grotius	  and	  Francisco	  de	  Vitoria	  that	  jurists	  
began	   to	   assert	   IL	   protection	   for	   the	   rights	   of	   travelling	   and	   trading	   aliens.22	  
This	   temporal	   link	  with	   emergent	   European	   sovereignty	   is	   telling	   since	  what	  
followed	   was	   a	   propagated	   discord	   between	   such	   sovereignty,	   once	  
disseminated	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  dictates	  of	  investment	  protection.	  
The	  public-­‐private	  binary	  was	  thus	  turned	  into	  a	  site	  of	  struggle	  for	  domination	  
over	   regulatory	   space	   and	   an	   ideological	   tug	   of	  war	   as	   to	   the	   route	   by	  which	  
public	   interest	   is	   best	   served.	   Particularly	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   neoliberalism,	   a	  
‘unique	  bargain’	  was	  struck	  ‘in	  which	  developing	  countries	  traded	  part	  of	  their	  
regulatory	  sovereignty	   for	   the	  promise	  of	   foreign	   investment’.23	  An	  analysis	  of	  
the	  roots	  of	  this	  sovereignty/protection	  dichotomy	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  
enquiry	  except	  for	  the	  suggestion	  –	  discernible	  from	  the	  genealogical	  narrative	  
–	   that	   it	   may	   be	   symptomatic	   of	   capitalism’s	   compulsion	   for	   endless	  
accumulation.	   Resources	   and	   markets	   are	   to	   be	   had	   with	   at	   least	   cost	   and	  
disturbance	  and	  at	  maximum	  profit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Lay	  of	  the	  Land	  
Contested	  Rise	  	  
In	   liberal	   writings	   power	   and	   its	   inequalities	   often	   recede	   into	   the	  
background.24	  	   Yet,	   power	  plays	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	   the	   structuring	   of	   the	   global	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
maintained	  in	  Muslim	  lands	  by	  foreign	  merchants	  from	  the	  Italian	  maritime	  republics	  such	  as	  
Venice	  and	  Genoa.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  enable	  these	  Christian	  traders	  to	  benefit	  from	  legal	  
guarantees	  of	  contractual	  and	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  face	  of	  prevailing	  Islamic	  law	  and	  religion.	  
These	  extraterritorial	  legal	  regimes	  form	  a	  precedent	  for	  the	  modern	  ‘free	  Zone’;	  Francesco	  
Francioni,	  ‘Access	  to	  Justice,	  Denial	  of	  Justice,	  and	  International	  Law’	  in	  Pierre-­‐Marie	  Dupuy,	  
Francesco	  Francioni	  and	  Ernst-­‐Ulrich	  Petersmann	  (eds),	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Investment	  IL	  and	  
Arbitration	  (International	  Economic	  Law	  Series,	  OUP,	  Oxford	  2009)	  63.	  
22	  Andrew	  Newcombe	  and	  Louis	  Paradell,	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  Investment	  Treaties:	  Standards	  of	  
Treatment	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2009)	  4.	  	  
23	  Asha	  Kaushal,	  ‘Revisiting	  History:	  How	  The	  Past	  Matters	  For	  The	  Present	  Backlash	  Against	  
The	  Foreign	  Investment	  Regime’	  (2009)	  50	  2	  Harvard	  International	  Law	  Journal	  491	  at	  496.	  	  
24	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  neglect	  of	  power	  in	  liberal	  writing	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  neglect	  
see	  generally	  Andrew	  Hurrell,	  ‘Power,	  institutions	  and	  the	  production	  of inequality’	  in	  Michael 
Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall	  (eds),	  Power	  in	  Global	  Governance	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  
International	  Relations	  CUP	  2005)	  33-­‐58.	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space	   and	   the	   shaping	   of	   institutions. 25 	  	   Overlooking	   it	   thus	   produces	   a	  
knowledge	  deficit,	  whereby	  the	  diffusion/imposition	  of	  dominant	  ideas	  and	  the	  
means	  by	  which	  cooperation	  is	  secured	  are	  glossed	  over.26	  	  With	  regard	  to	  law,	  
the	  technical	  and	  apolitical	  terms	  generally	  applied	  mask	  its	  constitutive	  role.27	  	  
In	   particular,	   covert	   is	   the	   capacity	   of	   capital	   to	   mediate	   power,	   so	   as	   to	  
generate	   norms	   and	   practices	   that	   legitimise	  market	   authority,	   inhibit	   states’	  
regulatory	   functions,	  and	  privilege	  corporate	   interests.28	  	  Space	  constraints	  do	  
not	   permit	   a	   full	   discussion	   that	   does	   justice	   to	   the	   multiple	   ways	   by	   which	  
power	  is	  mediated.29	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  limit	  myself	  to	  the	  events	  with	  which	  the	  
genesis	  of	  BITs	  is	  often	  associated.30	  	  That	  is,	  Third	  World	  solidarity	  that	  came	  
on	   the	   heels	   of	   decolonisation,	   and	   played	   out	   internationally	   in	   the	   General	  
Assembly	   (GA)	   resolutions	   of	   the	   60s	   and	   70s	   and	   domestically	   in	   a	  wave	   of	  
nationalisations.31	  As	   we	   shall	   see,	   such	   solidarity	   was	   to	   be	   fractured	   and	  
replaced	   with	   interstate	   competitiveness.	   Internalisation	   of	   hegemonic	  
discourse	  about	  matters	  such	  as	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  development	  
and	  foreign	  investment	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  alternatives	  followed	  suit.	  	  
Various	   factual	   accounts	   are	   proffered	   as	   to	   how	   BITs	   and	   Third	   World	  
fragmentation	  came	  to	  converge.	  For	  Sornarajah	  it	   is	  reflective	  of	  pragmatism.	  
Developing	  countries	  sought	  to	  combine	  their	  newly	  found	  sovereignty	  with	  the	  
harnessing	   of	   transnational	   corporations	   (TNCs)	   to	   the	   task	   of	   national	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall,	  ‘Power	  in	  Global	  Governance’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  
ibid	  3.	  
26	  Hurrell,	  ibid	  (n	  24)	  52.	  
27	  A.	  Claire	  Cutler,	  Private	  Power	  and	  Global	  Authority:	  Transnational	  Merchant	  Law	  in	  the	  Global	  
Political	  Economy	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  International	  Relations	  CUP	  2003)	  4.	  
28	  ibid	  4-­‐6;	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  authority	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  market	  authority	  in	  particular	  see	  
Rodney	  Bruce	  Hall	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Biersteker,	  ‘The	  Emergence	  of	  Private	  Authority	  in	  the	  
International	  System’	  in	  Rodney	  Bruce	  Hall	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Biersteker	  (eds),	  The	  Emergence	  of	  
Private	  Authority	  in	  Global	  Governance	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  International	  Relations	  CUP	  2002)	  
4-­‐7.	  	  
29	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (25)	  2.	  
30	  See	  for	  example	  Lehavi	  and	  Licht,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  120-­‐21.	  
31	  Examples	  of	  nationalisations	  include	  Iran	  in	  1951,	  Libya	  in	  1955,	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  the	  
Suez	  Canal	  by	  Egypt	  in	  1956	  and	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  an	  array	  of	  foreign	  held	  assets	  by	  Cuba	  in	  
1959.	  For	  the	  ideological	  link	  between	  the	  nationalisations	  movement	  and	  new	  states’	  doctrines	  
see	  Lehavi	  and	  Licht,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  122;	  see	  also	  for	  example	  the	  Libyan	  Government’s	  
Memorandum	  of	  26	  July	  1974	  in	  which	  it	  relied	  on	  the	  doctrine	  of	  Permanent	  Sovereignty	  over	  
Natural	  Resources	  (PSNR)	  to	  assert	  its	  right	  to	  nationalisation.	  Cited	  in	  R.	  Doak	  Bishop,	  James	  
Crawford	  and	  W.	  Michael	  Reisman,	  Foreign	  Investment	  Disputes;	  Cases,	  Materials	  and	  
Commentary	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2005)	  718.	  
49	  
	  
development.	  Consequently,	  at	   the	  same	  time	  as	  being	  protective	  of	  sovereign	  
control	   they	   were	   also	   inconsistently	   concluding	   investment	   treaties.32	  	   Yet,	  
Sornarajah	  accepts	   that	   the	   ‘frantic	   treaty-­‐making	  activity’	  was	  also	  attendant	  
on	  developed	  countries’	  desire	  to	  circumvent	  the	  competing	  norms	  introduced	  
by	  new	  states	  as	  part	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  vision.	  	  In	  
a	  similar	  vein	  but	  with	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  an	  underlying	  power	  based	  design,	  
Anghie	  points	  to	  the	  interaction	  between	  imperialism	  and	  Economic	  IL.	  For	  him,	  
BITs	   emerged	   as	   part	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   and	   deliberate	   move	   by	   capital	  
exporting	  countries	  to	  formulate	  new	  sources	  of	  IL	  through	  the	  instrumentality	  
of	  commercial	  transnational	  law.	  It	  was	  a	  corporations-­‐driven	  tactical	  response	  
to	  the	  threat	  which	  former	  colonised	  countries’	  newly	  found	  sovereignty	  posed	  
to	  their	  traditional	  arrangements	  with	  colonial	  governments.33	  	  From	  a	  political	  
economy	   perspective,	   Arrighi	   formulates	   this	   threat	   as	   the	   reductive	   effect,	  
which	  full	  sovereign	  rights	  were	  bound	  to	  have	  on	  flexibility	  in	  the	  use	  of	  Third	  
World	  resources.34	  	  The	  risk	  was	  that	  true	  independence	  would	  lead	  to	  pressure	  
on	  supplies,	  such	  that	  would	  in	  turn	  generate	  excessive	  competition	  within	  and	  
among	  First	  World	  states.35	  
The	  answer	  to	  the	  risk	  of	   ‘excessive’	  competition	  in	  the	  Global	  North	  seems	  to	  
have	   been	   found	   in	   the	   eventual	   dispensation	   of	   competition	   to	   the	   Global	  
South.	   	  The	  opportunity	  presented	   itself	   in	   the	  80’s	  when,	   faced	  with	  a	  glut	  of	  
global	  liquidity	  that	  threatened	  control	  over	  the	  world’s	  purchasing	  power,	  the	  
US	  abandoned	  traditional	  New	  Deal	  policies	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  alliance	  with	  private	  
high	   finance.	   The	   aim	   was	   to	   restraint	   demand	   for	   Third	   World	   supplies	  
through	   a	   combination	   of	   tight	   monetary	   policies,	   expansion	   of	   national	  
indebtedness	   and	   deregulation.36	  	   The	   outcome	   was	   a	   de	   facto	   Third	   World	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  23;	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  view	  that	  Least	  Developed	  Countries	  (LDCs)	  
came	  to	  realize	  that	  they	  would	  be	  better	  off	  by	  entering	  into	  contractual	  arrangements	  with	  
investors	  which	  Guzman	  terms	  the	  ‘LDC	  enlightenment	  theory’	  see	  Andre	  T	  Guzman,	  ‘Why	  LD	  
Sign	  Treaties	  that	  Hurt	  Them:	  Explaining	  the	  Popularity	  of	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties’	  (1998)	  
38	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law)	  639	  at	  667.	  	  
33	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  226-­‐43;	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  184-­‐85.	  
34	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  The	  Long	  Twentieth	  Century:	  Money,	  Power	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Times	  
(New	  and	  Updated	  edn,	  Verso	  2010)	  332.	  
35	  ibid.	  
36	  ibid	  326-­‐28.	  
50	  
	  
bankruptcy	  and	  an	  ensuing	  competition	  over	  mobile	  capital.37	  	  States	  were	  now	  
expected	   to	   liberalise,	   open	   their	  markets,	   export,	   and	  pay	  back	   their	  debts.38	  	  
The	  move	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  and	  corresponding	  drying	  
up	  of	  lending	  was	  closely	  followed	  by	  the	  disintegration	  of	  socialist	  alternatives	  
and	   the	   adoption	   of	   neoliberal	   orthodoxy	   by	   the	   international	   financial	  
institutions	   (IFIs).39	  	   Such	   orthodoxy	   postulated	   -­‐	   some	  may	   say	   falsely	   -­‐	   that	  
development	  necessitates	  foreign	  investment	  and	  that	  such	  foreign	  investment	  
is	  best	  secured	  through	  treaties.40	  	  	  
It	  is	  thus	  that	  the	  diffusion	  of	  statehood	  triggered	  a	  contest	  in	  which	  new	  states’	  
attempt	   at	   innovations	   was	   met	   with	   multiple	   power	   responses	   that	   in	   turn	  
engendered	   collaboration,	   discursive	   receptiveness,	   fragmentation	   and	  
competitiveness. 41 	  	   Arguably,	   it	   was	   precisely	   because	   BITs	   represented	  
individual	  arrangements	  that	  they	  were	  fitting	  device	  for	  bypassing	  the	  United	  
Nations	   (UN)	   and	   other	   multilateral	   forums	   where	   collective	   action	   made	  
consent	   difficult	   to	   secure.42	  Competition	   was	   thus	   enlisted	   in	   support	   of	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  ibid	  334.	  
38	  Tomas	  Enrlich	  Reifer,	  ‘Beyond	  Divide	  and	  Rule?	  From	  the	  Washington	  to	  the	  Beijing	  
Consensus’	  in	  Sungho	  Kang	  and	  Ramon	  Grosfoguel,	  ‘Geopolitics	  and	  Trajectories	  of	  
Development’	  (2010)	  Research	  Papers	  and	  Policy	  Studies	  45,	  Institute	  of	  East	  Asian	  Studies	  
University	  of	  California	  Berkley	  21.	  	  
39	  The	  propagation	  of	  neoliberal	  doctrines	  among	  the	  IFIs	  is	  associated	  with	  conditionalities	  
that	  required	  developing	  countries	  to	  implement	  market-­‐oriented	  structural	  reforms	  and	  
protect	  private	  property.	  Lehavi	  and	  Licht,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  124.	  
40	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  185-­‐86;	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  disintegration	  of	  socialist	  alternatives,	  often	  
cited	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  a	  cause	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  BITs,	  Sornarajah	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  
the	  Soviet	  Block’s	  states’	  practice	  of	  concluding	  BITs	  began	  when	  communism	  was	  still	  in	  place.	  
ibid	  185;	  evidence	  that	  conclusion	  of	  BITs	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  investment	  is	  inconclusive.	  See	  
Subedi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  86;	  M	  Sornarajah,	  ‘The	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Agenda	  in	  Investment	  Arbitration:	  Its	  Rise,	  
Retreat	  and	  Impact	  on	  State	  Sovereignty’	  in	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  Penelope	  Simons	  and	  Dalvinder	  
Singh	  (eds),	  Redefining	  sovereignty	  in	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (Studies	  in	  International	  
Trade	  Law,	  Hart	  Publishing	  2008)	  20;	  on	  whether	  BITs	  promote	  development	  see,	  for	  example,	  
Jason	  W.	  Yackee,	  ‘Do	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  Promote	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment?	  Some	  
Hints	  from	  Alternative	  Evidence’	  (2010)	  Research	  Papers	  Series	  Paper	  No.	  1114	  University	  
Wisconsin	  Law	  School	  Legal	  Studies	  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1594887>	  accessed	  11	  April	  2011.	  
41	  	  For	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  power	  in	  which	  compulsory	  power	  is	  one	  see	  generally	  Barnett	  and	  
Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  25);	  on	  hegemonic	  production	  of	  collaboration	  see	  for	  example	  Hurrell,	  ibid	  (n	  
26)	  51-­‐52.	  
42	  The	  elusiveness	  of	  multilateralism	  is	  generally	  attributed	  to	  an	  array	  of	  reasons,	  including	  the	  
disagreements	  between	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries,	  the	  complexities	  involved	  and,	  as	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Havana	  Charter	  1948	  and	  the	  Multilateral	  Agreement	  on	  Investment	  (MAI)	  
unsuccessfully	  negotiated	  in	  the	  1990s,	  substantive	  disagreements	  among	  capital	  exporting	  
countries	  as	  well	  as	  opposition	  from	  non-­‐government	  organisations	  (NGOs).	  An	  important	  
concern	  particularly	  in	  the	  US	  camp	  centered	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  having	  to	  settle	  on	  the	  lowest	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investors’	   friendly	   body	   of	   IL	   instruments.43 	  Indeed,	   Dine	   attributes	   BITs’	  
proliferation	   to	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   multilateral	   negotiations	   at	   Cancun.	  
Powerful	  trading	  nations	  picked	  off	  the	  poorer	  countries	  one	  by	  one	  to	  pursue	  
in	  BITs	  and	  FTAs	  those	  same	  contested	  matters	  that	  met	  with	  resistance	  at	  the	  
multilateral	  forum.44	  	  	  
The	  outcome	  was	  a	  regime	   that	   is	  probably	  more	  protective	  of	   investors	   than	  
anything	  which	  could	  have	  been	  achieved	  otherwise.	  	  In	  the	  area	  of	  intellectual	  
property	   rights	   for	   example	   protection	   provisions	   in	   BITs	   are	  more	   stringent	  
than	   those	   required	   by	   TRIPS.45 	  	   Similarly,	   the	   level	   of	   compensation	   for	  
expropriation	  achieved	  through	  BITs	  can	  exceed	  that	  which	  is	  available	  through	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  Hull	  formula.46	  	  The	  process	  is	  now	  coming	  full	  circle	  with	  
the	   proposition	   that,	   disagreements	   over	   a	   multilateral	   agreement	  
notwithstanding,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   BITs	   and	   their	   substantive	   similarities	  
have	  combined	  to	  create	  a	  multilateral	  regime	  in	  any	  event.47	  
A	  narration	  would	  be	  incomplete	  were	  it	  to	  focus	  solely	  on	  interstate	  contest	  to	  
the	   exclusion	  of	   capital.48	  	   Private	   actors’	   role	   in	   the	   shaping	  of	   investment	   IL	  
will	   be	   revisited	   later	   in	   this	   chapter.	   For	   now,	   let	   us	   say	   that	   the	   word	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
common	  denominator.	  On	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  attempts	  at	  a	  multilateral	  investment	  
treaty,	  see	  for	  example	  Stephen	  W.	  Schill,	  The	  Multilateralization	  of	  International	  Law	  
(Cambridge	  International	  Trade	  and	  Economic	  Law,	  CUP	  2009)	  33,	  39,	  54-­‐58;	  Subedi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  
41;	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  20,	  22.	  
43	  For	  an	  argument	  that	  developing	  countries’	  defection	  from	  collaborative	  action	  in	  favour	  of	  
competition	  created	  a	  ‘prisoner’s	  dilemma’	  with	  resulting	  loss	  of	  multilateral	  treaty	  benefits	  and	  
increased	  sovereignty	  costs	  see	  Andre	  T	  Guzman,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  669;	  Zachary	  Elkins,	  Andrew	  T	  
Guzman	  and	  Beth	  Simmons,	  ‘Competing	  for	  Capital:	  The	  Diffusion	  of	  Bilateral	  Treaties,	  1960-­‐
2007’	  (2006)	  60	  International	  Organization	  81;	  for	  a	  game	  model	  supporting	  this	  argument	  see	  
Christoph	  Engel,	  ’Governments	  in	  Dilemma:	  A	  Game	  Theoretic	  Model	  for	  the	  Conclusion	  of	  
Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties’	  (2007)	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  2007-­‐22	  University	  of	  St.	  Gallen	  Law	  &	  
Economics	  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1001174>	  accessed	  20	  Feb	  
2011;	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  this	  theory	  arguing	  a	  theory	  of	  ‘network	  effect’	  see	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  90-­‐
115.	  
44	  Janet	  Dine,	  ‘Multinational	  Companies	  and	  the	  Allocation	  of	  Environmental	  Risk	  in	  
International	  Investment	  Treaties’	  unpublished	  2	  citing	  from	  S.	  Anderman	  and	  R.	  Kariyawasam,	  
‘Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  BITs’	  in	  J.	  Dine	  and	  A.	  Fagan	  (eds)	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
Capitalism	  (Edward	  Elgar	  2005).	  
45	  ibid.	  
46	  Guzman,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  642.	  
47	  See	  for	  example	  Schill,	  ibid	  (n	  42)	  generally.	  
48	  For	  an	  account	  of	  TNCs	  role	  in	  the	  MAI	  negotiations	  see	  for	  example	  Belén	  Balanyá	  and	  
others,	  Regional	  &	  Global	  Restructuring	  &	  the	  Rise	  of	  Corporate	  Power	  (new	  edn	  Pluto	  Press	  
2003)	  109-­‐22.	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‘investors,’	  with	  its	  individualistic	  undertone,	  and	  the	  word	  ‘protection’,	  with	  its	  
suggestion	  of	  vulnerability	  mask	  a	  reality	  in	  which	  the	  protected	  entity	  is	  in	  all	  
likelihood	   a	   commanding	   TNC	   with	   sufficient	   power	   to	   tip	   risk	   allocation	   in	  
their	  favour.	  Taking	  the	  ICSID	  claims	  brought	  against	  Argentina	  as	  an	  example,	  
the	   claimants	  were	  all	  TNCs	   such	  as	  Enron	  and	  Azurix	  of	   the	  US,	  Vivendi	   and	  
Suez	  of	  France,	  Siemens	  of	  Germany,	  Gas	  Natural	  of	  Spain	  and	  National	  Grid	  of	  
the	  UK.49	  	  Backed	  by	  financial	  resources	  that	  in	  some	  instances	  exceed	  those	  of	  
states,50	  and	  utilising	  their	  power	  to	  mobilise	  the	  state’s	  legislative	  monopoly	  in	  
their	   favour	   TNCs	   are	   able	   to	   shape	   the	   political	   and	   developmental	   path	   of	  
countries,	  and	  formulate	  norms	  with	  claims	  to	  IL	  status.51	  	  
The	  growth	  of	   corporate	  private	  authority	   is	   recounted,	   inter	  alia,	   in	  Arrighi’s	  
exposition	   on	   systemic	   cycles	   of	   accumulation	   (SCAs)	   whereby	   their	   rise	  
fundamentally	  distinguishes	  the	  third	  (British)	  hegemonic	  cycle	  from	  that	  of	  the	  
subsequent	   US	   cycle.	   Thus,	   British	   hegemony	   operated	   primarily	   through	   a	  
system	  of	  small	  and	  medium-­‐size	  enterprises.	  US	  hegemony,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
is	   characterised	   by	   large-­‐scale,	   vertically	   integrated	   TNCs.	   	   Attendant	   on	   this	  
change	   is	   a	   shift	   from	   trade	   towards	   direct	   investment	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	  
global	  order.52	  	  This	   transformation	  of	   the	  economic	   landscape	  was	   facilitated	  
by	   the	   capitalist	   legal	   system.53	  	   Modern	   company	   law’s	   device	   of	   a	   ‘holding	  
company’	  enables	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  (M&As).54	  	  In	  turn,	  concepts	  such	  as	  
‘legal	   personality’	   and	   ‘limited	   liability	   protect	   TNCs	   from	   the	   potentially	  
adverse	   implications	   of	   such	   M&As.55	  In	   the	   context	   of	   investment,	   BITs	   are	  
often	   corporations	   driven,	   serve	   their	   globalisation	   agenda	   and	   vest	   rights	   in	  
them,	   while	   remaining	   silent	   on	   their	   responsibility	   and	   indeed	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  2.	  
50	  Janet	  Dine,	  Companies,	  International	  Trade	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  
Corporate	  Law	  (CUP	  2005)	  47	  making	  the	  point	  that	  TNCs	  account	  for	  fifty-­‐one	  of	  the	  world’s	  
largest	  economic	  entities.	  The	  rest	  are	  nation-­‐states;	  for	  a	  graphical	  account	  of	  the	  most	  
powerful	  TNCs	  see	  Transnational	  Institute,	  ‘State	  of	  Power	  (2013):	  A	  Corporate	  World’	  
<http://www.tni.org/article/planet-­‐earth-­‐corporate-­‐world>	  accessed	  16	  April	  2013.	  
51	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  61-­‐62;	  business	  lobbies	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  
Commerce	  (ICC)	  and	  the	  US	  Council	  of	  International	  Business	  for	  example	  worked	  alongside	  
Western	  governments	  in	  promoting	  a	  multilateral	  investment	  protection	  treaty.	  	  
52	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  34)	  73-­‐74;	  for	  a	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  TNCs	  see	  also	  Peter	  T.	  
Mulchinski,	  Multinational	  Enterprises	  &	  the	  Law	  (2nd	  edn	  OUP	  2007)	  8-­‐44.	  
53	  Mulchinski,	  ibid	  33.	  
54	  ibid	  35.	  
55	  Dine,	  ibid	  (n	  44)	  1,	  30-­‐31.	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presence.56	  	  For	  formally	  BITs	  are	  entered	  into	  between	  states.	  In	  sum,	  a	  dualist	  
dynamic	  is	  in	  operation	  whereby	  TNCs	  are	  both	  beneficiaries	  and	  producers	  of	  
juridical	  structures.	  	  
Capacious	  jurisprudence	  
The	   transfer	   of	   investor-­‐state	   disputes	   to	   the	   privately	   modelled	   forum	   of	  
international	  arbitration	  was	  to	  prove	  conducive	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  capacious	  
jurisprudence.	   With	   no	   constitutive	   rules	   and	   with	   standards	   of	   treatment	  
vaguely	   formulated,	   awards	  made	   by	   private	   arbitrators	   are	   relied	   upon	   as	   a	  
source	   of	   expansive	   normative	   construction.	   Thus,	   first	   BITs	   stepped	   into	   the	  
vacuum	   generated	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   definition	   of	   investment	   in	   the	   ICSID	  
Convention	   to	   create	   a	  broad	  and	  open-­‐ended	   concept57	  that	   goes	  beyond	   the	  
common	   understanding	   of	   the	   term	   to	   comprise	   non-­‐tangible	   assets	   such	   as	  
shares,	  contractual	  rights	  and	  intellectual	  property	  rights.58	  	  The	  definition	  was	  
then	   further	   enlarged	   in	   ICSID	   practice	   to	   include	   loans	   guaranteed	   by	   the	  
government	   and	   promissory	   notes.59	  	   In	   time,	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   linkage	  
between	  investment	  and	  development	  was	  weakened	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Phoenix	  
v	  Czech	  Republic	  and	  Saba	  Fakes	  v	  Turkey,	  in	  which	  the	  tribunal	  diluted	  the	  test	  
established	  in	  Salini	  v	  Morocco	  by	  excluding	  the	  requirement	  for	  a	  contribution	  
to	  development.60	  	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  which	  considers	  the	  Salini	  test	  a	  mere	  
starting	   point,	   and	   eliminates	   its	   original	   requirement	   for	   contribution	   to	  
development	  was	  also	  adopted	  in	  the	  recent	  case	  of	  Deutsche	  Bank	  v	  Sri	  Lanka.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  63.	  
57	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  122;	  pre-­‐1990s	  BITs	  provided	  a	  relatively	  restricted	  definition	  of	  
investment.	  However,	  most	  recent	  treaties,	  including	  those	  based	  on	  the	  US	  and	  OECD	  models	  
adopt	  a	  broad,	  descriptive	  approach	  of	  coverage	  such	  as	  ‘every	  kind	  of	  asset’	  together	  with	  an	  
illustrative	  list	  of	  categories.	  Noah	  Rubins,	  ‘The	  Notion	  of	  ‘Investment’	  in	  International	  
Investment	  Arbitration’	  in	  Norbet	  Horn	  (ed),	  Arbitrating	  Foreign	  Investment	  Disputes:	  
Procedural	  and	  Substantive	  Legal	  Aspects	  	  (Studies	  in	  Transnational	  Economic	  Law	  19	  Kluwer	  
Law	  International	  2004)	  292-­‐93.	  	  
58	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  10-­‐18.	  
59	  Ceskoslovenska	  Obchodni	  Banka	  A.S	  v	  The	  Slovak	  Republic	  (1999)	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/97/4;	  
Fedax	  NV	  v	  Venezuela	  (1998)	  37	  ILM	  1378.	  
60	  Saba	  Fakes	  v	  The	  Republic	  of	  Turkey,	  Award	  (2010)	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/07/20;	  Phoenix	  V	  
Czech	  Republic,	  Award	  (2009)	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/06/5;	  Salini	  Costruttori	  S.p.A	  v	  Kingdom	  of	  
Morocco,	  Award,	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/02/13;	  the	  objective	  requirements	  for	  an	  economic	  
activity	  to	  constitute	  an	  ‘investment’	  is	  stated	  in	  the	  Salini	  case	  to	  comprise	  duration,	  regularity	  
of	  profit	  and	  return,	  assumption	  of	  risk,	  substantial	  commitments	  and	  significance	  contribution	  
to	  the	  host	  state’s	  development.	  On	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  Phoenix	  case	  see	  Dine,	  ibid	  (n	  44)	  5,	  7.	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Here,	   the	  majority	   found	   that	   an	   oil	   related	   hedging	   agreement	  was	   an	   asset,	  
that	   claims	   to	  money	   need	   not	   be	   associated	  with	   a	   separate	   investment	   and	  
that	  the	  Salini	  criteria	   ‘are	  not	  fixed	  or	  mandatory	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   law.	  They	  do	  
not	  appear	  in	  the	  ICSID	  Convention.’	  61	  The	  majority	  further	  elaborated	  that	  ‘the	  
development	  of	  case	   law	  suggests	  only	  three	  criteria	  (…)	  namely	  contribution,	  
risk	  and	  duration’	  and	  found	  that	  these	  were	  satisfied	  by	  a	  hedging	  agreement	  
of	   12	  months	   duration	   with	   preceding	   2	   years	   of	   negotiations.62	  Further,	   the	  
Cemex	   tribunal	   confirmed	   that	   rights	   derived	   from	   shares	   entitle	   an	   indirect	  
shareholder	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  Dutch/Venezuela	   BIT.	   thereby	   extending	  
protection	  to	  the	  controversial	  indirect	  portfolio	  form	  of	  investment.63	  	  
Other	   examples	   of	   expansive	   construction	   in	   favour	   of	   investors	   include	   the	  
approval	  of	  corporate	  migration	   to	  another	  state	   to	  secure	   the	  protection	  of	  a	  
BIT	  in	  Aguas	  del	  Tunari	  v	  Bolivia.64	  	  The	  fair	  and	  equitable	  standard	  of	  treatment	  
(FET)	  -­‐	  most	  often	  invoked	  by	  investors	  due	  to	  its	  vagueness	  and	  generality	  65	  -­‐	  
is	   being	   constantly	   expanded	   to	   incorporate	   new	   elements.66	  	   These	   include	  
reasonableness,	   investor’s	   legitimate	   expectations,	   non-­‐discrimination,	  
transparency	   and	   due	   process.67 	  	   In	   the	   Deutsche	   Bank	   case	   the	   tribunal	  
followed	  the	  expansive	  line	  of	  reasoning	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  FET,	  finding	  it	  to	  be	  
an	  autonomous	  standard	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  restatement	  of	  the	  IMS.68	  	  Notably,	  the	  
scope	   of	   treatment	   under	   the	   most	   favoured	   nation	   provision	   (MFN)	   was	  
construed	  to	  extend	  at	  least	  the	  substantive	  benefits	  under	  one	  BITs	  to	  all	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Deutsche	  Bank	  v	  Democratic	  Socialist	  Republic	  Sri	  Lanka,	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/09/12	  para	  294.	  	  
62	  ibid	  para	  295.	  
63	  Cemex	  Caracas	  BV	  and	  Cemex	  Caracas	  II	  Investments	  BV	  v	  Bolivarian	  Republic	  of	  Venezuela	  
(2010)	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/08/15;	  indirect	  investment	  is	  expressly	  provided	  for	  in	  some	  
treaties	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  investment	  chapter	  of	  the	  US-­‐Singapore	  FTA.	  Rubins,	  ibid	  (n	  57)	  
294;	  critics	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  portfolio	  investment	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  investment	  argue	  that	  
such	  investment	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  economic	  development,	  does	  not	  represent	  long	  term	  
commitment,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  trigger	  an	  economic	  crisis	  by	  sudden	  withdrawal	  and	  is	  
generally	  volatile.	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  123;	  Sornarajah	  questions	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  
extending	  protection	  to	  portfolio	  investments	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  shares	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  
BITs’	  definition	  of	  investment	  are	  only	  shares	  in	  the	  investing	  corporate	  vehicle.	  Sornarajah,	  
ibid	  (n	  18)	  12;	  see	  also	  Mulchinski,	  ibid	  (n	  52)	  7-­‐8.	  
64	  Aguas	  del	  Tunari	  v	  Bolivia	  (2005)	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/02/3	  Award	  on	  Jurisdiction.	  
65	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  203.	  
66	  Katia	  Yannaca-­‐Small,	  ‘Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Treatment	  Standard:	  Recent	  Development’	  in	  
Reinisch,	  ibid	  (n	  21)	  111.	  
67	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  202-­‐03.	  
68	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  ibid	  (n	  61)	  para	  478.	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BITs,	   to	  which	   the	  state	   is	  a	  party	  and	  which	  contain	  a	  MFN	  provision.69	  	  This	  
‘multiplying	   effect’	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   fundamentally	   subvert	   the	   negotiated	  
balance	  of	  the	  BIT	  in	  issue.70	  	  
Exceptional	  jurisprudence	  
A	   number	   of	   facets	   conflate	   to	   render	   treaty	   arbitration	   an	   anomalous	   and	  
exceptional	   institution	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   IL.	   First,	   it	   represents	   a	  
departure	  from	  the	  assumption	  of	  reciprocity	  intrinsic	  to	  customary	  IL	  whereby	  
states’	  juridical	  equality	  dictates	  that	  they	  alone	  can	  resolve	  among	  themselves	  
disputes	   involving	   non-­‐state	   actors. 71 	  By	   contrast,	   in	   treaty	   arbitration,	  
investors	   are	   accorded	   locus	   where	   locus	   was	   traditionally	   absent	   and	   are	  
pitched	   directly	   against	   states.72	  Not	   only	   does	   this	   attribution	   of	   standing	  
distance	   IL	   from	   its	  positivist	  mooring,	   but	   it	   also	   legitimises	   the	   existence	  of	  
what	   Cutler	   coins	   ‘private	   international	   regimes’	   –	   the	   formal	   and	   informal	  
institutions	  that	  operate	  as	  a	  source	  of	  governance	  in	  economic	  areas.73	  In	  other	  
words,	   it	   recognises	   non-­‐state	   centres	   of	   power.74	  Thus,	   foreign	   investors	   can	  
avail	   themselves	   of	   awards	   for	   substantial	   damages	   that	   are	   then	   enforceable	  
against	  states	  across	   the	  globe	  without	  any	  national	  or	   international	  vetting.75	  
Given	   the	   possible	   chilling	   effect	   that	   such	   awards	   have	   on	   states’	   decision-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  359;	  for	  a	  baseline	  analysis	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  MFN	  clauses	  see	  Tony	  
Cole	  &	  Madhu	  Agrawal,	  ‘When	  is	  a	  Forum	  “More	  Favourable”?	  The	  Use	  of	  MFN	  Clauses	  to	  Found	  
an	  Investment	  Tribunal’s	  Jurisdiction’,	  (2010)	  Legal	  Studies	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  2010-­‐19,	  
University	  of	  Warwick	  School	  of	  Law	  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1674378>	  accessed	  on	  20	  April	  2011.	  	  
70	  Norah	  Gallagher	  and	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  Chinese	  Investment	  Treaties:	  Policies	  and	  Practice	  (Oxford	  
International	  Arbitration	  Series	  OUP	  2009)	  142.	  
71	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11).	  
72	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  40)	  210.	  
73	  A.	  Claire	  Cutler,	  ‘Private	  International	  Regimes	  and	  Interfirm	  Cooperation’	  in	  Hall	  and	  
Biersteker,	  ibid	  (n	  28)	  29.	  
74	  M.	  Sornarajah,	  The	  Settlement	  of	  Foreign	  Investment	  Disputes	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  
2000)	  6;	  Cutler,	  ibid	  30.	  
75	  Unlike	  New	  York	  Convention	  awards,	  ICSID	  constitutes	  a	  self-­‐contained	  arbitral	  body	  
whereby	  awards	  may	  be	  appealed	  against	  in	  ICSID	  own	  annulment	  proceedings.	  Their	  
enforcement	  bypasses	  national	  courts.	  Arts	  52	  and	  54(1)	  of	  the	  ICSID	  Convention,	  ibid	  (n	  2)	  26-­‐
7;	  the	  award	  of	  US$353	  million	  made	  in	  the	  CME	  Czech	  Republic	  BV	  v	  Czech	  Republic	  on	  13	  Sept	  
2001	  was	  roughly	  equal	  to	  the	  country’s	  entire	  health-­‐care	  budget.	  Von	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  7;	  
following	  the	  Argentinian	  government’s	  decision	  in	  2002	  to	  devalue	  the	  peso	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
country’s	  financial	  collapse,	  the	  over	  30	  claims	  that	  were	  pending	  against	  Argentina	  by	  2006	  
totaled	  US$17	  billion,	  equivalent	  to	  almost	  entire	  national	  budget.	  ibid	  2.	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making,	   in	  all	  other	  areas,	  outside	  of	  Europe,	  claims	  by	  individuals	  against	  the	  
state	  in	  IL	  are	  rare.76	  	  
A	  second	  and	  related	  aspect	  of	   investment	   treaty	  exceptionalism	  arises	  out	  of	  
its	   selectivity.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   a	   designated	   group	   is	   singled	   out	   so	   as	   to	   enjoy	  
privileges	   denied	   to	   others.	   Historically,	   claims	   arising	   out	   of	   state	  
responsibility	   for	   injury	   to	   aliens	   were	   settled	   between	   states	   through	   the	  
instrumentality	   of	   diplomatic	   protection	   and	   rarely	   by	   adjudication.77	  Thus,	  
foreign	  investors	  were	  on	  a	  par	  with	  all	  other	   individuals	   in	  their	  dependency	  
on	   their	  government	   for	   resolution	  of	  grievances.	  The	  exclusive	  availability	   to	  
foreign	  investors	  of	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration,	  argues	  Van	  Harten,	  constitutes	  a	  
powerful	  system	  that	  protects	  one	  class	  of	  individuals	  by	  excluding	  them	  from	  
state’s	  authority.78	  	  Further,	  privileging	  investors	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	   population.	   It	   potentially	   deprives	   them	   of	   regulations	   from	   which	   they	  
would	  have	  otherwise	  benefited,	  or	   from	  public	   initiatives	   that	  are	   foreclosed	  
by	   the	   threat	   of	   a	   treaty	   claim.79	  Given	   the	   essential	   principle	   of	   international	  
society	   ‘that	   a	   state	   is	   the	   legal	   representative	   of	   the	   population	   of	   its	  
territory,’80	  it	  is	  of	  little	  surprise	  that	  beyond	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  extension	  
of	  a	  similar	  privilege	  to	  other	  categories	  of	  complainants	  is	  resisted.81	  
Third	   is	   the	  blurring	  of	   the	  public-­‐private	  binary.82	  	  Within	   this	  binary,	   liberal	  
discourse	  tends	  to	  associate	  the	  former	  with	  states’	  impositions,	  while	  equating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  102-­‐03	  citing	  C	  Harlow,	  State	  Liability:	  Tort	  Law	  and	  Beyond	  (OUP	  
2004);	  despite	  the	  expansion	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  since	  1945,	  individual	  claims	  for	  
damages	  are	  authorized	  only	  under	  the	  European	  and	  American	  conventions	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  
In	  both	  the	  right	  to	  damages	  is	  far	  more	  limited	  than	  under	  investment	  treaties.	  
77	  By	  signing	  on	  to	  the	  ICSID	  Convention	  states	  give	  up	  their	  right	  to	  exercise	  diplomatic	  
protection.	  Art	  27	  ICSID	  Convention	  ibid	  (n	  2)	  19;	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  9.	  
78	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  10.	  
79	  ibid	  9;	  whether	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  business	  regulation	  is	  foreclosed	  by	  investment	  
treaties	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  debate.	  See	  for	  example	  Vandevelde’s	  argument	  that	  most	  host	  states	  
retain	  considerable	  discretion	  to	  regulate	  foreign	  investment’	  by	  narrowing	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  BIT,	  
limiting	  the	  access	  provisions	  and	  adjusting	  standards	  of	  treatment.	  Further,	  he	  argues,	  once	  
investment	  is	  admitted	  most	  host-­‐state	  conduct	  is	  permitted	  provided	  it	  relates	  to	  legitimate	  
regulatory	  objectives,	  is	  non-­‐discriminatory	  and	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  prior	  commitments	  to	  
the	  investor.	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  9-­‐11;	  for	  an	  opposing	  argument	  see	  Dine,	  ibid	  (n	  44)	  9.	  
80	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  9.	  
81	  ibid.	  
82	  ibid	  58-­‐59.	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the	   latter	  with	   individual	  market	   and	   contractual	  based	   freedom.83	  	   In	   reality,	  
trends	   towards	   privatisation	   and	   states’	   engagement	   in	   commercial	   activities	  
cast	  doubt	  over	  the	  coherence	  of	  this	  separation.84	  	  Yet,	  the	  binary	  is	  generally	  
preserved	  in	  IL	  through,	  for	  example,	  the	  distinction	  in	  the	  context	  of	  sovereign	  
immunity	  between	  sovereign	  acts	  (jus	  imperil)	  and	  states’	  commercial	  acts	  (jus	  
gestionis).	  	  Thus,	  a	  state	  may	  be	  stripped	  of	  immunity,	  but	  only	  in	  circumstances	  
where	  its	  act	  is	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  a	  jus	  gestionis.	  	  
Treaty	  arbitration	  extends	  the	  obfuscation	  of	   the	  public-­‐private	  binary	  to	   IL.85	  
For	   now,	   a	   state	   may	   find	   itself	   embroiled	   in	   external	   proceedings,	  
notwithstanding	  that	  the	  act	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  such	  proceedings	  is	  jus	  imperil.	  86	  	  
Further,	   adjudication	   of	   such	   disputes	   is	   assigned	   to	   an	   arbitral	   scheme	   that	  
borrows	   from	   the	  private	  mechanism	  of	   international	   commercial	   arbitration.	  
This	   distortion	   is	   particularly	   arresting	   when	   one	   considers	   the	   essential	  
character	  of	  commercial	  arbitration	  -­‐	  that	  of	  a	  confidential	  private	  alternative	  to	  
national	   courts.	   In	  other	  words,	   commercial	  arbitration	  permits	   the	  parties	   to	  
contract	   out	   of	   the	   public	   adjudicative	   sphere.	   Its	   discourse	   is	   animated	   by	  
notions	  of	  complete	  liberation	  from	  court	  and	  municipal	  control	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  
internationally	   floating	   lex	  mercatoria.87	  ICSID	  accomplishes	   these	  aspirations,	  
notwithstanding	   that	   the	   substance	   of	   disputes	   before	   it	   concerns	   public	  
regulatory	  matters.	  It	  thus	  offers	  a	  supranational	   jurisprudence,	   in	  which	  both	  
the	   adjudicating	   process	   and	   the	   resulting	   awards	   are	   insulated	   from	   the	  
national	   sphere.	   In	   contrast,	   IL	   conventional	   wisdom	   dictates	   that,	   subject	   to	  
constraints	  such	  as	  the	  unavailability	  of	  local	  remedies,	  the	  first	  port	  of	  call	  for	  
the	   resolution	   of	   regulatory	   disputes	   are	   domestic	   courts	   applying	   domestic	  
law.88	  	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   ELSI	   case	   the	   United	   States	   questioned	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Hall	  and	  Biersteker,	  ibid	  (n	  28)	  5.	  
84	  Cutler,	  ibid	  (n	  27)	  236-­‐40.	  	  
85	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  58-­‐59.	  
86	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  by	  consenting	  to	  arbitration	  the	  state	  voluntarily	  renounces	  its	  immunity.	  
This	  seems	  a	  technical	  reasoning	  whereby	  the	  device	  of	  arbitration	  is	  adopted	  to	  enable	  a	  
departure	  from	  IL.	  	  
87	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  74)	  159-­‐61.	  
88	  Van	  Harten	  coined	  the	  term	  ‘regulatory	  disputes’	  to	  denote	  differences	  between	  states	  and	  
private	  parties.	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  49-­‐58;	  In	  Helnan	  v	  Egypt	  the	  ICSID	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  
Committee	  annulled	  the	  tribunal	  decision	  that	  a	  challenge	  by	  the	  investor	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  court	  
was	  required	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  substantive	  validity	  of	  the	  claim.	  The	  Committee	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application	   of	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   local	   remedies	   rule,	   given	   that	   its	   friendship,	  
commerce	   and	   navigation	   (FCN)	   treaty	   with	   Italy	   was	   not	   qualified	   by	   this	  
requirement.	  	  The	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  rejected	  this	  argument.	  It	  
held	  that	  dispensation	  with	  this	  important	  principle	  of	  customary	  IL	  requires	  an	  
express	  exclusion.89	  	  
The	  application	  of	  a	  confidential	  privatised	  scheme	   to	   the	  resolution	  of	  public	  
regulatory	   disputes	   has	   far-­‐reaching	   implications.90	  	   The	   additional	   layer	   of	  
protection	   offered	   to	   investors	   is	   hardly	   controversial.	   Yet,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  
competing	  principles	  attendant	  on	  democratic	  and	  governmental	  policy-­‐making	  
are	   weakened,	   so	   as	   to	   undermine	   the	   ‘basic	   hallmarks	   of	   juridical	  
accountability,	  openness	  and	   independence’.91	  	  Thus,	  with	  practically	  no	   court	  
supervision,	   free	   of	   constitutive	   rules	   and	   armed	   with	   wide	   discretion	   and	  
broadly	   formulated	   standards	   of	   treatment,	   private	   arbitrators	   apply	   private	  
law	  concepts	  and	   techniques	   to	   sit	   in	   judgment	  of	   sovereign	  acts.	  The	  awards	  
meted	  out	  transfer	  substantial	  funds	  from	  the	  public	  to	  the	  private	  purse,92	  and	  
bite	   ever	   more	   deeply	   into	   states’	   regulatory	   space.	   They	   are	   animated	   by	   a	  
propensity	   towards	   an	   absolutist	   approach	   to	   property	   rights	   and	   sanctity	   of	  
contracts;	  such	  that	  exceeds	  modern	  trends	  in	  municipal	  law.93	  	  
Exceptionalism	  is	  underscored	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  commercial	  arbitration	  is	  at	  odds	  
with	  its	  treaty	  counterparty	  in	  a	  number	  of	  material	  respects.94	  	  First,	  in	  relation	  
to	   the	   parties,	   in	   commercial	   arbitration	   jurisdiction	   stems	   from	   consent	  
between	  private	  parties.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  treaty	  arbitration,	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
noted	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  tribunal’s	  approach	  ‘could	  be	  serious	  and	  would	  ‘inject	  an	  
unacceptable	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  into	  the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  investor	  ought	  to	  proceed	  when	  
faced	  with	  a	  decision	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Executive	  of	  the	  State,	  replacing	  the	  clear	  rule	  of	  the	  
Convention	  which	  permits	  resort	  to	  arbitration’.	  Helnan	  International	  Hotels	  A/S	  v	  Arab	  Republic	  
of	  Egypt	  (2010)	  Decision	  on	  Annulment	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/05/19	  paras	  52-­‐53.	  
89	  Case	  Concerning	  Elettronica	  Sicula	  S.p.A	  (ELSI)	  United	  States	  v	  Italy	  (1989)	  ICJ	  Rep.	  15	  para	  50	  
(1989)	  28	  I.L.M.	  1109;	  The	  ICJ	  also	  found	  that	  Italy	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  demonstrating	  that	  there	  
was	  some	  local	  remedy	  which	  has	  not	  been	  exhausted	  so	  that	  its	  defence	  failed.	  	  
90	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  40)	  202.	  	  
91	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  5.	  
92	  ibid;	  see	  also	  Sornarajah,	  (n	  40)	  200-­‐11.	  	  	  
93	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  212	  linking	  absolutist	  trends	  in	  treaty	  arbitration	  to	  the	  
internationalisation	  of	  investment	  contracts;	  Lehavi	  and	  Licht,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  116	  arguing	  that	  the	  
effect	  of	  BITs	  on	  securing	  cross-­‐border	  property	  rights	  is	  unclear;	  see	  also	  Kaushal,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  
511-­‐12.	  
94	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  46-­‐47.	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state	  acting	  in	  its	  public	  capacity.	  Whereas	  in	  commercial	  arbitration	  the	  parties	  
are	  directly	   implicated	   in	   the	  making	  and	  performance	  of	   the	   contract,	   state’s	  
participation	   in	   treaty	   arbitration	   may	   flow	   from	   its	   prioritisation	   of	   public	  
objectives	  rather	  than	  any	  contractual	  obligations.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  third	  party	  
is	   brought	   into	   a	   dispute	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   generally	   excluded	   from	  
commercial	  arbitration.95	  	  In	  commercial	  arbitration,	  either	  party	  may	  institute	  
proceedings.	  In	  treaty	  arbitration,	  the	  right	  to	  bring	  proceedings	  lies	  exclusively	  
with	   the	   investor.	   This	   lack	   of	   reciprocity	   is	   enhanced	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  
substantive	  obligations	  are	  confined	  to	  states,	  whereas	  the	  investor	  is	  devoid	  of	  
any.96	  	   Second,	   with	   regard	   to	   consent,	   in	   treaty	   arbitration,	   jurisdiction	   is	  
founded	  not	  on	  a	  private	  agreement	  but	  on	  a	  sovereign	  act.97	  	  Further,	  consent	  
is	   given	   not	   to	   the	   other	   party	   to	   the	   dispute,	   but	   to	   a	   group	   of	   potential	  
claimants.	   Consensual	   adjudication	   thus	  becomes	  a	   governing	   arrangement	   in	  
which	   agreement	   flows	   from	   an	   interstate	   bargain	   and	   consent	   represents	   a	  
privilege	   rather	   than	   a	   reciprocal	   obligation.98	  	   It	   is	   not	   that	   state	   parties	   are	  
excluded	   from	   participating	   in	   commercial	   arbitration.	   However,	   ordinarily,	  
where	   a	   state	   engages	   in	   commercial	   arbitration,	   it	   does	   so	   pursuant	   to	   an	  
agreement	  that	  was	  entered	  into	  specifically	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  contracting	  
counterparty	   in	   an	   act	   of	   jus	  gestionis.	   The	   implications	   for	  policy	  making	   are	  
thus	  much	  reduced.99	  	  
Finally,	   claims	   for	   damages	   are	   traditionally	   a	   private	   law	   remedy.	   In	   the	  
context	  of	  public	  law	  delinquency,	  it	  is	  applied	  mostly	  in	  adjudications	  between	  
juridically	  equal	  states.100	  	  
In	   sum,	   paradoxically,	   the	   process	   of	   privatisation	   that	   permeates	   investment	  
protection	   law	   is	   triggered	   by	   a	   public	   act	   of	   treatification.	   Thereafter,	   state-­‐
investor	   contracts	   are	   treated	   as	   if	   they	   were	   entered	   into	   between	   private	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  74)	  7;	  see	  also	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11).	  	  
96	  Kaushal,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  491.	  
97	  Van	  Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  48.	  
98	  ibid	  64,	  70.	  
99	  ibid	  62-­‐63.	  
100	  ibid	  105.	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parties.	  101	  In	  Guzman’s	  view	  there	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  this	  mechanism.	  In	  this	  
way,	   he	   argues,	   BITs	   circumvent	   the	   problem	   known	   as	   ‘dynamic	  
inconsistency’.102	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  contracts	  entered	  into	  by	  private	  parties	  enjoy	  
the	   credibility	   associated	   with	   enforceability	   under	   domestic	   law.	   When	  
contracting	  with	  a	  state,	  such	  credibility	  is	  rendered	  impossible	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  
state’s	  monopoly	  over	   legislation,	   and	   the	  practical	   and	  conceptual	  difficulties	  
with	  which	  enforcement	  under	  IL	  is	  fraught.103	  In	  the	  context	  of	  investment,	  the	  
problem	  is	  particularly	  acute	  post-­‐entry	  and	  in	  resources	  contracts.	  Once	  made,	  
withdrawal	  of	  the	  investment	  becomes	  less	  of	  an	  option,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  the	  
balance	   of	   power	   is	   tilted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   state.	   Resources	   contracts	   are	  
particularly	  vulnerable	   to	   this	  dynamic	   since	   they	   tend	   to	  be	  of	   long	  duration	  
and	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  changing	  policies	  of	  successive	  governments.	  It	  is	  argued	  
that	   stabilisation	   clauses	   insulate	   investors	   from	   such	   risks.	   However,	  
theoretical	   difficulties,	   such	   as	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   mere	   contractual	  
provision	  can	  fetter	  a	  state’s	  legislative	  sovereignty,	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  clear	  
conclusion	  that	  the	  clause	  is	  binding	  on	  the	  state	  party.104	  	  The	  treatification	  of	  
contractual	   obligations	   resolves	   the	   problem.	   Now	   the	   state	   and	   the	   investor	  
face	  each	  other	  as	  if	  they	  were	  two	  private	  people	  entering	  into	  the	  transaction	  
on	   equal	   footing.	   This	   is	   so,	   notwithstanding	   that	   the	   state	   is	   fundamentally	  
different	   from	   the	   investor	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	   a	   public	   apparatus	   and	   a	  
representative	  of	  a	  whole	  population.	  In	  achieving	  this	  outcome,	  the	  investor	  is	  
assisted	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  contractual	  rights	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  investment.	  In	  
consequence	   virtually	   any	   investor-­‐state	   dispute	   arising	   out	   of	   a	   negotiated	  
agreement	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  IL.105	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Guzman,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  655.	  
102	  ibid	  658.	  
103	  There	  is	  no	  consensus	  that	  a	  state-­‐private	  party	  contract	  in	  itself	  offers	  additional	  protection	  
under	  IL.	  ibid	  660;	  see	  also	  Lehavi	  and	  Licht,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  128	  for	  an	  argument	  that	  BITs	  function	  
to	  enhance	  the	  credibility	  and	  certainty	  of	  states	  commitment	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  foreign	  
investors’	  legal	  rights.	  	  	  	  
104	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  74);	  see	  also,	  for	  example,	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  281-­‐84;	  Thomas	  W.	  
Waelde	  &	  George	  Ndi,	  ‘Stabilizing	  International	  Investment	  Commitments:	  International	  Law	  
Versus	  Contract	  Interpretation’	  (1996)	  31	  Texas	  International	  Law	  Journal	  215.	  
105	  Guzman,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  656;	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  Guzman’s	  view	  and	  arguing	  that	  states’	  promises	  to	  
investors	  have	  long	  been	  held	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Foreign	   investors	   are	   further	   assisted	   by	   a	   retreat	   from	   the	   very	   same	  
principles	   of	   legal	   separateness	   and	   shareholders	   limited	   liability	   by	   which	  
municipal	   company	   law	  protects	   corporations	   from	   the	   implications	  of	  M&As.	  
Thus,	   protection	   is	   afforded	   by	   adopting	   certain	   principles	   in	   the	   municipal	  
sphere	  only	  to	  discard	  them	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  The	  mechanism	  by	  which	  
this	   double	   act	   is	   performed	   comprises	   recognition,	   markedly	   absent	   from	  
national	  company	  laws,	  of	  the	  parent	  company’s	  control	  of	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  
activities	  of	  its	  locally	  incorporated	  subsidiary.106	  The	  purpose	  of	  such	  ‘lifting	  of	  
the	   corporate	   veil’	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   investment	   protection	   is	   to	   facilitate	   its	  
applicability	  to	  subsidiaries	  incorporated	  in	  the	  host	  states.	  It	  is	  thus	  justified	  by	  
the	  need	  to	  bypass	  the	  requirement,	  often	  found	  in	  foreign	  investment	  national	  
legislation,	   for	   entry	   to	   be	   made	   through	   a	   locally	   incorporated	   company.107	  
Were	   the	   principle	   of	   corporate	   legal	   separateness	   to	   apply,	   such	   locally	  
incorporated	   company	   would	   be	   a	   national	   of	   the	   host	   state,	   and	   therefore	  
outside	   treaty	   protection.	   ‘For	   this	   reason’	   so	   goes	   the	   argument,	   ‘it	   has	   been	  
necessary	  to	  devise	  a	  means	  of	  protection	  for	  the	  locally	  incorporated	  vehicle	  of	  
the	   foreign	   investment’.108	  	   This	  may	  be	   so.	  However,	   it	   could	  be	   argued	  with	  
similar	   conviction	   that	   such	   exceptionalism	   should	   also	   extend	   to	   claims	   for	  
injuries	   sustained	  by	  populations	   and	   the	   environment	   in	   consequence	  of	   the	  
activities	   of	   a	   foreign	   investor.	   Absent	   such	   extension,	   claims	   brought	   against	  
the	   parent	   company	   tend	   to	   stumble	   against	   the	   combined	   barriers	   of	   legal	  
separateness	  and	  the	  territoriality	  of	  state	  jurisdiction.	  Consequently,	  they	  may	  
be	   limited	   to	   an	   action	   against	   the	   local	   subsidiary	   that,	   in	   turn,	  may	  be	   kept	  
short	  of	  funds	  or	  may	  be	  made	  defunct	  altogether.109	  	  The	  prevailing	  resistance	  
to	  such	  extension	  indicates	  an	  ideological	  and	  power	  underpinning	  that	  skews	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the	   legal	  environment	   in	   favour	  of	  TNCs.110	  Matters	  however	  do	  not	  rest	  here.	  
For	   separateness	   appears	   to	   resurface	   in	   other	   instances	   so	   as	   to	   bypass	   the	  
principle	   of	   ‘res	   judicata’	   and	   enable	   the	   institution	   of	   parallel	   claims	   by	  
different	  entities	  within	  a	  group.	  Thus,	   the	  cosmetics	  billionaire,	  Ralph	  Lauder	  
commenced	   arbitration	   against	   the	   Czech	   Republic	   under	   the	   Czech/United-­‐
States	   BIT	   for	   loss,	   allegedly	   suffered	   by	   reason	   of	   government	   advice	   that	  
caused	  him	  to	  divest	  himself	  of	  a	  popular	  television	  station.	  The	  tribunal	  found	  
no	  evidence	  of	  breach	  of	  FET	  and	  the	  claim	  was	  dismissed.	  CME	  Czech	  Republic,	  
a	  Dutch	  company	  owned	  by	  Mr	  Lauder	  then	  brought	  the	  same	  complaint	  again,	  
but	   under	   the	   Dutch-­‐Czech	   Republic	   BIT.	   This	   time	   the	   award	   described	   the	  
Czech	   government’s	   conduct	   as	   amounting	   to	   interference,	   coercion	   and	  
intentional	   undermining.	   Mr	   Lauder	   was	   able	   to	   collect	   through	   his	   Dutch	  
holding	  company	  damages	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  US$353	  million.111	  
Change	  and	  resistance	  
An	  account	  of	  the	  BITs	  program	  will	  be	  incomplete	  absent	  an	  observation	  of	  a	  
possible	   emergent	   backlash.	   Bolivia	   was	   the	   first	   to	   denounce	   the	   ICSID	  
Convention	   on	   2	   May	   2007.112	  	   Reasons	   cited	   include	   references	   to	   ICSID	   as	  
unjust,	  anti-­‐democratic,	  expensive,	  unconstitutional	  and	  inherently	  biased.	  Such	  
bias	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  World	  Bank’s	   involvement	  in	  structural	  adjustment	  
programs	  that	   favour	   investors,	  and	   its	  occasional	  role	  as	  an	   investor	   through	  
its	  International	  Finance	  Corporation	  (IFC)	  arm.	  113	  Ecuador	  exited	  ICSID	  in	  July	  
2009.114	  	   It	   appears	   though	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   denouncement	   pursuant	   to	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Articles	   71	   and	  72	   of	   the	   ICSID	  Convention	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   finally	   determined.115	  	  
Shan	  points	  to	  the	  recent	  resurgence	  of	  the	  Calvo	  Doctrine.116	  	  India	  has	  omitted	  
key	   treaty	   protections	   such	   as	   the	   FET	   and	   the	   MFN	   standards	   from	   its	  
Economic	  Cooperation	  Agreement	  with	  Singapore.117	  	  Resistance	  at	  indigenous	  
and	  societal	  level	  compounds	  awakenings	  at	  the	  state	  level.	   	  An	  example	  is	  the	  
challenge	   mounted	   by	   the	   National	   Roundtable	   Against	   Metallic	   Mining,	  
pursuant	   to	  which	   the	  El	  Salvadoran	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  asked	   to	  declare	   the	  
US-­‐Central	  America	  and	  Dominican	  Republic	  free	  trade	  agreement	  (CAFTA-­‐DR)	  
and	  the	  EU	  agreement	  to	  be	  declared	  unconstitutional.118	  	  
A	  trend	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  limiting	  expansive	  arbitral	  interpretations,	  delimiting	  
sovereignty	  and	  revisiting	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  BITs	  can	  also	  be	  discerned	  
in	   the	   context	   of	   developed	   countries.	   It	   is	   often	   attributed	   to	   the	   changing	  
patterns	  of	  global	  investment	  –	  increasingly,	  developing	  countries	  such	  as	  China	  
and	   India	   are	   becoming	   capital	   exporters,	   with	   the	   potential	   to	   revisit	   the	  
investment	   protection	   agenda	   on	   its	   originators.119	  	   Thus,	   the	  US,	   Canada	   and	  
Mexico	   issued	   a	   statement	   confirming	   that	   the	   FET	   in	   NAFTA	   was	   only	  
reflective	   of	   customary	   IL.	   The	   US	   has	   revised	   its	   Model	   BIT	   to	   include	   non-­‐
economic	   objectives,	   such	   as	   health,	   safety,	   internationally	   recognized	   labour	  
rights	  and	  the	  environment.	  Norway’s	  new	  Model	  BIT	  refers	  to	  corporate	  social	  
responsibility	   (CSR),	   the	  protection	  of	  health,	   safety,	   labour,	   the	   environment,	  
democracy	   and	   human	   rights.120	  	   The	   EU	   is	   now	   proposing	   to	   follow	   in	   the	  
footsteps	   of	  US	   and	  Canada	  by	   resolving	   to	   adapt	   their	  model	  BITs.	   Concerns	  
extend	  to	  matters	  such	  as	   the	  need	  as	   to	  restrict	   interpretative	  discretion	  and	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ensure	   better	   protection	   for	   the	   public	   domain’.121	  	   The	   report	   by	   the	   EU	  
rapporteur	  calls	  for	  greater	  transparency	  in	  ICSID	  proceedings,	  opportunity	  for	  
an	  appeal,	  an	  obligation	  to	  exhaust	  local	  remedies,	  amicus	  curiae	  briefs	  and	  the	  
prevention	  of	  forum	  shopping.	  It	  expresses	  concern	  about	  the	  broad	  definition	  
of	  a	  foreign	  investor	  and	  the	  vagueness	  of	  standards	  of	  protection.122	  	  
There	  is	  also	  some	  evidence	  that	  the	  wave	  of	  BITs	  may	  be	  slowing.123	  Further,	  
while	   the	   majority	   of	   BITS	   remain	   between	   developed	   and	   developing	  
countries,	   a	   respectable	   percentage	   has	   now	   been	   concluded	   between	  
developing	   parties.	   This	  may	   be	   an	   indicator	   of	   their	   rising	   economic	   power.	  
However,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  construed	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  
impulse	   for	   uniformity,	   and	  of	   a	   further	   fracture	  within	   the	  developing	   camp.	  
Notably,	   in	   its	   motion	   for	   a	   resolution	   on	   the	   future	   European	   international	  
investment	   policy,	   the	   European	   Parliament	   (EP)	   stated	   that	   the	   Commission	  
did	   not	   intend	   to	   have	   a	   standard	   model	   for	   all	   emergent	   capital	   exporting	  
countries.	   	   It	  seems	  privileged	  partners	  will	  comprise	  countries	  such	  as	  China,	  
India,	   Mercosur	   and	   Russia.	   There	   is	   no	   mention	   of	   poor,	   purely	   capital	  
importing	   countries.124	  	   As	   Rajagopal	   points	   out,	   ‘Vast	   differences	   in	   levels	   of	  
economic	   and	   political	   power	   between	   Third	  World	   states	   have	   exacerbated	  
collective	   action	   problems	   and	   created	   new	   coalitions.’125	  	   In	   other	   words,	  
power	  variations	  now	  add	  another	   layer	   to	   the	   fragmentation	  of	  Third	  World	  
solidarity.	   BITs	   fit	   into	   such	   variations.	   For,	   formal	   espousing	   of	   reciprocal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  European	  Parliament,	  ‘Report	  on	  European	  on	  the	  future	  of	  European	  International	  
Investment	  policy’	  (22	  March	  2011)(2010/2203	  (INI))	  2	  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A7-­‐
2011-­‐0070&language=EN>	  accessed	  5	  May	  2011.	  	  
122	  ibid	  3-­‐11.	  
123	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  ‘International	  Substitutes	  for	  Domestic	  Institutions:	  Bilateral	  Investment	  
Treaties	  and	  Governance’	  (Oct	  2006)	  Series	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  LEO-­‐027	  Illinois	  Law	  and	  
Economics	  Working	  Papers	  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916351>	  
accessed	  15	  Feb	  2011.	  	  
124	  EP	  Committee,	  ibid	  (n	  121)	  1.	  
125	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal,	  ‘Counter-­‐hegemonic	  International	  Law:	  rethinking	  human	  rights	  
and	  developments	  as	  a	  Third	  World	  Strategy’	  in	  Richard	  Falk,	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  &	  
Jacqueline	  Stevens	  (eds),	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  Third	  World:	  Reshaping	  Justice	  (Routledge-­‐
Cavendish	  2008)	  63.	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rights	   notwithstanding,	   the	   flow	   of	   investment	   in	   a	   BIT	   usually	   remains	   one-­‐
sided,	  with	  little	  change	  to	  its	  power-­‐based	  imbalance.126	  	  
The	  Genealogical	  Framework	  
BITs	  of	  empire	  	  	  
Following	  on	  from	  Anghie’s	  work,	  the	  view	  adopted	  here	  is	  that	  modern	  foreign	  
investment	   protection	   law	   evolved	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   colonial	   encounter.	  	  
Later,	   and	   following	   the	   dissemination	   of	   sovereignty	   to	   former	   colonised	  
territories	  it	  sought	  to	  address	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  competing	  narratives	  of	  
host	  -­‐	  generally	  developing	  countries	  -­‐	  and	  those	  of	  home	  -­‐	  generally	  developed	  
countries	   and	   their	   corporate	   emissaries.127	  	   Put	   simply,	   to	   a	   great	   extent,	  
investment	   IL	  was	   shaped	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   natural	   resources	   that	   are	   the	  
lifeline	   of	   European	   industrialisation	   are	   mostly	   located	   in	   non-­‐European	  
territories.128	  	   Starting	   with	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   this	   was	  
supplemented	   by	   a	   growing	   need	   for	   new	   markets.129	  	   From	   a	   discursive	  
perspective,	   establishing	   a	   Eurocentric	   normative	   universality	   through	   the	  
instrumentality	  of	  IL,	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  historical	  project	  to	  ensure	  unfettered	  
and	  secure	  access	  to	  such	  natural	  resources	  and	  markets.	  Universality	  was	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  177.	  
127	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  IL	  and	  colonialism	  see	  
generally	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17);	  an	  analysis	  of	  investment	  IL	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  conflicts	  
between	  capital	  importing	  and	  capital	  exporting	  countries	  is	  also	  found	  for	  example	  in	  Van	  
Harten,	  ibid	  (n	  11)	  12-­‐18;	  Schill	  acknowledges	  the	  historical	  role	  of	  the	  developing/developed	  
dichotomy	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  investment	  IL	  but	  points	  to	  a	  cutting	  point	  in	  1998	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  MAI.	  Schill,	  ibid	  (n	  42)	  57-­‐58.	  	  
128	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  link	  between	  imperialist	  drives	  and	  19th	  century	  Western	  	  demand	  for	  
raw	  materials	  located	  in	  remote	  places	  see	  Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  The	  Age	  of	  Empire	  1975-­‐1914	  
(Abacus	  1994)	  63.	  
129	  Rather	  than	  the	  quest	  for	  investment	  opportunities,	  Hobsbawm	  points	  to	  the	  search	  for	  
markets	  as	  a	  generally	  more	  convincing	  motive	  for	  late	  19th	  century	  imperialist	  expansion.	  In	  
this,	  ‘China	  was	  one	  which	  haunted	  the	  imagination	  of	  salesmen’.	  ibid	  66-­‐7;	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  
investment	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  market	  opportunities	  are	  complimentary.	  For	  example,	  much	  of	  
the	  inward	  investment	  into	  China	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  wish	  of	  corporations	  to	  secure	  an	  
advantageous	  position	  for	  exploiting	  the	  Chinese	  market;	  Burbank	  and	  Cooper	  also	  point	  to	  the	  
fact	  that,	  compared	  with	  earlier	  empires,	  the	  19th	  century	  empire	  brought	  a	  greater	  section	  of	  
the	  world	  under	  the	  power	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  states	  resulting	  in	  their	  enrichment	  compared	  
with	  their	  colonies.	  Jane	  Burbank	  and	  Fredrick	  Cooper,	  Empires	  in	  World	  History:	  Power	  and	  the	  
Politics	  of	  difference	  (Princeton	  University	  press	  2010)	  287;	  see	  also	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  141-­‐42	  
pointing	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  an	  intimate	  connection	  existed	  between	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  




produced	   to	  explain	  and	   support	   the	   colonial	   encounter,	   and	   later,	   to	   counter	  
the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   dispersed	   sovereignty.130	  	   Taken	   together,	   these	   two	  
developments	  point	  towards	  a	  continuous	  overarching	  imperialist	  function.131	  
This	  last	  statement	  calls	  for	  a	  brief	  amplification.	  It	  will	  be	  necessarily	  brief	  and	  
selective	   since	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   imperialism,	   and	   the	   forces	   by	  which	   it	   is	  
driven	  are	   the	  subjects	  of	  polemic	   that	   is	  outside	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  work.132	  	  A	  
fitting	   starting	   point	   may	   be	   the	   distinction	   between	   colonialism	   and	  
imperialism.	   The	   first	   alludes	   generally	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   physically	   settling	  
territories.133	  	   The	   second,	   postulates	  Doyle,	   implicates	  processes	   and	  policies	  
both	   formal	   and	   informal	   -­‐	   e.g.	   the	   use	   of	   force,	   induced	   collaboration	   and	  
dependency	   -­‐	   the	   desired	   outcome	   of	   which	   is	   the	   establishment	   or	  
maintenance	  of	  an	  empire.	  Their	  essential	  feature	  is	  control.134	  	  In	  other	  words,	  
colonialism	  is	  but	  one	  of	  the	  many	  forms	  empires	  may	  assume.	  	  
As	   against	   this,	   Hardt	   and	   Negri	   may	   argue	   that	   a	   Doyle	   type	   narrative	  
overlooks	  contemporary	  break	  with	  the	  past.135	  	  Such	  break,	  they	  would	  say,	  is	  
manifest	   in	   the	   constitution	   of	   a	   new	   global	   empire,	   one	   that	   is	   devoid	   of	  
territorial	   centres	   of	   power	   and	   control.136	  	   Globalisation	   thus	   produced	   a	  
spatial	   totality,	   in	  which	  nation-­‐states	  have	  been	  replaced	  with	  non-­‐territorial	  
imperial	   sovereignty,	   and	  where	   juridical	   definitions	   ‘tend	   to	   project	   a	   single	  
supranational	   figure	   of	   political	   power’.137	  	   Transcribed	   into	   the	   language	   of	  
investment	   IL,	   these	   observations	   may	   be	   said	   to	   mirror	   the	   debate	   as	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Anghie’s	  central	  argument	  is	  that	  IL	  did	  not	  meet	  imperialism	  as	  a	  fully	  formed	  body	  of	  law.	  
Rather,	  many	  of	  its	  basic	  doctrines,	  including	  that	  of	  sovereignty	  ’were	  forged	  out	  of	  an	  attempt	  
to	  create	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  could	  account	  for	  relations	  between	  the	  European	  and	  non-­‐
European	  worlds	  in	  the	  colonial	  confrontation’.	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  3	  and	  generally.	  
131	  	  Alluding	  to	  imperialism	  as	  a	  hegemonic	  concept	  Rajagopal	  refers	  to	  present-­‐day	  IL	  as	  
‘hegemonic’	  but	  argues	  that,	  combined	  with	  other	  factors,	  globalisation	  raises	  the	  specter	  of	  a	  
return	  to	  an	  ‘imperial	  ‘	  IL	  ‘which	  legitimises	  the	  use	  of	  raw	  power	  by	  the	  USA’.	  Rajagopal,	  ibid	  (n	  
125)	  64,	  67.	  
132	  Michael	  W.	  Doyle,	  Empires	  (Cornell	  Studies	  in	  Comparative	  History,	  Cornell	  University	  Press	  
1986)	  22-­‐30.	  	  
133	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  11.	  
134	  Doyle,	  ibid	  (n	  132)	  45;	  Burbank	  and	  Cooper	  appear	  to	  bring	  Doyle	  and	  Anghie	  together	  by	  
incorporating	  notions	  of	  both	  power	  politics	  and	  politics	  of	  difference	  into	  their	  understanding	  
of	  empires.	  Burbank	  and	  Cooper,	  ibid	  (n	  129)	  11-­‐12,	  39.	  
135	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Empire	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  2000)	  239.	  
136	  ibid	  preface	  xii.	  
137	  ibid	  9.	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whether,	   as	   argued	   here,	   the	   spread	   of	   BITs	   reflects	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   the	  
historical	   binary	   of	   core/periphery	   societies,	   or	   whether	   it	   represents	   a	  
multilateral	  arrangement	  which	  breaks	  with	  the	  past,	  via	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  
global	  order.138	  	  	  
Consideration	   of	   this	   debate	   requires	   a	   brief	   examination	   of	   imperial	  
compulsions.	  Doyle	  points	  to	  the	  warning	  signs	  of	  design	  and	  resistance.	  They	  
should	   alert	   us	   to	   the	   possibility	   that	   collaboration	   may	   not	   be	   truly	  
independent,	  but	  rather	  nominally	  independent	  and	  actually	  subordinate.	  That	  
is	   to	   say,	   the	   imperial	   actor	   exercises	   control	   over	   the	   subordinate	   actor	   to	  
achieve	   outcomes	   the	   latter	  may	   not	   desire.139	  	   Responses	   to	   resistance	   then	  
vary	  according	  to	  the	  level	  of	  imperial	  formality.	  In	  formal	  empires	  resistance	  is	  
met	   by	   police	   actions	   or	   the	   replacement	   of	   formerly	   collaborative	   elites.	   In	  
informal	   ones	   the	   response	   tends	   to	   be	   by	   way	   of	   indirect	   constraints	  
manifested,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  imposition	  of	  embargoes.140	  	  One	  may	  recognize	  
the	  warning	  sign	  of	  design	  in	  US	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  sanctions	  imposed	  against	  
Cuba	  and	  Iran,	  or	  the	  military	  interventions	  and	  regime	  changes	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East	   and	   Central	   Asia.	   However,	   indicators	   of	   influence	   and	   power	   pose	  
difficulties,	  since	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  covert	  and	  problematic	  to	  measure.	  They	  may	  
therefore	  need	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  by	  reference	  to	  outcomes.141	  	  Thus,	  WikiLeaks’	  
revelations	   about	   US-­‐India	   relationship	   exposed	   dynamics	   of	   control	   and	  
influence	  over	   Indian	  political	  elites	   that	  produced	   ‘an	   ignominious	  surrender	  
of	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  dignity’.142	  Rajagopal	  points	  to	  a	  security	  pretext	  for	  
pushing	  a	   trade	  and	   investment	  protection	  design,	  as	  evidenced,	   inter	  alia,	  by	  
an	  article	  written	  by	  Robert	  Zoellick	   shortly	  after	  9/11.	  The	   former	  US	  Trade	  
representative	   argued	   that	   the	   war	   on	   terror	   was	   in	   reality	   a	   war	   for	   free	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Schill,	  ibid	  (n	  42)	  generally;	  for	  an	  opposing	  view	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  legal	  analysis	  see	  for	  
example	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18).	  
139	  Doyle,	  ibid	  (n	  132)	  34,	  37.	  
140	  ibid	  39.	  
141	  Susan	  Strange,	  ‘An	  International	  Political	  Economy	  Perspective’	  in	  John	  H	  Dunning	  (ed),	  
Government,	  Globalisation,	  and	  International	  Business	  (OUP	  1997)	  136;	  Doyle,	  ibid	  (n	  132)	  34.	  
142	  Pankaj	  Mishra,	  ‘Behind	  the	  ‘Rising	  India’	  Lies	  the	  Surrender	  of	  National	  Dignity’	  [5	  April	  
2011]	  The	  Guardian.	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trade.143	  	  For	  Zoellick,	  globalisation	  implicates	  a	  return	  to	  imperial	  IL,	  such	  that	  
legitimises	  the	  use	  of	  raw	  power	  by	  the	  USA.144	  	  
Turning	   to	   investment	   protection,	   even	   if	   Rajagopal’s	   view	   on	   the	   renewed	  
legitimisation	   of	   the	   use	   of	   force	   is	   to	   be	   rejected	   and,	   whether	   or	   not	   one	  
adopts	  Montt’s	  explanation	  of	  the	   ‘network	  effect’	   in	  the	  spread	  of	  BITs,145	  the	  
existence	   of	   design,	   is	   difficult	   to	   ignore.	   The	   neoliberal	   model	   articulates	  
orthodoxies	  actively	  propagated	  by	  the	  US.	  They	  are	  implemented	  through	  the	  
exercise	  of	  power	  and	  the	  drawing	  of	  a	  design.	  146	  	  Consequently,	  states’	  consent	  
to	   act	   as	   competitive	   agents	   and	   to	   embrace	   BITs	   may	   not	   embody	  
independently	   arrived	   at	   outcomes147 .	   Indeed,	   Sornarajah	   asserts	   that	   the	  
power	   of	   TNCs	   to	   secure	   legislation	   that	   penalises	   errant	   states	   is	   amply	  
evident. 148 	  	   Elkin,	   Guzman	   and	   Simmons’	   research	   reveals	   pressure	   on	  
governments	   ‘to	   adopt	   capital-­‐friendly	   policies.’ 149 	  	   Kaushal	   points	   to	   the	  
complementary	  role	  of	  IFIs’	  conditionalities	  in	  imposing	  BITs	  on	  cash-­‐strapped	  
host	  states.150	  	  Inter	  alia,	  such	  policies	  may	  link	  the	  availability	  of	  insurance	  to	  
the	   existence	   of	   BITs.151	  	   In	   particular,	   in	   its	   project-­‐based	   lending	   role,	   the	  
World	   Bank	   avoids	   extending	   loans	   that	   may	   otherwise	   be	   available	   from	  
private	   sources.	   This	   is	   so	   as	   to	   promote	   foreign	   private	   capital. 152	  
Consequently,	  ‘In	  the	  absence	  of	  foreign	  aid	  or	  other	  capital	  inflows,	  developing	  
countries	  must	  create	  a	  favourable	  climate	  for	  foreign	  investment	  before	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Rajagopal,	  ibid	  (n	  125)	  67.	  
144	  ibid	  64.	  
145	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  departing	  from	  Guzman’s	  theory	  of	  ‘prisoner’s	  dilemma’	  whereby	  
competitive	  forces	  drive	  developing	  states	  to	  adopt	  non-­‐desirable	  solutions	  and	  explaining	  the	  
spread	  of	  BITs	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  ‘network	  effect	  –	  ‘an	  economic	  concept	  describing	  those	  
markets	  in	  which	  the	  utility	  derived	  from	  the	  consumption	  of	  a	  good	  or	  service	  increases	  as	  
more	  users	  consume	  the	  same	  good	  or	  service’.	  Thus,	  the	  more	  countries	  enter	  into	  a	  BIT	  the	  
greater	  the	  utility.	  Hence,	  others	  are	  induced	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  
146	  See	  for	  example	  Sornarajah’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘neo-­‐liberal	  agenda’.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  40)	  
206-­‐07;	  Lehavi	  and	  Licht,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  124.	  
147	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  8.	  
148	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  63.	  
149	  Elkins,	  Guzman	  and	  Simmons,	  ibid	  (n	  43)	  2.	  
150	  Kaushal,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  505.	  
151	  ibid	  506.	  
152	  ibid	  507.	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requests	  will	   be	   entertained	   by	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	   institutions’.153	  	   Or,	   in	   the	  
words	  of	  Alvarez:	  
	  
BIT	  partners	  turn	  to	  the	  US	  BIT	  with	  the	  equivalent	  of	  an	  IMF	  gun	  
pointed	  at	   their	  heads;	  others	  may	   feel	   that,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   a	  
rival	   superpower,	   economic	   relations	  with	   the	  one	   that	   remains	  
are	  inevitable.	  For	  many,	  a	  BIT	  relationship	  is	  hardly	  a	  voluntary,	  
uncoerced	   transaction.	   They	   feel	   that	   they	   must	   enter	   into	   the	  
arrangement,	   or	   that	   they	   would	   be	   foolish	   not	   to	   do	   so,	   since	  
they	  have	  already	  made	  the	  internal	  adjustments	  required	  for	  BIT	  
participation	   in	  order	   to	  comply	  with	  the	  demands	  made	  by,	   for	  
example,	  the	  IMF.154	  	  
	  
Further,	   BITs	   entail	   ‘sovereignty	   costs’	   -­‐	   any	   regulatory	   change	   that	   affects	  
foreign	   investors	   is	   potentially	   subject	   to	   review	   by	   an	   external	   tribunal.155	  
Paradoxically,	  the	  fact	  of	  entering	  into	  a	  BIT	  engages	  a	  state’s	  act,	  but	  its	  effect	  
is	   to	   reduce	   the	   state’s	   freedom	   to	   act.156	  Viewed	   from	   this	   perspective,	   BITs	  
appear	  to	  implicate	  designed	  control	  exercised	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  reduced	  
sovereign	  power.157	  	  	  
To	  a	  great	  extent	  power-­‐produced	  outcomes	  are	  assisted	  by	  informality	  so	  as	  to	  
achieve	   greater	   legitimisation.	  Here	  we	  may	  want	   to	   review	  briefly	   Gallagher	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  ibid.	  
154	  Jose	  E.	  Alvarez,	  ‘The	  Development	  and	  Expansion	  of	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties:	  Remarks’	  
(1992)	  86	  American	  Society	  of	  International	  Law	  532;	  But	  see	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  23-­‐24	  
attributing	  the	  spread	  of	  BITs	  to	  an	  initial	  evolvement	  of	  pragmatic	  attitudes	  among	  developing	  
countries	  and	  subsequent	  willingness	  to	  compromise	  following	  on	  from	  the	  dismantling	  of	  
socialist	  alternatives	  and	  changes	  in	  global	  investment	  patterns.	  Yet	  he	  too	  counts	  competition	  
and	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  among	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  success	  of	  BITs.	  	  	  
155	  Elkin,	  Guzman	  and	  Simmons,	  ibid	  (n	  43)	  825.	  
156	  Kaushal,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  511.	  
157	  For	  example,	  the	  requirement	  of	  free	  capital	  repatriation	  of	  funds	  is	  an	  important	  
substantive	  right	  accorded	  to	  investors	  under	  BITs.	  Abba	  Kolo	  and	  Thomas	  Walde,	  ‘Capital	  
Transfer	  Restrictions	  under	  Modern	  Investment	  Treaties’	  in	  Reinisch,	  ibid	  (n	  21)	  213-­‐15.	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and	   Robinson’s	   important	   polemic	   of	   British	   free	   trade	   imperialism	   for	   its	  
striking	   applicability	   to	   present	   day	   eco-­‐political	   realities. 158 	  According	   to	  
Gallagher	   and	  Robinson,	  19th	   century	   imperialism	  combined	  outflow	  of	   goods	  
and	   capital	   with	   the	   willingness	   of	   states	   to	   directly	   intervene	   in	   support	   of	  
their	   economic	   interests. 159 	  These	   fluctuations	   between	   outflow	   and	  
intervention	   determined	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   imperialism	   was	   ‘formal’	   or	  
‘informal’,	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  a	  retreat	  in	  imperialist	  activity.	  Rather,	  when	  
it	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  formal	  political	  bond	  to	  be	  less	  pronounced,	  economic	  
dependence	  stepped	  in,	  so	  as	  to	  keep	  the	  colonies	  bound	  to	  Britain,	  and	  enable	  
their	   use	   as	   agents	   for	   further	   expansion.160	  	  Development	   efforts	   created	   the	  
illusion	   of	   a	   period	   of	  withdrawal.	   Indeed,	   once	   entry	   has	   been	   forced,	   stable	  
governments	   that	   did	   not	   require	   on-­‐going	   coercion	   were	   deemed	   to	   lessen	  
investment	  risks.161	  	  
In	  sum,	  it	  appears	  that	  investment	  protection	  juridical	  structures	  do	  not	  project	  
a	   single	   supranational	   form	   of	   political	   authority,	   but	   rather	   the	   control	   and	  
influence	  exercised	  by	  a	  centre	  or	  centres	  of	  power.	   	  From	  the	  outset,	   foreign	  
investment	  thus	  resided	  in	  a	  fluid	  twilight	  zone	  of	  mutually	  reinforcing	  formal	  
and	   informal	   power	   in	  which	   the	   latter,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   trade	   and	   investment,	  
operated	  as	  a	   tool,	  used	   to	   rectify	   the	  adverse	   consequences	  of	   the	   former.162	  	  
Commercial	  penetration	  bred	  co-­‐operation.163	  Conversely,	  political	  control	  that	  
lacked	  commercial	  penetration	  was	   flawed.164	  	  Either	  way,	  ultimately,	   as	  Lord	  
Clarendon	  pointed	  out	  in	  1870	  in	  the	  context	  of	  China,	  ‘British	  interests	  (…)	  are	  
strictly	  commercial,	  or	  at	  all	  events	  only	  so	  far	  political	  as	  they	  may	  be	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  John	  Gallagher	  and	  Ronald	  Robinson,	  ‘The	  Imperialism	  of	  Free	  Trade’	  (1953)	  Second	  Series	  
VI	  1	  The	  Economic	  History	  Review	  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gallagher.htm>	  accessed	  25	  Sep	  2010.	  
159	  Nicholas	  Frayn,	  ‘Empires,	  Imperialism	  and	  Free	  Trade:	  Reinventing	  the	  Robinson	  and	  
Gallagher	  controversy’	  [17	  March	  2004]	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  
International	  Studies	  Association,	  Quebec,	  Canada	  	  
<http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/5/8/pages73583/p
73583-­‐15.php>	  accessed	  25	  Sep	  2010.	  
160	  Gallagher	  and	  Robinson,	  ibid	  (n	  158)	  3.	  
161	  ibid	  6.	  
162	  For	  examples	  of	  how	  this	  formula	  operated	  with	  various	  degrees	  of	  success	  in	  Latin	  America,	  
China	  and	  the	  US	  see	  ibid	  6-­‐7.	  	  
163	  ibid	  7;	  North	  America	  was	  an	  exception.	  
164	  In	  China	  British	  political	  supremacy	  failed	  to	  dislodge	  Chinese	  self-­‐sufficiency	  resulting	  in	  
social	  and	  political	  instability	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  Taiping	  Rebellion.	  ibid.	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protection	  of	  commerce’.165	  	  	  Applied	  to	  more	  recent	  times,	  this	  analysis	  sheds	  a	  
different	   light	   on	   20th	   century’s	   modes	   of	   expansion	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	  
dissemination	  of	  sovereignty	  to	  non-­‐European	  territories.	  Rather	  than	  an	  ontic	  
break	  with	  the	  past,	  the	  grant	  of	  independence	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  further	  step	  
in	   the	   evolution	  of	   informal	   imperialism.	   From	  now	  on,	  with	   the	   exception	  of	  
instances	   of	   a	   deemed	   need	   for	   intervention,	   formal	   independence	   would	   be	  
founded	  on	  continuing	  informal	  subjugation,	  one	  that	  was	  constructed	  around	  
discursive	  pillars,	  such	  as	  ‘development,’166	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  structural	  and	  
institutional	   integration. 167 	  	   Development,	   argues	   Rajagopal,	   provided	   the	  
ideological	   foundation	   for	   the	  post-­‐colonial	   state.	   It	  was	   invented	   in	   the	  post-­‐
WWII	   to	   spur	   a	   wave	   of	   IL	   innovations,	   including	   Economic	   IL.168	  	   Thus,	   the	  
civilization/development	   discourse	   and	   colonial	   and	   imperial	   acts	   form	   an	  
integrated	  continuum	  along	  which	  investment	  protection	  law	  evolved.169	  
Fractured	  consensus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
If	  the	  formation	  of	  foreign	  investment	  protection	  law	  took	  place	  in	  a	  historical	  
context	  marked	  by	  initial	  domination	  and	  subsequent	  related	  disagreements,	  at	  
what	  point,	  if	  at	  all,	  can	  it	  be	  said	  to	  have	  become	  truly	  consensual?	  After	  all,	  as	  
will	  be	  seen	  below,	  treaties	  played	  no	  lesser	  role	  in	  the	  context	  of	  19th	  century	  
colonialism.	   The	   fact	   of	   their	   imposition	   was	   and,	   arguably	   remains	   severed	  
from	  their	   legal	  validity.170	  	  Another	  way	  of	  formulating	  this	  question	  is	  to	  ask	  
whether	  20th	  and	  21st	   centuries’	   consent	   to	   treaties	   is	   fundamentally	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  ibid,	  citing	  from	  N.A	  Pelcovits,	  Old	  China	  Hands	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  (Octagon	  Books	  1969)	  
85.	  
166	  Referring	  to	  Leroy-­‐Baulieu’s	  1874	  book	  Burbank	  and	  Cooper	  make	  the	  point	  that	  from	  the	  
outset	  modern	  colonialism	  was	  predicated	  on	  a	  myth	  of	  mutually	  beneficial	  progress	  rather	  
than	  conquest	  and	  extraction.	  Burbank	  and	  Cooper,	  ibid	  (n	  129)	  287.	  	  
167	  Literature	  on	  investment	  IL	  generally	  accepts	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  operates	  to	  reduce	  the	  
sovereignty	  of	  host	  stats.	  	  See	  for	  example	  Kaushal,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  496;	  Anghie	  goes	  further	  to	  state	  
that	  starting	  with	  the	  Mandate	  system	  ‘non-­‐European	  sovereignty	  was	  somehow	  destined	  to	  
become	  distinctive	  and	  dependent	  and	  lacking	  in	  real	  economic	  power’.	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  199.	  
168	  Rajagopal,	  ibid	  (n	  125)	  65;	  in	  the	  50s,	  investment	  contracts	  were	  re-­‐named	  ‘economic	  
development	  contracts’	  as	  part	  of	  the	  justification	  for	  their	  internationalisation.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  
(n	  74)	  225.	  
169	  ibid	  75,	  76.	  
170	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  85	  disputing	  Alexandrowicz’s	  account	  that	  pre-­‐	  19th	  century	  capitulation	  
treaties	  were	  originally	  accepted	  voluntarily	  by	  Asian	  states	  seeking	  to	  promote	  trade	  and	  were	  
entered	  into	  on	  equal	  terms	  in	  C	  H	  Alexandrowicz,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  
Nations	  in	  the	  East	  Indies	  (Clarendon	  Press	  1967)	  9.	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from	   its	   colonial	   antecedent;	   are	   BITs	   consensual	   or	   are	   they	   essentially	   the	  
outcome	  of	  reconstituted,	  informal	  imperial	  structures?171	  	  
Lowenfeld’s	  temporal	  taxonomy	  refers	  to	  a	   ‘pre-­‐1917	  consensus’	  that	  signifies	  
the	   accord,	   which	   existed	   during	   the	   times	   of	   European	   empires,	   but	   was	  
confined	  to	  the	  core	  of	  industrialised	  nations.172	  	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  post-­‐	  
1917	   era	   of	   its	   breakdown,	   when	   events	   such	   as	   the	   Mexican	   and	   Russian	  
revolutions,	  new	  doctrines	  canvassed	  by	  newly	  independent	  countries,	  a	  wave	  
of	   nationalisations	   and	   doubts	   among	  Western	   scholars173	  combined	   to	   raise	  
questions	   about	   the	   existence	   and	   content	   of	   customary	   standards	   of	  
investment	   IL. 174 	  	   Publicists	   such	   as	   Schill	   look	   to	   the	   proliferation	   and	  
normative	  convergence	  of	  IIAs	  since	  the	  1990s	  to	  assert	  a	  restored	  order	  and	  a	  
rejuvenated	   multilateralism,	   albeit	   one	   that	   is	   not	   formally	   codified.175	  	   The	  
view	   taken	   here	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   discussion	   above.	   Namely,	   that	   the	  
multilateralisation	   discourse	   overlooks	   the	   means	   by	   which	   consent	   was	  
extracted.	   Even	   if	   consensus	   can	   be	   said	   to	   exist,	   it	   does	   not	   epitomize	   the	  
outcome	   of	   independent	   decision-­‐making.	   	   Rather,	   it	   is	   founded	   on	   enduring	  
power,	  mediated	  through	  global	  structures	  and	  the	  agency	  of	  states	  and	  capital.	  
It	  aims	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  ‘Western	  model	  of	  law	  and	  behaviour	  would	  be	  seen	  
as	  natural,	  inevitable	  and	  inescapable’.176	  	  
The	   reconstitution	   of	   a	   contemporary	   consensus	   meant	   that	   earlier	  
disagreements	   had	   to	   be,	   at	   best	   overcome,	   and	   at	   worst	   marginalised.	   The	  
outcome	   is	   thus	   a	   victor’s	   version	   of	   investment	   IL,	   one	   that,	   inter	   alia,	  
overlooks	   GA	   resolutions	   as	   one	   of	   its	   possible	   sources.177	  	   Given	   that	   such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  invocation	  of	  consent	  as	  justification	  for	  the	  global	  order	  see	  Thomas	  
Pogge,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  International	  Law	  in	  Reproducing	  Massive	  Poverty’	  in	  Samantha	  Besson	  &	  
John	  Tasioulas	  (ed),	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  International	  Law	  (OUP	  2010)	  425-­‐26.	  	  
172	  Andreas	  F.	  Lowenfeld,	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (OUP	  2002)	  391-­‐92.	  
173	  In	  the	  20s	  and	  30s	  Western	  scholars	  such	  as	  Oppenheimer	  and	  Lauterpacht	  doubted	  the	  
extent	  of	  host	  states’	  obligations	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  ibid	  403-­‐04.	  	  	  	  
174	  ibid	  392-­‐415.	  
175	  On	  the	  question	  of	  multilateralism	  see	  also,	  for	  example,	  Rafael	  Leal-­‐Arcas	  	  ‘Towards	  the	  
Multilateralization	  of	  International	  Investment	  Law’	  (2009)	  10	  No	  6	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Investment	  and	  Trade	  865.	  
176	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  146.	  
177	  Ian	  Brownlie,	  Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  law	  (7th	  edn,	  OUP	  2008)	  15;	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  
(n	  18)	  84.	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marginalisation	   is	   contested,	   the	   debate	   that	   animated	   these	   resolutions	  
deserves	  airing.	  	  	  
Schill	  argues	  an	  initial	  rejection	  of	  investment	  protection	  on	  the	  part	  of	  capital	  
importing	   countries.178	  	   Such	   opposition,	   he	   says,	   finally	   changed	   in	   the	   post-­‐
1945	  area,	  and	  then	  again	  in	  the	  1990s	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  socialism.179	  	  As	  will	  
be	   seen	   below,	   the	   proposition	   that	   the	   intention	   was	   to	   reject,	   or	   that	   the	  
change	   in	   position	   was	   as	   fundamental	   as	   it	   is	   made	   out	   to	   be,	   appears	  
overstated.	   	   Rather,	   the	   common	   reaction	   of	   newly	   independent,	   including	  
socialist	  countries	  such	  as	  China,	  was	  to	  adopt	  Western	  discourse	  that	  replaced	  
colonial	   civilized/uncivilized	   binary	   with	   the	   parlance	   of	   development.	  
Internally,	   development	  was	   to	   be	   the	   universalising	   force	   that	  would	   bridge	  
ethnic	  differences	  between	  disparate	  groups	  -­‐	  now	  bundled	  together	  as	  nation-­‐
states	  -­‐	  and	  facilitate	  nation	  building.180	  	  Thus,	  the	  experience	  of	  colonialism	  and	  
a	   predatory	   West	   was	   translated	   into	   a	   commitment	   to	   modernity	   that	   was	  
governed	  by	  Western	  notions	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  the	  raising	  of	  living	  standards	  
through	   industrialisation.181 	  	   This	   position	   is	   hardly	   surprising	   given	   that	  
liberation	   movements	   were	   generally	   led	   by	   Westernised	   political	   and	  
economic	  elites	  who	  sought	  to	  reproduce	  the	  Western	  path	  to	  national	  wealth	  
and	   power.182	  Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   enduring	   effects	   of	   19th	   century	   colonialism	  
and	   the	   Mandate	   system	   of	   early	   20th	   century	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   new	   states’	  
internalisation	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  European	  prescribed	  standards	  -­‐	  the	  way	  
in	   which	   the	   uncivilized	   would	   become	   civilized	   and	   the	   backward	   would	  
progress.183	  Taking	  for	  example	  the	  principle	  of	  state	  responsibility	  for	  injury	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  Schill,	  ibid	  (n	  42)	  19.	  
179	  ibid	  43-­‐44,	  60-­‐64.	  
180	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  204-­‐07.	  
181	  See	  Hardt	  and	  Negri,	  ibid	  (n	  135)	  247-­‐48	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘disciplinary	  project’	  -­‐	  a	  post	  
WWI	  mechanism	  originating	  from	  the	  dominant	  capitalist	  countries	  and	  representing	  a	  takeoff	  
towards	  modernity	  in	  which	  disciplinary	  forms	  of	  industrialised	  production	  are	  posited	  as	  
ineluctable	  from	  development.	  	  
182	  Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  The	  Age	  of	  Extremes:	  1914-­‐1991	  (Abacus,	  London	  1994)	  200.	  Liberation	  
movements	  also	  looked	  to	  the	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  for	  guidance.	  However,	  the	  Revolution	  also	  
emphasized	  the	  centrality	  of	  industrialisation	  to	  development	  and	  was	  by	  reference	  to	  Western	  
discourse.	  
183	  On	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  native	  and	  her	  society	  see	  for	  example	  
Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  127,	  145-­‐46	  and	  generally.	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aliens, 184 	  the	   colonialist	   encounter	   produced	   a	   reformist	   rather	   than	   a	  
repudiatory	   approach.185 	  	   Thus,	   argues	   Montt,	   contrary	   to	   the	   proposition	  
proffered	   by	   a	   number	   of	   Western	   scholars,	   the	   late	   19th	   century’s	   Calvo	  
Doctrine	  pursued	  neither	  the	  immunisation	  of	  states	  from	  liability	  to	  aliens,	  nor	  
a	   prohibition	   of	   foreign	   investment.186	  	   Rather,	   its	   purpose	  was	  more	   limited.	  
That	   is,	   to	   replace	   the	   forcible	   self-­‐help	   excesses	   of	   19th	   century	   diplomatic	  
protection	   with	   state	   and	   nationals-­‐aliens	   equality	   of	   treatment.187	  	   In	   other	  
words,	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  bargaining	  inequality	  attendant	  on	  the	  threat	  of	  
forcible	   response	   from	   militarily	   superior	   powers,	   the	   Calvo	   doctrine	  
represented	   a	   more	   balanced	   and	   equal	   notion	   of	   foreign	   investment	  
protection.188	  	   Beyond	   this,	   it	   remained	   committed	   to	   property	   rights	   and	  
individual	  economic	   freedom.	  Further,	   the	  objective	  was	  to	   incentivise	   foreign	  
investment	   by	   offering	   aliens	   full	   civil	   and	   legal	   equality,	   a	   progressive	  
statement	   in	   those	   days.189	  Furthermore,	   the	   Calvo	  Doctrine	   did	   not	   object	   to	  
diplomatic	  protection	  in	  principle.	  It	  simply	  limited	  its	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  event	  of	  
denial	  of	  justice,	  a	  position	  not	  far	  removed	  from	  Western	  understanding.190	  	  As	  
Walde	   observes	   ‘the	   Calvo-­‐doctrine,	   much	   opposed	   by	  Western	   governments	  
with	   respect	   to	   developing	   countries,	   has	   in	   fact	   been	   –	   and	   still	   is	   –	   the	  
dominant	  maxim	  of	  Western	  countries	  themselves’.191	  	  
Turning	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  compensation,	  Montt	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  
the	  Calvo	  doctrine,	  during	  the	  20th	  century,	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War,	  developing	  countries	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  a	  rule	  of	  law-­‐based	  
concept	   of	   state	   responsibility	   in	   favour	   of	   compensation	   as	   deemed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  	  Liability	  for	  injury	  provides	  standards	  of	  treatment	  of	  aliens	  and	  creates	  host	  state’s	  liability	  
for	  failure	  to	  adhere	  to	  them.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  120-­‐21.	  
185	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  45.	  
186	  ibid.	  
187	  ibid	  38-­‐39,	  48;	  on	  the	  Calvo	  Doctrine	  merely	  opposing	  ‘super-­‐national	  treatment’	  see	  also	  
Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  116)	  248-­‐49;	  the	  diplomatic	  protection	  doctrine	  refers	  to	  the	  principle	  that	  an	  
alien	  carries	  with	  him	  the	  protection	  of	  his	  home	  state.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  121.	  
188	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  33-­‐41.	  
189	  ibid	  39.	  
190	  ibid	  4-­‐5;	  see	  also	  Francioni,	  ibid	  (n	  21)	  63-­‐64.	  
191	  Thomas	  W	  Walde,	  ‘Investment	  arbitration	  under	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  Treaty	  –	  From	  Dispute	  
Settlement	  to	  Treaty	  Implementation’	  (1998)	  2	  Arbitration	  International	  429	  at	  426	  cited	  in	  
Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  45;	  but	  see	  Edwin	  Bochard,	  ‘The	  “Minimum	  Standard”	  of	  the	  Treatment	  of	  
Aliens’	  (1939)	  33	  American	  Society	  of	  International	  Law	  Proceedings	  51	  arguing	  that	  national-­‐
aliens	  equal	  treatment	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  minimum	  standard	  of	  civilised	  norms	  of	  justice.	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appropriate	   by	   the	   state.192 	  He	   then	   equates	   the	   principle	   of	   appropriate	  
compensation	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘expropriation	   without	   compensation’.193	  The	  
reason	   for	   such	   equation	   is	   not	   made	   clear.	   However,	   at	   first	   blush,	   it	   is	  
problematised	   by	   the	   very	   example	   Montt	   gives.	   Namely,	   the	   exchanges	  
between	   the	   Mexican	   and	   the	   US	   governments	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   Mexican	  
agrarian	   reforms	   in	   1914,	   and	   subsequent	   nationalisation	   of	   foreign	   oil	  
companies	   in	   1938.194	  	   To	   expand,	   the	   emphasis	   that	   the	   1917	   Russian	   and	  
Mexican	   revolutions	   placed	   on	   the	   social	   rather	   than	   private	   function	   of	  
property,	   triggered	   a	   debate	   that	  went	   beyond	   property	   rights	   to	   encompass	  
the	  content	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  IMS.195	  In	  its	  exchanges	  with	  the	  US	  Secretary	  
of	   State,	   Cordell	   Hull,	   the	   Mexican	   government	   argued	   the	   subordination	   of	  
private	   property	   rights	   to	   public	   welfare	   and,	   by	   implication,	   the	   primacy	   of	  
societal	   rights	   where	   regulation,	   ownership,	   use	   and	   conservation	   of	   natural	  
resources	   are	   concerned. 196 	  	   The	   corollary	   was	   a	   rule	   that,	   though	  
compensation	  may	  be	  in	  principle	  due,	  questions	  such	  as	  whether	  they	  were	  in	  
fact	   payable	   and	   if	   so,	  whether	  payment	  was	   to	   be	  prompt	   and	   for	   full	   value,	  
were	  contingent	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  circumstances	  of	  the	  taking.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
Mexico	   distinguished	   between	   expropriations	   that	   follow	   on	   from	   juridical	  
reorganisation	   and	   affect	   equally	   the	   population	   as	   a	  whole	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  
and	   takings	   that	   are	   exercised	   by	   decree	   and	   impact	   on	   specific	   individual	  
interests	  on	  the	  other.197	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  first,	  Mexico	  asserted	  the	  absence	  of	  
a	  universally	  accepted	  doctrine	  of	  IL	  ‘that	  would	  render	  obligatory	  the	  giving	  of	  
adequate	  compensation.198	  	  	  
The	   Mexican	   government	   further	   invoked	   the	   principle	   that	   municipal	   laws	  
governed	   the	   time	   and	   manner	   of	   compensation.199	  	   In	   line	   with	   the	   Calvo	  
doctrine,	   it	  argued	  that	  IL	  did	  not	  confer	  on	  aliens	  rights	  that	  are	  greater	  than	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  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  55-­‐56.	  
193	  ibid	  55-­‐57.	  
194	  ibid	  55-­‐56.	  
195	  Lowenfeld	  views	  these	  developments	  as	  marking	  the	  end	  of	  what	  he	  terms	  ‘the	  long	  century	  
of	  consensus’.	  Lowenfeld,	  ibid	  (n	  172)	  392.	  
196	  ibid	  394-­‐95.	  
197	  Mexican	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  US	  Ambassador,	  1	  Sep	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  401.	  	  
198	  Mexican	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  US	  Ambassador,	  3	  Aug	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  399,	  400.	  
199	  ibid	  399.	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those	   afforded	   to	   nationals	   of	   the	   host	   state.200	  	   Hull	   accepted	   the	   legality	   of	  
expropriation	   undertaken	   in	   the	   public	   interest.201	  	  However,	   he	   argued,	   such	  
legality	  was	  subject	  to	  the	  international	  rule	  of	  ’adequate,	  effective,	  and	  prompt’	  
compensation. 202 	  	   This	   ‘ancient	   principle’	   he	   asserted	   was	   integral	   to	   a	  
universally	   recognized	   law	   of	   nations,	   to	   which,	   when	   applied	   to	   aliens,	  
municipal	   laws	   were	   subordinate.203	  	   It	   did	   not	   follow	   from	   this	   that	   foreign	  
nationals	   were	   entitled	   to	   special	   privileges,	   as	   suggested	   by	   the	   Mexican	  
government’s	   ‘wholly	   inapplicable	   doctrine	   of	   equality’.204	  	   Rather,	   it	   was	   a	  
matter	   of	   maintaining	   an	   international	   order	   that	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	  
preservation	  of	  ‘reason,	  equity	  and	  justice’.205	  
A	   degree	   of	   semantic	   similarities	   in	   the	   invocation	   of	   notions	   of	   equity	   and	  
justice	  notwithstanding,	  the	  writings	  reveal	  different	  perspectives	  –	  collective	  v	  
individualist	  -­‐	  and	  contrasting	  interests.	  For	  Mexico,	  social	  justice	  appears	  to	  be	  
associated	  with	   the	   collective	   needs	   of	   an	   impoverished	   nation,	  whose	   future	  
should	  not	  ‘be	  halted	  by	  the	  impossibility	  of	  paying	  immediately	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
properties	  belonging	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  foreigners	  who	  seek	  only	  a	  lucrative	  
end’.206	  	  Equity	  requires	  that	  payments	  would	  not	  be	  made	  to	  foreign	  nationals	  
in	  circumstances	  when	  her	  own	  nationals	  could	  not	  be	  similarly	  compensated.	  
Hull,	  by	  contrast,	  invokes	  IL	  in	  defence	  of	  individualised	  ‘human	  and	  property’	  
rights,	  the	  deprivation	  of	  which	  cannot	  be	  legitimised	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  others	  are	  
equally	   deprived.	   Justice	   requires	   that	   such	   individual	   rights	   be	   protected	  
regardless	   of	   collective	   circumstances.	   Thus,	   according	   to	  Hull,	   IL	   operates	   to	  
afford	  protection	  and	   justice	  by	  ensuring	   that,	   the	  wellbeing	  of	  own	  nationals	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  ibid	  395.	  
201	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  Mexican	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US,	  21	  July	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  398.	  
202	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  Mexican	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US,	  22	  Aug	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  400.	  This	  
formula	  stipulates	  a	  standard	  of	  compensation	  whereby,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  such	  compensation	  
must	  reflect	  the	  full	  value	  of	  the	  property	  taken.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  209.	  
203	  Lowenfeld,	  ibid	  (n	  172)	  400.	  
204	  ibid.	  
205	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  Mexican	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US,	  21	  July	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  398.	  
206	  Mexican	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  US	  Ambassador,	  3	  Aug	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  399.	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notwithstanding,	   governments	  may	  not	  be	   free	   to	   take	  property	  beyond	   their	  
ability	  or	  willingness	  to	  pay.207	  	  
Both	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   obligation	   to	   pay	   ‘prompt,	   adequate	   and	   effective’	  
compensation	  and	  its	  status	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  customary	  IL	  remain	  the	  subject	  of	  
intense	   debate.	   In	   Sabbatino,	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   declined	   to	   review	  
expropriation	   by	   Cuba,	   commenting	   that	   there	   were	   ‘a	   few	   if	   any	   issues	   in	  
international	  law	  today	  on	  which	  opinion	  was	  so	  divided	  as	  the	  limitations	  on	  a	  
state’s	  power	  to	  expropriate	  the	  property	  of	  aliens’.208	  	  The	  OECD	  considers	  that	  
positive	   attitudes	   towards	   foreign	   investment	   and	   the	   proliferation	   of	   BITs	  
containing	   the	   Hull	   formula	   deprive	   the	   debate	   of	   practical	   significance.209	  	  
Sornarajah,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  opines	  that	  the	  issue	  remains	  both	  controversial	  
and	   of	   practical	   significance	   given	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   BITs	   is	   limited	   to	   law	  
making	   as	   between	   the	  parties.	   Further,	   BITs	   are	   not	   uniform	   in	   this	   respect.	  	  
Their	   effect	   becomes	   even	   more	   questionable	   when	   variables	   such	   as	  
differences	   in	  bargaining	  power	   are	   factored	   in.210	  According	   to	  Reinisch,	   20th	  
century	   nationalisations	   and	   developing	   countries’	   doctrines	   operated	   to	  
dislodge	  the	  Hull	  formula	  from	  its	  former	  status	  of	  a	  widely	  accepted	  expression	  
of	   customary	   IL,	   leaving	   a	   much	   reduced	   principle	   that	   at	   least	   some	  
compensation	  must	  be	  paid	   for	   expropriation.211	  	  Mendelson	   refers	   to	   the	  on-­‐
going	  raging	  controversy	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  Hull	  formula	  represents,	  or	  indeed	  
has	   ever	   represented,	   a	   standard	   of	   customary	   IL.212	  	   Be	   it	   as	   it	  may,	  Montt’s	  
characterisation	  of	  developing	   countries’	  position	  as	   ‘opportunistic’	   departure	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  Us	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  Mexican	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  21	  July	  1938,	  cited	  in	  ibid	  
398.	  
208	  Banco	  National	  de	  Cuba	  v	  Sabbatino	  [1964]	  376	  US	  398,	  428.	  
209	  OECD	  Directorate	  for	  Financial	  and	  Enterprise	  Affairs,	  ‘“Indirect	  Expropriation”	  and	  the	  
“Right	  to	  Regulate”	  in	  International	  Investment	  Law’	  (2004)	  2004/4	  Working	  papers	  on	  
international	  investment	  2	  <www.oecd.org/data/oecd/22/54>	  accessed	  14	  Aug	  2010;	  but	  see	  
Sornarajah’s	  distinction	  between	  developing	  countries’	  subscription	  to	  ‘appropriate	  
compensation’	  at	  the	  international	  level	  and	  their	  pragmatism	  driven	  practice	  of	  signing	  BITs	  
containing	  the	  Hull	  Formula	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (18)	  211.	  
210	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  208-­‐11.	  
211	  August	  Reinisch,	  ‘Legality	  of	  Expropriation’	  in	  Reinisch,	  ibid	  (n	  21)	  194-­‐195;	  see	  also	  for	  
example	  D	  J	  Harris,	  Cases	  and	  Materials	  on	  International	  Law	  (6th	  edn,	  Sweet	  &	  Maxwell	  2004)	  
596-­‐601.	  
212	  M.	  H	  Mendelson,	  ‘Agora	  What	  Price	  Expropriation?	  Compensation	  For	  Expropriation:	  The	  
Case	  Law’	  (1985)	  79	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  395.	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from	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  appears	  questionable.213	  	  Mexico	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  dispute	  the	  
principle	  of	  compensation.	  Rather,	  she	  questioned	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  customary	  
IL	   in	   the	   specific	   circumstances	   of	   a	   nationwide	   systemic	   reform.	   In	   this,	   she	  
was	   not	   alone.	   The	   1937	   edition	   of	   Lauterpacht	   similarly	   qualified	   a	   state’s	  
obligation	   to	   respect	   the	   property	   of	   aliens	   by	   reference	   to	   ‘fundamental	  
changes	  in	  the	  political	  system	  and	  economic	  structure	  of	  the	  state’:214	  	  
	  
In	   such	   cases	   neither	   the	   principle	   of	   absolute	   respect	   for	   alien	  
private	   property	   nor	   rigid	   equality	   with	   the	   dispossessed	  
nationals	   offers	   a	   satisfactory	   solution	   to	   the	   difficulty.	   It	   is	  
probably	   that,	   consistently	   with	   legal	   principle,	   such	   solution	  
must	  be	  sought	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  partial	  compensation.215	  
	  
The	  OECD	  similarly	  distinguishes	  between	  expropriation	  -­‐	  generally	  applied	  to	  
individual	   measures	   taken	   for	   a	   public	   purpose	   -­‐	   and	   nationalisation,	   which	  
involves	  large-­‐scale	  takings	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  executive	  or	  legislative	  act.216	  
Turning	   to	   the	   newly	   independent	   states’	   attempts	   at	   bringing	   about	   a	  NIEO,	  
were	   such	  attempts	   rejectionist	   or	   reformist	   and	  adaptive?	   In	   itself,	   the	  word	  
‘international’	  in	  the	  NIEO	  points	  to	  a	  participatory	  approach,	  rather	  than	  to	  an	  
intent	  at	  withdrawal.	  Indeed,	  for	  Anghie,	  the	  aim	  was	  to	  reform,	  not	  to	  dispense	  
with	  IL.	  	  
Reform	  meant	  that	  the	  discipline	  had	  to	  be	  stripped	  of	  its	  colonial	  past.217	  It	   is	  
here	  that	  the	  new	  states’	  response	  to	  the	  grant	  of	  sovereignty	  proved	  fractious.	  
For	  them,	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  sovereignty,	  the	  hard	  won	  prize	  of	  their	  struggle,	  was	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  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  55-­‐57.	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  L.	  Oppenheim,	  International	  Law	  (9th	  edn,	  Jennings	  and	  Watt	  1992)	  407.	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  OECD,	  ibid	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  ibid	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understood	   to	   have	   made	   them	   ‘masters	   in	   their	   own	   house’	   and	   to	   have	  
conferred	  on	  them	  real	  power	  and	  equality,	  both	  political	  and	  economic.218	  The	  
desirability	   of	   development	   as	   a	   universalising	   and	   progressive	   force	   was	  
accepted. 219 	  However,	   the	   path	   to	   such	   development	   required	   that	   the	  
relationship	   between	   former	   colonised	   and	   former	   colonisers	   be	  
transformed.220	  	   The	   creation	   of	   IL	  which	  would	   cater	   also	   for	   their	   interests,	  
and	   in	  which	   their	  power	   to	   shape	   their	  national	   future	  would	  not	  be	  a	  mere	  
formality	  was	   to	  be	  part	  of	   such	   transformation.221	  	  By	   contrast,	   for	   the	  West,	  
the	   diffusion	   of	   sovereignty	   represented	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	   shift	   from	  
exclusion	  to	  inclusion,	  via	  a	  prescribed,	  European-­‐modelled	  uniform	  process	  of	  
self-­‐reform.222	  Further,	  new	  states’	  participation	  was	  to	  support	  the	  universality	  
of	   IL’s	   classical	   origins.223	  Thus,	   the	   emphasis	   was	   on	   the	   strengthening	   and	  
continuation	   of	   an	   institution	   that	   had	   been	   shaped	   by	   the	   powerful	   colonial	  
powers	   and	   has	   served	   their	   interests.224	  With	   this	   level	   of	  misapprehension,	  
and	  given	  the	  enormity	  of	  what	  was	  at	  stake,	  the	  eruption	  of	  a	  contest	  seemed	  
inevitable.	  
In	  issue	  was	  the	  question	  of	  whether,	  by	  reason	  of	  new	  states’	  non-­‐participation	  
in	  the	  construction	  of	  IL	  their	  creation	  occasioned	  a	  demarcation	  line	  between	  
past	  and	  future,	  and	  a	  point	  at	  which	  reform	  could	  take	  place.	  For	  the	  West,	  the	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  ibid	  196	  citing	  from	  R	  P	  Anand,	  ‘Role	  of	  the	  “New”	  Asian-­‐African	  Countries	  in	  The	  Present	  
International	  Legal	  Order’	  (1962)	  56	  American	  Law	  of	  International	  Journal	  383	  at	  390.	  	  
219	  ibid	  207.	  
220	  ibid,	  208	  citing	  from	  R	  P	  Anand,	  ‘Attitude	  of	  the	  Asian-­‐African	  States	  Toward	  Certain	  
Problems	  of	  International	  Law’	  in	  F.	  Snyder	  and	  Surakiart	  Sathirathai	  (eds),	  Third	  World	  
Attitudes	  Toward	  International	  Law:	  An	  Introduction	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1987).	  	  	  
221	  ibid	  198.	  
222	  Anghie	  points	  to	  the	  mandate	  system	  as	  charged	  with	  the	  task	  of	  grooming	  non-­‐European	  
territories	  for	  the	  impeding	  de-­‐colonialisation	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  their	  future	  participation	  in	  the	  
existing	  international	  institution.	  This	  was	  important	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  universality.	  
It	  was	  to	  be	  achieved	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  an	  international	  institution	  with	  a	  shift	  in	  IL	  
narrative	  from	  exclusion	  to	  inclusion.	  Thus,	  under	  the	  mandate	  system	  development,	  
persuasion,	  ethical	  administration,	  common	  goals	  and	  shared	  interests	  replaced	  the	  language	  of	  
exploitation,	  coercion	  and	  exclusion.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  create	  self-­‐governing	  societies	  by	  
restructuring	  their	  interior	  in	  a	  process	  of	  self-­‐reform.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Mandate	  
system	  that	  the	  role	  of	  ‘standards’	  (rather	  than	  rigid	  legal	  rules)	  in	  maintaining	  flexibility	  was	  
first	  recognized.	  For	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  the	  mandate	  system	  see	  Anghie,	  ibid	  115-­‐95	  and	  
Anthony	  Anghie,	  ‘The	  Evolution	  of	  International	  Law:	  Colonial	  and	  Postcolonial	  Realities’	  in	  Falk,	  
Rajagopal	  &	  Stevens,	  ibid	  (n	  125)	  42-­‐44.	  
223	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  197.	  
224	  ibid	  198.	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dissemination	   of	   sovereignty	   from	   Europe	   to	   elsewhere	   supported	   the	   claim	  
that	  IL	  as	  a	  truly	  universal	  discipline	  had	  finally	  come	  of	  age.225	  The	  argument	  
as	  found	  for	  example	  in	  the	  writing	  of	  Karol	  Gess	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  
prior	  to	  and	  while	  being	  colonised	  new	  states	  had	  no	  existence	  cognizable	  by	  IL.	  
It	   follows	   that	   they	   entered	   the	   international	   area	   through	   conquest	   and	  
colonialisation.	  The	  statehood	  then	  gifted	  to	  them	  was	  thus	  of	  European	  origins	  
and	  bound	  with	  existing	  IL.	  226	  Doctrines	  such	  as	  state	  succession	  and	  acquired	  
rights	  supported	  this	  proposition	  that,	  having	  assumed	  a	  Eurocentric	  statehood,	  
new	  states	  were	  deemed	  to	  have	  accepted	  the	  IL	  that	  went	  with	  it.227	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  new	  states	  questioned	  the	  applicability	  ‘stock	  lock	  and	  barrel’	  of	  
a	   discipline	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   which	   they	   did	   not	   participate,	   which	   they	  
believed	   to	   have	   been	   structured	  with	   the	   furthering	   of	  Western	   interests	   in	  
mind,	   and	   which	   imposed	   on	   them	   onerous	   and	   inequitable	   concessions.228	  	  
Once	  again,	  disputes	  over	  the	  doctrine	  of	  state	  responsibility	  for	  injury	  to	  aliens	  
moved	   centre	   stage.	   	   Following	   on	   arguments	   advanced	   earlier	   in	   Latin	  
America,	   the	   new	   states	   disputed	   Eurocentric	   understanding	   of	   state	  
responsibility.	  In	  particular	  they	  resisted	  the	  imposition	  of	  an	  external	  standard	  
through	  the	  medium	  of	  an	  IMS	  and	  the	  associated	  exclusion	  of	  aliens	  from	  the	  
application	  of	  municipal	   laws.	  From	  this	   flowed	  an	  assertion	  of	  equality	   in	  the	  
treatment	   of	   foreign	   investors	   and	   nationals,	   one	   that	   was	   to	   be	   based	   on	  
domestic	  laws	  and	  jurisdiction.229	  	  
By	  the	  60s	  and	  70s,	  the	  newly	  independent	  states	  embarked	  on	  realizing	  their	  
aspirations	  to	  bind	  together	  political	  and	  economic	  sovereign	  equality.	  They	  did	  
so	  by	   formulating	  within	   the	  GA	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	   IL	  doctrines.230	  These	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  ibid	  197-­‐98,	  
226	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  219.	  
227	  Broadly,	  these	  doctrines	  refer	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  continuity	  of	  obligations	  whereby	  a	  
government	  is	  bound	  by	  rights	  granted	  to	  private	  parties	  by	  its	  predecessors;	  it	  encompass	  the	  
principle	  of	  Pacta	  Sunt	  Servanda.	  	  
228	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  198,	  209-­‐10.	  
229	  ibid	  209.	  
230	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  UN	  debate	  regarding	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  the	  PSNR	  and	  whether	  it	  created	  
a	  new	  legal	  basis	  as	  argued	  by	  Syria	  for	  example	  see	  Karol	  N	  Gess,	  ‘Permanent	  Sovereignty	  Over	  
Natural	  Resources:	  An	  Analytical	  Review	  of	  the	  United	  Nation	  Declaration	  and	  Its	  Genesis’	  
(1964)	  International	  &	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  13	  398,	  408-­‐11.	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came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  NIEO.	  In	  the	  main	  the	  NIEO	  comprised	  the	  Permanent	  
Sovereignty	  Over	  Natural	  Resources	  (PSNR)	  resolution	  of	  1962	  and	  the	  Charter	  
of	   Economic	   Rights	   and	   Duties	   among	   States	   (CERDS)	   resolution	   of	   1974.	  
Together	   they	   challenged	   the	   mandate	   era’s	   narrative	   of	   externally	   led	  
progress.231	  The	  PSNR	  was	  also	  a	  response	  to	  the	  industrialised	  countries’	  move	  
to	  address	  their	  dependency	  on	  overseas	  raw	  materials	  and	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  
their	   supply	   lines	  by	   concluding	   the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  of	  1941.232	  	  This	  Charter	  
sought	  to	  characterize	  natural	  resources	  as	  ‘the	  raw	  materials	  of	  the	  world’.233	  	  
The	   NIEO	   tackled	   IL	   on	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   including	   nationalisation,	  
expropriation,	  standards	  of	  compensation,	  exhaustion	  of	  domestic	   jurisdiction,	  
and	  principles	  of	  Pacta	  Sunt	  Servanda	  and	  acquired	  rights.234	  	  Opinions	  as	  to	  its	  
implications	   for	   investment	   IL	   vary.	   	   Gess	   concludes	   that	   the	   PSNR	  positively	  
affirms	   four	   of	   IL’s	   basic	   principles.	   Namely,	   that	   (i)	   lawful	   expropriation	  
attracts	   compensation;	   (ii)	   the	   measure	   of	   compensation	   is	   subject	   to	  
international	   standards;	   (iii)	   states	   are	   bound	   by	   their	   promises	   to	   investors;	  
(iv)	  arbitration	  agreements	  are	  binding.235	  	  Yackee	  is	  assisted	  by	  this	  conclusion	  
to	  critique	  the	  ‘myth’	  that	  ‘BITs	  are	  necessary	  to	  establish	  an	  international	  legal	  
principle	  of	  Pacta	  Sunt	  Servanda	  in	  state-­‐investor	  relationship.236	  	  He	  attributes	  
such	   myth	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   Guzman’s	   contention	   that,	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	  
destructive	   effect,	  which	   the	   PSNR,	   and	   even	  more	   so,	   the	   CERDS	   had	   on	   the	  
Hull	   formula,	  BITs	  provide	  a	  route	  by	  which	  the	  credibility	  of	  states’	  promises	  
can	   be	   restored.	  237	  In	   fact,	   argues	   Yackee,	   by	   its	   articles	   3	   and	   4,	   the	   PSNR	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  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  212.	  
232	  Nico	  Schrijver,	  Sovereignty	  over	  Natural	  Resources:	  Balancing	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  (CUP	  1998)	  
37;	  see	  also	  Anghie,	  ibid.	  
233	  	  Schrijver,	  ibid;	  The	  US-­‐UK	  joint	  declaration	  known	  as	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  provided	  the	  
blueprint	  for	  many	  of	  today’s	  agreements	  including	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  
(GATT);	  see	  also	  Anghie,	  ibid	  212;	  if	  the	  division	  of	  wealth	  between	  developing	  and	  developed	  
countries	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  the	  natural	  resources	  of	  the	  first	  and	  the	  technological	  
advances	  of	  the	  latter,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  principle	  of	  humanity’s	  
free	  access	  to	  natural	  resources	  and	  IL	  principles	  relating	  to	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  
expressed,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  TRIP	  agreement.	  The	  characterisation	  of	  resources	  as	  belonging	  
to	  humanity	  as	  a	  whole	  can	  be	  found	  also	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  mandate	  era.	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  
212.	  
234	  For	  the	  various	  understandings	  of	  permanent	  sovereignty	  see	  Schrijver,	  ibid	  (n	  232)	  22-­‐23;	  
for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  UN	  about	  these	  issues	  see	  Gess,	  ibid	  (n	  230)	  420-­‐48.	  
235	  	  Gess,	  ibid	  448.	  
236	  Yackee,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  10,	  21.	  
237	  Guzman,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  648-­‐51.	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affirms	  the	  binding	  nature	  of	  host	  states’	  promises	  to	  investors	  and	  their	  right	  
to	   agree	   international	   adjudication.238	  Outside	   of	   the	   PSNR,	   in	   international	  
jurisprudence	   predating	   BITs,	   tribunals	   consistently	   presumed	   that	   states’	  
promises	  were	  enforceable,	  so	  that	  investors	  were	  entitled	  to	  compensation	  in	  
the	  event	  of	  a	  breach.239	  	  
In	   the	   same	   vein,	   Sornarajah	   points	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   states’	   control	   over	   all	  
economic	   activities	   within	   its	   boundaries	   is	   a	   self-­‐evident	   principle	   of	   state	  
sovereignty. 240 	  	   Thus,	   he	   argues,	   the	   PSNR	   encapsulated	   an	   inoffensive	  
principle.	  The	  sole	  reason	   it	  required	  re-­‐articulation	  was	  developed	  countries’	  
quest	   for	   on-­‐going	   post-­‐colonial	   domination. 241 	  	   Yet,	   Sornarajah	   may	   be	  
overlooking	   the	   full	   legal	   implications	   of	   the	   GA	   resolutions,	   such	   that	   may	  
explain	   why	   they	   produced	   the	   contest	   they	   did.	   For	   implied	   in	   them	   was	   a	  
preceding	  native	  sovereignty,	  one	  that	  ‘survived	  the	  colonialist	  encounter’.242	  	  It	  
followed	   that	   the	   new	   states	   had	   the	   right	   to	   review	   concessions	   granted	   by	  
colonial	   powers	   to	   trading	   companies	   including,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   assessment	   of	  
any	  compensation	  payable.243	  	  
Schrijver	   contends	   that	   the	   PSNR	   eventually	   matured	   into	   a	   comprehensive	  
principle	  of	  treaty	  law	  and	  state	  practice.244	  	  In	  the	  process	  it	  produced	  a	  myriad	  
of	  states’	  rights	  and	  duties,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  regulate	  foreign	  investment,	  a	  
duty	   to	  co-­‐operate	   in	   international	  development,	   respect	   for	   IL,	   fair	   treatment	  
of	   foreign	   investors	   and	   obligations	   pertaining	   to	   the	   taking	   of	   foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  Yackee,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  14-­‐15;	  the	  reference	  to	  IL	  was	  however	  removed	  from	  the	  CERDS;	  see	  
also	  Sornarajah	  who	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  Hull	  Formula	  and	  ‘appropriate’	  compensation	  as	  
in	  the	  PSNR.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  208-­‐11;	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  Guzman’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  CERDS	  as	  
essentially	  placing	  the	  investor	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  that	  government	  see	  Yackee,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  16-­‐18	  	  
239	  ibid,	  abstract	  1.	  
240	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  83.	  
241	  ibid.	  
242	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  212.	  
243	  ibid	  212-­‐13.	  
244	  Schrijver,	  ibid	  (232)	  34.	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property.245	  	  Chowdhury	  considers	  that	  at	  best	  the	  PSNR	  established	  a	  norm	  of	  
‘equitable	  principles’	  in	  determining	  compensation.246	  	  	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   divergence	   of	   views	   summarised	   above,	   and	   attempts	   at	  
marginalising	  the	  GA	  resolutions	  as	  soft	  law	  or	  as	  lex	  ferenda,	  they	  continue	  to	  
constitute	  a	  source	  of	  principles	  of	  investment	  IL.247	  	  As	  Sornarajah	  points	  out,	  
In	  comparison	  with	  GA	  Resolutions,	   law	   that	   is	   stated	   to	  have	  emanated	   from	  
such	  low-­‐order	  sources	  as	  publicists’	  writings	  and	  private	  arbitrators’	  decisions	  
carries	  little	  weight.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  he	  argues,	  states’	  opinions	  ‘must	  have	  the	  
effect	   of	   neutralising	   the	   views	   stated	   by	   mere	   individuals	   (…)’.248	  	   In	   this	  
Sornarajah	   is	   supported	   by	  Brownlie	  who	   includes	   the	   PSNR	   in	   his	   list	   of	   GA	  
resolutions	  that	  ‘provide	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  progressive	  development	  of	  the	  law	  and	  
the	  speedy	  consolidation	  of	  customary	  rules’.249	  
In	  sum,	  the	  narrative	  that	  evolved	  around	  attempts	  at	  reforms	  raises	  a	  number	  
of	   issues.	  The	   first	  pertains	   to	   the	  proposition	   that	   the	  doctrines	  proffered	  by	  
the	  new	  states	  shattered	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  consensus.	  Echoing	  Schill’s	  assertion	  of	  
a	   process	   of	  multilateralisation,	   Schwebel	   considers	   that	   such	   consensus	  was	  
reconstituted	   when	   a	   cascade	   of	   parallel	   BITs	   cut	   through	   the	  
developed/development	  divide	  to	  create	  an	  essentially	  unified	  investment	  IL.250	  	  
In	  reality,	  as	  evidenced,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  codification	  difficulties,	  all	  along	  variances	  
ran	  and	  continue	  to	  run	  through	  the	  discipline.251	  	  Further,	  given	  the	  vagueness	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  For	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  these	  rights	  and	  obligations	  see	  ibid	  258-­‐364.	  
246	  Kamal	  Hossain	  and	  Subrata	  Roy	  Chowdhury	  (eds),	  Permanent	  Sovereignty	  over	  Natural	  
Resources	  in	  International	  Law:	  Principles	  and	  Practice	  (Frances	  Pinter	  1984)	  1,6,15.	  
247	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  83.	  
248	  ibid	  84.	  	  
249	  Brownlie,	  ibid	  (n	  177)	  15;	  see	  also	  Texaco	  v.	  Libya,	  ibid	  (n	  19)	  where	  the	  arbitrator	  accepted	  
that	  the	  PSNR	  expresses	  real	  general	  will.	  	  
250	  Stephen	  M.	  Schwebel,	  ‘Investor-­‐state	  Disputes	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  International	  Law:	  
The	  Influence	  of	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  on	  Customary	  International	  Law’	  (2004)	  98	  
American	  Society	  of	  International	  Law	  Proceedings	  27;	  for	  an	  opposing	  view	  see	  for	  example	  
Sornarajah	  argument	  that	  BITs	  contain	  widely	  disparate	  principles	  and	  standards.	  Sornarajah,	  
ibid	  (n	  18)	  85.	  	  
251	  When	  finally	  welcomed	  by	  the	  GA	  following	  forty	  five	  years	  of	  attempts	  at	  codification,	  the	  
Draft	  Articles	  on	  State	  Responsibility	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts	  comprised	  only	  residual	  
rules	  and	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  define	  the	  content	  of	  international	  obligations	  the	  breach	  of	  which	  
gives	  rise	  to	  responsibility.	  [2001]	  ‘General	  Commentary	  (1)	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  State	  
Responsibility	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  with	  Commentary’	  
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>	  accessed	  
23	  Sep	  2010;	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  efforts	  to	  codify	  state	  responsibility	  see,	  for	  example,	  Montt,	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of	   BITs’	   provisions,	   the	   lack	   of	   uniformity	   in	   their	   interpretation252	  and	   the	  
sporadic	   inconsistency	   of	   arbitral	   awards,253	  it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   the	  
mere	   fact	   of	   abundant	   treatification	   is	   sufficient	   to	   support	   an	   argument	   of	  
disciplinary	  unity.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  inventory	  of	  the	  disagreements	  surrounding	  the	  
normative	   content	   and	   sources	   of	   investment	   IL	  may	   suggest	   otherwise.	   The	  
proposition	  that	  it	   is	  a	  cohesive	  body	  of	   law	  founded	  on	  a	  meeting	  of	  minds	  is	  
thus	  vulnerable	  to	  questioning.	  	  
The	  second	  and	  related	   issue	   touches	  on	   the	  notion	  of	  a	   linear	  progression	  of	  
universal	   dimensions. 254 	  Referred	   to	   by	   Yackee	   as	   a	   ‘make-­‐believe	  
universalism’,255	  such	   notion	   is	   at	   pains	   to	   erase	   the	   diversities	   of	   interests,	  
power	   and	   perspectives	   which	   criss-­‐cross	   political	   economy.	   	   Arguably,	   its	  
success	  is	  limited,	  given	  that	  the	  question	  of	  why	  host	  countries	  should	  want	  to	  
participate	  in	  a	  program	  that	  entails	  sovereignty	  and	  potential	  monetary	  costs	  
continues	  to	  engage	  much	  scholarly	  attention.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  BITs	  minimise	  the	  
credibility	  deficit	   inherent	   in	   states’	   contractual	  promises.256	  	   In	   this	  way,	   it	   is	  
argued,	   BITs	   encourage	   foreign	   investment	   and	   thus	   contribute	   to	   economic	  
development.	  Yet,	  Yackee’s	  critique	  of	  the	   ‘myth’	  of	  pursuit	  of	  certainty	  serves	  
to	   undermine	   this	   contention.	   Further,	   empirical	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   BITs	  
may	  not	  necessarily	  produce	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  foreign	  investment.257	  	  In	  
this	   respect,	   one	   is	   struck	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   no	  BIT	  has,	   so	   far,	   been	   concluded	  
between	  developed	  countries,	  notwithstanding	  that	  it	  is	  there	  that	  the	  greatest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ibid	  (n	  7)	  59-­‐60;	  see	  also	  Schill	  on	  the	  point	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  MAI	  was	  due	  to	  
disagreements	  among	  developed	  countries	  and	  opposition	  from	  NGOs.	  Schill,	  ibid	  (n	  42)	  54-­‐58.	  
252	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  85.	  
253	  Yackee,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  7.	  
254	  ibid	  71.	  
255	  ibid.	  
256	  See	  for	  example	  Guzman’	  theory	  discussed	  in	  the	  text	  to	  n	  101-­‐05;	  see	  also	  Jeswald	  W.	  
Salacuse,’	  The	  Treatification	  of	  International	  Investment	  Law’	  (2007)	  13	  Law	  &	  Business	  
Review	  America	  155	  arguing	  that	  other	  factors,	  such	  as	  relation-­‐	  building	  and	  economic	  
liberalisation	  are	  also	  at	  play.	  	  	  
257	  Yackee,	  ibid	  (n	  40);	  see	  also	  for	  example	  Salacuse,	  ibid	  161-­‐62;	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  40)	  201;	  
Ginsburg,	  ibid	  (n	  123)	  16,	  18-­‐19	  pointing	  that	  ‘the	  best	  available	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  BITs	  
have	  either	  no	  effect	  or	  a	  minimal	  positive	  effect	  on	  investment	  flow;	  Brazil	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  a	  country	  which	  attracts	  substantial	  foreign	  investment	  notwithstanding	  that	  it	  
neither	  signed	  the	  ICSID	  Convention	  nor	  concluded	  many	  BITs.	  Similarly,	  Bolivia	  continued	  to	  
attract	  foreign	  investment	  despite	  tightening	  its	  foreign	  investment	  regime.	  Subedi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  
86;	  but	  see	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  117	  referring	  to	  studies	  which	  establish	  BITs’	  positive	  effect	  
on	  the	  flow	  of	  investment.	  The	  quality	  of	  such	  investment	  is	  less	  researched.	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concentration	  of	   foreign	  investment	  flow	  is	  to	  be	  found.258	  	   If	  we	  are	  to	  accept	  
that	  matters	  such	  as	  credibility	  deficit	  and	  flow	  of	  investment	  are	  not	  in	  reality	  
the	  main	  drivers	  behind	  ‘make	  belief	  universalism’,	  what	  then	  might	  be	  its	  true	  
purpose?	   	   	  A	   clue	  may	  be	   found	   in	  Arrighi’s	  definition	  of	  hegemonism	  and,	   in	  
particular,	  his	  reference	  to	  ‘(…)	  the	  additional	  power	  that	  accrues	  to	  a	  dominant	  
group	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  place	  all	  the	  issues	  around	  which	  conflict	  rages	  
on	   a	   “universal”	   plane’. 259 	  	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	   universalism	   thus	  
appears	  to	  be	  a	  tool	  in	  the	  kit	  of	  hegemonism,	  a	  discourse	  in	  which	  BITs	  serve	  
the	   purpose	   of	   spreading	   prescriptive	   liberalisation	   throughout	   developing	  
economies.260	  	   Yet,	   the	   emergent	   backlash,	   alluded	   to	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	  
indicates	   that,	  whether	   constructed	  on	   a	   foundation	  of	   ‘consent’	   or	   ‘coercion’,	  
hegemonic	   structures	   remain	   vulnerable	   to	   changing	   circumstances,	   and	   the	  
revival	   of	   suppressed	   disagreements.	   	   Or	   as	   Yackee	   puts	   it,	   this	   system	   of	  
‘grandiose	  ambitions’	  ignores	  at	  its	  peril	  ‘the	  basic	  truth	  that	  foreign	  investment	  
is	  ‘at	  least	  as	  some	  level,	  inherently	  controversial’.261	  	  
The	   third	   issue	   concerns	   IL’s	   role	   in	   supporting	   imperial	   control.	   	   Can	   capital	  
exporting	  countries’	  uncompromising	  response	  to	  attempts	  at	  reform	  be	  said	  to	  
reflect	   a	   strategy	   –	   a	   design	   aimed	   at	   curbing	   potential	   erosion	   of	   their	  
domination?	   According	   to	   Montt,	   the	   Calvo	   doctrine	   was	   the	   subject	   of	  
‘historical	   and	   conceptual	   misunderstanding’. 262 	  	   Was	   this	   a	   random	  
misunderstanding,	  or	  was	   it	   the	  by-­‐product	  of	  an	  anxiety	  about	  change	   in	   the	  
balance	  of	  power?	   	   Indeed,	   looking	  at	   investment	   law	  through	  the	  prism	  of	   its	  
genealogy,	   it	  may	   be	   said	   that	   the	   developed/developing	   discourse	   resides	   in	  
the	   interior	   of	   the	   discipline.	   Its	   normative	   content	   was	   constructed	   with	   a	  
specific	  section	  of	  the	  global	  community	  in	  mind;	  claims	  to	  universalism	  formed	  
part	   of	   a	   strategy.	   This	   proposition	   is	   in	   line	  with	  Anghie’s	   view	   of	   BITs	   as	   a	  
tactical	   response	   to	   post-­‐colonial	   states’	   resistance,	   one	   that	   is	   located	   in	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  Ginsburg,	  ibid	  (n	  123)	  3-­‐4.	  
259	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  34)	  29.	  
260	  Salacuse,	  ibid	  (n	  256)	  160;	  see	  also	  for	  example	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  3	  arguing	  that	  
promoting	  a	  liberal	  investment	  regime	  may	  be	  regarded	  ‘as	  a	  second	  major	  function	  of	  BITS’.	  
261	  	  Yackee,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  73-­‐74.	  
262	  Montt,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  47.	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historical	   continuum	   of	   imperialist	   design.263	  	   It	   is	   also	   supported	   by	   the	   gap	  
between	   discourse	   and	   its	   institutional	   materialisation.	   The	   PSNR	   expressly	  
links	   a	   state’s	   exercise	   of	   permanent	   sovereignty	   with	   a	   requirement	   to	  
promote	  people’s	  wellbeing.264	  	  As	  we	  saw,	  the	  language	  of	  wellbeing	  is	  a	  shared	  
one,	  and	  one	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Western	  narrative	  of	  the	  mandate	  
system.	   Yet,	   then	   as	   now,	   for	   the	  West,	   it	   is	   welfare	   that	   should	   be	   properly	  
shaped	   by	   its	   own	   interests	   and	   under	   its	   control.	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   least	  
controversial	  outcomes	  of	  BITs	  is	  the	  reduction	  in	  host	  states’	  sovereign	  space	  
for	  independent	  policy.265	  	  Thus,	  as	  pointed	  by	  Sornarajah,	  in	  the	  BITs	  and	  ICSID	  
generation	   the	   sanctity	   of	   investment	   contract	   is	   often	   protected	   to	   the	  
exclusion	   of	   other	   considerations,	   such	   as	   public	   interest,	   bargaining	   capacity	  
deficit	   and	   the	   environment.	   This	   is	   notwithstanding	   that	   municipal	   contract	  
laws	   have	   shifted	   towards	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   such	   surrounding	  
circumstances	   to	   better	   facilitate	   just	   outcomes.266	  	   A	   reductive	   trend	   has	  
emerged	   more	   recently	   in	   the	   face	   of	   changing	   foreign	   investment	   patterns.	  
However,	   rather	   than	   being	   value-­‐driven,	   such	   trend	   responds	   to	   a	   threat	   of	  
adjustments.	   This	   raises	   the	   possibility	   that	   promised	   changes	   may	   not	  
represent	  a	  true	  re-­‐assessment	  of	  the	  role	  Economic	  IL	  plays	  in	  the	  constitution	  
of	  the	  world	  order.	  More	  likely,	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
hegemonic	  interests.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  236.	  
264	  GA	  Resolution,	  ‘Permanent	  Sovereignty	  Over	  Natural	  Resources’	  (1803)	  XVII	  of	  14	  December	  
1962,	  guideline	  1	  <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/resources.htm>	  accessed	  16	  April	  
2011.	  
265	  For	  example,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  performance	  requirements	  in	  some	  BITs	  prevents	  host	  
states	  from	  engaging	  in	  a	  desired	  industrial	  policy.	  Similarly,	  the	  provision	  for	  free	  transfer	  of	  
profits	  may	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  the	  host	  state	  to	  prevent	  the	  flight	  of	  ‘hot	  money’	  as	  
happened	  during	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  of	  1997-­‐98.	  Ginsburg,	  ibid	  (n	  123)	  10.	  
266	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  40)	  212.	  
87	  
	  
CHAPTER	  3:	  THE	  PARADIGM	  –	  DIVINE	  MARKETS	  	  
Introduction	  
At	   the	   time	   of	  writing,	  markets	   have	   assumed	  mythological	   proportions.	   Like	  
the	  deities	  of	  ancient	  days,	  their	  displeasure	  looms	  over	  popular	  discontent.	  In	  
places	  such	  as	  Greece	  and	  Italy	  governments	  live	  or	  die	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  nurse	  
divine	   predicaments.	  Human	   sacrifice	   is	   the	   order	   of	   the	   day.	   Translated	   into	  
modern	  discourse,	  what	  is	  being	  witnessed	  is	  the	  practice	  of	  neoliberalism.	  
In	  the	  liberal	  art	  of	  government,	  says	  Foucault,	  markets	  inhabit	  the	  site	  of	  truth.	  
Conceptualised	   as	   spontaneous	   and	   natural,	   they	   constitute	   a	   benchmark,	   by	  
which	  correct	  administration	  is	  distinguished	  from	  an	  erroneous	  one.1	  Market-­‐
based	   veracity	   is	   then	   complemented	   by	   legal	   doctrine. 2 	  	   Theirs	   is	   an	  
intertwined	  narrative,	   in	  which	  the	  history	  of	   truth	   ‘is	  coupled,	   from	  the	  start,	  
with	   a	   history	   of	   law’.3	  Or	   as	   Hayek,	   a	   founding	   father	   of	   the	   neoliberal	  
movement	  succinctly	  put	  it:	  ‘Liberalism	  is	  a	  doctrine	  about	  what	  the	  law	  ought	  
to	   be’. 4 	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   normative	   content	   of	   juridical	   principles	   is	  
embedded	   in	   the	   paradigmatic	   logic	   of	   the	   prevailing	   art	   of	   government.	   The	  
two	  evolve	  in	  tandem	  so	  as	  to	  shape	  the	  trajectory	  of	  institutional	  configuration.	  
The	   outcome	   is	   an	   interdependent	   eco-­‐political-­‐juridical	   ensemble.	   Within	   it,	  
the	   function	   of	   distinguishing	   truth	   from	   falsehood	   has	   been	   allocated	   to	  
markets.	   Law	   then	   provides	   the	   rules	   by	   which	   differentiation	   is	   practiced.5	  	  
Thus,	  it	  validates	  sovereign	  self-­‐limitation,	  segregates	  public	  intervention	  from	  
individual	   independence,	   and	   enables	   contract-­‐based	   social	   relationships.6	  It	  
articulates	  the	  rationality	  of	  what	  Wood	  terms	  the	  ‘Empire	  of	  Capital’7	  or	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Michel	  Foucault	  (tr),	  The	  Birth	  of	  Biopolitics:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  De	  France	  1978-­‐1979	  
(Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2008)	  32.	  
2	  ibid.	  
3	  ibid	  35.	  
4	  F.A.	  Hayek,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Liberty	  (Routledge	  Classics	  2006)	  90.	  
5	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  35.	  
6	  ibid	  37-­‐38,	  41.	  
7	  Ellen	  Meiskins	  Wood,	  The	  Empire	  of	  Capital	  (Verso	  2005).	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Gill	  names	  ‘the	  ‘empire	  of	  civil	  society’,	  being	  one	  in	  which	  private	  property	  and	  
mobile	  capital	  take	  precedence	  over	  political	  jurisdiction.8	  
Seen	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  Marxist	  determinism,	  such	  ensemble	  cannot	  but	  follow	  
capitalism’s	  crisis-­‐prone	  and	  ultimately	   fatal	   logic	  of	  endless	  accumulation.	  By	  
contrast,	  for	  liberal	  thinkers	  capitalism	  is	  no	  more	  than	  an	  economic	  theory.	  In	  
other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  embedded	  in	  structures,	  and	  so,	  when	  at	  risk,	  is	  capable	  of	  
self-­‐rescue	   through	   institutional	   innovations. 9 	  	   The	   evocative	   rhetoric	   of	  
freedom	  and	  civilizational	  peril,	  adopted	  by	  the	  1947	  founding	  statement	  of	  the	  
neoliberal	   Mont	   Pelerin	   Society	   (MPS)	   to	   describe	   such	   risk,	   captures	   the	  
essence	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   message,	   and	   the	   way	   it	   plays	   on	   internalised	  
discourse,	  one	  that	  treads	  a	  path	  between	  collective	  civilizational	   imaging	  and	  
related	  individual	  fears	  and	  aspirations.10.	  The	  message	  states:	  
	  
The	   central	   values	   of	   civilization	   are	   in	   danger.	   Over	   large	  
stretches	  of	  the	  earth’s	  surface	  the	  essential	  conditions	  of	  human	  
dignity	  and	  freedom	  have	  already	  disappeared.	  (…).	  The	  position	  
of	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   voluntary	   group	   are	   progressively	  
undermined	  by	  extensions	  of	  arbitrary	  power.	  11	  
	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  juridical	  constituent	  of	  the	  eco-­‐political-­‐
juridical	   ensemble.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   turn	   my	   attention	   to	   its	   paradigmatic	  
imperatives.	   Given	   that	   both	   paradigm	   and	   law	   are	   mechanisms	   for	   the	  
expression	   of	   discursive	   truths,	   such	   division	   may	   appear	   at	   first	   blush	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Stephen	  Gill,	  ‘The	  Contradictions	  of	  US	  Supremacy’	  in	  Leo	  Panitch	  and	  Colin	  Leys	  (eds),	  The	  
Socialist	  Register	  2005:	  The	  Empire	  Reloaded	  (Merlin	  Press	  2004)	  24.	  
9	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ordoliberal	  conceptualisation	  of	  capitalism	  as	  an	  economic	  theory	  that	  
is	  capable	  of	  survival	  through	  institutional	  corrections	  and	  innovations	  see	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  
164-­‐67.	  	  
10	  The	  MPS	  is	  a	  think	  tank	  founded	  by	  Freidrich	  Hayek.	  
11	  The	  Mont	  Pelerin	  Society,	  (April	  8,	  1947)	  
<https://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/mpsGoals.html>	  accessed	  18	  July	  2010.	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artificial.12	  However,	  it	  reflects	  the	  proposition	  that	  within	  the	  same	  discourse,	  
the	   two	   fulfil	   different	   functions.	   Borrowing	   Foucault’s	   traffic	   metaphor,	   the	  
paradigm	  determines	   the	   type	   of	   transport	   used.	   The	   law	   then	   functions	   as	   a	  
‘highway	  code’	  that	  manages	  its	  circulation.13	  	  
This	   chapter	   explores	   the	  worldview	   that	  broadly	   animates	   the	  governmental	  
discourse	  of	  neoliberalism.	  The	  allusion	  to	  ‘governmental’	  denotes	  the	  fact	  that,	  
having	  gone	  through	  a	  prolonged	  period	  (1920-­‐1960)	  of	   theoretical	  digestion,	  
neoliberalism	   now	   informs	   acts	   of	   states	   across	   the	   globe,	   and	   inspires	   the	  
institutions	   they	   landscape	   nationally	   and	   globally.14	  	   Specifically,	   neoliberal	  
orthodoxy	   allocates	   to	   states	   the	   function	   of	   custodians	   of	   free,	   spontaneous	  
markets,	  a	  function	  they	  fulfil	  through	  the	  instrumentality	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.15	  It	  
may	  be	  appropriate	  at	   this	   juncture	   to	   say	  a	   few	  words	  about	  what	   such	   rule	  
entails	   in	   its	   neoliberal	   mutation.	   The	   preservation	   of	   markets’	   purported	  
freedom	  and	  spontaneity	  requires	  that	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  be	  abstract,	   impersonal	  
and	   detached	   from	   its	   outcomes16.	   It	   thus	   has	   little	   natural	   affinity	   with	   the	  
attainment	   of	   societal	   collective	   aims	   such	   as	   justice	   and	   welfare.	   Rather,	   its	  
natural	  habitat	  is	  that	  of	  individualised	  processes.	  In	  its	  advanced	  form,	  argues	  
Hayek,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  encapsulates	  Hume’s	  ‘three	  fundamental	  laws	  of	  nature’:	  
stability	   of	   possession,	   transference	   by	   consent	   and	   the	   performance	   of	  
promises.17	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  through	  a	  blueprint	  of	  property	  ownership	  and	  
contractual	  exchange	  that	  law	  and	  liberty	  converge,	  and	  law	  -­‐	  a	  human	  creation	  
that	   is	  underpinned	  by	   the	  natural	   law	  of	   the	  market	   -­‐	   is	   transformed	   from	  a	  
constraining	  institution	  to	  a	  custodian	  of	  freedom.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For	  Johnstone	  the	  discourse	  of	  law	  fulfills	  three	  functions:	  it	  shapes	  interactions,	  indirectly	  
determines	  their	  direction	  and	  affects	  the	  position	  of	  states;	  Ian	  Johnstone,	  ‘The	  Power	  of	  
Interpretive	  Communities’	  in	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall	  (eds),	  Power	  in	  Global	  
Governance	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  International	  Relations:	  98	  CUP	  2008)	  185.	  
13	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  162.	  
14	  Jamie	  Peck,	  The	  Constructions	  of	  Neoliberal	  Reason	  (OUP	  2010)	  20.	  
15	  Kean	  Birch	  and	  Vlad	  Mykhnenko,	  ‘Introduction	  –	  A	  World	  Turned	  Right	  Way	  Up’	  in	  Kean	  
Birch	  &	  Vlad	  Mykhnenko	  (eds)	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Neo-­‐liberalism:	  The	  Collapse	  of	  an	  Economic	  
Order?	  (Zed	  Books	  2010)	  3.	  
16	  Hayek,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  135-­‐38.	  
17	  ibid	  138.	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The	   word	   ‘broadly’	   alludes	   to	   the	   possibility	   that,	   with	   its	   varying	   claims	   to	  
theoretical	  purity,	  contradictory	  processes,	  variegated	  forms	  of	  implementation	  
and	   propensity	   to	   invisibility,	   the	   neoliberal	   phenomenon	   eludes	   concise	  
definition.18	  The	  answers	  to	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  neoliberalism,	  argues	  Clarke,	  are	  
both	   divergent	   and	   overlapping. 19 	  He	   identifies	   two	   broad	   categories:	   a	  
Foucaultian	   analysis	   that	   focuses	   on	   governmentality	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   a	  
political	   economy	   approach	   on	   the	   other.20	  	   In	   this	   latter	   category	   diverse	  
understandings	  may	   be	   found.	   	   For	   example,	   there	   is	   neoliberalism	   as	   open-­‐
ended	  processes	  of	   ‘statecraft’	  and	  global	  restructuring	  aimed	  at	  formulating	  a	  
pro-­‐corporate	   market	   order; 21 	  neoliberalism	   as	   a	   set	   of	   variegated	  
transformative	   policies	   that	   range	   from	   ‘shock	   therapy’ 22 	  and	   ‘creative	  
destruction’, 23 	  to	   internal	   regime	   shifts	   and	   externally	   imposed	   economic	  
restructuring;24	  neoliberalism	   as	   a	   political	   project	   of	   transnational	   economic	  
elites’	   power	   restoration;25	  neoliberalism	   as	   a	   Western	   led	   neo-­‐imperialist	  
strategy	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  investment	  aimed	  at	  locking	  in	  Western	  competitive	  
advantages.26	  	  Yet,	  within	  such	  diversity	  a	  degree	  of	   consensus	  may	  be	   teased	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  8-­‐20.	  
19	  John	  Clarke,	  ‘Living	  With/In	  and	  Without	  Neo-­‐liberalism’	  [2008]	  Focaal,	  51	  135	  
<http://oro.open.ac.uk/18127/1/10_Clarke.pd>	  accessed	  28	  Oct	  2011.	  	  
20	  ibid	  136.	  
21	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  8-­‐10.	  
22	  The	  term	  ‘economic	  shock	  treatment’	  was	  coined	  by	  Milton	  Friedman,	  the	  Chicago	  University	  
professor	  and	  guru	  of	  neoliberal	  globalisation	  who,	  together	  with	  other	  ‘Chicago	  boys’	  
economists	  was	  summoned	  to	  help	  with	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  following	  
the	  Pinochet	  coup	  in	  1973.	  The	  theory	  that	  the	  shock	  of	  speedy	  and	  intense	  reforms	  will	  
produce	  adjustment	  was	  based	  on	  the	  ‘psychic	  driving’	  treatment	  developed	  by	  the	  psychiatrist,	  
Ewen	  Cameron.	  Broadly,	  the	  idea	  was	  to	  break	  up	  pathology	  by	  using	  electric	  shocks	  so	  as	  to	  
turn	  the	  patient’s	  mind	  into	  a	  blank	  slate	  upon	  which	  new	  patterns	  can	  be	  etched.	  Researchers	  
at	  the	  CIA	  became	  interested	  in	  Cameron’s	  work	  in	  the	  50s	  and	  funded	  his	  work	  until	  1961.	  
Naomi	  Klein,	  The	  Shock	  Doctrine:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Disaster	  Capitalism	  (Allen	  Lane	  2007)	  7,	  25-­‐38.	  
23	  Originally	  derived	  from	  Marxist	  economic	  theory	  to	  denote	  the	  associated	  processes	  of	  
accumulation	  and	  annihilation	  of	  wealth,	  the	  term	  was	  adopted	  and	  given	  a	  different	  meaning	  in	  
the	  50s	  by	  the	  economist	  Joseph	  Schumpeter	  as	  part	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  innovation	  and	  progress.	  It	  
now	  forms	  part	  of	  neoliberal	  economics	  to	  describe	  the	  process	  of	  replacing	  old	  with	  new.	  
24	  Bob	  Jessop,	  ‘What	  follows	  Neo-­‐liberalism?	  The	  Deepening	  Contradictions	  of	  US	  domination	  
and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  a	  New	  Global	  Order’	  in	  Robert	  Albritton,	  Bob	  Jessop	  and	  Richard	  Westra	  
(eds),	  Political	  Economy	  and	  Global	  Capitalism:	  The	  21st	  Century,	  Present	  and	  Future	  (Anthem	  
Press	  2010)	  70-­‐71;	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  road	  from	  capital/labour	  compromise	  to	  US	  
‘supercapitalism’	  see	  Robert	  Reich,	  ‘Supercapitalism:	  The	  Battle	  for	  Democracy’	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Big	  
Business	  (Icon	  Books	  2007).	  
25	  David	  Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism	  (OUP	  2005)	  19.	  
26	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  Kicking	  Away	  the	  Ladder:	  Development	  Strategy	  in	  Historical	  Perspective	  
(Anthem	  Press	  2002).	  See	  also	  Adam	  Swain,	  Vlad	  Mykhnenko	  and	  Shaun	  French,	  ‘The	  
Corruption	  Industry	  and	  Transition:	  Neoliberalizing	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Space?’	  in	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  
ibid	  (n	  15)	  114	  arguing	  the	  existence	  of	  three	  main	  understandings	  of	  neoliberalism:	  a	  class	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out.	   It	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   project	   that	   comprises	   national	   and	  
transnational	   interactions.	   At	   the	   global	   level,	   neoliberalism	   is	   reliant	   on	   the	  
power	  of	  core	  states	  to	  exert	  control	  over	  the	  interstate	  system	  so	  as	  to	  launch	  
its	   constituents	   on	   a	   state-­‐led,	   market-­‐centred,	   pro-­‐corporate	   program	   of	  
privatization	   and	   commodification.27 	  	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  
control	   may	   employ	   diverse	   strategies.	   For	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	   implicate	  
formal	  coercion.	  Instead	  it	  may	  set	  in	  motion	  a	  process	  of	  internalisation	  that	  in	  
turn	   produces	   the	   appearance	   of	   consensual	   participation.	   The	   result	   is	   a	  
dialectical	   dynamic	   of	   what	  may	   be	   depicted	   as	   imposed	   voluntariness.	   Such	  
imposed	   voluntariness	   is	   aided	   by	   interstate	   competition	   over	   a	   place	   in	   the	  
hierarchical	   world-­‐system.	   Particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   such	   pressure,	   for	  
example,	   is	  Wallerstein’s	   semi-­‐peripheral	   state	   that	   strives	   for	   a	   place	   at	   the	  
core,	  but	  is	  forever	  at	  risk	  of	  slipping	  down	  to	  the	  periphery.28	  	  Imposition	  may	  
not	  be	  perfect	  and	  may	  end	  up	  producing	  variegated	   local	   regime	   formations.	  
However,	  the	  aim	  is	  one	  of	  uniform	  implementation.	  	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  this	  chapter	  will	  now	  proceed	  to	  outline	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  
neoliberal	  paradigm.	  A	   section	  will	  be	  dedicated	   to	   its	  Washington	  Consensus	  
incarnation.	   It	   encapsulates	   the	   capitalism/neoliberal	   impulse	   for	   expansion,	  
one	  that	  is	  not	  only	  territorial,	  but	  seeks	  also	  to	  penetrate	  all	  manners	  of	  spaces	  
-­‐	  political,	  cultural,	  social	  and	  economic.29	  	  As	  with	  BITs,	  I	  will	  argue	  that,	  rather	  
than	  a	  rupture,	  the	  neoliberal	  movement	  represents	  an	  evolutionary	  stage	  in	  a	  
continuum	   of	   historical	   capitalism.	   The	   chapter	   will	   also	   examine	   the	  
paradigm’s	   remarkable	   capacity	   for	   endurance	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   its	  
essential	  tenets.	  Finally,	  it	  will	  consider	  the	  way	  its	  rationality	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  
BITs	  regulatory	  architecture.	  Here,	  the	  word	  ‘regulatory’	  alludes	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
project,	  a	  neo-­‐imperial	  project	  and	  an	  ideology	  which	  informs	  state	  policies	  and	  generate	  
neoliberal	  processes.	  
27	  On	  the	  transnational	  nature	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  state	  see	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  79-­‐81.	  
28	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein,	  World-­‐systems	  Analysis:	  An	  Introduction	  (Duke	  University	  Press	  2004)	  
55-­‐57.	  
29	  Gill,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  23;	  Robert	  O’Brien	  &	  Marc	  Williams,	  Global	  Political	  Economy	  (3rd	  edition,	  
Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2010)	  11;	  Moishe	  Postone,	  ‘Theorizing	  the	  Contemporary	  World:	  Robert	  
Brenner,	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  David	  Harvey’	  in	  Albritton,	  Jessop	  and	  Westra,	  ibid	  (n	  24)	  19	  
referring	  to	  David	  Harvey,	  The	  Conditions	  of	  Postmodernity:	  An	  Enquiry	  into	  the	  Origins	  of	  
Cultural	  Change	  (Basil	  Blackwell	  1989)	  vii.	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BITs	   replicate	   the	   neoliberal	   paradox	   of	   regulated	   deregulation.	   This	   will	   be	  
discussed	  further	  in	  the	  chapter.	  
Positioned	  as	   it	   is	  ahead	  of	   the	  China	  related	  part	  of	   this	  enquiry,	   this	  chapter	  
will	   focus	   on	   those	   constituents	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   dogma	   for	   which	   the	  
Harmonious	  World	   Paradigm	   (HWP)	   is	   posited	   as	   an	   alternative.	   	   That	   is,	   an	  
alternative	   to	   neoliberalism	   as	   a	   promissory	   note	   of	  markets-­‐based	   economic	  
growth	   that	   is	   animated	   by	   hegemonic,	   prescriptive,	   sovereignty-­‐reducing	  
impulses.	   It	   follows	   that	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   this	   chapter	   my	   perspective	   will	  
generally	  be	   the	  one	   identified	  by	  Clarke	  as	   that	  of	  political	  economy,	  with	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  neoliberalism’s	  transnational	  rather	  than	  national	  facets.	  	  
Neoliberalism	  in	  Historical	  Context	  
The	  genesis	  of	  civilization	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter	   I	   called	   into	   question	   the	   proposition	   that	   the	  
emergence	  of	  BITs	  represents	  a	  revolutionary	  occurrence.30	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  I	  
also	   argue	   that,	   in	   important	   respects,	   the	   rise	   of	   neoliberal	   regimes	  marks	   a	  
discontinuity	   rather	   than	   a	   break	   in	   capitalist	   development.31	  Postone,	   for	  
example,	  considers	  that	  the	  trajectory	  of	  weakening	  economic	  sovereignty,	  and	  
corresponding	   consolidation	   of	   neoliberal	   globalisation	   in	   the	   past	   three	  
decades,	   denotes	   a	   significant	   break	  with	   the	   post-­‐	  WWII	   order.32	  	   As	  will	   be	  
seen	  below,	  the	  view	  canvassed	  here	  is	  that,	  rather	  than	  any	  ontic	  or	  epistemic	  
rupture,	   neoliberal	   discourse	   and	   institutions	   represent	   an	   evolutionary	  
development	   in	   a	   historically	   innovative	   continuum	   of	   reconstitution	   and	  
inflections.	   At	   its	   base,	   such	   continuum	   has	   enduring	   and	   non-­‐contingent	  
structural	   configurations.	   Thus,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   (1870-­‐
1914)	  was	  shored	  up	  by	  a	  vision	  of	  an	  integrated	  global	  marketplace	  that	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Chapter	  2	  text	  to	  n	  14-­‐20	  pp	  45-­‐46.	  
31	  See	  for	  example	  Jessop,	  ibid	  (n	  24)	  68;	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  18	  referring	  to	  Gamble’s	  description	  
of	  the	  neoliberal	  project	  in	  the	  70s	  as	  ‘a	  great	  convulsion’;	  Andrew	  Gamble,	  ‘Two	  Faces	  of	  
Neoliberalism’	  in	  R.	  Robison	  (ed),	  The	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Revolution:	  Forging	  the	  Market	  State	  
(International	  Political	  Economy	  Series,	  Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2006)	  21.	  
32	  Postone,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  7.	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guarantee	   world	   peace.33 	  A	   similar	   vision	   of	   world	   peace	   reverberates	   in	  
contemporary	  Fukuyama’s	   ‘end	  of	  history’	   treatise.34	  	  The	  post-­‐	  WWII	  Bretton	  
Wood	   institutional	   innovation	   was	   not,	   as	   argued	   by	   some,	   an	   era	   of	   capital	  
repression	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  an	  era	  of	  its	  liberation	  in	  the	  70s	  and	  80s.35	  Rather,	  
the	  Bretton	  Wood	  design	  planted	  the	  seeds	  that	  were	  to	  blossom	  into	  present	  
day	   global	   regime	   of	   neoliberal	   trade	   and	   international	   investment	   under	   US	  
hegemony.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  two	  phases	  flowed	  into	  each	  other.36	  Indeed,	  for	  
Petras	   and	   Veltmeyer,	   the	   neoliberal	   model	   is	   no	   more	   than	   a	   variant	   of	  
liberalism,	   rather	   than	   any	   new	   construction.	  37	  That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   represents	  
resurrection	   of	   liberalism	   in	   its	   pre-­‐1930s	   configuration.	  38	  	   Implied	   in	   this	  
proposition	   is	   the	  possibility	   that	   the	  post-­‐WWII	   ‘golden	  period	  of	  capitalism’,	  
with	   its	   accommodation	   of	   trade	   unions,	   state	   intervention,	   progressive	  
taxation	  and	  other	  efforts	  at	  income	  distribution,	  represented	  a	  deviation	  from	  
capitalist	  logic.39	  	  Or	  put	  differently,	  the	  hostility	  of	  the	  present	  ‘golden	  period	  of	  
profitability’	  to	  all	  the	  above	  represents	  a	  return	  to	  form.	  40	  
Moreover,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  Hayek’s	  harking	  back	  to	  the	  thoughts	  of	  18th	  century	  
Hume,	   continuities	   and	   recurrences	   go	   back	   to	   even	   earlier	   times.	   Thus,	   the	  
discursive	  propagation	  of	  a	  political	  ‘culture	  of	  danger’	  to	  justify	  the	  bailing	  out	  
of	   banks	   was	   in	   operation	   as	   early	   as	   the	   19th	   century.41	  Indeed,	   the	   trail	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Karl	  Polanyi,	  The	  Great	  Transformation:	  The	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Time	  
(Beacon	  Press	  1957)	  xxxi;	  for	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  liberal	  belief	  in	  the	  connection	  between	  
economic	  nationalism	  and	  conflict	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  capitalism	  and	  peace	  and	  happiness	  on	  
the	  other	  see	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  22-­‐23;	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  theoretical	  and	  
historical	  roots	  of	  ‘perpetual	  peace’	  see	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  56-­‐59.	  
34	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  The	  End	  of	  History	  and	  The	  Last	  Man	  (Penguin	  Books	  1992).	  	  
35	  Eric	  Helleiner,	  States	  and	  the	  Reemergence	  of	  International	  Finance	  (Cornell	  University	  Press	  
1994)	  3.	  
36	  Leo	  Panitch	  and	  Sam	  Gindin,	  ‘Finance	  and	  American	  Empire’	  in	  Panitch	  and	  Leys,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  
48-­‐54.	  
37	  James	  Petras	  and	  Henry	  Veltmeyer,	  Multinationals	  on	  Trial:	  Foreign	  investment	  Matters	  
(Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd	  2007)	  22.	  
38	  ibid	  83;	  but	  see	  Noam	  Chomsky,	  Profit	  Over	  People:	  Neoliberalism	  and	  Global	  Order	  
(Turnaround	  Publisher	  Services	  Ltd	  1999)	  19	  arguing	  that	  neoliberalism	  is	  based	  on	  classical	  
liberal	  ideas	  but	  is	  also	  new.	  	  
39	  Dieter	  Plehwe,	  Bernhard	  Walpen	  and	  Gisela	  Neunhoffer,	  ‘Introduction:	  Reconsidering	  
Neoliberal	  Hegemony’	  in	  Dieter	  Plehwe,	  Bernhard	  Walpen	  and	  Gisela	  Neunhoffer	  (eds)	  
Neoliberal	  Hegemony:	  A	  Global	  Critique	  (RIPE	  Series	  in	  Global	  Political	  Economy	  Routledge	  
2006)	  8-­‐9.	  
40	  Robert	  Albritton,	  Bob	  Jessop	  and	  Richard	  Westra,	  ‘Introduction:	  Political	  Economy	  and	  Global	  
Capitalism’	  in	  Albritton,	  Jessop	  and	  Westra	  ibid	  (n	  24)	  xiv.	  
41	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  66-­‐67.	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power	   diffusion	   by	  means	   of	   private	   property	   ownership	  may	   take	   us	   all	   the	  
way	   back	   to	   the	   Roman	   Empire.42	  Wood	   points	   to	   the	   Roman	   strategy	   of	  
purposely	   developing	   Romanised	   local	   propertied	   elites	   in	   the	   peripheries.	  
Then	  as	  now,	  the	  gain	  was	  mutual	  enrichment.	  The	  Roman	  Empire,	  she	  argues,	  
represents	   ‘the	   criterion,	   (….)	   of	   European	   imperialism.	   In	   a	   sense,	   it	  was	   the	  
first	  colonial	  ‘empire’,	  as	  we	  have	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  word’.43	  	  	  
Historical	   beginnings	   are	   notoriously	   difficult	   to	   capture.	   It	   is	   therefore	  
unsurprising	  that	  the	  temporal	  dawn	  of	  the	  capitalist	  continuum	  is	  shrouded	  in	  
controversy.44	  	   For	   present	   purposes	   I	   adopt	   the	   18th	   century	   as	   the	   point	   in	  
time	   at	  which	   it	  was	   constituted	   as	   a	   specific,	   distinct	   and	  historically	   unique	  
form	  of	  social	  relations.45	  	  For	  many	  of	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  neoliberalism	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  treatises	  on	  that	  century’s	  political	  economy.	  Thus,	   it	   is	   to	  
that	   period	   that	   Foucault	   traces	   the	   inauguration	   of	   the	   liberal	   art	   of	   ‘frugal’,	  
‘least	   possible	   government’,46	  and	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	  market	   as	   the	   site	   of	  
natural,	  price-­‐forming	  mechanisms	  -­‐	  a	  regime	  of	  truth	  that	  was	  to	  become	  the	  
standard	   for	   good	   practice.47	  	   It	   was	   this	   purported	   state/market	   dichotomy	  
that	   neoliberalism	   fine-­‐tuned	   by	   elevating	   market	   spontaneity	   to	   such	  
commanding	   heights	   that	   almost	   any	   proposed	   intervention	   could	   be	  warned	  
off	  as	  impairing	  and	  distortive.48	  The	  outcome	  is	  ‘a	  state	  under	  the	  supervision	  
of	  the	  market	  rather	  than	  a	  market	  supervised	  by	  the	  state’.49	  	  	  
It	  was	   also	   in	   the	   18th	   century	   that	   capitalism	  matured	   into	   its	   industrialised	  
form.50	  	  For	  Polanyi,	  it	  was	  the	  disruptions	  engendered	  by	  industrialisation	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  32-­‐37.	  
43	  ibid	  27.	  
44	  Samir	  Amin,	  Global	  History:	  A	  View	  From	  the	  South	  (Pambazuka	  Press	  2011)	  12;	  Amin	  
attributes	  the	  start	  of	  capitalism	  to	  early	  16th	  century.	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  The	  Long	  Twentieth	  
Century:	  Money,	  Power	  and	  the	  Origins	  Of	  Our	  Times	  (new	  edn	  Verso	  2010)	  37-­‐48;	  Arrighi	  posits	  
the	  city-­‐state	  of	  Venice	  as	  a	  prototype	  of	  a	  capitalist	  formation	  within	  a	  medieval	  system.	  
45	  See	  for	  example	  Ellen	  Meiksins	  Wood,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Capitalism:	  A	  Longer	  View	  (Verso	  2002)	  
2-­‐3,	  6-­‐7,	  75-­‐80,	  189,	  194-­‐95.	  
46	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  28-­‐29.	  
47	  ibid	  32,	  37.	  
48	  ibid	  31.	  
49	  ibid	  146.	  
50	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  45)	  3.	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gave	   rise	   to	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   capitalist	   civilization.51	  The	   transformative	  
force	   unleashed	   was	   that	   of	   market	   liberalism	   with	   its	   core	   belief	   in	   what	  
Polanyi	  conceptualised	  as	  economic	  ‘disembedding’–	  society’s	  detachment	  from	  
economic	   imperatives	   and	   its	   subordination	   to	   self-­‐regulating	  markets.	   Thus,	  
disembedding	   represented	   a	   radical	   break	   from	   past	   social	   relations.	   It	  
articulated	   a	   new	   singular	   logic	   that	   substantively	   divided	   English	   classical	  
economists	   from	   previous	   thinkers.52	  By	   1820	   it	   evolved	   from	   ‘a	   spasmodic	  
tendency’	   to	   a	   full	   fledge	   dogma,	   one	   that,	   inter	   alia,	   called	   for	   free	   flow	   of	  
foreign	  trade.53	  	  I	  single	  out	  this	  particular	  tenet	  of	  19th	  century	  liberal	  thinking,	  
since	   it	   highlights	   the	   expansionary	   impulse	   that	   characterised	   the	   capitalist	  
project	  from	  the	  outset.	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  expansive	  compulsions	  
harnessed	  both	   ‘formal’	   and	   ‘informal’	   free	   trade	  and	   investment	  dynamics	  of	  
empire	   building.54	  	   Yet,	   they	  were	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   an	   outward	  
reach.	   For	   the	   imperialist	   economic,	   political	   and	   juridical	   ensemble	   was	  
replicated	   at	   home.	   	   Thus,	   European	   industrialisation	   and	   colonialisation	  
constituted	  analogue	  processes.	  In	  line	  with	  a	  Ricardian	  construct	  of	  the	  labour	  
market,	  they	  sought	  to	  dismantle	  social	  structures	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  as	  
part	   of	   a	   unitary	   aim	   to	   extract	   a	   supply	   of	   commodified	   labour. 55	  	  
Consequently,	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  the	  condition	  of	  some	  
African	  tribes	  resembled	  that	  of	  the	  English	  labouring	  classes.56	  	  This	  theme	  of	  
‘home’	  and	   ‘abroad’	   is	  similarly	   found	  at	   the	  other	  end	  of	   the	  social	  hierarchy.	  
Western	   and	   non-­‐Western	   local	   elites	   converged	   to	   form	   collaborative	  
transnational	  networks.	   Such	  networks	   continue	   to	  present	   times,	   except	   that	  
their	   early	   colonial	   beginnings	   are	   now	   further	   enhanced	   by	   neoliberal	  
globalisation.	   For	  Harvey,	   they	  are	   the	  driver	  behind	   the	  neoliberal	  project	   of	  
class	  power	  restoration.57	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  xxii,	  3,	  90-­‐107.	  	  
52	  ibid	  xxiii-­‐xxiv.	  
53	  ibid	  141.	  
54	  John	  Gallagher	  and	  Ronald	  Robinson,	  ‘The	  Imperialism	  of	  Free	  Trade’	  (1953)	  Second	  series	  VI	  
no	  1	  The	  Economic	  History	  Review	  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gallagher.htm>	  accessed	  21	  Oct	  2011;	  see	  also	  
Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  x	  referring	  to	  the	  American	  empire’s	  reliance	  on	  economic	  hegemony.	  
55	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  172.	  
56	  ibid	  165.	  
57	  Harvey,	  ibid,	  (n	  25)	  35.	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At	   the	   same	   time,	   juridical	   principles	   were	   constructed	   so	   as	   to	   explain	   and	  
legitimise	  commodification	  and	  expropriation.	  Thus,	  the	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  
contract	  enabled	  the	  commodification	  of	  labour,	  and	  its	  subjugation	  to	  the	  laws	  
of	   the	   market. 58 	  	   It	   further	   legitimised	   the	   liquidation	   of	   non-­‐contractual	  
relationship,	   such	  as	  kingship,	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐European	  collective	   traditions.59	  
In	   relation	   to	   expropriation,	   theories	   were	   developed	   to	   distance	   land	  
ownership	  from	  its	  occupancy,	  and	  to	  attach	  it	  instead	  to	  market	  value.	  Grotius	  
postulated	   a	   nexus	   between	   ownership	   rights	   and	   the	   transformation	   or	  
consumption	  of	  property.	  Related	   to	   this	  nexus	  was	   the	  entitlement	   to	  punish	  
with	   minimal	   moral	   constraints	   those	   who	   infringed	   such	   rights.60	  Grotius	   -­‐	  
widely	   regarded	   as	   the	   forefather	   of	   IL	   –	   was,	   we	  may	   recall,	   counsel	   to	   the	  
Dutch	   East	   India	   Company	   and.	   Locks’	   theory	   of	   property	   ownership	   –	   the	  
proposition	   that	   private	   rights	   over	   common	   property	   derived	   not	   from	  
occupancy	   but	   from	   the	   augmentation	   in	   its	   exchange	   value61	  -­‐	   justified	   both	  
enclosures	   at	   home	   and	   colonial	   expropriations.62	  	   This	   association	   of	   private	  
rights	  with	  exchange	  value	   can	   in	   turn	  be	   seen	  as	  a	  progression	   from	  Vattel’s	  
notion	   of	   the	   rightful	   expropriation	   of	   uncultivated	   land.	   Vitoria’s	  
conceptualisation	   of	   ownership	   rights	   as	   secular	   rather	   than	   divine	   was	  
essentially	   concerned	  with	   explaining	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Spaniards	  
and	   the	   Indians	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   colonial	   encounter.	  63	  	   However,	   its	  
significance	  went	  further	  than	  that.	  For,	  of	  the	  feudalist	  triangulation	  of	  divine,	  
natural	  and	  human	   law,	   it	  was	  only	   the	   first	   that	  was	  dispensed	  with.64	  	  Thus,	  
for	   Vitoria,	   human	   laws	   derived	   their	   universality	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  
articulated	  laws	  of	  nature.65	  This	  coalescence	  of	  the	  natural,	  the	  human	  and	  the	  
universal	   is	   similarly	   found	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   discourse,	   whereby	   sovereign	  
legislation	  reflects,	  or	  ought	  to	  reflect,	  natural	  and	  universal	  laws	  of	  markets.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  171.	  
59	  ibid.	  
60	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  70,	  95,	  97.	  
61	  John	  Lock,	  ‘Of	  Property’	  in	  Matthew	  Clayton	  and	  Andrew	  Williams	  (eds),	  Social	  Justice	  
(Blackwell	  Readings	  in	  Philosophy,	  Blackwell	  Publishing	  2004)	  30.	  
62	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  96.	  
63	  Antony	  Anghie,	  Imperialism,	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  International	  Law	  (CUP	  2005)	  13-­‐
17.	  Vitoria’s	  two	  famous	  lectures	  were	  entitled	  in	  translation	  ‘On	  the	  Indians	  Lately	  Discovered’	  
and	  ‘On	  the	  Law	  of	  War	  Made	  by	  the	  Spaniards	  on	  the	  Barbarians’.	  
64	  ibid	  17.	  
65	  ibid	  17-­‐18.	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The	   conflation	   of	   innovative	   juridical	   structures	   and	   imperialist	   ambitions	  
encapsulates	   the	  historically	   intimate	   relationship	  between	  home	  and	  abroad.	  
Anghie	  posits	  this	  intimacy	  as	  a	  two-­‐ways	  normative	  traffic	  that	  is	  borne	  out	  of	  
the	   core/peripheries	   encounter.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   ‘colonizer	   constructs	  
himself	   as	   he	   constructs	   the	   colony’.66	  The	   spatial	   fluidity	   of	   these	   processes,	  
and	  their	  propensity	   for	  a	  boomerang	  style	  homecoming,	   is	  exemplified	   in	  the	  
concept	   of	   sovereignty.	   The	   sovereignty	   that	  was	   to	   be	   disseminated	   to	   non-­‐
European	  peoples	   as	  part	   of	   de-­‐colonialisation	  was	   an	   essentially	  Eurocentric	  
juridical	   construct.	   	  However,	   the	   sovereignty	   actually	   granted	  was	  a	   reduced	  
variation.	   In	   particular,	   political	   sovereignty	   was	   detached	   from	   economic	  
autonomy. 67 	  This	   carving	   out	   of	   developing	   countries’	   economic	   self-­‐
determination	   as	   somehow	   different	   and	   liable	   to	   a	  more	   invasive	   treatment	  
was	  then	  institutionalised	  in	  neoliberal	  IFIs,	  and	  juridically,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  
practice	   of	   BITs.	   	   More	   recently,	   however,	   such	   reductive	   practices	   spread	  
beyond	   their	   non-­‐Western	   origins	   to	   penetrate	   the	   European	   core/periphery	  
interaction	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	   response	   to	   the	   Greek,	   Italian	   and	   Spaniard	  
crisis.	  Thus,	  policies	  of	  bail	  out	  and	  economic	  restructuring,	  observed	  by	  Dine	  in	  
relation	  to	  developing	  countries,	  is	  now	  being	  replicated	  in	  the	  treatment	  meted	  
out	  to	  the	  countries	  of	  Southern	  Europe	  by	  the	  continent’s	  Northern	  core.	  At	  the	  
same	   time	   the	   transatlantic	   public	   interstate/	   private	   corporate	   space	   is	   the	  
subject	  of	  proposed	  remodelling	  through	  a	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  
Partnership	  (TTIP).68	  	  
The	  genesis	  of	  hegemonic	  discourse	  
Turning	  to	  neoliberalism’s	  more	  recent	  beginnings,	  the	  term	  originates	  from	  a	  
1938	  Paris	  meeting	  organized	  by	   the	  philosopher	  Luis	  Rougier.	   It	  alludes	   to	  a	  
‘new’	   liberalism,	  one	  that	   is	  capable	  of	  responding	  to	  capitalism	  at	  risk.	  At	  the	  
time	   of	   inauguration,	   the	   perceived	   risk	   took	   the	   form	   of	   German	   National	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  ibid	  1.	  
67	  ibid	  196-­‐204.	  
68	  Janet	  Dine,	  Companies,	  International	  Trade	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  
Corporate	  Law,	  CUP	  2005)	  100-­‐05;	  ‘Investor-­‐state	  dispute	  resolution:	  Will	  the	  EU-­‐US	  deal	  
encourage	  attacks	  on	  the	  public	  interest?’	  [June	  2013]	  Transnational	  Institute	  
<http://www.tni.org/events/investor-­‐state-­‐dispute-­‐resolution>	  accessed	  11	  July	  2013.	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Socialism,	  the	  British	  Keynesian	  state	  and	  the	  US	  New	  Deal.69	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  
for	   Friedman,	   the	   need	   for	   a	   new	   liberal	   configuration	   was	   born	   out	   of	   20th	  
century	  corruption.70	  
Neoliberalism’s	   foundational	   tenets	   derive	   from	   doctrines	   hypothesized	   by	  
economists	   and	   philosophers	   such	   as	   Ludwig	   Von	   Mises	   and	   Friedrich	   Von	  
Hayek.71	  For	   instance,	   Von	   Mises’s	   axiom	   that	   ‘egoism	   is	   the	   basic	   law	   of	  
society’72	  led	  him	   to	   conclude	   that	  unrestricted	   laissez-­‐faire,	   free	  markets	   and	  
the	  confinement	  of	  governmental	  acts	  to	  the	  defence	  of	  private	  property	  rights	  
comprised	   the	   only	   viable	   policy.73 	  For	   Hayek,	   spontaneous	   order	   of	   free	  
markets	   offered	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   economic	   computation.74	  	   Such	  
principles	   then	   propped	   up	   a	   host	   of	   political	   and	   ideological	   claims.75	  The	  
establishment	   of	   the	  MPS	   after	   the	  WWII	   launched	   neoliberalism’s	   expansion	  
into	  the	  intellectual	  establishment,	  bringing	  together	  several	  diverse	  strands	  of	  
thoughts,	   including	   Austrian	   émigrés,	   British	   academics	   from	   the	   London	  
School	   of	   Economics	   (LSE)	   and	   University	   of	   Manchester,	   Chicago	   School	  
Americans	   and	   Germans	   from	   the	   Freiburg	   School. 76 	  	   This	   nestling	   in	  
intellectual	   circles	   proved	   significant.	   For	   think	   tanks,	   corporations	   and	  
academia	  played	  and,	  indeed,	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
neoliberal	   ideology,	   and	   in	   justifying	   corporate	   and	   governmental	   intimacy.	   It	  
was	  Hayek	  who	  identified	  the	  need	  for	  an	  initial	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  neoliberal	  
persona	  by	   shaping	   commonly	  held	  political	   and	   social	   beliefs	   through	   top	   to	  
bottom	  dissemination	  of	  ideas.77	  And	  so	  it	  was	  that	  ‘ideas	  centres’	  or	  ‘centres	  of	  
persuasion’78	  served	   as	   a	   launching	   pad	   for	   neoliberalism’s	   journey	   from	   a	  
theoretical	  construct,	  to	  a	  hegemonic	  discourse,	  to	  a	  state/elites/global	  finance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  3.	  
70	  Milton	  Friedman,	  Capitalism	  and	  Freedom	  (40th	  anniversary	  edn,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  
2002)	  4-­‐6.	  	  
71	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  3.	  
72	  ibid.	  
73	  Murray	  N.	  Rothbard,	  ‘Biography	  of	  Ludwig	  Von	  Mises	  (1881-­‐1973)’	  Ludwig	  Von	  Mises	  
Institute	  	  <http://mises.org/about/3248>	  accessed	  29	  Oct	  2011.	  
74	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  3.	  
75	  ibid.	  
76	  ibid.	  
77	  Hayek,	  ibid	  (n	  4)	  97-­‐99.	  	  
78	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (15)	  49.	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led	  political	  project.79	  Nurtured	  by	  corporate	  financiers	  and	  lobbying	  groups,	  its	  
discourse	  made	   its	   way	   to	   governments	   via	   global	   networks	   of	   thinkers	   that	  
were	  positioned	  in	  specific	  sites	  across	  the	  globe	  e.g.	  Washington	  and	  London.80	  
Given	   the	   Westphalian	   state’s	   monopoly	   over	   legislation	   and	   violence,	   it	   is	  
hardly	  surprising	   that	   it	  quickly	  became	  the	  neoliberal	  movement’s	  battlefield	  
of	   choice.	   The	   formation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   historical	   capitalism	   as	   a	  world	  
order,	  argues	  Braudel,	  is	  related	  to	  processes	  of	  state	  formation	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  
and	  market	  formation	  on	  the	  other.81	  	  Or	  as	  Wood	  puts	  it,	  the	  world	  was	  carved	  
into	  small	  states	  that	  were	  then	  to	  be	  drawn	  into	  the	  orbit	  of	  world	  capitalism.82	  
The	   IFIs	   may	   be	   the	   ‘de	   facto	   world	   government’	   of	   a	   ‘new	   imperial	   age’.83	  
However,	  it	  is	  through	  nation-­‐states	  that	  they	  function.	  Similarly,	  TNCs	  rely	  on	  
the	  state	  to	  prize	  open	  markets	  and	  to	  minimise	  operational	  risk.84	  	  Thus,	  state	  
reconfiguration	   was	   essential,	   one	   would	   say,	   the	   starting	   point,	   to	   the	  
expansion	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  project.	  It	  was	  in	  that	  arena	  that	  it	  mutated	  from	  an	  
ideological	   to	   a	   political	   project	   of	   state	   formation	   and	   institutional	  
reconstitution.	  
What	   was	   reconstitution	   to	   entail?	   In	   theory,	   the	   neoliberal	   state	   sheds	   off	  
economic	   intervention.	   Instead,	   it	   uses	   its	   monopolistic	   powers	   to	   protect	  
national	  and	  global	   institutional	  arrangements	  of	   individual	   freedoms:	  private	  
property	  rights,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  free	  markets.	  Specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
rule	   of	   law,	   freedom	   is	   posited	   as	   the	   unconstraint	   ability	   of	   juridical	   and	  
natural	   persons	   to	   negotiate	   contractual	   relationships	   in	   the	   marketplace.85	  
This	  in	  turn	  is	  translated	  into	  a	  number	  of	  core	  policy	  prescriptions	  which	  cut	  
across	   neoliberalism’s	   various	   national	   guises:	   privatisation	   of	   state	   assets,	  
liberalisation	   of	   trade	   and	   capital	   investment,	   monetarist	   focus	   on	   inflation	  
control	  and	  supply-­‐side	  economics,	  deregulation	  of	  labour	  and	  marketisation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  16.	  
80	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  6.	  
81	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  (n	  44)	  10.	  	  
82	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  129.	  
83	  Chomsky,	  ibid	  (n	  38)	  20.	  
84	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  31.	  
85	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  64.	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society.86 	  In	   practice,	   such	   policies	   engender	   a	   state	   that	   is	   anything	   but	  
innocuous.	   Rather,	   it	   becomes	   fused	   with	   capital	   to	   form	   an	   alliance	   that	   is	  
historically	   unique	   to	   the	  West.87	  	   Not	   only	   does	   the	   state	   construct	   so-­‐called	  
free	  markets	   and	   free	   trade	   institutions	   that	   benefit	   corporations,	   but	   it	   also	  
then	  propagate	  them	  to	  its	  population	  as	  a	  fundamental	  good’.88	  It	   is	  here	  that	  
neoliberalism’s	   core	   contradictions	   is	   located:	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   state	   that	   is	  
economically	   less	  sovereign,	  and	  which	   is	  side-­‐lined	  by	  the	  primacy	  of	  market	  
compulsions;	   yet,	   it	   remains	   vital	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   safeguarding	   those	   same	  
economic	   imperatives	   by	   which	   it	   was	   marginalised	   in	   the	   first	   place.89	  It	  
deregulates	  so	  as	  to	  free	  its	  TNCs	  from	  the	  impediments	  of	  public	  supervision.	  
Yet,	   it	  does	  so	  by	  using	   its	  monopoly	  over	   legislation	  and	   treatification.	  These	  
implicate	   new	   ‘legalities’	   aimed	   at	   protecting	   the	   rights	   of	   global	   capital	   of	  
which	  the	  neoliberal	  state	  is	  the	  ultimate	  guarantor.90	  	  
In	  sum,	  neoliberalism	  represents	  an	  institutional	  and	  paradigmatic	  progression	  
of	  capitalist	  civilization,	  one	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  world	  money	  and	  global	  
finance.91	  More	  recently,	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  a	  uniform	  world	  order,	  it	  manufactured	  
what	   came	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   Washington	   Consensus,	   to	   be	   diffused	   as	   a	  
prescriptive	  remedy	  for	  the	  Global	  South.92	  
The	  Demise	  of	  a	  Promise	  
The	  Washington	  consensus	  –	  first	  generation	  
In	   a	   paper,	   written	   for	   a	   1989	   conference	   convened	   by	   the	   Institute	   of	  
International	  Economics,	   the	   economist,	   John	  Williamson	   identified	   ten	  policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Plehwe,	  Walpen	  and	  Neunhoffer,	  ibid	  (n	  39)	  5.	  
87	  Postone,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  15.	  
88	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  64.	  
89	  For	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  see	  ibid	  70-­‐81;	  Wood	  (n	  7)	  10-­‐14.	  
90	  Saskia	  Sassen,	  ‘The	  State	  and	  Globalisation’	  in	  Rodney	  Bruce	  Hall	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Biersteker	  
(eds),	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Private	  Authority	  in	  Public	  Governance	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  
International	  Relations	  CUP	  2002)	  94.	  
91	  For	  the	  role	  of	  international	  haute	  finance	  in	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  1815-­‐1914	  see	  for	  
example	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  10-­‐20.	  
92	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  7;	  John	  Williamson,	  ‘What	  Washington	  Means	  by	  Policy	  
Reform’	  in	  John	  Williamson	  (ed),	  Latin	  American	  Adjustment:	  How	  Much	  Has	  Happened?	  
(Institute	  for	  International	  Economics	  1990)	  8.	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tenets	  with	  regard	  to	  which	  a	  reasonable	  degree	  of	  consensus	  could	  be	  found	  in	  
Washington,	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   which	   would	   enable	   lagging	   economies	   to	  
catch	  up	  with	  the	  developed	  world.	  93	  Such	  policies	  comprised	  fiscal	  discipline,	  
removal	  of	  subsidies,	  tax	  reforms,	  the	  freeing	  of	  interest	  and	  exchange	  rates	  by	  
subjecting	   them	   to	   market	   forces,	   trade	   and	   foreign	   direct	   investment	  
liberalisation,	   privatisation	   of	   state	   industries,	   deregulation	   and	   secure	  
property	   rights.94	  	  Together,	   they	  were	   to	   form	   the	  Washington	  Consensus	   -­‐	  a	  
design	   of	   purportedly	   prudent	  macroeconomics	   policies,	   outward	   orientation	  
instead	   of	   economic	   nationalism	   and	   free-­‐market	   capitalism.95	  	   The	   bush	   fire-­‐
like	   spread	   of	   the	   Washington	   Consensus	   during	   the	   1980s	   and	   90s	  
transformed	   the	   global	   developmental	   landscape,	   resulting	   in	   ‘more	  
privatization,	   deregulation	   and	   trade	   liberalization	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	  
Eastern	   Europe	   than	   probably	   anywhere	   else	   at	   any	   point	   in	   economic	  
history’.96	  In	  Bolivia,	  even	  rainwater	  was	  privatised.97	  	  Increasingly,	  developing	  
countries	   abandoned	   import	   substitution-­‐based	   industrialisation,	   as	   well	   as	  
economic	   interventionism	   and	   protectionism,	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   deepening	   global	  
integration.	   In	   consequence,	   in	   a	   matter	   of	   three	   decades,	   the	   Washington	  
Consensus	  brand	  went	   global,	   variously	   reaching	  every	   corner	  of	   the	  world.98	  	  
In	   the	   process	   it	   was	   also	   amplified,	   and	   Williamson’s	   protestations	  
notwithstanding,	   became	   equated	   with	   a	   neoliberal	   agenda	   of	   market	  
fundamentalism,	   IMF	   driven	   capital	   account	   liberalisation	   and	   small	  
governments.	   By	   contrast,	   public	   sector	   institutions	   were	   propagated	   as	   ‘the	  
black	   hole	   of	   economic	   reforms’.99 	  	   Such	   was	   the	   breadth	   of	   enthusiastic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  John	  Williamson,	  ‘A	  Short	  History	  of	  the	  Washington	  Consensus’	  in	  Narcis	  Serra	  and	  Joseph	  E.	  
Stiglitz	  (eds),	  The	  Washington	  Consensus	  Reconsidered:	  Towards	  a	  New	  Global	  Governance	  (The	  
Institute	  for	  Policy	  Dialogue	  Series,	  OUP	  2008)	  15,	  19.	  	  
94	  ibid	  16-­‐17;	  see	  also	  Williamson,	  ibid	  (n	  92)	  8-­‐17.	  
95	  Williamson,	  ibid	  (n	  92)	  18.	  
96	  Dani	  Rodrik,	  ‘Goodbye	  Washington	  Consensus,	  Hello	  Washington	  Confusion?	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank’s	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  the	  1990s:	  Learning	  from	  a	  Decade	  of	  Reform’	  (2006)	  XLIV	  
Journal	  of	  Economic	  Literature	  974.	  
97	  ‘Cochabamba	  Water	  Revolt’	  Timeline	  
<http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html>	  accessed	  5	  Nov	  2011;	  for	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  ‘shock	  doctrine’	  in	  Bolivia	  see	  Klein,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  142-­‐54.	  
98	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  8.	  
99	  Moises	  Naim,	  ‘Fad	  and	  Fashion	  in	  Economic	  Reforms:	  Washington	  Consensus	  or	  Washington	  
Confusion?’	  [Oct	  1999]	  Foreign	  Policy	  Magazine	  Working	  Draft	  of	  a	  Paper	  Prepared	  for	  the	  IMF	  
Conference	  on	  Second	  Generation	  Reforms,	  Washington	  D.C.	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implementation	  that	   ‘Williamson’s	  original	   list	  of	  do’s	  and	  don’ts	  came	  to	   look	  
remarkably	  tame	  and	  innocuous	  (….).’100	  	  
The	   Washington	   Consensus,	   argued	   Williamson,	   reflected	   a	   program	   of	  
‘universal	   convergence’,	   one	   that	   sprouted	   out	   of	   the	   US	   government	   and	   its	  
IFIs’	   conventional	   wisdom.101	  Whether	   or	   not	   such	   consensus	   ever	   existed	   in	  
reality	   is	  at	  best	  questionable.	  According	   to	  Naim,	   the	   impression	  of	  universal	  
accord	  masked	  persistent	  disagreements	  even	  among	  pro-­‐markets	  Washington	  
ideologues.	  A	  measure	  of	   coercion	  was	   implicated	   in	   that	  dissent	   came	  under	  
attack	   as	   anti-­‐markets	   and	   anti-­‐American. 102 	  At	   the	   interstate	   level,	  
implementation	  was	  assisted	  by	  coercive	  strategies,	  such	  as	  the	  making	  of	  debt-­‐
forgiveness	  and	  IFIs’	  lending	  to	  developing	  countries	  -­‐	  already	  convulsed	  by	  the	  
Volcker	   Shock	   -­‐103	  conditional	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   Consensus-­‐inspired	  
policy	   reforms.104	  The	   IMF	   and	   the	   World	   Bank	   thus	   became	   20th	   century’s	  
missionaries	   entrusted	  with	   the	   spread	   of	   an	   economic	   prescription	   that	  was	  
the	  same	  for	  each	  and	  every	  country,	  and	  which	  invariably	  reflected	  free	  market	  
orthodoxies.105	  
No	   less	   powerful	   was	   the	   allure	   of	   a	   promise	   of	   a	   historically	   unique	  
prosperity.106	  	  This	  pledge	  was	  poignantly	  articulated	  by	  Renato	  Ruggiero,	   the	  
first	  director-­‐general	  of	  the	  WTO,	  when	  he	  declared	  the	  transition	  to	  neoliberal	  
globalisation	  as	  having	  	  ‘the	  potential	  for	  eradicating	  global	  poverty	  in	  the	  early	  
part	  of	  the	  next	  [21st]	  century	  –	  a	  Utopian	  notion	  even	  a	  few	  decades	  ago,	  but	  a	  
real	   possibility	   today’. 107 	  	   A	   disciplinary	   discourse	   of	   ‘no	   alternative’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/Naim.HTM>	  accessed	  19	  June	  
2011;	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  (n	  96)	  974;	  see	  also	  Williamson,	  ibid	  (n	  93)	  16,	  21-­‐22.	  
100	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  974.	  
101	  John	  Williamson,	  ‘Democracy	  and	  the	  “Washington	  Consensus’	  (1993)	  21	  World	  
Development	  1329-­‐36,	  1329.	  
102	  Naim,	  ibid	  (n	  99).	  
103	  The	  Volcker	  Shock	  refers	  to	  the	  hike	  in	  interest	  rates	  instituted	  by	  Paul	  Volcker,	  chairman	  of	  
the	  Federal	  Reserve	  during	  the	  Carter	  and	  Regan	  administrations.	  Rates	  went	  up	  to	  as	  much	  as	  
21%.	  Klein,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  159;	  the	  first	  casualty	  was	  the	  Mexico	  default	  in	  1982-­‐4.	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  
25)	  29.	  
104	  	  Naim,	  ibid	  (n	  99).	  
105	  Joseph	  Stiglitz,	  Globalization	  and	  its	  Discontents	  (Penguin	  Books	  2002)	  13-­‐14.	  
106	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  384.	  
107	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  Bad	  Samaritans:	  The	  Guilty	  Secrets	  of	  Rich	  Nations	  &	  The	  Threat	  to	  Global	  
Prosperity	  (Random	  House	  Business	  Books	  2007)	  23	  citing	  from	  R.	  Ruggiero	  ‘Whither	  the	  Trade	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supplemented	  the	  promise.108	  	  This	  ‘carrot	  and	  stick’	  rhetoric	  was	  articulated	  in	  
the	   1996	  World	   Bank	   Development	   Report	   directed	   specifically	   at	   transition	  
economies	   that	   displayed	   an	   enduring	   attachment	   to	   central	   planning.109	  It	  
merits	   citation	   for	   the	   way	   it	   invokes	   a	   sense	   of	   isolation.	   In	   other	   words,	  
central	  planning	  is	  not	  only	  bad,	  but	  is	  also	  counter-­‐historic.	  To	  this,	  a	  layer	  of	  
seduction	  is	  added,	  whereby	  prosperity	  would	  materialise	  if	  only	  impediments	  
were	  to	  be	  removed.	  Thus,	  the	  Bank	  declared:	  	  
	  
This	   transition,	   which	   affects	   about	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	   world’s	  
population,	  has	  been	  unavoidable.	  The	  world	  is	  changing	  rapidly;	  
massive	   increases	   in	   global	   trade	   and	   private	   investment	   in	  
recent	  years	  have	  created	  enormous	  potential	  for	  growth	  in	  jobs,	  
incomes,	   and	   living	   standards	   through	   free	   markets.	   Yet,	   the	  
state-­‐dominated	   economic	   systems	   of	   these	   countries,	   weighed	  
down	  by	  bureaucratic	  control	  and	  inefficiency,	  largely	  prevented	  
markets	   from	   functioning	   and	   were	   therefore	   incapable	   of	  
sustaining	  improvements	  in	  human	  welfare.110	  
	  
The	  Washington	  consensus	  –	  second	  generation	  	  
Naim’s	   working	   paper	   to	   the	   IMF	   offered	   a	   critique,	   whereby	   Washington	  
Consensus	   ideas	   were	   ‘necessary	   but	   not	   sufficient’.	   What	   was	   required	   was	  
‘stronger,	  more	  effective	  institutions’.	  That	  the	  paper	  was	  delivered	  in	  1999	  was	  
no	   coincidence.111	  	   By	   then	   it	   became	   apparent	   that,	   even	   excluding	   the	   full-­‐
blown	   financial	   crises	   across	   South	   America,	   East	   Asia,	   Russia	   and	   Turkey,	  
outcomes,	  predicted	  to	   follow	  on	  the	   footsteps	  of	   the	  application	  of	  neoliberal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
System	  Next?’	  in	  J.	  Bhagwati	  &	  M.	  Hirsch	  (eds)	  The	  Uruguay	  Round	  and	  Beyond	  –	  Essays	  in	  
Honour	  of	  Arthur	  Dunkel	  (The	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press	  1998)	  130.	  
108	  ibid	  40.	  
109	  World	  Bank,	  From	  Plan	  to	  Market,	  World	  Development	  Report	  1996	  (OUP	  1996)	  iii.	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  ibid.	  
111	  Naim,	  ibid	  (99).	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reforms,	  were	  not	  about	  to	  materialise.112	  Rather	  than	  unprecedented	  affluence,	  
in	   most	   countries	   neoliberal	   globalisation	   became	   associated	   with	  
unprecedented	  poverty.113	  	  The	  90s	  and	  2,000s	   turned	  out	   to	  be	   ‘lost	  decades	  
for	   most	   developing	   and	   transition	   economies’, 114 	  with	   financial	   crises	  
becoming	  both	  endemic	  and	  contagious.115	  	  By	  2010	  world	  poverty	  accounted	  
‘for	   a	   third	   of	   all	   human	   deaths	   and	   the	   majority	   of	   human	   deprivation,	  
morbidity	  and	  suffering	  worldwide.’116	  Any	  windfall,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  generated	  
by	   a	   property	   boom	   was	   limited	   to	   the	   Global	   North	   and	   in	   any	   event	   was	  
relatively	  short	  lived.117	  Even	  there,	  excluding	  government	  guarantees	  of	  Euro	  6	  
trillion,	   the	   monetary	   value	   of	   proceeds	   from	   three	   decades	   of	   privatisation,	  
marketisation	   and	   liberalisation	   is	   only	   twice	   the	   amount	   spent	   by	   US	   and	  
European	  governments	  on	  bailing	  out	  their	  failing	  banks.118	  	  
The	   answer	   was	   to	   be	   more	   neoliberalism.	   In	   its	   1996	   policy	   manifesto	   the	  
World	   Bank	   continued	   to	   espouse	   policies	   of	   stabilisation,	   liberalisation	   and	  
privatisation.	   It	   insisted	   that	   the	   unleashing	   of	   markets	   remained	   the	   basis	  
reform	  from	  which	  all	  benefits	  would	  flow,	  and	  the	  only	  mechanism	  capable	  of	  
renewing	  growth	  and	  spreading	  prosperity.119	  	  The	  conclusion	  reached	  by	   the	  
IMF	  was	  that	  the	  problem	  was	  one	  of	  implementation.	  It	  did	  not	  go	  deep	  and	  far	  
enough.120	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  was	  argued,	  reforms	  stopped	  short	  of	  the	  full-­‐blown	  
restructuring	   necessary	   for	   well-­‐functioning	   market	   economies.	   This	   further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  (n	  96)	  974.	  
113	  At	  a	  time	  when	  annual	  total	  world	  income	  increased	  by	  2.5%	  the	  number	  of	  people	  living	  in	  
poverty	  has	  gone	  up	  by	  100	  million.	  For	  most	  people	  in	  East	  and	  Central	  Europe	  the	  market	  
economy	  proved	  worse	  than	  predicted	  by	  their	  communist	  leaders.	  Stiglitz,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  5-­‐6;	  
World	  per	  capita	  income	  grew	  at	  2%	  during	  the	  neoliberal	  period	  of	  1980-­‐2000	  compared	  with	  
3.1%	  in	  1960-­‐80.	  Growth	  of	  per	  capita	  income	  in	  developing	  countries	  declined	  from	  3%	  to	  
1.5%	  and	  would	  be	  even	  less	  once	  China	  with	  it	  non-­‐neoliberal	  policies	  is	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  
equation.	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  Globalisation,	  Economic	  Development	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  State	  (Zen	  
Books	  Ltd	  2004)	  2;	  on	  the	  Consensus’	  failure	  to	  deliver	  growth	  see	  also	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  
ibid	  (n	  37)	  56-­‐57.	  
114	  In	  the	  post	  Soviet	  Union	  world	  The	  ‘transformational	  depression	  lasted	  for	  six	  years	  on	  
average,	  unemployment	  ranged	  between	  20-­‐40%	  and	  broader	  indicators	  such	  as	  life	  
expectancy,	  infant	  mortality	  and	  poverty	  suggest	  heavy	  cost	  associated	  with	  transition.	  Birch	  &	  
Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  10-­‐11.	  
115	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  94-­‐98.	  
116	  Thomas	  Pogge,	  Politics	  As	  Usual:	  What	  lies	  Behind	  the	  Pro-­‐Poor	  Rhetoric	  (Polity	  Press	  2010)	  
107.	  	  
117	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  1-­‐2.	  
118	  ibid.	  
119	  World	  Bank,	  ibid	  (n	  109)	  7.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
120	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  (96)	  977-­‐79;	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  386.	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augmentation	  of	  market	   fundamentalism	  with	  a	   second-­‐generation	  Consensus	  
of	  institutional	  fundamentalism	  drew	  from	  works,	  such	  as	  those	  published	  by	  D	  
H	   Soto	   and	   Acemoglu	   and	   Johnson	   and	   Robinson,	   who	   by	   2001	   pointed	   to	  
secure	  property	  rights	  as	   the	  single	  most	   important	  determinant	  of	  successful	  
development.121	  	   Thus,	   property	   rights	   which	   came	   last	   and	   ‘almost	   as	   an	  
afterthought’122	  in	  Williamson’s	   list	  of	  policy	   tenets	  now	  reclaimed	   their	  place	  
as	   a	   paradigmatic	   centrepiece	   of	   strong	   legal	   institutions	   of	   contract	   and	  
property.123	  The	   focus	   on	   institutionalised	   rule	   of	   law	  was	   then	   coupled	  with	  
notions	   of	   market-­‐based	   democracies	   and	   freedom.	   The	   world	   order	   so	  
conceptualised	  went	  beyond	  pure	  economics	  to	  encompass	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  Kantian	  
perpetual	  peace,	  towards	  which	  humanity	  is	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  a	  single	  hegemonic	  
state.124	  History	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  process,	  wrote	  Fukuyama,	  a	  former	  deputy	  
director	  of	  the	  US	  State	  Department’s	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
US	  neoconservative	  movement,	  has	   reached	   its	  end	  point	  with	   the	   triumph	  of	  
Western	   economic	   and	   political	   liberalism.125	  	   With	   liberal	   democracies	   now	  
embedded	  in	  human	  consciousness,	  he	  argued,	  they	  represent	  a	  globally	  shared	  
coherent	   political	   aspiration.	   Nation-­‐states	   are	   bound	   together	   by	   global	  
markets,	   the	   universal	   diffusion	   of	   consumer	   culture	   and	   capitalist	   scientific	  
logic.126	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   IFIs,	   incursion	   into	   institutional	   reforms	   meant	  
that	   IMF	   conditionalities	   now	   extended	   beyond	   economics	   to	   encompass	  
political	   demands. 127 	  Thus,	   financial	   assistance	   became	   contingent	   on	   the	  
transformation	   of	   the	   interior	   of	   the	   recipient	   state	   by	   posing	   ever-­‐greater	  
sovereignty	  encroaching	  demands	  for	  political,	   legal	  and	  social	  reforms.128	  Yet,	  
as	  pointed	  by	  Rodrik,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  (n	  96)	  978-­‐79;	  see	  also	  M	  Sornarajah,	  ‘The	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Agenda	  in	  Investment	  
Arbitration:	  Its	  Rise,	  Retreat	  and	  Impact	  on	  State	  Sovereignty’	  in	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  Penelope	  
Simons	  and	  Dalvinder	  Singh	  (eds),	  Redefining	  Sovereignty	  in	  International	  Economy	  (Studies	  in	  
International	  Trade	  Law,	  Hart	  Publishing	  2008)	  206.	  
122	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  (n	  96)	  973.	  
123	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  121)	  206.	  
124	  ibid	  206-­‐07.	  
125	  Fukuyama	  resigned	  from	  the	  neoconservative	  movement	  in	  2006	  over	  the	  Iraq	  war.	  
126	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  ‘The	  end	  of	  History?’	  [Summer	  1989]	  The	  National	  Interest	  
<http://courses.essex.ac.uk/GV/GV905/IR%20Media%202010-­‐
11/W4%20Readings/Fukuyama%20End%20of%20History.pdf>	  accessed	  3	  July	  2011;	  
Fukuyama,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  xii,	  xv.	  
127	  Joseph	  Stiglitz,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  44-­‐45	  giving	  as	  an	  example	  the	  case	  of	  Korea,	  where	  IMF	  lending	  
was	  conditional	  on	  a	  change	  in	  the	  charter	  of	  the	  country’s	  Central	  Bank.	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  Ha-­‐Joon	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  ibid	  (n	  113)	  1-­‐2.	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design	  and	  growth,	   so	   that	   the	   focus	  on	   the	   latter	   is	   ‘largely	  a	  dead-­‐end	  upon	  
closer	  look’:129	  	  
And	   so,	   neoliberalism	   appears	   to	   repeatedly	   ‘fail	   forward’.130 	  	   Neither	   the	  
unravelling	  of	  its	  utopian	  vision	  of	  a	  non-­‐cyclical	   ‘new	  economy’	  as	  a	  reality	  of	  
deepening	   poverty,	   nor	   even	   the	   severe	   and	   on-­‐going	   financial	   crisis	   which	  
began	   in	   the	   West	   in	   2008	   appear	   able	   to	   dislodge	   this	   paradigm	   from	   its	  
hegemonic	   perch.131	  	   Thus,	   in	   his	   speech	   of	   19	   May	   2011	   President	   Obama	  
called	   on	   post-­‐uprising	   Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	   to	   implement	   liberalising	   reforms,	  
and	  adhere	  to	  integration	  promoting	  agreements.132	  In	  a	  further	  demonstration	  
of	   what	   Dine	   terms	   ‘risk	   free	   banking’,133	  in	   the	   UK,	   Greece	   and	   elsewhere,	  
banks	  appear	  immune	  to	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  bad	  decisions,	  while	  people	  
are	   forced	   by	   their	   governments,	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   IMF	   to	   bear	   the	   cost	   of	  
indebtedness,	   regardless	   of	   the	   consequences	   to	   their	   livelihood	   and	  
wellbeing.134	  
Probing	  the	  moral	  implications	  of	  this	  world	  design,	  Pogge	  points	  out	  that	  at	  a	  
time	  of	  unprecedented	  global	  wealth,	  such	  that	  is	  sufficient	  to	  eradicate	  all	  life-­‐
threatening	  poverty,	  global	  inequalities	  are	  on	  the	  rise	  and	  ‘the	  global	  economic	  
regime	   that	  our	   countries	  designed	  and	   impose	  kills	  more	  efficiently	   than	   the	  
Nazi	  extermination	  camps;	  the	  daily	  suffering	  from	  poverty	  and	  disease	  greatly	  
exceeds	  that	  caused	  by	  World	  War	  II	  in	  its	  darkest	  days’.135	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Rodrik,	  ibid	  (n	  96)	  979.	  
130	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  6-­‐7.	  
131	  Plehwe,	  Walpen	  and	  Neunhoffer,	  ibid	  (n	  39)	  1.	  
132	  Barack	  Obama	  speech	  to	  the	  English	  parliament	  on	  19	  may	  2011.	  
133	  Janet	  Dine,	  ibid	  (n	  68)	  100-­‐105.	  
134	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  29.	  
135	  Pogge,	  ibid	  (n	  116)	  2,	  12-­‐13	  pointing	  out	  that	  in	  2000	  the	  bottom	  half	  of	  the	  world’s	  adults	  
together	  owned	  1.1%	  of	  global	  wealth	  with	  the	  bottom	  10%	  possessing	  only	  0.03%;	  by	  contrast,	  
the	  top	  10%	  owned	  85.1%	  and	  the	  top	  1%	  possessed	  39.9%	  of	  global	  wealth.	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On	  Power,	  Hegemony	  and	  Empire	  
The	  puzzle	  of	  endurance	  
So	  here	  we	  have	   it:	   a	  paradigm,	   its	   features	   ruffled	  by	  popular	   resistance,	  but	  
the	   compulsive	   dissemination	   of	   which	   persists	   essentially	   unmodified	   and	  
impervious	  to	  the	  growing	  chasm	  between	  discourse	  and	  real	  outcomes.136	  The	  
neoliberal	  claim	  to	  a	  basis	   in	  scientific	   logic	  renders	  such	  dogmatic	  endurance	  
all	   the	  more	   puzzling.137	  For	   the	   capitalist	   claim	   to	   scientific	   approach	  would	  
ordinarily	  include	  a	  final	  stage	  of	  testing	  models	  against	  empirical	  observations.	  
Yet,	  there	  is	  little	  historical	  evidence	  that	  markets	  produce	  growth	  or	  that	  such	  
growth	   translates	   into	   benefit	   for	   the	   poor.138	  	   This	   in	   turn	   lends	   support	   to	  
Polanyi’s	  view	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  functioning	  free	  markets	  is	  a	  myth	  constructed	  
as	   part	   of	   a	   utopian	   vision.139	  	   The	   answer	   may	   lie	   in	   the	   ‘no	   alternative’	  
discourse.	   	  However,	   yet	   again,	   in	   reality	   and	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Pogge,	   rather	  
than	   an	   inevitable	   consequence,	   the	   massive	   deprivation	   consequential	   upon	  
the	   present	   world	   design	   is	   not	   only	   foreseeable,	   but	   is	   also	   avoidable	   at	   a	  
miniscule	  cost	  to	  the	  affluent.140	  	  
In	   seeking	   to	   explain	   this	   phenomenon	   of	   outcomes-­‐defying	   endurance	   three	  
possible	  conjectures	  come	  to	  mind:	  First,	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  theoretical	  model	  is	  
not	  concerned	  with	  consequences.	  Support	   for	   this	  supposition	  may	  be	   found,	  
for	   example,	   in	   Hayek’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   liberty	   and	   law.	   Freedom	   is	  
postulated	  as	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  moral	  value	  that	  is	  detached	  from	  its	  aftermath.	  One	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  But	  see	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  385-­‐86	  arguing	  that	  initial	  disagreements,	  variegated	  
implementation	  and	  popular	  resistance	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  stalling	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Washington	  
Consensus;	  see	  also	  Dieter	  Plehwe	  and	  Bernhard	  Walpen,	  ‘Between	  Network	  and	  Complex	  
Organization:	  the	  Making	  of	  Neoliberal	  Knowledge	  and	  Hegemony’	  in	  Plehwe,	  Walpen	  and	  
Neunhoffer,	  ibid	  (n	  39)	  28;	  referring	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  electoral	  success	  of	  new	  social	  
democratic	  parties	  in	  Italy	  and	  France	  and	  the	  Noble	  Prizes	  awarded	  to	  development	  economist	  
Amartya	  Sen	  and	  World	  Bank	  insider	  turned	  critique,	  Joseph	  Stiglitz,	  were	  seized	  upon	  as	  
pointing	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  more	  ethical	  ‘post-­‐Washington	  Consensus’;	  see	  also	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  
14)	  9	  arguing	  that	  declarations	  of	  the	  death	  of	  neoliberalism	  are	  premature.	  	  
137	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  10-­‐11.	  
138	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  vii.	  
139	  ibid	  xxix,	  116-­‐35,148;	  see	  also	  Robert	  B.	  Reich,	  The	  Work	  of	  Nations	  (1st	  edn	  Vintage	  Book	  
Edition)	  186	  stating	  that	  the	  free	  market	  idea	  is	  a	  construct	  produced	  by	  laws	  and	  political	  
decisions	  and	  is	  pure	  fantasy	  outside	  this	  context.	  
140	  Pogge,	  ibid	  (n	  116)	  12,	  21-­‐24,	  107.	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may	  be	  free	  to	  starve	  for	  example.141	  	  Similarly,	  in	  truly	  free	  societies,	  law	  too	  is	  
detached	  from	  its	  real	  outcomes.142	  	  The	  focus	  is	  thus	  on	  processes	  rather	  than	  
on	   end-­‐results.	   For	   Nozick	   justice	   is	   embedded	   in	   the	   processes	   that	   lead	   to	  
proprietary	   entitlement,	   rather	   than	   in	   the	  management	   of	   their	   outcomes.143	  
Further,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Washington	   Consensus,	   the	   proposition	   that	  
equity	   may	   be	   pertinent	   to	   development	   ‘often	   received	   short	   shrift’.144	  	   Yet,	  
development	  that	  is	  measured	  by	  GDP	  performance	  is	  very	  much	  integral	  to	  the	  
Consensus	  rhetoric.145	  	  Further,	  neoliberalism	  may	  be	  described	  as	  a	  utilitarian	  
discipline	   in	   that	   the	   sufferings	   encountered	   on	   the	   way	   are	   justified	   by	   the	  
outcome	   of	   overall	   benefit.	   Chicago	   school	   orthodoxy	   may	   be	   averse	   to	  
distribution.	  Nonetheless,	   it	   is	  concerned	  with	   the	  welfare	  of	  consumers.	  Such	  
welfare	  is	  maximised	  when	  the	  general	  level	  of	  wealth	  is	  raised.146	  	  This	  is	  then	  
distributed	   through	   a	   spontaneous	   process	   of	   ‘trickling	   down’.147	  	   To	   say	   that	  
neoliberalism	   is	   indifferent	   to	   consequences	   is	   therefore	   to	   ignore	   one	   of	   its	  
fundamental	  constituents.	  	  
The	   second	   supposition	   is	   that	   neoliberalism	   may	   represent	   an	   instance	   of	  
irrationality,	   whereby	   paradigmatic	   pronouncements	   are	   incongruous	   with	  
their	   implementation.	   The	   proposition	   is	   not	   as	   far-­‐fetched	   as	   it	   may	   first	  
appear.	   	   For,	   at	   least	   on	   some	   views,	   irrationality	   is	   integral	   to	   empire	  
building. 148 	  The	   rejection	   of	   the	   Keynesian	   model	   is	   a	   case	   in	   point.	  
Neoliberalism	  is	  the	  product	  of	  at	  least	  three	  decades	  of	  capitalist	  evolution.	  At	  
one	  stage,	  spurred	  on	  by	  workers’	  resistance,	  its	  liberal	  progenitor	  mutated	  into	  
the	  growth	  producing,	   state-­‐led	  Keynesian	  model	  of	  post-­‐WWII	   ‘golden	  age	  of	  
capitalism’.	  Yet,	  this	  model	  was	  vilified	  and	  replaced	  with	  a	  return	  to	  pre-­‐1930	  
ideas,	   notwithstanding	   the	   severe	   financial	   crisis	   they	  had	  produced	  by	  1929.	  
Thus,	  by	  the	  time	  neoliberalism	  came	  on	  line,	  the	  experience	  of	  market	  failure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  Hayek,	  ibid,	  (n	  4)	  17.	  
142	  ibid	  135-­‐38.	  
143	  Robert	  Nozick,	  ‘An	  Entitlement	  Theory’	  in	  Clayton	  and	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  61)	  94.	  
144	  Joseph	  E	  Stiglitz,	  ‘Is	  There	  a	  Post	  –Washington	  Consensus?’	  in	  Serra	  and	  Stiglitz	  ibid	  (n	  93)	  
47.	  
145	  ibid.	  
146	  Colin	  Crouch,	  The	  Strange	  Non-­‐Death	  of	  Neoliberalism	  (Polity	  Press	  2011)	  61.	  
147	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  16;	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  35;	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  64;	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  
ibid	  (n	  37)	  60.	  
148	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  12-­‐13.	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under	   conditions	   of	   unrestrained	   freedom	   had	   already	   been	   etched	   into	  
collective	  consciousness.	  	  Nevertheless,	  as	  between	  two	  models	  in	  difficulties,	  it	  
was	  the	  one	  with	  proven	  track	  record	  of	  growth	  that	  was	  rejected.	  Further,	   in	  
the	   liberal/neoliberal	   construction,	   markets	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   a	   test	   of	  
legitimacy	   by	   reference	   to	   some	   other	   overriding	   values.	   Rather,	   they	   are	  
evaluated	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  success	  or	  failure	  to	  achieve	  projected	  outcomes.149	  
Yet,	   as	   we	   saw,	   failure	   is	   consistently	   excused	   away	   as	   the	   product	   of	  
interference	  and	  faulty	  implementation.	  	  
One	  may	   conclude	   that	  what	   is	   being	  witnessed	   is	   an	   empire	   in	   the	   grip	   of	   a	  
permanent	   state	  of	   irrationality.	  Alternatively,	  one	  may	  deduce	   -­‐	   and	  here	  we	  
come	   to	   the	   third	   conjecture	   -­‐	   that	   there	   is	   something	   else,	   a	   subterfuge,	  
whereby	  paradigm	  is	  incongruous	  not	  with	  its	  implementation,	  but	  with	  its	  true	  
intent.	  In	  other	  words,	  objective	  truth	  is	  masked	  by	  discourse.	  Rather	  than	  the	  
manifestation	  of	  a	  dynamic	  of	  irrationality,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  growth	  is	  adopted	  to	  
facilitate	   the	   realisation	   of	   another,	   more	   covert	   rationale.	   Polanyi	   succinctly	  
articulated	   this	   rationale	   when	   he	   said:	   ‘Laissez	   faire	   was	   not	   a	   method	   to	  
achieve	   a	   thing	   it	  was	   the	   thing	   to	   be	   achieved’.150	  	   In	   line	  with	   the	   capitalist	  
compulsion	   for	   accumulation	   that	   has	   no	   purpose	   other	   than	   its	   own	  
endlessness,	   the	   neoliberal	   paradigm’s	   real	   intended	   outcome	   is	   its	   own	  
perpetuation.	  Seen	  from	  this	  perspective,	  perhaps	  the	  next	  question	  to	  pose	  in	  
the	  one	  which	  for	  Susan	  Strange	  is	  central	  to	  any	  realist	  approach;	  that	  is,	  who	  
actually	   benefits	   from	   this	   self-­‐perpetuation. 151 	  This	   question	   leads	   us	   to	  
consider	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  rationale	  of	  the	  ‘new	  imperialism.’152	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  16.	  
150	  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  145.	  
151	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  38.	  	  
152	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  30;	  see	  also	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  56.	  
110	  
	  
New	  imperialism	  	  
Discourse	  and	  governance	  
‘New	  imperialism’	  denotes	   ‘a	  new	  global	  calculation’	   in	  Western	  governmental	  
practice.153	  	  Its	  aim	  is	  for	  the	  whole	  surface	  of	  the	  earth	  to	  be	  brought	  within	  the	  
realm	   of	  market-­‐based	   economic	   imperatives.154	  It	   is	   designed	   to	   bring	   about	  
the	   integration	   of	   disparate	   nation-­‐states	   into	   a	   unified	   global	   order	   that	   is	  
forged	  by	  the	  US,	  and	  which	  serves	  to	  enrich	  it	  and	  its	  corporate	  elite.155	  As	  well	  
as	   capital	   and	   debt	   bondage,	   the	   dynamics	   of	   ‘new	   imperialism’	   also	   include	  
what	   Harvey	   terms	   ‘accumulation	   by	   dispossession’	   –	   the	   continuity	   within	  
neoliberal	   capitalism	   of	  Marxist	   primitive	   accumulation	   through	   for	   example,	  
land	  grabbing	  and	  privatisation.156	  	  	  
The	   polemic	   surrounding	   the	   traits	   of	   post-­‐WWII	   US	   Empire	   is	   vast.	   A	  
comprehensive	  discussion	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  work.157	  I	  therefore	  focus	  
on	   one	   essential	   feature	   most	   pertinent	   to	   this	   enquiry.	   That	   is,	   new	  
imperialism’s	   preference	   for	   informal	   strategies.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   shies	   away	  
from	  direct	  colonial	  rule	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  dynamic	  of	  imposed	  voluntariness.	  The	  
order	  into	  which	  incorporation	  is	  required	  comprises	  first,	  multiple	  states	  and	  
second,	   an	   ecology	   of	   accumulation	   regimes.	   In	   this	   ecology	   no	   country	   is	  
permitted	  to	  be	  itself.158	  	  Rather,	  each	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  put	  its	  law	  and	  violence	  
monopolies	  at	   the	  service	  of	  empire.	  Development	   is	  made	  subject	   to	   the	   free	  
operation	   of	   capital	   ‘whose	   property	   rights	   are	  militarily	   and	   constitutionally	  
guaranteed	  and	  upheld’.159	  	  ‘On	  the	  whole’	  says	  Wood,	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  US	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Foucault,	  ibid	  56.	  
154	  ibid	  57.	  
155	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  130-­‐	  42.	  
156	  David	  Harvey,	  The	  New	  Imperialism	  (OUP	  2003)	  87-­‐169;	  see	  also	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  154,	  
178-­‐79.	  
157	  For	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  various	  views	  from	  a	  Marxist	  perspective	  see	  Alex	  Callinicos,	  
Imperialism	  and	  Global	  Political	  Economy	  (Polity	  Press	  2009)	  14-­‐21.	  
158	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  30;	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  xi.	  
159	  Gill,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  24.	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been	   to	   avoid	  direct	   colonial	   rule	  wherever	  possible	   and	   to	   rely	   on	   economic	  
hegemony,	  which	  is	  less	  costly,	  less	  risky	  and	  more	  profitable’.160	  	  
From	   a	   paradigmatic	   perspective,	   imposed	   voluntariness	   is	   diffused	   from	  
‘persuasion	  centres’	  by	  means	  of	  a	  discourse	  that	  goes	  beyond	  universalism	  to	  
claim	   ‘natural’	   or	   ‘moral’	   attributes	   and	   assert	   inevitability. 161 	  	   In	   turn,	  
inevitability	  that	  is	  founded	  on	  natural	  and	  moral	  attributes	  serves	  to	  gloss	  over	  
the	   conflictual	   dimensions	   of	   the	   ‘political’. 162 	  	   In	   the	   process,	   capitalist	  
imperatives	   and	   TNCs’	   interests	   are	   presented	   as	   aligned	   with	   those	   of	  
developing	   countries	   to	   suggest	   a	   ‘win-­‐win’	   formula. 163 	  	   From	   an	  
implementation	   perspective,	   structural	   adjustments	   are	   applied	   under	   the	  
supervision	  of	  Washington	  and	  the	  IFIs	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  ensuing	  order	  is	  
irreversible.164	  	   Crises	   are	   at	   times	   orchestrated,	   and	   invariably	  managed	   and	  
packaged	  to	  rationalise	  the	  system	  and	  discipline	  the	  peripheries.165	  	  Economic	  
mechanisms	  are	  supplemented	  by	  military	  power,	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  its	  use;	  ‘a	  war	  
without	  end’	  posited	  as	  a	  foundational	  layer	  of	  persuasion	  and	  a	  warning	  to	  foes	  
and	  allies	  alike.166	  	  
Discourse	  and	  governance	   thus	   replicate	  each	  other.	  Both	  are	  grounded	   in	  an	  
order	   that	   is	   steered	   by	   economic	   imperatives.	   The	   starting	   point	   is	   one	   of	  
juridically	   equal	   free	   and	   autonomous	   institutions,	   be	   it	   states,	   people	   or	  
corporations.	   Such	   institutions	   are	   treated	   as	   ‘individuals’	   engaged	   in	   a	  
competitive	   interaction	   through	   voluntary	   exchanges	   in	   the	  marketplace.	   Yet,	  
this	   starting	   point	   is	   flawed	   since	   the	   purported	   freedom,	   voluntariness	   and	  
equality	  are	  illusionary.	  In	  reality,	  the	  structural	  positions	  of	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘legal’	  
persons	   are	   asymmetric.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   two-­‐tier	   system,	   whereby	   people’s	  
ability	   to	   make	   free	   choices	   is	   rendered	   almost	   meaningless	   when	   pitched	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  x.	  
161	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  49.	  
162	  Chantal	  Mouffe,	  On	  the	  Political	  (Routledge	  2005)	  8-­‐13,	  72-­‐76.	  
163	  	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  118;	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  129-­‐30.	  
164	  ibid	  108.	  
165	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  156)	  150;	  for	  the	  role	  of	  crises	  in	  producing	  profitable	  investment	  
opportunities	  through	  the	  fall	  in	  the	  value	  of	  assets	  see	  also	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  162-­‐63.	  
166	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  143-­‐59.	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against	  the	  systemic	  power	  of	  and	  protection	  afforded	  to	  corporations.167	  Such	  
illusion	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  core\periphery	  interstate	  relations.168	  
States	  are	  not	  equal,	  and	  are	  rendered	  even	  less	  so	  when	  the	  sovereignty	  cost	  of	  
their	  incorporation	  into	  the	  imperial	  order	  is	  brought	  into	  the	  equation.	  As	  seen	  
above,	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Consensus	  into	  institutional	  fundamentalism	  meant	  
that	   such	   cost	   now	   touches	   not	   only	   on	   economic,	   but	   also	   on	   political	  
sovereignty.	   The	   flip	   side	   is	   that	   inequalities	   in	   core/periphery	   relations	   also	  
aggravate	  national	  differences	  and	  provoke	  instincts	  for	  self-­‐preservation	  in	  the	  
face	   of	   predatory	   globalisation.169	  	   In	   consequence,	   coercive	   power	   is	   often	  
called	   upon	   at	   both	   the	   national	   and	   international	   levels	   to	   secure	   order,	   to	  
annex	   and	   to	   discipline.	   	   Paradoxically,	   especially	   since	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Soviet	  
alternative,	   argues	   Gill,	   the	   neoliberal	   project	   has	   become	   increasingly	  
‘disciplinary’	  and	  ‘punitive’.170	  
Power	  
Foucault	  distinguishes	  liberal	  power	  from	  that	  of	  feudalism	  by	  its	  inventiveness	  
and	  capacity	  to	  expand	  through	  successive	  transformations.171	  	  Thus,	  capitalism	  
endures	  by	  means	  of	  power	  that	  is	  light	  on	  its	  feet.	  However,	  lightness	  of	  form	  is	  
supplemented	   by	   a	   mode	   of	   operation	   that	   is	   invariably	   ‘heavy,	   ponderous,	  
meticulous	   and	   constant’. 172 	  	   In	   other	   words,	   change	   and	   constancy	   are	  
intertwined	   and	   interdependent.	   Change	   facilitates	   durability.	   Both	   are	  
contingent	   on	   persistence	   and	   planning.	   This	   interplay	   between	   change,	  
permanence,	   and	   perseverance	   was	   observed	   earlier	   in	   the	   chapter.	   It	   also	  
seems	   to	   run	   through	   Arrighi’s	   theory	   of	   capitalist	   Systemic	   Cycles	   of	  
Accumulation	   (SCAs).	   According	   to	   Arrighi,	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   world	  
hegemony	   is	  maintained	   through	   successive	   cycles	  of	   empire.	  All	   cycles	   share	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  79.	  
168	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (37)	  20-­‐22.	  
169	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  156)	  188.	  
170	  Gill,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  24.	  
171	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Power/Knowledge:	  Selected	  Interviews	  &	  Other	  Writings	  1927-­‐1977	  (Vintage	  
Books	  1977)	  160.	  
172	  ibid	  58.	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the	   same	   evolutionary	   stages.	   Yet,	   each	   draws	   on	   the	   causative	   roots	   of	   its	  
predecessor’s	  downfall	  to	  acquire	  new	  qualities.173	  	  
Versatility	  means	   that	  power	  may	   take	  on	  a	  variety	  of	   guises.	  Yet	   such	  guises	  
are	   also	   homogenous	   in	   that	   they	   share	   a	   single	   purpose,	   that	   of	   designing	   a	  
desired	   outcome,	   and	   then	   maximising	   compliance	   and	   minimising	  
resistance.174	  Barnett	   and	   Duvall’s	   taxonomy	   of	   power	   distinguishes	   between	  
four	   categories	  of	   guises:	   compulsory,	   institutional,	   structural	   and	  productive.	  
Each	  operates	  differently,	  but	  all	  function	  so	  as	  to	  shape	  the	  capacity	  of	  actors	  to	  
determine	   their	   fate	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   social	   interactions.175	  It	   stands	   to	  
reason	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  neoliberal	  creative	  destruction,	  they	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  
conflated.	   The	   first	   stage	   of	   destruction	   may	   gravitate	   towards	   compulsory	  
power.	  However,	   the	  production	  of	   an	   enduring	   alternative	   to	   that	  which	  has	  
been	   destroyed	   may	   call	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   power	   forms.	   Thus,	   the	   creative	  
destruction	  of	  Chile	  in	  1973	  and	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  implicated	  the	  use	  of	  compulsory	  
power,	   followed	   by	   institutional	   power,	   so	   as	   to	   reconfigure	   the	   state.	   	   For	  
Harvey,	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   two	   instances	   of	   state	   restructuring	   occurred	   in	  
different	  times,	  and	  in	  two	  quite	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  suggests	  that	  ‘the	  
grim	   reach	   of	   imperial	   power	   might	   lie	   behind	   the	   rapid	   proliferation	   of	  
neoliberal	   state	   forms	   throughout	   the	  world	   from	   the	  mid-­‐1970	   onwards’.176	  
Naim	  similarly	  discerns	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Consensus	  
originated	   in	   Washington,	   the	   seat	   of	   ‘the	   victorious	   empire’.177	  Notably,	   the	  
overthrow	   of	   the	   democratically	   elected	   Allende	   government	   in	   Chile	   on	   11	  
September	   1973,	   and	   its	   replacement	   with	   the	   Pinochet	   brutal	   regime	   -­‐	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  44)	  6,	  9-­‐10,	  89.	  
174	  David	  Miller,	  ‘How	  Neoliberalism	  Got	  Where	  It	  is:	  Elite	  Planning,	  Corporate	  Lobbying	  and	  the	  
Release	  of	  the	  Free	  Market’	  in	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  39.	  
175	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall,	  ‘Power	  in	  Global	  Governance’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  
ibid	  (n	  12)	  3.	  
176	  	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  6-­‐9;	  the	  four	  orders	  promulgated	  on	  19	  September	  2003	  by	  Paul	  Bremer,	  
head	  of	  the	  Coalition	  Provisional	  Authority	  in	  Iraq	  included	  the	  full	  privatisation	  of	  public	  
enterprises,	  full	  ownership	  rights	  by	  foreign	  firms	  of	  Iraqi	  businesses,	  full	  repatriation	  of	  
foreign	  profits,	  the	  opening	  of	  Iraqi	  banks	  to	  foreign	  control,	  national	  treatment	  and	  the	  
elimination	  of	  nearly	  all	  trade	  barriers;	  for	  the	  MENA/OECD	  investment	  program	  for	  Iraq	  see	  
MENA/OECD	  Investment	  Program,	  ‘Iraq	  –	  International	  Investment	  Program’	  [2004]	  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/5/41052987.pdf>	  accessed	  15	  July	  2011;	  Gill,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  39	  
discussing	  the	  privatisation	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  economy	  by	  the	  US	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  its	  invasion.	  	  
177	  Naim,	  ibid	  (n	  99).	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sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘the	   first	  9/11’178	  -­‐	  was	  the	   first,	  but	  not	   the	  only	  US	  
and	   corporations-­‐led	   experiment	   in	   neoliberal	   state	   restructuring.179	  	   In	   fact,	  
between	   the	   60s	   and	   the	   Soviet	   collapse	   in	   1990,	   ‘the	   number	   of	   political	  
prisoners,	  torture	  victims,	  and	  executions	  of	  non-­‐violent	  political	  dissenters	  in	  
Latin	  America	  vastly	  exceeded	  those	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  East	  European	  
satellites’.180	  	  Other	  views	  on	  the	  role	  of	  power	  in	  guaranteeing	  implementation	  
include	   Crouch’s	   explanation	   of	   the	   ‘strange	   non-­‐death	   of	   neoliberalism’	   as	  
attendant	  on	   industrial	  workers	  historical	   loss	  of	  power.181	  	  Sornarajah	  points	  
to	   the	  role	  of	   institutional	  power	   in	  determining	   the	  normative	  content	  of	   the	  
rule	   of	   law.	  182	  Similarly,	   Stiglitz	   talks	   about	   the	   inability	   of	   poor	   countries	   to	  
influence	   IFIs’	   rules.	   Consequently,	   their	   governments	   are	   forced	   to	   ignore	  
popular	  protestations	  and	  trade	  sovereignty	  for	  cash.183	  	  
Last	  but	  not	   least	   in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall’s	   taxonomy	  is	  productive	  power,	  with	  
its	  moulding	  of	  subjectivities	  through	  the	  social	  diffusion	  of	  meanings,	  and	  the	  
legitimisation/delegitimisation	   of	   knowledge	   and	   its	   sources.	   The	   successful	  
dissemination	   of	   discourse	   fulfils	   a	   particularly	   important	   function	   in	   the	  
securing	  of	  imposed	  voluntariness.	   	  In	  the	  neoliberal	  context,	  concepts	  such	  as	  
individual	   freedom,	   human	   dignity	   and	   human	   rights	   are	   powerful	   and	  
compelling	  precepts	  to	  pitch	  against	  the	  spectre	  of	  state	  intervention,	  and	  to	  act	  
as	  a	  subterfuge	  for	  political	  realities.184	  	  Such	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  word	  freedom	  
on	  Western	   popular	   understandings	   that	   it	   becomes	   ‘a	   button	   that	   elites	   can	  
press	  to	  open	  the	  door	  to	  the	  masses	  to	  justify	  almost	  anything’.185	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  Noam	  Chomsky,	  ‘9/11	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Mentality:	  Looking	  Back	  on	  9/11	  a	  Decade	  Later’	  [6	  
Sep	  2011]	  Common	  Dreams	  <http://readersupportednews.org/off-­‐site-­‐opinion-­‐section/423-­‐
national-­‐security/7326-­‐911-­‐and-­‐the-­‐imperial-­‐mentality>	  accessed	  6	  Nov	  2011.	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  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  7-­‐8;	  Gill,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  39.	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  Chomsky,	  ibid	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  178);	  referring	  to	  John	  Coatsworth,	  3	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War	  Series	  (CUP	  2010).	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  Crouch,	  ibid	  (n	  146)	  title,	  1.	  
182	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  121)	  206.	  
183	  Stiglitz,	  ibid	  (n	  105)	  9.	  
184	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  5.	  
185	  ibid	  39;	  citing	  from	  J.	  Rapley,	  Globalization	  and	  Inequality:	  Neoliberalism’s	  Downward	  Spiral	  




Power	  is	  exercised	  for	  a	  purpose.	  Within	  the	  neoliberal	  framework,	  it	  shores	  up	  
a	   desired	  design.	   In	   the	  words	   of	   Polanyi:	   ‘Laissez	   faire	  was	  planned’.186	  	   In	   a	  
historical	  process	  of	  ‘double	  movement’	  –	  that	  of	  economic	  ‘disembedding’	  and	  
its	   opposition–	   argues	   Polanyi,	   it	   is	   only	   the	   latter	   that	   is	   unpremeditated.	   In	  
other	   words,	   in	   reality,	   ‘disembedding’	   is	   preconceived,	   notwithstanding	   its	  
claim	  to	  spontaneity.187	  	  Support	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  neoliberal	  order	  is	  
in	  fact	  the	  product	  of	  a	  conscious	  and	  calculated	  policy	  blueprint	  is	  found	  in	  the	  
operation	   of	   elite	   policy	   planning	   organisations,	   think	   tanks	   and	   corporate	  
lobby	  groups.188	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  MPS	  for	  example,	  as	  recalled	  by	  Ralph	  (Lord)	  
Harris,	  ‘the	  ‘war	  aim’	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  class-­‐wide	  propaganda	  organisation	  to	  
reverse	   the	   tide	   of	   collectivism	   sweeping	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   westward	  
across	  Europe’.189	  	  It	  took	  a	  generation	  for	  the	  MPS	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  right	  wing	  
political	   parties	   and	   a	   further	   10-­‐15	   years	   for	   residual	   parties	   that	   sought	   to	  
represent	   popular	   interests	   to	   be	   neutralised.190	  	   This	   deliberate	   capturing	   of	  
the	   state	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   ideas	   and	   power	   politics	   belies	   the	  
propagated	  myth	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  was	  a	  spontaneous	  response	  to	  
the	  failure	  of	  alternatives.	  Home	  and	  abroad	  processes	  replicated	  each	  other	  as	  
elites’	  planning	  went	  global	   through	   the	  power	  and	   influence	  of	   transnational	  
business	  lobbies	  and	  policy	  planning	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Chamber	  
of	   Commerce	   (ICC),	   an	   early	   campaigner	   for	   the	   global	   harmonisation	   of	  
business	   rules,	   the	   secretive	   Bilderberg	   Group,191	  the	  World	   Economic	   Forum	  
and	   the	   enigmatic	   Trilateral	   Commission,	   a	   self-­‐appointed	   crusader	   for	   the	  
dismantling	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.192	  All	  four	  are	  run	  by	  and	  for	  the	  biggest	  TNCs,	  
are	  often	  directed	  by	  their	  CEOs,	  and	  represent	  policy	  planning,	  networking	  and	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  Polanyi,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  xxvii.	  
187	  ibid	  138-­‐39;	  151-­‐57.	  
188	  Miller,	  ibid	  (n	  174)	  24-­‐25.	  
189	  ibid	  26;	  citing	  from	  R	  Harris,	  ‘The	  Plan	  to	  End	  Planning	  –	  The	  Founding	  of	  the	  Mont	  Pelerin	  
Society’	  [1997)	  National	  Review.	  	  
190	  ibid	  27-­‐33	  discussing	  the	  rise	  of	  Thatcherism	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  US	  linked	  organisations	  
often	  connected	  with	  the	  CIA	  in	  the	  neutralization	  of	  the	  Labour	  party	  in	  the	  UK	  between	  1979	  
and	  1997.	  
	  191	  ibid	  34;	  TNCs	  involved	  in	  the	  Bilderberg	  Group	  include	  British	  American	  Tobacco,	  BP,	  Shell,	  
Exxon,	  IBM,	  Rio	  Tinto,	  General	  Motors	  and	  others.	  
192	  ibid	  37.	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co-­‐ordination	  groups	  that	  pursue	  a	  transnational	  free	  market	  agenda.193	  	  Thus,	  
Miller	   points	   to	   a	   subterranean	   layer	   in	   Arrighi’s	   concept	   of	   hegemonic	  
leadership:	  the	  role	  of	  elites	  in	  supplying	  the	  normative	  content	  to	  be	  dispersed.	  
Such	   content	   is	   borne	   out	   of	   national	   and	   transnational	   class	   unity	   of	   shared	  
ideas	  and	  interests.194	  
A	   second	   and	   complementary	   mechanism	   that	   is	   constitutive	   of	   design	   is	  
foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI).195	  TNCs	  are	  its	  ‘basic	  operating	  units’.196	  	  Thus,	  
by	   and	   large,	   imperial	   planning	   and	   implementation	   appear	   to	   implicate	   the	  
same	   people	   namely,	   corporate	   transnational	   elites.	   Together,	   they	   form	   the	  
‘shock	  troops’197	  of	  neoliberal	  paradigmatic	  diffusion,	  and	  are	  ‘key	  agents	  of	  US	  
imperialism’.198	  They	  are	   the	  bearers	  of	   the	  gift	  of	  economic	   liberalism	  and	   its	  
rules	  of	   governance	   from	   the	   imperial	   core	   to	   its	  peripheries.	   In	   return,	  TNCs	  
bring	  back	  tributes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘surplus	  transfer’.199	  	  In	  the	  1990s	  returns	  on	  
the	  operations	  of	  US	  capital	  in	  Latin	  America	  averaged	  $60	  billion	  a	  year.	  Over	  
the	   decade	   $585	   billion	   in	   interest	   and	   profit	   were	   remitted	   to	   the	   imperial	  
core,	   primarily	   to	   US	   corporations’	   home	   quarters. 200 	  	   This	   excludes	   the	  
significant	  revenues	  drawn	  from	  royalty	  payments,	  shipping,	  insurance	  and	  fees	  
for	   other	   services. 201 	  Nor	   does	   it	   include	   the	   billions	   of	   dollars	   illegally	  
transferred	  by	  elites	  to	  overseas	  accounts	  in	  US	  and	  European	  banks.202	  	  Once	  a	  
country’s	   capital	  market	   has	  been	  prized	  open,	   FDI	   can	   easily	   be	  made	   liquid	  
and	   then	   repatriated. 203 	  	   It	   also	   facilitates	   ‘transfer	   pricing’,	   the	   practice	  
whereby	  TNCs	   charge	   and	  undercharge	   their	   subsidiaries	   in	   a	  manner,	  which	  
ensures	   that	   the	  highest	   profits	   are	   registered	   in	   the	   country	  with	   the	   lowest	  
corporate	  tax	  rate,	  preferably	  one	  of	  the	  ever	  proliferating	  tax	  havens.204	  	  All	  the	  
while,	  the	  host	  state	  is	  burdened	  with	  foreign	  capital	  expenditure,	  inter	  alia,	  in	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  ibid	  33.	  
194	  ibid	  24.	  
195	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  1.	  
196	  ibid	  33.	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  ibid	  6.	  
198	  ibid	  30.	  
199	  Ibid	  46.	  
200	  ibid	  43.	  
201	  ibid.	  
202	  ibid.	  
203	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  ibid	  (n	  107)	  88-­‐9.	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  ibid	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the	  form	  of	  input	  importation	  and	  foreign	  loans.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  carrier	  of	  much	  
needed	  capital,	  FDI	  may	  thus	  prove	  a	  source	  of	  foreign	  capital	  drain.	  This	  is	  in	  
circumstances	  where	  much	  of	   foreign	   investment	   is	   ‘brownfield’:	  mergers	  and	  
acquisitions,	   often	   of	   privatised	   local	   industries,	   sold	   at	   a	   depressed	   price	  
courtesy	   of	   collaborative	   local	   elites.205	  	   The	   process	   is	   circular:	   FDI	   creates	  
capital	   shortage.	   This	   sustains	   the	   myth	   that	   peripheral	   economies	   are	  
underdeveloped	  which	  in	  turn	  justifies	  their	  need	  for	  further	  FDI.206	  	  It	  is	  little	  
wonder	   that	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   construction	   of	   the	   global	   order	   FDI	   was	  
celebrated,	  albeit	  ironically,	   ‘as	  if	  it	  was	  Mother	  Teresa	  of	  foreign	  capital’.207	  	  It	  
is	  equally	  unsurprising	  that	  home	  countries	  are	  happy	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  their	  
TNCs	  abroad	  or	  that,	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  US	  designs	  its	  national	  interests	  in	  line	  
with	  those	  of	  its	  TNCS.208	  	  
	  
BITs	  –	  The	  Juridical	  Imaging	  
And	   so,	   we	   are	   back	   to	   the	   beginning.	   That	   is,	   Foucault’s	   proposition	   that	  
political	  economy	  and	  the	  law	  develop	  in	  tandem,	  are	  mutually	  replicating	  and	  
that,	  within	  this	  ensemble,	   the	  role	  of	   the	   law	  is	   to	  provide	  rules	  and	  codes	  of	  
practice.	  Here,	  the	  focus	  of	  attention	  is	  the	  BITs	  program,	  and	  the	  way	  it	  acts	  as	  
a	   ‘highway	   code’	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   consensus.	   I	   argue	  
that	  BITs	  do	  so	   in	   two	   fundamental	  ways.	  First,	   they	   translate	  neoliberal	   law-­‐
state-­‐market	   interaction	   into	   juridical	   rules.	   Second,	   they	   provide	   an	  
institutional	   framework	   for	   the	   neoliberal	   world	   order.	   In	   performing	   these	  
functions	  BITs	  cut	  through	  the	  two	  levels	  of	  neoliberal	  orthodoxy	  articulated	  by	  
Jessop:	  	  its	  ideological	  surface	  and	  its	  interior	  realities.209	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  Petras	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  ibid	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  Investment	  Law	  (CUP	  2009)	  3-­‐5	  arguing	  that	  foreign	  investment	  is	  widely	  
viewed	  as	  positive	  for	  host	  countries.	  
207	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  ibid	  (n	  107)	  88	  citing	  a	  remark	  made	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  the	  Chilean	  economist,	  Gabriel	  
Calma.	  
208	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  31.	  




According	   to	   Foucault,	   in	   neoliberal	   dogma,	   the	   function	   of	   the	   law	   is	   to	  
structure	   the	   way	   by	   which	   state	   power	   is	   exercised.	   The	   law	   imposes	   and	  
formulates	   sovereign	   powers	   limitations.210 	  	   This	   proposition,	   however,	   is	  
predicated	  on	  a	  paradox:	   it	   is	   the	   state	   that	  has	  monopoly	  over	   legislation.	   In	  
other	  words,	  it	  is	  the	  government	  and	  it	  alone	  that	  possesses	  the	  power	  to	  limit	  
its	   own	   power.	   The	   neoliberal	   state	   thus	   becomes	   the	   author	   of	   its	   own	  
misfortune.	  It	  means	  that	  the	  path	  to	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  less	  government	  must	  
in	   the	   first	   instance	   pass	   through	   more	   government.	   BITs	   encapsulate	   this	  
phenomenon	   of	   self-­‐imposed	   reduction,	   this	   alternation	   between	   power	   and	  
powerlessness,	   initiative	   and	   passivity.	   The	   act	   of	   entering	   into	   a	   BIT	   is	   a	  
positive	  sovereign	  act.	  Yet,	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  curb	  sovereignty.	  The	  state	  party	  to	  
a	   BIT	   acts	   to	   conclude	   it,	   and	   then	   retreats,	   to	   return	   only	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	  
dispute.	  The	  standards	  of	  treatment	  contained	  in	  the	  treaty	  limit	  its	  regulatory	  
space.211	  	   International	  arbitration	  and	  IL	  mean	  that	  even	  when	  the	  state	  does	  
venture	  into	  policymaking,	  the	  consequences	  that	  follow	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  out	  of	  
its	  control.	  	  
What	   legitimises	  the	  neoliberal	  state’s	   juridical	  self-­‐limitation?	  For	  Foucault,	   it	  
is	   the	   economy	   that	   validates	   state	   actions	   and	   creates	   public	   law.212	  	   The	  
market	  is	  the	  site	  of	  truth.	  Importantly,	  however,	   it	   is	  not	  the	  site	  of	   justice.213	  
Thus,	  the	  state’s	  divestiture	  of	  its	  sovereign	  powers	  is	  endorsed	  or	  criticised	  by	  
reference	  to	  a	   just	  price.	  Yet,	  such	   just	  price	  has	   little	  to	  do	  with	   justice	   in	  the	  
sense	  of	  equity.	  It	  is	  just	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  represents	  the	  economic	  rationale	  of	  
a	  fair	  outlay.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  BITs,	  such	  outlay	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  against	  
the	  benefit	   of	   foreign	   investment.	   In	   this	  way	  BITs	   embody	   a	   straightforward	  
economic	   bargain,	   whereby	   a	   promise	   of	   future	   investment	   is	   secured	   for	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  15,	  37-­‐8.	  
211	  But	  see	  Kenneth	  J	  Vandevelde,	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties:	  History,	  Policy,	  and	  
Interpretation	  (OUP	  2010)	  9-­‐11	  arguing	  that	  the	  state	  party	  to	  a	  BIT	  retains	  regulatory	  
discretion.	  
212	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  84.	  
213	  ibid	  30-­‐1.	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levy.214	  	   It	   is	   indeed	   on	   these	   terms	   that	   they	   are	   discussed	   in	   much	   of	   the	  
literature.215	  	  	  
Turning	  to	  fairness,	  for	  Franck	  fairness	  in	  IL	  is	  judged,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  reference	  to	  
justifiable	  distribution	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits’216.	   	  Thus,	  he	  applies	  a	  principle	  of	  
‘distributive	   justice’217	  in	   the	  sense	  of	  a	   fair	   system	   for	   the	  allocation	  of	   rights	  
and	  obligations	  and	  for	  the	  equalisation	  of	  outcomes.218	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  BITs,	  
he	   argues,	   fairness	   is	   revealed,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   preamble’s	   reference	   to	  
‘mutual	  benefit’	  and	  to	  IL.219	  More	  generally,	  the	  BITs	  program	  is	  essentially	  fair	  
because	   it	   transforms	   a	   relationship	   of	   disequilibrium	   (private	   investor-­‐
sovereign)	   to	  one	  of	   equilibrium	   (sovereign-­‐sovereign)’.220	  	   The	   application	  of	  
‘distributive	  justice’	  appears	  at	  first	  blush	  appropriate	  since	  the	  language	  is	  one	  
of	   economic	   activity.	   However,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   the	   principle	   itself	  
relates	   to	   BITs.	   	   First,	   the	   treaties	   are	   silent	   on	   the	   outcomes	   of	   investors’	  
economic	   activity,	   such	   as	   the	   impact	   on	   the	   environment	   or	   the	   actual	  
maximisation	  of	  human	  wellbeing.	   In	   this	  way,	   they	  are	  more	   in	   the	  nature	  of	  
Nozick’s	  theory	  of	  ‘entitlement’,	  whereby	  justice	  and	  fairness	  reside	  in	  rules	  of	  
distribution	   rather	   than	   in	   their	   outcomes. 221 	  Second,	   rather	   than	   a	   fair	  
distribution	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  BITs,	  one	  of	  the	  parties,	  the	  
host	   state,	   has	   all	   the	   obligations	   and	   none	   of	   the	   rights.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  
treaties’	  hallmark	  is	  disequilibrium	  as	  opposed	  to	  equilibrium.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  See	  for	  example	  Asha	  Kaushal,	  ‘Revisiting	  History:	  How	  The	  Past	  Matters	  For	  The	  Present	  
Backlash	  Against	  The	  Foreign	  Investment	  Regime’	  (2009)	  50	  2	  Harvard	  International	  Law	  
Journal	  496.	  	  
215	  See	  for	  example,	  Jason	  W.	  Yackee,	  ‘Do	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  Promote	  Foreign	  Direct	  
Investment?	  Some	  Hints	  from	  Alternative	  Evidence’	  (2010)	  Research	  Papers	  Series	  Paper	  No.	  
1114	  University	  Wisconsin	  Law	  School	  Legal	  Studies	  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1594887>	  accessed	  11	  April	  2011;	  
Christoph	  Engel,	  ’Governments	  in	  Dilemma:	  A	  Game	  Theoretic	  Model	  for	  the	  Conclusion	  of	  
Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties’	  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1001174>	  accessed	  20	  Feb	  2011.	  
216	  Tomas	  M.	  Franck,	  Fairness	  in	  International	  Law	  and	  Institutions	  (OUP	  1995)	  7.	  
217	  ibid	  8-­‐9.	  
218	  ibid	  11.	  
219	  ibid	  446.	  
220	  ibid	  447.	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Reductive	   sovereignty	   is	   but	   one	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   BITs	   replicate	  
neoliberalism’s	  dialectic	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.222	  	  Looking	  for	  example	  at	  
deregulation,	  BITs	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  regulatory	  instruments	  and	  a	  form	  of	  state	  
intervention	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   free	   markets.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   arguable	   that,	   in	  
itself,	   deregulation	   does	   not	   entail	   a	  move	   away	   from	   state	   intervention,	   but	  
merely	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   such	   intervention.	   Rather	   than	   introduce	  
regulations,	   the	   state	   is	   now	   tasked	   with	   managing	   their	   absence.223	  It	   is	   a	  
dialectical	  process	  of	  ‘regulation-­‐in-­‐denial’.224	  	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  another	  aspect	  of	  BITs’	  neoliberal	  underpinning:	   that	   is,	   that	  
the	  state/market	  binary	  is	   in	  reality	  a	  triangular	  relationship	  involving	  a	  third	  
party	   -­‐	   the	  corporate	  elites,	  which	   inhabit	   the	  TNCs,	  and	   to	  whose	   freedom	  of	  
operation	  the	  treaty	  bargain	  is	  tailored.	  	  The	  proposition	  is	  that	  the	  investor	  is	  
not	  an	  active	  participant,	  but	  a	  passive	  recipient.	  Its	  entitlement	  for	  the	  benefit	  
of	   the	   bargain	   struck	   by	   the	   government	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   neoliberal	  
proposition	  that	  corporate	  freedom	  to	  maximise	  profits	  serves	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  
all.225	  	  This	  subterfuge	  of	  TNCs’	  power	  mirrors	  the	  disparity	  between	  discourse	  
and	  objective	  truth.	   In	  neoliberal	  orthodoxy,	  TNCs’	  power	  is	  subject	  to	  market	  
mediation.	  In	  neoliberal	  reality,	  TNCs	  can	  dominate	  markets	  and	  indeed	  do	  so.	  
Through	   fuzzy	   relationships	  with	   governments	   they	   formulate	   policies,	   shape	  
institutions	  and	  pitch	   states	   against	   each	  other	   in	   competition	   for	  propagated	  
benefits.226	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  Peck,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  65.	  
223	  ibid	  187.	  
224	  ibid,	  xiii.	  
225	  This	  supposition	  is	  habitually	  found	  in	  the	  preamble.	  Taking	  the	  US/Argentina	  BIT	  as	  an	  
example	  the	  treaty	  states:	  ‘Recognizing	  that	  agreement	  upon	  the	  treatment	  to	  be	  accorded	  such	  
investment	  will	  stimulate	  the	  flow	  of	  private	  capital	  and	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  
parties’.	  ‘Treaty	  Between	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  Argentine	  Republic	  Concerning	  
the	  Reciprocal	  Encouragement	  and	  Protection	  of	  Investment’	  
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf	  >	  accessed	  3	  Sept	  2011.	  
226	  Crouch,	  ibid	  (n	  146)	  50.	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The	  World	  order	  
Extrapolating	   the	   main	   constituents	   of	   US	   led	   new	   imperialism’s	   logic,	   they	  
include:	   (i)	   economic	   incorporation	   under	   US	   hegemony	   (ii)	   optimal	  
universalisation	   of	   economic	   imperatives227	  (iii)	   uniformity	   (iv)	   design	   that	  
benefits	   the	   imperial	   core	   and	   its	   elites	   (iv)	   mobilisation	   of	   nation-­‐states’	  
sovereign	  powers.	  	  
BITs	  are	  a	  device	  for	  the	  geographical	  incorporation	  of	  states	  into	  the	  imperial	  
order	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  less	  visible	  and	  less	  costly	  than	  naked	  force.228	  	  Through	  
their	   global	   diffusion,	   they	   promote	   the	   universalisation	   of	   Westerncentric	  
liberal	   notions	   of	   property	   rights,	   deregulation	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law.229	  	   More	  
generally,	   they	   foster	   a	   world	   order	   that	   is	   underpinned	   by	  markets	   and	   the	  
’logic	   of	   competitiveness’.230	  	   In	   particular,	   they	   facilitate	   the	   global	   spread	   of	  
FDI.	   They	   are	   instrumental	   in	   turning	   it	   into	   what	   the	   IMF	   termed	   the	  
‘backbone’	  of	  development	   finance.231	  	  BITS	  achieve	   this	   status	  by	  providing	  a	  
layer	   of	   investors’	   protection,	   so	   as	   to	   supplement	   institutional	   reforms	  
imposed	   by	   IFIs.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   BITs	   complement	   the	   IFIs’	   task	   of	   locking	   in	  
reforms	  and	  render	  them	  difficult	  to	  reverse.232	  	  The	  operation	  of	  protection	  in	  
times	   of	   financial	   crises	   provides	   a	   pertinent	   example	   of	   the	   gulf	   between	  
neoliberalism’s	   acute	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   plight	   of	   corporate	   investors,	   and	   its	  
disregard	   to	   its	   true	  victims	  –	   the	  rest	  of	  humanity.	  On	  4th	   July	  2011	  UNCTAD	  
pointed	  out	  that,	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  case	  of	  Argentina,	  investment	  treaties’	  broad	  
assets-­‐based	   definition	   of	   investment	   and	   treatment	   standards,	   such	   as	  
expropriation,	   FET	   and	   umbrella	   clauses,	   provide	   potential	   jurisdiction	   for	  
bondholders.	   They	   can	   sue	   states	   for	   their	   debt	   restructuring	   policies.233	  In	  
Abaclat,	   the	   tribunal	   found	   by	   a	   majority	   that	   it	   had	   jurisdiction	   to	   hear	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  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  22.	  
228	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  15	  discussing	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  incorporation.	  
229	  Vandevelde,	  ibid	  (n	  211)	  108-­‐14.	  
230	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  7.	  
231	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  38.	  
232	  Chomsky,	  ibid	  (n	  38)	  123.	  
233	  UNCTAD,	  ‘Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructuring	  and	  International	  Investment	  Agreement’	  [4	  July	  
2011]	  IIA	  Issues	  Notes	  




proceedings	   advanced	   by	   around	   60,000	   holders	   of	   bonds	   issued	   by	   the	  
Argentine	   government.	   The	   claims	   arose	   out	   of	   Argentina’s	   default	   on	   its	  
sovereign	  debt	  obligations	  and	  subsequent	  debt	  restructuring.	  In	  January	  2005	  
the	  government	   launched	  an	  offer	  pursuant	   to	  which	  existing	  bonds	  would	  be	  
exchanged	   for	   new	   bonds	   on	   revised	   terms.	   The	   Claimants	   refused	   to	  
participate	   in	   the	   offer	   and	   commenced	   ICSID	   arbitration.	   The	   tribunal	  
determined,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  the	  facts	  relied	  on	  by	  the	  claimants	  were	  capable	  of	  
establishing	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   Argentina-­‐Italy	   BIT’s	   provisions	   relating	   to	   FET,	  
discrimination	   and,	   possibly,	   expropriation.	   Notably,	   it	   concluded	   that	   the	  
claims	   did	   not	   arise	  merely	   from	   the	   failure	   to	   perform	   payment	   obligations	  
under	   the	   bonds,	   but	   rather	   from	  Argentina’s	   intervention	   and	   exercise	   of	   its	  
sovereign	  power	  to	  restructure	  its	  sovereign	  debt.234	  	  
In	   sum,	   BITs	   core	   stated	   aim	   is	   to	   ensure	   additional	   and	   higher	   standards	   of	  
legal	  protection	  than	  those	  offered	  under	  national	   laws.235	  However,	   in	  reality,	  
their	  function	  goes	  beyond	  this.	  For	  the	  treaties	  signal	  the	  country’s	  willingness	  
to	   get	   incorporated	   and	   accept	   ‘a	   particularly	   American	   conception	   of	  
investment	  rights’.	  236	  	  They	  are	  power-­‐based	  creatures	  of	  empire.	  Power	   thus	  
permeates	  both	   the	  process	  by	  which	   they	  are	  created,	  and	   the	  way	  by	  which	  
substantive	   obligations	   are	   allocated.	   In	   this	   way,	   they	   mirror	   structural	  
positions	  within	  the	  global	  order.237	  They	  are	  similarly	  reflective	  of	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  capital	  mediates	  power.	  We	  saw	  the	  operation	  of	  corporate	  elites	  in	  the	  
conversion	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  paradigm	  from	  mere	  ideas	   into	  a	  political,	  policy-­‐
producing	  project.	  	  Such	  project	  included	  the	  shaping	  of	  BITs.	  Consequently,	  the	  
treaties	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  a	  legal	  instrument	  that	  ensures	  open	  borders	  for	  the	  
free	  movement	   of	   capital	   and	   guards	   the	   primacy	   of	   private	   property	   rights,	  
including	  their	  entitlement	  to	  protection.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  Abaclat	  and	  others	  v	  Argentine	  Republic	  [2012]	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/07/5.	  
235	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  111	  citing	  from	  UNCTAD,	  ‘World	  Investment	  Report	  2000:	  
Cross-­‐Border	  Mergers	  and	  Acquisitions	  and	  Development’	  (United	  Nations	  2000).	  




CHAPTER	   4:	   China’s	   Bilateral	   Investment	   Treaties:	   Incorporation	   with	  
‘Chinese	  Characteristics’	  
Introduction	  	  
The	   year	   2011	   signalled	   a	   number	   of	   ‘firsts’	   in	   the	   chronicles	   of	   China’s	   BITs	  
program.	   On	   24	   May	   a	   Malaysian	   construction	   company	   made	   history	   by	  
bringing	   the	   first	   ever	   CSID	   claim	   against	   her.1	  The	   same	   year	   saw	   an	   ICSID	  
tribunal	  awarding	  damages	  against	  Peru	  in	  the	  first	  ICSID	  proceedings	  brought	  
under	  a	  Chinese	  BIT.2	  	  Also	  in	  2011	  professor	  An	  Chen	  became	  the	  first	  Chinese	  
to	   be	   appointed	   to	   an	   ICSID	   tribunal.3 	  In	   July,	   the	   Implementing	   Opinion	  
concerning	  Encouraging	  and	  Guiding	  Private	  Enterprises	  to	  Actively	  Carry	  Out	  
Investment	  Overseas	  declared	   state’s	   support	   for	  ODI	  by	  private	   capital.	   Such	  
support	  was	  to	  include	  the	  signing	  of	  BITs	  with	  more	  countries	  so	  as	  ‘to	  create	  a	  
stable	   and	   transparent	   external	   environment	   (…)’.4	  	   Some	   two	   months	   later	  
China’s	  biggest	  financial	  services	  company,	  Ping	  An	  Insurance	  became	  the	  first	  
mainland	   company	   to	   have	   filed	   ICSID	   arbitration	   proceedings.	  5	  	   It	   seems	   all	  
aspects	   of	   China’s	   integration	   into	   the	   global	   BITs	   network	   of	   private	   capital	  
protection	  have	  finally	  come	  of	  age	  both	  discursively	  and	  materially.	  	  	  
Chapter	  2	  examined	  the	  drive	  towards	  uniformity	  from	  a	  juridical	  perspective.	  6	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter	   this	   theme	   was	   looked	   at	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	  
neoliberal	  paradigm.	  Home	  and	  abroad	  were	  posited	  as	  analogue	  processes	  that	  
shaped	  the	  historical	  continuum	  of	  capitalist	  development.	  7	  The	  complexities	  of	  
China’s	  quest	  for	  reform	  and	  integration	  lend	  force	  to	  this	  need	  for	  a	  reasoning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Ekran	  Berhad	  v	  The	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  ICSID	  Case	  No.	  ARB/11/150.	  The	  proceedings	  
were	  suspended	  two	  months	  later	  pursuant	  to	  the	  parties’	  agreement.	  	  
2	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  ICSID	  Case	  No.	  ARB/07/6.	  
3	  An	  Chen	  was	  appointed	  arbitrator	  in	  two	  ICSID	  claims	  against	  Zimbabwe.	  ARB/10/25).	  
4	  ‘13	  Authorities	  Issue	  Measures	  to	  Encourage	  and	  Guide	  Private	  Enterprises	  to	  Invest	  
Overseas’,	  [13	  July	  2012]	  the	  Xinhua	  Agency;	  see	  also	  ‘China	  to	  Shore	  Up	  Private	  Capital	  
Overseas	  Investment’	  [4	  July	  2012]	  Morning	  Whistle.com	  
<http://www.morningwhistle.com/html/2012/Macro_0704/212863.html>	  accessed	  21	  July	  
2012.	  	  
5	  Ping	  An	  Life	  Insurance	  Company	  of	  China,	  Limited	  and	  Ping	  An	  Insurance	  (Group)	  Company	  of	  
China,	  Limited	  v	  Kingdom	  of	  Belgium	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/12/29.	  	  
6	  Chapter	  2	  generally.	  
7	  Chapter	  3	  text	  to	  n	  55-­‐66	  p	  95.	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that	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   study	   of	   individual	   facets,	   but	   looks	   at	   systemic	  
connections.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  China’s	  BITs	  program	  offers	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  way	  
the	  dual	  process	  of	  treatification	  and	  internalisation	  coalesce	  to	  transform	  not	  
only	  the	  country’s	  exterior,	  but	  also	  her	  interior.	  Study	  of	  the	  ‘interior’	  is	  outside	  
the	  scope	  of	  this	  enquiry.	  However,	  in	  view	  of	  its	  importance	  to	  understanding	  
the	  exterior,	  this	  chapter	  will	  reflect	  on	  aspects	  of	  the	  country’s	  domestic	  legal	  
transformation	   most	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   BITs.	   It	   will	   highlight	  
areas	  of	  alignment	  with,	  as	  well	  as	  residual	  resistance	  to	  imported	  concepts	  and	  
rules	  making.	  In	  particular,	  the	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  is	  pertinent	  to	  the	  internalisation	  of	  
external	  norms.	  Since	  the	  concept	  of	  expropriation	  resides	  in	  both	  the	  domestic	  
and	   international	   arenas, 8 	  consideration	   of	   China’s	   ‘rule	   of	   law’	   will	   be	  
supplemented	  by	  an	  attempt	  to	  decipher	  her	  property	  ownership	  configuration.	  
The	  intricacies	  of	  China’s	  progress	  towards	  modernity,	  and	  the	  violent	  rapture	  
that	   accompanied	   the	   juxtaposition	   of	   Westernized	   self-­‐imaging	   on	   her	  
historical	   topography,	   give	   rise	   to	   a	  wide	   spectrum	   of	   diverse	   opinions.	   They	  
complement,	   but	   also	  dissent	   from	  official	   discourse.	   It	   is	   said	   that	   discursive	  
multiplicity	  nevertheless	  remains	  confined	  to	  a	  shared	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  
country’s	   own	   developmental	   path,	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	  world	   beyond	   her	  
borders.	  	  Wang	  Chaohua,	  for	  example,	  comments	  on	  his	  inability	  to	  commission	  
a	   chapter	   on	   the	   country’s	   relations	   with	   the	   outside.	   For	   all	   the	   differences	  
among	   the	   contributors	   to	   his	   book,	   he	   says,	   they	   all	   displayed	   lack	   of	   ‘any	  
sympathetic	   understanding	   of	   other	   smaller	   countries	   especially	   those	   of	   the	  
Third	  World,	  or	  any	  critical	  standpoint	  on	  global	  politics’.9	  	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  
Wang’s	   experience	   encapsulates	   a	   general	   phenomenon	   is	   questionable.	   The	  
HWP	   ventures	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   country	   international	   positioning.	   Dong	  
Chen	   and	  An	   Chen	   observe	   that	   the	   proposed	   inevitability	   of	   her	   becoming	   a	  
compliant	   actor	   in	   a	   US	   dominated	   interstate	   system	   remains	   the	   subject	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ye	  Ji,	  ‘Voluntary	  “Westernization”	  of	  the	  Expropriation	  Rules	  in	  Chinese	  BITS	  and	  Its	  
Implication:	  An	  Empirical	  Study’	  (2011)	  12	  1	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  86.	  
9	  Chaohua	  Wang,	  ‘Introduction;	  Minds	  of	  the	  Nineties’	  in	  Chaohua	  Wang	  (ed),	  One	  China,	  Many	  
Paths	  (Verso	  2005)	  44-­‐45.	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disagreements.10	  	  This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  tease	  out	  this	  debate	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  
interaction	  between	  the	  Chinese	  treatification	  program	  and	  Western	  practice.	  	  	  
More	   generally,	   BITs	   straddle	   both	   the	   local	   and	   the	   international.	   Their	  
implications	   flow	   in	   both	   directions.	   Such	   two-­‐way	   flow	   is	   often	   oblique	   and	  
may	  take	  place	  simultaneously,	  so	  that	  separation	  between	  cause	  and	  effect	   is	  
not	   self-­‐evident.	   Indeed,	   the	   polemic	   surrounding	   the	   interaction	   between	  
national	   and	   transnational	   rules	   making	   appears	   to	   display	   this	   dilemma.	  
Bourdieu,	   for	   example,	   observes	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   national	   legal	  
norms.11	  	   For	   Merry,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   abstractions	   of	   international	   origins	  
assume	  variegated	   forms	  when	  translated	   into	   local	   linguistic,	   legal	  and	  social	  
cultures.12	  	   In	   the	   same	   vein	   of	   reasoning,	   Potter	   conceptualises	   the	   interplay	  
between	   the	   adoption	   of	   external	   legal	   norms	   and	   their	   interpretation	   at	   the	  
national	  level	  as	  a	  process	  of	  ‘selective	  adaptation’	  that	  comprises	  dynamics	  of	  
perception,	   complementarity	   and	   legitimacy. 13 	  Global	   legal	   pluralism,	   first	  
pioneered	   by	   Eugen	   Ehrlich,	   abandons	   altogether	   the	   national/international	  
dichotomy	  in	  order	  to	  look	  at	  how	  globalisation	  is	  governed.	  Here,	  the	  premise	  
is	   that	   the	   global	   arena	   is	   animated	   by	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   legal	   orders	   that	   cut	  
across	  juridical	  territoriality.14	  	  Snyder	  builds	  on	  this	  premise	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
global	   realm	   as	   comprising	   distinct	   sites	   of	   governance	   that	   nevertheless	  
produce	   global	   pluralism	   through	   episodic	   dialogues.	   Thus,	   globalism	   is	  
governed	  by	  means	  of	  multiplicity	  of	  sites	  of	  governance	  that	  are	  activated	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  An	  Chen	  and	  Dong	  Chen,	  ‘What	  Should	  Be	  China’s	  Strategic	  Position	  in	  the	  Establishment	  of	  
New	  International	  Economic	  Order?	  With	  Comments	  on	  Neo-­‐Liberalistic	  Economic	  Order,	  
Constitutional	  Order	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  Economic	  Nationalism’s	  Disturbance	  of	  Globalization’	  
(2009)	  10	  3	  The	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  361.	  
11	  P	  Bourdieu,	  ‘The	  Force	  of	  Law:	  Towards	  a	  Sociology	  of	  the	  Juridical	  Field’	  (1987)	  38	  The	  
Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  814.	  
12	  See	  generally	  Sally	  Engle	  Merry,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Gender	  Violence:	  Translating	  International	  
Law	  Into	  Local	  Justice	  (Chicago	  Series	  in	  Law	  and	  Society,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  2006).	  
13	  Pittman	  B.	  Potter,	  ‘Public	  Regulation	  of	  Private	  Relations:	  Changing	  Conditions	  of	  Property	  
Regulation	  in	  China’	  in	  Guanghua	  Yu	  (ed)	  The	  Development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Legal	  System:	  Change	  
and	  Challenges	  (Routledge	  2011)	  51-­‐68;	  Pittman	  B.	  Potter,	  ‘China	  and	  the	  International	  Legal	  
System:	  Challenges	  of	  Participation’	  in	  Donald	  C.	  Clarke,	  China’s	  Legal	  System:	  New	  
Developments,	  New	  Challenges	  (The	  China	  Quarterly	  Special	  Issues	  New	  Series,	  No.	  8,	  CUP	  2008)	  
145-­‐61.	  	  
14	  Francis	  Snyder,	  The	  EU,	  The	  WTO	  and	  China:	  Legal	  Pluralism	  and	  international	  Trade	  
Regulation	  (China	  and	  International	  Economic	  Law	  Series,	  Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  29.	  
126	  
	  
brought	   into	   relation	  with	  each	  other	  by	   strategic	  actors.15	  	  Their	   interactions	  
comprise	   a	   two-­‐way	   dynamic.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   they	   create	   ‘international	  
normative	  repertoire’	  which	  then	  returns	  to,	  and	  is	  absorbed	  by	  the	  sites,	  so	  as	  
to	  shape	  their	  interior.16	  	  This	  analysis	  appears	  aligned	  with	  Hardt	  and	  Negri’s	  
conceptualisation	  of	   the	  global	  order	  as	  devoid	  of	   territorial	   centres	  of	  power	  
and	  control.	   	   Instead,	   the	  process	  of	  globalisation	   is	  mediated	  by	  multitude	  of	  
states	   and	   non-­‐states	   actors,	   to	   create	   a	   territorially	   detached	   supranational	  
totality.17 	  In	   relation	   to	   BITs,	   one	   would	   presumably	   look	   to	   Schill	   for	   a	  
contextualisation	   that	   is	   informed	   by	   a	   Snyder	   type	   perception	   of	   an	  
unregulated	   global	   market	   place	   in	   which	   actors	   from	   different	   sites	   of	  
governance	   freely	   negotiate	   treaties.18	  	   Out	   of	   these	   disparate	   negotiations	  
arises	  a	  state	  of	  multilateralism,	  or	  what	  Shapiro	  alludes	   to	  as	   	   ‘a	  single	  set	  of	  
rules’	   that	  characterizes	   the	   ‘globalization	  of	   law’.	  19	  In	  other	  words,	  outcomes	  
may	   be	   uniform	   rather	   than	   pluralistic.	   Nevertheless,	   such	   uniformity	   is	  
voluntary	  and	  consensual.	  	  
Notable	   in	   this	   line	   of	   analysis	   is	   the	   absence	   of	   Doyle’s	   identification	   of	  
dynamics	   of	   design	   and	   resistance	   and	   his	   distinction	   between	   independent	  
cooperation	  and	  one	  that	  is	  nominally	  independent	  but	  actually	  subordinate.20	  
Similarly	  absent	   is	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall’s	  attention	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  in	  
the	  determination	  of	  capacities	  and	  outcomes.	  The	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  global	  
structures,	  whereby	  some	  sites	  are	  more	  strategic	  than	  others	  does	  not	  appear	  
to	  have	  been	   factored	   in.	  Further,	   in	   reality,	  within	   this	  hierarchy	  each	  site	  of	  
governance	   is	   not	   for	   itself.	   Rather	   than	   a	   two-­‐way	   flow,	   overall	   interaction	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  ibid	  382;	  a	  site	  of	  governance	  is	  a	  locus	  of	  decision-­‐making	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  settle	  
disputes.	  ibid	  49;	  strategic	  actors	  may	  be	  organizational	  –	  states,	  firms,	  regional	  and	  
international	  organizations	  –	  or	  structures	  of	  governance.	  ibid	  42.	  
16	  ibid	  265.	  
17	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Empire	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  2000)	  generally;	  see	  
specifically	  xii,	  239.	  	  
18	  Stephan	  W.	  Schill,	  The	  Multilateralization	  of	  International	  Investment	  Law	  (International	  
Trade	  and	  Economic	  Law,	  CUP	  2009)	  generally;	  in	  relation	  to	  China	  see	  Stephan	  Schill,	  ‘Tearing	  
Down	  the	  Great	  Wall:	  The	  New	  Generation	  Investment	  Treaties	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  
China’	  (2007)	  15	  Cardozo	  Journal	  of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  73	  
<http://www.transnational-­‐dispute-­‐management.com/article.asp?key=1418>	  accessed	  21	  June	  
2012.	  
19	  Martin	  Shapiro,	  ‘The	  Globalization	  of	  Law’	  (1993)	  37	  Indiana	  journal	  of	  Global	  Legal	  Studies	  
37.	  
20	  Michael	  W.	  Doyle,	  Empires	  (Cornell	  Studies	  in	  Comparative	  History,	  Cornell	  University	  Press	  
1986)	  generally;	  see	  specifically	  39,	  45.	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tends	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  a	  process	  of	  drawing	  the	  other	  into	  the	  orbit	  of	  a	  
normative	   and	   institutional	   centre	   in	   a	   continuous	   civilizing	   drive	   for	   global	  
uniformity.	   The	   result	   is	   ‘a	   certain	   overlap	   between	   globalization	   and	  
Americanization’.21	  In	   other	   words,	   a	   discourse	   of	   consent	   that	   is	   posited	   as	  
spontaneous	  and	  invisibly	  formed	  masks	  the	  centrality	  of	  power	  and	  agency	  in	  
the	  imposition	  of	  voluntariness.22	  	  Snyder	  concedes	  that	  at	  least	  where	  foreign	  
direct	   investment	   (FDI)	   is	   concerned,	   the	   relations	  between	   the	  United	  States	  
and	   the	   European	   Union	   remain	   the	   centre	   of	   gravity.23	  	   	   Or,	   as	   observed	   by	  
Shapiro:	   ‘much	   of	   the	   time,	   the	   globe	  will	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	  US	   and	  Western	  
Europe	  with	   shadowy	   addenda’.24	  	   Such	   dynamics	   of	   territoriality	   and	   power	  
are	   theorised	   in	  Wallerstein’s	  world-­‐systems	   analysis	   and	   supplemented	  with	  
an	   additional	   component,	   that	   of	   competition.	   For	   Wallerstein,	   the	   global	  
interstate	   system	   is	   a	   trilateral	   arrangement	   comprising	   core	   ‘strong’	   states,	  
semi-­‐peripheral	   and	  peripheral,	  weak	   states;	  or	   in	   legal	  pluralism	  discourse	  –	  
core,	   semi-­‐peripheral	   and	   peripheral	   sites	   of	   governance.	   Core	   states/sites	  
engage	   in	   a	   contradictory	   rivalry.	   For,	   the	   competition	   between	   them	   is	  
tempered	  by	  a	  common	  interest	  in	  holding	  together	  the	  interstate	  system	  from	  
which	   they	   benefit.25	  	   Semi-­‐peripheral	   states/sites	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   ‘spend	  
their	   energy	   running	   very	   fast	   in	   order	   at	   the	   very	   least	   to	   stay	   in	   their	  
intermediate	   place,	   but	   hoping	   as	   well	   that	   they	   may	   rise	   on	   the	   ladder.’26	  	  
Theirs	  is	  a	  relationship	  of	  unmitigated	  competition	  for	  a	  place	  sufficiently	  high	  
on	  the	  hierarchical	  ladder	  to	  liberate	  them	  from	  the	  flow	  of	  economic,	  political	  
and	   juridical	   dictates	   transmitted	   from	   strong	   to	   weak	   states/sites	   through	  
treaties	  and	  international	  organisations.27	  	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Chinese	  BITs	  discourse,	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  external	  is	  
found	   in	   allusions	   to	   international	   practice	   that	   is	   then	   posited	   against	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Shapiro,	  ibid	  (n	  19)	  61.	  
22	  Richards	  Westra,	  The	  Evil	  Axis	  of	  Finance:	  The	  US-­‐Japan-­‐China	  Stranglehold	  on	  the	  Global	  
Future	  (Clarity	  Press,	  Inc.	  2012)	  17.	  
23	  Snyder,	  ibid	  (n	  14)	  15.	  
24	  Shapiro,	  ibid	  (n	  19)	  at	  38	  cited	  in	  Snyder,	  ibid.	  
25	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein,	  World-­‐Systems	  Analysis:	  An	  Introduction	  (Duke	  University	  Press	  2004)	  
56.	  
26	  ibid.	  	  
27	  ibid	  55,	  57.	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backdrop	   of	   a	   developed/developing	   binary	   and	   hegemonic	   power	  
concentration. 28 	  	   This	   chapter	   echoes	   this	   multiplicity.	   In	   narrating	   the	  
penetration	  of	   investment	  treaties’	   international	  normative	  repertoire	  into	  the	  
Chinese	   juridical	   landscape,	   it	   is	   assisted	  by	   Snyder’s	   conceptualisation	  of	   the	  
formation	  of	  a	  global	   juridical	  arena.	   	   	   In	  seeking	  to	  unravel	  the	  way	  by	  which	  
imported	   norms	   and	   rules	  making	   are	   absorbed,	   it	   turns	   to	   Potter’s	   selective	  
adaptation.	   These	   are	   then	   supplemented	   by	   a	   Wallerstein’s	   world-­‐system	  
analysis	  perspective	  to	  take	  account	  of	  issues	  of	  power	  and	  agency.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  an	  
investigation	  that	  confesses	  its	  own	  limitations.	  The	  evolving	  nature	  of	  China’s	  
BITs	  program,	  the	  paucity	  to	  date	  of	  ICSID	  cases	  involving	  this	  country,	  and	  the	  
novelty	  of	  her	  progression	  up	  the	  global	  hierarchical	  ladder	  impose	  constraints	  
on	   the	   analysis	   of	   her	   investment	   related	   interaction	   with	   other	   sites	   of	  
governance.	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  the	  only	  award	  to	  date	  to	  arise	  out	  of	  a	  Chinese	  BIT	  
will	  therefore	  be	  looked	  at	  in	  some	  detail.	  
The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  in	  two	  main	  sections.	  The	  first	  observes	  the	  interface	  
between	  the	  concomitant	  processes	  that	  operate	  in	  the	  interior	  and	  the	  exterior	  
of	   the	   Chinese	   eco-­‐political-­‐juridical	   ensemble	   and	   inform	   its	   evolution.	   	   The	  
section	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   differences	   between	   indigenous	   and	  
exogenous	  perspectives	  of	  the	  country’s	  unfolding	  investment	  treaties	  program.	  	  
Its	  second	  part	  outlines	  the	  historical	  progression	  and	  features	  of	  this	  program.	  
It	   does	   so	   by	   reference	   to	   corresponding	   transformations	   in	   the	   country’s	  
interior	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	   to	   interaction	  with	   the	   ICSID	  dispute	  resolution	  
arm	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  site	  of	  governance	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  hope	  is	  that	  by	  the	  
end	  an	  overall	   view	  of	  China’s	  BITs	  network	  and	   its	  place	   in	   the	  global	   arena	  
will	  emerge.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  But	  see	  the	  title	  to	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	  Westernisation	  as	  ‘voluntary’.	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China’s	  Eco-­‐Political–Juridical	  Ensemble	  	  	  
Home	  and	  abroad	  
Elucidations	   of	   China’s	   progression	   towards	   her	   BITs	   related	   coming	   of	   age	  
cover	  the	  gamut	  of	  both	  inward	  and	  outward	  transmutations.	  On	  the	  domestic	  
front,	   explanations	   include	   the	   passage	   to	   a	   market	   economy,	   including	   the	  
creeping	   privatisation	   of	   SOEs	   and	   their	   restructuring	   as	   modern	  
corporations;29	  the	   adoption	   of	   a	   development	   model	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
absorption	   of	   foreign	   capital,	   with	   a	   resulting	   need	   to	   structure	   a	   stable	   and	  
competitive	   investment	  environment;	   financial	   solvency	  and	  a	   surge	   in	  FDI.	  30	  
On	   the	   international	   front,	   allusion	   is	  made	   to	  a	  quest	   for	   integration	   into	   the	  
global	   economy,31	  a	   surge	   in	   national	   confidence32	  and	   the	   implementation	   of	  
China’s	   going	   abroad	  policy	   (zou	  chuqu),	   first	   declared	   in	   the	  2001	  Outline	   of	  
the	  Tenth-­‐Five	  Year	  Plan	   for	   the	  National	  Economy	  and	  Social	  Development.33	  	  
This	   policy	   –	   spearheaded	   by	   the	   now	   corporatised	   SOEs	   rather	   than	   the	  
ideologically	  motivated	  state	  projects	  of	  earlier	  times	  -­‐	  saw	  China	  transforming	  
from	  a	  capital	  importing	  to	  the	  largest	  capital	  exporting	  developing	  country.	  By	  
2011	   she	   overtook	   Japan	   and	   the	   UK	   to	   become	   the	   fifth	   biggest	   global	  
investor.34	  With	   new	   opportunities	   presented	   by	   the	   current	   economic	   crisis,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  See	  for	  example	  Norah	  Gallagher	  and	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  Chinese	  Investment	  Treaties:	  Policies	  and	  
Practice	  (Oxford	  International	  Arbitration	  Series	  (OUP	  2009)	  7-­‐8;	  Jian	  Zhou,	  ‘National	  
Treatment	  in	  Foreign	  Investment	  Law:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  from	  a	  Chinese	  Perspective’	  (2000)	  
10	  Touro	  International	  Review	  39	  at	  116-­‐17;	  on	  the	  need	  to	  enhance	  SOEs’	  global	  
competitiveness	  see	  generally	  Liu	  Wenbing,	  zhongyang	  qiye	  guoji	  jingzhengli	  yanjiu:	  binggou	  
chongzu	  de	  shijiao	  (Study	  of	  Central	  Enterprises’	  International	  Competitiveness:	  a	  Mergers	  and	  
Acquisitions	  Restructuring	  Perspective)	  (China	  Economic	  Publishing	  House	  2010).	  
30	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  87,94-­‐95;	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  ibid	  1-­‐2;	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  78-­‐79;	  
Jian	  Zhou,	  ibid	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31	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  ibid	  (n	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  82.	  
32	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	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33	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  Direct	  Investment	  Protection	  and	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  Chinese	  
BITs	  Practice’	  (2006)	  7	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  621	  at	  626-­‐27.	  
34	  Cecily	  Liu,	  Zhang	  Haizhou	  and	  Ding	  Qinfen,	  ‘Firms	  to	  Unite	  in	  Europe’	  [28	  June	  2012]	  China	  
Daily	  <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-­‐06/28/content_15529107.htm>	  accessed	  
20	  July	  2012;	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  2;	  Cai	  Congyan	  ‘	  China-­‐US	  BIT	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  and	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Future	  of	  Investment	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(2009)	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  Journal	  of	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  Law	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Statistical	  Bulletin	  of	  China	  Outward	  Direct	  Investment	  China’s	  net	  ODI	  flow	  was	  US$68.8	  
billion,	  an	  increase	  of	  21.7%	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  with	  16,000	  overseas	  enterprises	  in	  178	  




Chinese	   ODI	   is	   predicted	   to	   register	   an	   annual	   growth	   of	   17%	   in	   the	   period	  
2011-­‐2015.35	  
As	  observed	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  these	  multiple	  transformations	  are	  not	  fenced	  
off	   from	   each	   other.	   Rather,	   they	   coalesce	   in	   a	   dual	   and	  mutually	   reinforcing	  
interaction	  of	   internalisation	  and	  externalisation	  whereby	  external	  norms	  and	  
rules	   are	   absorbed	   internally.	   Thereafter,	   cloaked	   in	   voluntariness	   and	  
localisation,	  they	  resurface	  in	  the	  relations	  with	  the	  world	  beyond	  one’s	  borders	  
from	  whence	  they	  came	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Li	  Mingqi,	  for	  example,	  points	  to	  the	  
need	   to	   break	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Chinese	   working	   class	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	  
China’s	  global	  competitiveness.36	  	  For	  Li	  Hui,	  the	  sense	  of	  urgency	  displayed	  by	  
Premier	  Zhu	  Rongji	   and	  his	  entourage	  of	  economists	   in	   the	  context	  of	  China’s	  
entry	   into	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organisation	   (WTO)	   -­‐	   and	   presumably	   also	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  BITs	  -­‐	  reflected	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  government’s	  capacity	  
to	  modernise	  its	  SOEs.	  It	  was	  hoped	  that	  competition	  from	  foreign	  capital	  would	  
steer	   the	   economy	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   reforms. 37 	  An	   expansive	   and	  
transformative	   dynamic	   that	   crossed	   from	   the	   external	   to	   the	   internal	   arena	  
and	  vice	  versa	  may	  be	  distilled	  from	  the	  enlisting	  of	  private	  capital	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
national	  development.	   	  Thus,	   the	  private	  sector	  was	   first	  pronounced	  a	  useful	  
supplement	   to	   the	   public	   sector	   following	   the	   Thirteenth	   Party	   Congress	   in	  
October	  1987.	  	  At	  that	  point,	  it	  was	  to	  be	  encouraged,	  but	  was	  to	  exist	  alongside	  
other	   forms	   of	   co-­‐operative	   ownership.38	  	   In	   the	   countryside,	   the	   People’s	  
Communes	   as	   the	   basic	   administrative	   unit	   were	   dismantled	   in	   favour	   of,	   in	  
practice,	   private	   ownership.39	  	   Nevertheless,	   overall,	   the	   indigenous	   private	  
sector	  was	  kept	  small	  with	  public	  ownership	  continuing	  to	  form	  ‘the	  basis	  of	  the	  
socialist	   economic	   system’.	   SOEs	   remained	   the	   main	   source	   of	   national	  
industrial	   output.40	  	   Thus,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   solutions	   to	   socialist	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  Ding	  Qingfen,	  ‘More	  Chinese	  Firms	  Opt	  for	  M&As’	  [10	  July	  2012]	  ChinaDaily.com.cn	  
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-­‐07/10/content_15564004.htm>	  accessed	  25	  
July	  2012.	  	  
36	  Mingqi	  Li,	  The	  Rise	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Demise	  of	  the	  Capitalist	  World	  Order	  (Pluto	  Press	  2008)	  
62.	  
37	  Wang	  Hui,	  ‘The	  New	  Criticism’	  in	  Chaohua	  Wang,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  79.	  
38	  John	  Gittings,	  The	  Changing	  Face	  of	  China:	  From	  Mao	  to	  Market	  (OUP	  2006)	  116-­‐17.	  
39	  ibid	  128.	  
40	  Jian	  Zhou,	  ibid	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quandaries	  were	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  exterior.	  The	  door	  of	  the	  national	  economy	  
was	   prized	   open	   for	   foreign	   private	   capital	   to	   provide	   resources,	   now	  
propagated	   as	   both	   necessary	   and	   lacking	   -­‐	   money,	   technology,	   management	  
skills	  and	  business	  know	  how.	   	  Aided	  by	  purposefully	  designed	   legal	  vehicles,	  
such	   as	   joint	   ventures	   and	  wholly	   owned	   foreign	   enterprises,	   these	   imported	  
resources	   were	   to	   transform	   China’s	   economic	   topography	   and	   propel	   it	  
towards	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   catching	   up	   with	   the	   West.41	  	   It	   was	   only	   at	   a	  
second	  stage,	  and	  against	   the	  backdrop	  of	  a	   falling	  growth	  rate,	   that	  domestic	  
private	   capital	   was	   invited	   to	   join	   FDI	   in	   infiltrating	   sectors	   traditionally	  
reserved	  for	  SOEs.42	  	  In	  July	  2011	  a	  Chinese	  private	  company	  was	  the	  first	  to	  be	  
licensed	   to	   construct	   a	   cross-­‐border	  natural	   gas	  pipeline	  between	  Kazakhstan	  
and	   Xinjiang.43	  	   A	   survey	   of	   private	   companies	   with	   annual	   revenues	   of	   over	  
RMB300	  million	   conducted	   by	   the	   All-­‐China	   Federation	   of	   Industry	   reported	  
50.9%	  and	  79.5%	  year-­‐on-­‐year	   increase	   in	   assets	   and	  profit	   respectively.44	  	  A	  
year	  later,	  Yunnan	  provincial	  government	  announced	  it	  was	  looking	  for	  private	  
capital	   to	   exploit	   the	   area’s	   rich	   reserves	   of	   mineral	   and	   energy	   resources.45	  
Detailed	   policies	   were	   to	   be	   unveiled	   to	   allow	   private	   capital	   in	  
telecommunications,	   until	   now	   a	   strategic	   industry	   with	   restricted	   entry	   for	  
non-­‐state	  investment.46	  	  By	  March	  2013,	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  break	  state	  monopoly,	  Wang	  
Fang,	   deputy	   head	   of	   the	   China’s	   State	   Commission	   Office	   for	   Public	   Sector	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  2012]	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  the	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  the	  rules	  on	  private	  
investment	  in	  state	  sectors	  published	  is	  ‘to	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  market	  access	  to	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  the	  vitality	  of	  
private	  capital’	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  pledge	  made	  by	  premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  in	  March	  2012.	  
‘Private	  investment	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  [6	  June	  2012]	  China	  Daily	  
<http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-­‐06/06/content_25579566.htm>	  accessed	  22	  June	  
2012.	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  July	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  China	  Daily	  
<http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-­‐07/17/content_25929223.htm>	  accessed	  16	  Aug	  
2012.	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  News	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Aug	  2011]	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accessed	  29	  July	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  accessed	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2012.	  	  
46	  Rich	  Zhu,	  ‘Private	  Capital	  Likely	  For	  Telecom	  Sector’	  [26	  July	  2012]	  Shanghai	  Daily	  
<http://www.shanghaidaily.com/nsp/Business/2012/07/26/Private%2Bcapital%2Blikely%2
Bfor%2Btelecom%2Bsector/>	  accessed	  16	  Aug	  2012.	  
132	  
	  
Reform	   announced	   the	   introduction	   of	   private	   capital	   into	   railways	  
construction	   and	   operation.47	  	   These	   developments	   were	   homogenised	   into	   a	  
coherent	   policy	   when,	   in	   its	   2013	   session,	   the	   NPC	   proclaimed	   that	   controls	  
over	  market	  access	   for	  the	  non-­‐public	  sector	   is	   to	  be	  relaxed	  as	  governmental	  
investment	  decreases.48	  	  In	  addition,	  private	  capital	  is	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  
in	   the	   country’s	   ODI	   drive,	   with	   more	   BITs	   promised	   to	   facilitate	   its	   border	  
crossing.	  Further,	  now	  legitimized	  and	  expanding,	  private	  capital	  has	  found	  its	  
voice.	  Thus,	   in	  a	   July	  2012	  critique	  of	   the	  measures	  aimed	  at	  encouraging	  ODI	  
by	   private	   enterprises,	   the	   All	   China	   Private	   Enterprises	   Federation	   (ACPEF)	  
called	   for	   SOEs	  monopolies	   to	   be	   dismantled	   and	   for	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   be	  
consolidated.49	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  encounter	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  
capital	  the	  external	  integrated	  into	  the	  interior,	  and	  the	  interior	  is	  now	  making	  
its	   way	   into	   the	   external.	   Simultaneously,	   Chinese	   private	   capital	   is	   also	  
questioning	  the	  terms	  of	   its	   incorporation	   into	  both	  arenas,	  so	  as	   to	  challenge	  
the	  very	  structural	  and	  ideological	  foundations	  of	  China’s	  eco-­‐political	  model.	  	  
A	   preoccupation	   with	   this	   interconnectedness	   between	   the	   international	   and	  
the	   domestic	   can	   also	   be	   discerned	   at	   the	   leadership	   level.	   The	   slogan	  
‘Domestic,	   external,	   two	   big	   situations’	   (guonei,	   guowai,	   liangge	   daju)	   was	   a	  
major	  theme	  of	  a	  Central	  Work	  Conference	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs	  convened	  by	  the	  
Chinese	  Communist	  Party	   (CCP)	  as	  early	  as	  August	  2006.50	  	   	  The	  Conference’s	  
top	   priority	   was	   to	   ensure	   that	   China’s	   international	   activities	   support	   her	  
domestic	   objectives. 51 	  	   Excluding	   for	   present	   purposes	   the	   emergence	   of	  
dissenting	   voices52	  and	   workers’	   resistance,53	  implied	   in	   this	   discourse	   is	   an	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  July	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acceptance	   of	   the	   current	   world	   order,	   and	   an	   understanding	   of	   national	  
development	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  need	  to	  absorb	  external	  standards	  and	  structures	  so	  
as	  to	  secure	  a	  self-­‐serving	  integration.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  discursive	  criterion	  
of	  own	  benefit	  may	  also	  point	   to	  a	  utilitarian	  approach	  rather	   than	  normative	  
sanctioning,	   whereby	   the	   pursuit	   of	   empowerment	   remains	   the	   overriding	  
object	   of	   the	   act	   of	   incorporation.54	  	   ‘Self-­‐serving’	   thus	   denotes	   the	   possibility	  
that	  the	  process	  of	  assimilation	  may	  leave	  space	  for	  variations.	  As	  suggested	  by	  
Clegg,	   it	  may	   be	   finely	   tuned,	   so	   as	   to	   subtly	   influence	   the	  world	   order	   from	  
within,	   rather	   than	   pursue	   one-­‐way	   adaptation.55	  	   It	   may	   also	   intimate	   a	  
potential	  for	  withdrawal	  should	  circumstances	  so	  dictate.56	  	  The	  complexities	  of	  
China’s	  quest	   for	  modernity,	  her	   long	  and	  divergent	  history,	  her	  multi-­‐faceted	  
uniqueness	   and	   the	   route	   by	   which	   she	   was	   propelled	   towards	   integration,	  
render	   this	   possibility	   particularly	   intriguing.	   	   On	   further	   analysis,	   parallels	  
with	  the	  Western	  experience	  may	  well	  be	  revealed	  as	  potentially	  superficial.	  It	  
is	  possible	  Polanyi’s	  self-­‐replicating	   ‘home’	  and	   ‘abroad’	  analogue	  processes	  of	  
violent	   industrialisation	   and	   colonialisation	   cannot	   be	   properly	   equated	   with	  
China’s	  contemporary	  global	  search	   for	  commercial	  partnerships	  and	  win-­‐win	  
economic	   diplomacy.57	  	   Whether	   or	   not	   she	   represents	   another	   instance	   of	  
national	   succumbing	   to	  an	  expansive	  neoliberal	  hegemony	   is	  polemical.58	  	  But	  
even	  if	  one	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  she	  is,	  unlike	  in	  the	  West,	  such	  succumbing	  did	  not	  
come	  about	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  development	  in	  a	  continuum	  of	  non-­‐contingent	  
structures.	  If	  European	  industrialization	  represents	  an	  ‘intervening’	  rather	  than	  
an	   ‘independent’	   event,	   and	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   two	   or	   three	   centuries	   of	  
interaction	  between	  finance,	  capitalism,	  militarism	  and	  imperialism,59	  until	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  ‘Will	  Chinese	  Workers	  Challenge	  Global	  Capitalism?’	  interview	  with	  Li	  Mingqi,	  The	  Real	  News	  
<http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&j
umival=5502>	  accessed	  29	  July	  2012.	  
54	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ’Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties:	  The	  Chinese	  Approach	  and	  Practice’	  in	  B.	  S.	  
Chimni,	  S.	  Ko	  Swan	  and	  others	  (eds)	  Asian	  Book	  of	  International	  Law	  1998-­‐1999	  (Volume	  8	  
Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2003)	  110.	  
55	  Jenny	  Clegg,	  China’s	  Global	  Strategy:	  Toward	  a	  Multipolar	  World	  (Pluto	  Press	  2009)	  6-­‐7.	  
56	  But	  see	  Westra,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  146-­‐75	  for	  an	  argument	  that	  China	  is	  chained	  to	  the	  US	  designed	  
order.	  
57	  ibid	  4.	  
58	  For	  a	  view	  of	  China	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  ‘neoliberalism	  with	  Chinese	  Characteristics’	  see	  David	  
Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism	  (OUP	  2005)	  120-­‐51;	  for	  a	  dissenting	  view	  see	  Giovanni	  
Arrighi,	  Adam	  Smith	  in	  Beijing:	  Lineages	  of	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  (Verso	  2007)	  357-­‐58;	  see	  
also	  Samir	  Amin,	  ‘China,	  Market	  Socialism,	  and	  US	  Hegemony’	  (2005)	  28	  3	  Review	  274-­‐5.	  
59	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  272.	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19th	  century	  China	  was	  neither	  industrialised	  in	  the	  Westerncentric	  sense,	  nor	  a	  
participant	  in	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐economy.	  	  Her	  incorporation,	  when	  it	  finally	  
came,	   was	   achieved	   via	   compulsion	   and	   trauma.	   Implicated	   in	   this	   traumatic	  
rupture	   were	   major	   transformations	   of	   both	   her	   internal	   structures	   and	  
external	   projections.60	  	   Markets	   are	   not	   new	   to	   China	   –	   traditional	   Chinese	  
society	   had	   vast	   regional	   and	   inter-­‐regional	   markets.61	  	   However,	   her	   19th	  
century	   violent	   encounter	   with	   Europe	   meant	   that,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   the	  
process	  of	  markets	  formation	  became	  entangled	  with	  the	  colonial	  pressures	  of	  
world	  capitalism.62	  	  In	  this	  entanglement,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Chinese	  tributary	  
system	  were	  propelled	   into	  an	  encounter	  with	  Western	  dialectics	  of	  militarily	  
competing	  and	  expansionist	  nation-­‐states	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  pull	  towards	  a	  
prescriptively	   uniform	   interstate	   system	   on	   the	   other. 63 	  It	   was	   a	   novel	  
landscape	   in	  which	   China	   had	   to	   navigate	   her	  way	   from	   the	   periphery	   to	   the	  
core.	   Internal	   truths	   were	   pitched	   against	   external	   realities	   in	   a	   process	   of	  
national	  re-­‐invention,	  one	  that	  was	   founded	  on	  a	  different	  historical	  path,	  and	  
thus	  impregnated	  with	  multiple	  potential	  outcomes.	  Whether	  one	  views	  her	  as	  
a	  ‘civilization	  state’	  or	  a	  ‘nation-­‐state’64,	  unlike	  many	  other	  non-­‐European	  states,	  
her	   sense	   of	   sovereign	   integrity	   is	   not	   the	   outcome	   of	   Western	   imperialist	  
manipulations.	   Rather,	   it	   existed	   before	   the	   Great	  Wall	   was	   finally	   breached,	  
and	   may	   well	   continue	   to	   guide	   the	   country’s	   quest	   for	   her	   own	   identity,	  
notwithstanding	  the	  interstate	  system’s	  impulse	  for	  uniformity.	  
The	   above	   is	   by	   way	   of	   intimation	   of	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   that	   inhabit	   the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  Chinese	  phenomenon.	  They	  will	  come	  to	  the	  forefront	  later	  in	  
the	  work	  when	  I	  look	  at	  the	  country’s	  paradigm.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	  
are	  absent	  from	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter.	  For,	  in	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  another	  
manifestation	   of	   Foucault’s	   eco-­‐political-­‐juridical	   ensemble,	   Chinese	  
transformative	   discourse	   incorporates	   juridical	   innovations.	   On	   the	   domestic	  
front,	  Wang	  Yi	  adopts	  Henry	  Maine’s	  conceptualization	  of	  human	  development	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  36)	  5.	  
61	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  64;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  59)	  321-­‐26.	  
62	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  64.	  
63	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  59)	  314-­‐20.	  
64	  For	  a	  view	  of	  China	  as	  a	  civilization	  see	  Martin	  Jacques,	  When	  China	  Rules	  the	  World:	  The	  Rise	  
of	  the	  Middle	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Western	  World	  (Allen	  Lane	  2009)	  194-­‐232.	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as	   a	   progress	   from	   ‘status	   to	   contract’.	   He	   observes	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	  
Chinese	   government	   utilises	   the	   modern	   legal	   paradigm	   of	   contractual	  
relationships	  	  ‘to	  shrug	  off	  political	  debts	  and	  moral	  obligations	  bequeathed	  by	  
the	   previous	   ideological	   regime.	   In	   consequence	   a	   whole	   generation	   is	   being	  
unjustly	  discarded	  and	  sacrificed’.65	  	  A	  private	  property	  framework	  was	  created,	  
first	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  foreign	  investors,	  and	  then	  to	  accommodate	  China’s	  own	  
emergent	   capital	   owning	   class.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   sectors	   such	   as	   stock	  
exchanges,	   insurance	   and	   financial	   services. 66 	  	   Municipal	   law	   designed	   to	  
regulate,	   encourage	   and	  protect	   foreign	   investment	  was	  developed,	  with	   calls	  
for	   its	   coherence	   to	   be	   improved	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   unified	   Foreign	  
Direct	   Investment	   Code.67	  	   On	   the	   international	   front,	   China	   appears	   to	   have	  
progressively	  shed	  off	  past	  mistrust	  of	  IL	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  hegemony	  and	  imperialist	  
ambitions.	   She	   participates	   and	   contributes	   to	   its	   development,68	  has	   become	  
an	  actor	  in	  the	  global	  BITs	  program,	  and	  seems	  to	  have	  come	  close	  to	  accepting	  
customary	  IL.69	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  Economic	  IL	  serves	  to	  uphold	  the	  
existing	   world	   order	   and	   balance	   of	   power	   through	   binding	   and	   enforceable	  
rules.70	  	   China’s	   evolving	   BITs	   program	   can	   thus	   be	   viewed	   as	   signalling	   her	  
changing	   attitude	   toward	   the	   system	   it	   underpins,	   a	   change	   that	   is	  
complemented	   internally	  by	   the	  domestic	  application	  of	  market	  doctrines	  and	  
neoclassical	  economics.71	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Wang	  Yi,	  ‘From	  Status	  to	  Contract’	  in	  Chaohua	  Wang,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  190.	  
66	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  ‘China’s	  International	  Future’	  [2012]	  China	  Geoeconomic	  Strategy	  6	  
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR012/westad.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  July	  
2012.	  
67	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  The	  Legal	  Framework	  of	  EU-­‐China	  Investment	  Relations:	  A	  Critical	  Appraisal	  
(Hart	  Publishing	  2005).	  
68	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  China’s	  contribution	  to	  IL	  see	  Wang	  Zonglai	  and	  Hu	  Bin,	  ‘China’s	  Reform	  
and	  Opening-­‐up	  and	  International	  Law’	  (2010)	  9	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  193.	  
69	  	  ‘Agreement	  on	  the	  encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investment	  between	  the	  
Government	  of	  The	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China’	  
(2007)	  art.	  4(1)	  <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_china.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  
June	  2012;	  ‘Agreement	  Among	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  The	  republic	  of	  
Korea	  and	  The	  Government	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  for	  the	  Promotion,	  Facilitation	  and	  
Protection	  of	  Investment’	  (May	  2012)	  art	  1(c)	  
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf	  >	  accessed	  14	  
July	  2012:	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  96-­‐97;	  see	  also	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  79.	  
70	  See	  also	  An	  Chen	  and	  Dong	  Chen,	  ibid	  (n	  10)	  399.	  
71	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  99.	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Different	  sites	  different	  perspectives	  
The	  Western	  site	  
BITs,	  we	  recall,	  were	  born	  out	  of	  the	  extension	  of	  self-­‐determination	  to	  formerly	  
colonised	   territories.72 	  	   It	   was	   a	   juridical	   innovation	   aimed	   at	   preserving	  
imperialist	   dynamics	   and	   power	   structures	   within	   an	   expanded	   interstate	  
system,	  a	  response	  to	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  Western	  capital	  from	  the	  vagaries	  of	  a	  
new	  and	  resistant	  non-­‐European	  sovereignty.73	  	  Such	  protection	  was	  premised	  
on	   the	   absence	  of	   reciprocity	   –	  obligations-­‐free	   investments	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  
and	   obligations-­‐laden	   protections	   on	   the	   other,	   would	   flow	   in	   opposite	  
directions	   across	   the	   capital	   exporting/capital	   importing,	  North/South	   divide.	  	  
One	  should	  thus	  not	  be	  surprised	  to	  find	  within	  Western	  literature	  on	  Chinese	  
BITs	   a	   pre-­‐occupation	   with	   their	   significance	   to	   her	   functioning	   as	   a	   host	  
country,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  protection	  she	  purports	  to	  offer	  to	  foreign	  
investors	  is	  trustworthy.74	  	  By	  contrast,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  
treaties’	  impact	  on	  her	  internal	  wellbeing.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  also	  attempts	  
at	   assessing	   the	   systemic	   implications	   of	   China’s	   passage	   through	   the	   global	  
BITs	  network,	  including	  the	  effect	  of	  her	  crossing	  the	  global	  North/South	  divide	  
to	   become	   a	   home	   country	   of	   certain	   import.	   	   Views	   diverge.	   For	   Schill,	   such	  
passage	   serves	   to	   affirm	   the	   value	   of	   investment	   IL	   to	   developing	   countries.	  
This,	   he	   argues,	   vindicates	   his	   assertion	   that	   the	   developed/developing	  
dichotomy	  is	  overstated.75	  	  It	  is	  also	  said	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  his	  hypothesis	  that	  
the	  BITs	  network	   is	   in	   reality	   a	   non-­‐hegemonic	  multilateral	   arrangement,	   the	  
absence	  of	  a	  multilateral	   treaty	  notwithstanding.	  China,	  he	  argues,	   is	  a	  case	   in	  
point	   by	   virtue	   of	   her	   negotiating	   power,	   such	   that	   enables	   her	   to	   decline	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Anthony	  Anghie,	  Imperialism,	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  International	  Law	  (Cambridge	  
Studies	  in	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law,	  CUP	  2004)	  209,	  223-­‐24.	  
73	  	  ibid;	  Karl	  P.	  Sauvant	  and	  Jose’	  E	  Alvarez,	  ‘Introduction:	  International	  investment	  Law	  in	  
Transition’	  in	  Jose’	  E	  Alvarez	  and	  Karl	  P.	  Sauvant	  with	  Kamil	  Gerrard	  Ahmed	  and	  Gabriela	  P.	  
Vizcaino	  (eds)	  The	  Evolving	  International	  Investment	  Regime:	  Expectations,	  Realities,	  Options	  
(OUP	  2011)	  xxxi.	  
74	  See	  for	  example	  Michael	  J.	  Moser,	  ‘Do	  China’s	  BITs	  Have	  Teeth?	  in	  Michael	  J.	  Moser	  (ed),	  
Business	  disputes’	  in	  China	  (2nd	  edn,	  JurisNet	  LLC	  2009)	  245-­‐48;	  for	  a	  view	  that	  China’s	  new	  
generation	  BITs	  transform	  them	  into	  effective	  and	  powerful	  fools	  of	  investment	  protection	  see	  
Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  77.	  
75	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  73;	  Schill,	  The	  Multilateralization,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  57.	  
137	  
	  
certain	  standards	  desired	  by	  capital	  exporting	  countries.76	  Sauvant	  and	  Alvarez,	  
on	   the	   other	   hand,	   point	   to	   a	   systemic	   readjustment	   in	   the	   direction	   of	  more	  
limited	  protection	  and	  greater	  space	  for	  government	  action.	  This,	  they	  say,	  was	  
occasioned	   by,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   rise	   of	   investors	   headquartered	   in	   emerging	  
markets,	   including	   China.77	  	   Sachs	   predicts	   a	   change	   in	   the	   world	   order,	   and	  
questions	   the	   ability	   of	   Western	   law	   to	   maintain	   its	   dominance	   over	   the	  
international	  investment	  regime.78	  	  Seen	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  legal	  pluralism,	  the	  
expectation	  is	  that	  China	  will	  become	  a	  dominant	  site	  of	  governance.	  In	  world-­‐	  
system	   analysis	   terms,	   she	   will	   make	   her	   way	   to	   the	   top	   echelon	   of	   the	  
interstate	  hierarchical	  ladder.	  
These	  extrapolations	   from	  China’s	  arrival	  on	   the	  BITs	   scene	  are	  vulnerable	   to	  
questioning.	  Given	   the	  primacy	  of	   the	  US	   site	  of	   governance,	  US	  BITs	  practice	  
provides	  a	  suitable	  example.	  Following	  in	  the	  footstep	  of	  its	  2004	  predecessor,	  
the	  new	  US	  Model	  BIT	  2012	  indeed	  limits	  FET	  and	  full	  protection	  and	  security	  
standards	   of	   treatment	   to	   the	   international	   minimum	   standard	   (IMS). 79	  
However,	   the	   IMS	   remains	   defined	   by	   reference	   to	   an	   external	   baseline	   of	  
customary	   IL,	   rather	   than	   developing	   countries’	   preferred	   FET	   in	   accordance	  
with	   the	   host	   country’s	   actual	   prevailing	   circumstances. 80 	  	   Further,	   the	  
recommendation	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  IMS	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  FET	  should	  be	  
limited	   to	   the	   one	   articulated	   in	   the	  Glamis	   Gold	  81	  was	   not	   adopted.82	  	   Other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  ibid	  114.	  
77	  Sauvant	  and	  Alvarez,	  ibid	  (n	  73)	  xxxiv,	  xli.	  
78	  Jeffrey	  D.	  	  Sachs,	  ‘The	  Context:	  Foreign	  Investment	  and	  the	  Changing	  Global	  Economic	  Reality’	  
in	  Sauvant	  and	  Alvarez,	  ibid	  (n	  73)	  l-­‐lii.	  
79	  ‘2012	  U.S	  Model	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty:	  Treaty	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  [Country]	  Concerning	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  
Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investment’	  art	  5	  (2)	  
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf>	  accessed	  17	  July	  2012.	  
80	  ibid;	  Xiuli	  Han,	  ‘The	  Application	  of	  the	  Principles	  of	  Proportionality	  in	  Tecmed	  v	  Mexico’	  
(2007)	  6	  3	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  635	  at	  637.	  
81	  In	  Glamis	  Gold,	  an	  ICSID	  case	  brought	  under	  NAFTA,	  the	  tribunal	  held	  that	  the	  FET	  has	  not	  
evolved	  under	  customary	  international	  law	  since	  it	  was	  first	  articulated	  in	  the	  Neer	  case:	  
violation	  ‘requires	  an	  act	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  egregious	  and	  shocking	  –	  a	  gross	  denial	  of	  justice,	  
manifest	  arbitrariness,	  blatant	  unfairness,	  a	  complete	  lack	  of	  process,	  evident	  discrimination,	  or	  
a	  manifest	  lack	  of	  reasons’.	  	  Glamis	  Gold	  Ltd	  V	  United	  States	  of	  America	  [8	  June	  2009]	  ICSID	  
Tribunal,	  Not	  Indicated	  para	  627	  <http://italaw.com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf	  >	  accessed	  
9	  Aug	  2012.	  
82	  Paolo	  Di	  Rosa,	  ‘The	  New	  2012	  U.S	  Model	  BIT:	  Staying	  the	  Course’	  [1	  June	  2012]	  Kluwer	  
Arbitration	  Blog	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recommendations	   for	   restrictions	   on	   protection,	   e.g.	   limiting	   the	   scope	   of	  
expropriation	   to	   direct	   taking,	   prohibiting	   the	   multiplying	   effect	   of	   the	   most	  
favoured	   nation	   (MFN)	   clause,	   limiting	   national	   treatment	   (NT)	   to	   measures	  
with	  discriminatory	  intent,	  and	  curbing	  the	  range	  of	  claims	  for	  violation	  of	  the	  
IMS	  were	  all	  similarly	  overlooked.83	  In	  other	  words,	  changes	  in	  the	  patterns	  of	  
investment	  flow	  did	  produce	  calls	  for	  lesser	  protection.	  However,	  at	  least	  as	  far	  
as	  US	  practice	  is	  concerned,	  such	  calls	  remain	  for	  most	  part	  unheeded,	  leaving	  
all	   substantive	  protection	  provisions	  unaltered.84	  	  Presumably,	   this	   reflects	   an	  
enduring	   emphasis	   by	   the	   US	   government	   and	   its	   TNCs	   on	   the	   protection	   of	  
their	   capital	   exporting	   interests.	   Such	  presumption	   is	   lent	   support	  by	   the	  key	  
changes	  introduced	  to	  tackle	  investments	  in	  countries	  with	  state-­‐led	  economies.	  	  
The	   US	   2012	   Model	   BIT	   endeavours	   to	   address	   perceived	   concerns	   about	  
investment	   by	   SOEs.	   It	   does	   so	   by	   means	   of	   a	   broader	   prohibition	   on	  
performance	  requirements,	  whereby	  the	  state	  is	  barred	  from	  requiring	  the	  use	  
of	  domestic	  technology.85	  	  A	  new	  provision	  imposes	  on	  the	  state	  an	  obligation	  to	  
allow	   foreign	   investors	   to	   participate	   in	   technical	   and	   similar	   standards	  
setting.86	  This	  stipulation	  forms	  part	  of	  general	  new	  transparency	  requirements	  
for	   advance	   publication	   and	   consultation	   of	   proposed	   laws	   and	   regulations	  
pertaining	   to	   matters	   covered	   by	   the	   treaty. 87 	  A	   footnote	   on	   delegated	  
government	  authority	  was	  added	  to	  ensure	  that	  SOEs	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  BITs	  
obligations.88	  	  In	  other	  words,	  under	  the	  catchword	  of	  transparency,	  sovereign	  
regulatory	   space	   is	   prized	   open	   to	   private	   interests,	   so	   as	   to	   enable	   TNCs’	  
participation	  in	  domestic	  legislative	  processes.	  Thus,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  dominant	  US	  
site	  of	  governance,	  any	  relatively	  novel	  trend	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  diminution	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/01/the-­‐new-­‐2012-­‐u-­‐s-­‐model-­‐bit-­‐staying-­‐
the-­‐course/>	  accessed	  7	  Aug	  2012;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Railroad	  Development	  Corporation	  v	  the	  
Republic	  of	  Guatemala	  (Award	  29	  June	  2012)	  ICSID	  Case	  No.	  ARB/07/23	  the	  tribunal	  adopted	  
the	  reasoning	  in	  ADF	  Group	  Inc.	  v	  USA	  (NAFTA)	  (Award,	  9	  January	  2003)	  and	  Waste	  
Management	  v	  Mexico	  (NAFTA)	  (Final	  Award,	  30	  April	  2004)	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  minimum	  
standard	  of	  treatment	  is	  constantly	  in	  a	  process	  of	  development.	  The	  tribunal	  opined	  that	  the	  
requirement	  to	  provide	  FET	  as	  part	  of	  the	  minimum	  standard	  of	  treatment	  would	  be	  infringed	  
by	  conduct	  that	  is	  ‘arbitrary,	  grossly	  unfair,	  unjust	  or	  idiosyncratic’.	  
83	  Di	  Rosa,	  ibid.	  
84	  ibid.	  
85	  US	  Model	  Law	  2012	  ibid	  (77)	  art	  8.	  	  
86	  ibid	  art	  11(8).	  
87	  ibid	  art	  11	  (1)-­‐	  (5).	  
88	  ibid	  n	  8	  to	  art	  2	  (2).	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protection	   remains	  within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   fundamental	   aim	   of	   peddling	   a	  
free-­‐market	  prescription	  under	   the	  umbrella	  of	  existing	   IL.89	  	  The	  response	   to	  
geopolitical	  shifts	  appears	  then	  to	  be	  tactical	  in	  nature.	  	  
As	  will	  be	  seen	  later,	  Chinese	  BITs	  do	  maintain	  divergent	  features	  that	  belie	  the	  
assertion	  of	   implied	  multilateralism.	  Further,	   from	   the	  waning	  of	  China’s	  past	  
resistance	  to	  Western	  practice,	  Schill	  extrapolates	  a	  rebuttal	  of	  the	  allegation	  of	  
hegemonic	   pressures	   at	   play,	   and	   an	   indication	   that	   BITs’	   FDI/sovereign	  
regulatory	   trade-­‐off	   is	   beneficial.	   These	   conclusions	   are	   supported	   by	   an	  
assertion	  of	  an	  equality	  of	  bargaining	  power.90	  	  In	  other	  words,	  China’s	  change	  
of	  attitude	  represents	  a	  free	  choice	  and	  one	  that	  is	  ‘deliberate’.91	  	  	  The	  difficulty	  
is	   that,	   in	   itself	   and	   absent	   an	   empirical	   study,	   a	   shift	   from	   resistance	   to	  
compliance	   is	   insufficient	   to	   support	   sweeping	   conclusions	   regarding	  benefits	  
and	  voluntariness.	  Particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  latter,	  as	  we	  saw,	  voluntariness	  
may	   be	   imposed	   through	   informal	   and	   covert	   dynamics.	   	   Indeed,	   integration	  
produces	   its	   own	   internal	   and	   external	   constraints	   on	   true	   independence	   of	  
action.	  Here,	  we	  may	  observe	  again	  the	  fusion	  of	  national	  economic	  elites	   into	  
transnational	  elites,	  so	  as	  to	  form	  collaborative	  and	  mutually	  dependent	  centres	  
of	   discourse	   and	   policymaking.	   There	   is	   also	   the	   increased	   control	   by,	   and	  
reliance	  on,	  foreign	  investment	  by	  TNCs.92	  Hung	  Ho-­‐Fung,	  for	  example,	  points	  to	  
China’s	   growing	   inability	   to	   renounce	   the	   consumers	   markets	   of	   the	   global	  
North	  as	  the	  source	  of	  her	  growth,	  and	  the	  US	  financial	  vehicles	  as	  the	  store	  of	  
value	  for	  her	  savings.	  93	  Similarly,	  Westra	  predicts	  that,	  were	  the	  country	  to	  give	  
up	   her	   US	   dollars	   holdings,	   her	   current	   economic	   structure	   would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  ‘Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  and	  Related	  Agreement’,	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  Diplomacy	  in	  
Action	  <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm>	  accessed	  17	  July	  2012.	  
90	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  37-­‐38.	  
91	  ibid.	  
92	  21	  out	  of	  28	  industries	  opened	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  to	  foreign	  investment	  are	  
controlled	  by	  foreign	  TNCs.	  Altogether	  foreign	  TNCs	  control	  a	  third	  of	  the	  entire	  market.	  ‘China	  
already	  has	  too	  much	  foreign	  investment,	  threatening	  its	  economic	  safety?’	  [31	  Dec	  2012]	  
Global	  Times	  <http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/607831/Backgroundre-­‐China-­‐
already-­‐has-­‐too-­‐much-­‐foreign-­‐investment-­‐threatening-­‐its>	  accessed	  18	  May	  2012;	  for	  a	  
discussion	  of	  China’s	  new	  elites	  see	  He	  Qinglian,	  ‘A	  Listing	  Social	  Structure’	  in	  Chaohua	  Wang,	  
ibid	  (n	  9).	  	  
93	  Hung	  Ho-­‐Feng,	  ‘America’s	  Head	  Servant?	  The	  PRC’s	  Dilemma	  in	  the	  Global	  Crisis’	  (2009)	  60	  
New	  Left	  Review	  <	  http://newleftreview.org/II/60/ho-­‐fung-­‐hung-­‐america-­‐s-­‐head-­‐servant>	  
accessed	  31	  July	  2012.	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‘unceremoniously	   unravel’. 94 	  These	   factors	   may	   well	   operate	   to	   reduce	  
bargaining	   capacity.	   Further,	   even	   if	   China	   enjoys	   an	   enhanced	   bargaining	  
power,	   the	   fact	   that	   one	   developing	   country	   appears	   to	   be	   doing	   better	   than	  
others	  do	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  a	  retreat	  from	  a	  systemic	  developed/developing	  
dichotomy.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   for	  Westra	   China’s	   dollars	   facilitate	  Washington	  
Consensus	  bludgeoning	  of	  weaker	  economies.95	  	  Seen	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  world-­‐	  
systems	   analysis,	   enhancement	   in	   China’s	   negotiating	   power,	   if	   any,	   thus	  
remains	  specific	  to	  her	  own	  passage	  in	  the	  interstate	  order.	  A	  fourth	  and	  related	  
point	   is	   that	   hegemony	   as	   understood	   here	   is	   about	   the	   power	   to	   persuade	  
others	  that	  they	  should	  follow	  the	  same	  path	  and	  that	  such	  path	  is	  universal	  and	  
in	  their	  interests.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  world-­‐systems	  analysis,	  it	  represents	  
the	   ability	   to	   formulate	   rules	   and	   cultural	   discourse.96	  	   From	   this	   perspective,	  
China’s	  absorption	  into	  the	  BITs	  architecture	  may	  well	  be	  understood,	  at	   least	  
in	  part,	  as	  the	  product	  of	  subordination	  to	  a	  hegemonic	  logic	  and	  an	  indication	  
of	  diminution	  in	  bargaining	  power.	  	  
The	  Chinese	  site	  
Chinese	   writings	   point	   towards	   a	   site	   of	   governance	   with	   a	   different	  
perspective.	  In	  line	  with	  Wang	  Chaohua’s	  observation,	  they	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
domestic	   backdrop	   to	   China’s	   BITs	   program,	   its	   significance	   to	   her	   national	  
development	  and	  the	  quality	  of	   the	  protection	  the	  country’s	  treaties	  extend	  to	  
her	   ODI.97	  	   One	  may	   detect	   in	   these	  writings	   the	   anxieties	   of	   an	   enterprising	  
Wallersteinian	  semi-­‐peripheral	  state	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  her	  position	  in	  the	  existing	  
hierarchy.	  	  Such	  anxieties	  veer	  on	  the	  side	  of	  engagement	  rather	  than	  schism	  or	  
withdrawal.98	  	  However,	  Chinese	  publicists	  are	  not	  altogether	  oblivious	  to	  BITs’	  
systemic	   context.	   Thus,	   some	   also	   reflect	   on	   the	   need	   to	   refashion	   the	   global	  
network	   of	   investment	   treaties,	   and	   on	   China’s	   capacity	   to	   become	   a	   site	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Westra,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  20.	  
95	  ibid	  19.	  
96	  Hung	  Ho-­‐Feng	  ibid	  (n	  93)	  58.	  
97	  See	  for	  example	  An	  Chen,	  ‘Should	  the	  Four	  Great	  Safeguards	  in	  Sino-­‐Foreign	  BITs	  Be	  Hastily	  
dismantled?	  Comments	  on	  Provisions	  concerning	  Dispute	  Settlement	  in	  Model	  US	  and	  Canadian	  
BITS’	  (2006)	  7	  No	  6	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  &	  Trade	  899;	  Cai	  Congyan,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  621;	  Ye	  
Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8);	  Jian	  Zhou,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  39.	  
98	  But	  see	  An	  Chen	  and	  Dong	  Chen,	  ibid	  (n	  10)	  generally.	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governance	   capable	   of	   generating	   a	   reformative	   trend.	   In	   other	   words,	   an	  
instinct	   for	   self-­‐serving	   integration	   coalesces	   with	   an	   awakening	   sense	   of	  
empowerment	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   change,	   albeit	   one	   that	   remains	   within	  
existing	  parameters.	  	  	  	  
Significantly,	   the	   reformative	   trend	   appears	   linked	   to	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	  
China	   as	   a	   leader	   of	   a	   developing	   camp	   where	   South-­‐South	   rhetoric	   is	  
increasingly	   underpinned	   by	   trade	   and	   investment	   co-­‐operation. 99 	  	   Cai	  
Congyan,	   for	   example,	   argues	   the	   need	   for	   the	   BITs	   practice	   to	   pursue	   a	  
development	  orientated	  ‘third	  way’,	  so	  as	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  transformation	  
of	  some	  developing	  countries	  into	  capital	  exporting	  nations.	  The	  risk	  of	  South-­‐
South	   BITs	   merely	   replicating	   the	   North-­‐South	   ones,	   he	   argues,	   is	   to	   be	  
avoided.100	  	   For	   him,	   the	   rapprochement	   in	   the	   BITs	   arena	   between	   China,	  
leader	   of	   the	   developing	   and	   the	   US,	   leader	   of	   the	   developed,	   presents	   an	  
opportunity	   for	   the	   two	   to	   engage	   in	   an	   equal	   dialogue.	   Its	   aim	  would	   be	   to	  
refashion	   the	   current	   treaty	   regime	   into	   one	   that	   is	   ‘more	   balanced,	   more	  
responsive	   and	   more	   accountable’. 101 	  	   Such	   refashioning	   would	   take	   into	  
account	   the	   level	   of	   economic	  development,	   regulate	   the	   conduct	   of	   investors	  
and	  incorporate	  the	  concept	  of	  sustainable	  development.102	  	  
Four	  presumptions	  may	  be	  extrapolated	   from	   this	  proposition:	   first,	   the	  US	   is	  
posited	   as	   a	   leader	   of	   only	   a	   section	   rather	   than	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   interstate	  
system.	   Second,	   the	   developed/developing	   dichotomy	   persists	   as	   a	   feature	   of	  
this	   system.	  Third,	  wealth	  accumulation	   is	  not	   contingent	  on	  a	  whole	   sway	  of	  
the	   world	   population	   being	   suspended	   in	   an	   interminable	   state	   of	  
underdevelopment.	   	   Fourth,	   equal	   bargaining	   between	   China	   and	   the	   US	   is	  
possible,	  and	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  are	  reconcilable.	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	   world	   order	   and	   its	   dichotomy	   are	   neither	   inevitable	   nor	   incapable	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  for	  example	  Chen	  Huiping,	  ‘The	  Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Mechanism:	  Where	  to	  
Go	  in	  the	  21st	  Century?	  (2008)	  9	  6	  The	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  &	  Trade	  467;	  Cai	  Congyan,’	  
Change	  of	  the	  Structure	  of	  International	  Investment	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  Developing	  
countries’	  BIT	  Practice	  –	  Toward	  a	  Third	  Way	  of	  BIT	  Practice’	  (2007)	  8	  6	  The	  Journal	  of	  World	  
Investment	  &	  Trade	  830.	  
100	  Cai	  Congyan,	  ibid	  generally.	  
101	  Cai	  Congyan,	  ibid	  (n	  34)	  458;	  to	  date,	  China	  has	  not	  signed	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  US.	  
102	  ibid	  474-­‐77.	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reform.	  Investment	  treaties	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  mechanism	  for	  equitable	  
and	  even	  development.	  The	   issue	   is	  merely	  one	  of	  negotiated	  management.	   In	  
this	   potential	   for	   transformation,	   China	   has	   a	   leadership	   role	   to	   play.	   Her	  
capacity	  to	  lead	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  global	  non-­‐zero	  game	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  
convergence	  her	  own	  national	   interest	   in	   investment	  protection	  with	  political	  
weight	  that	  cuts	  across	  both	  developed	  and	  developing	  camps.	  As	  a	  result	  she	  is	  
both	  willing	  and	  capable	  of	  bargaining	  with	  the	  US.103	  	  Cai’s	  allusion	  to	  China	  as	  
a	   ‘leader	   state’	   thus	   implicates	  Arrighi’s	   combination	  of	  dominance	  and	  moral	  
leadership	  that	  is	  exercised	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  all	  but	  does	  not	  hold	  out	  itself	  as	  a	  
model	   to	  be	  compulsively	  mimicked.104	  	  At	   first	  blush,	   this	   leadership	  remains	  
within	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   developmentalist	   discourse,	   first	   introduced	   in	  
1945,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  defining	  the	  ‘other’.105	  	  However,	  here	  again,	  one	  needs	  to	  take	  
account	   of	   the	   possibility	   that	   in	   its	   Chinese	   context,	   development	   imports	   a	  
specific	  normative	  content.	   	  For	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	   for	  example,	   concluding	  BITs	  
with	   developing	   countries	   was	   politically	   significant	   because	   it	   accentuated	  
‘China’s	   commitment	   to	   South-­‐South	   co-­‐operation’.106	  	   The	   suggestion	   is	   that	  
investment	   treaties	   are,	   or	   at	   least	   can	   be,	   vehicles	   for	   mutually	   beneficial	  
parallel	   development	   rather	   than	   power-­‐based	   device	   for	   capital	  
accumulation.107	  Yet,	   the	   2012	   US	  Model	   BIT	   and	   the	   Trans-­‐Pacific	   Economic	  
Partnership	  (TPP),	  rumoured	  to	  contain	  higher	  than	  ever	  TNCs’	  dictated	  levels	  
of	   protection,	   do	   not	   point	   in	   this	   direction.	   In	   particular	   the	  TPP	   is	   open	   for	  
more	  countries	  to	  join	  overtime.	  It	  is	  thus	  positioned	  to	  become	  incrementally	  a	  
multilateral	   agreement	   that	  was	   conceived	   and	   executed	   under	   the	   unilateral	  
leadership	   of	   the	   US	   and	   her	   TNCs.108	  As	   observed	   earlier	   in	   this	   work,	   such	  
leadership	  strives	  towards	  the	  conversion	  of	  the	  interstate	  order	  into	  a	  uniform	  
world	  empire	  with	  little	  tolerance	  for	  competitive	  national	  variances.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  ibid	  474.	  
104	  G.	  Arrighi	  and	  B	  Silver,	  Chaos	  and	  Governance	  in	  the	  Modern	  World	  System	  (University	  of	  
Minnesota	  Press	  1999)	  26-­‐28;	  David	  Harvey,	  The	  New	  Imperialism	  (OUP	  2003)	  36-­‐37.	  
105	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  10.	  
106	  	  Kong	  Qingjiang	  ibid	  (n	  54)	  113.	  
107	  Ho-­‐fung	  Hung	  (ed),	  China	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Global	  Capitalism	  (The	  John	  Hopkins	  
University	  Press	  2009)	  24-­‐26.	  
108	  ‘The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement:	  NAFTA	  of	  the	  Pacific	  Rim’	  
<http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/trade-­‐policies/tpp-­‐potential-­‐trade-­‐policy-­‐problems/>	  
accessed	  21	  July	  2012.	  
143	  
	  
In	  contrast	   to	  Cai,	  An	  Chen’s	   is	  a	  more	  cautious	  perspective,	  one	   that	  calls	   for	  
prudence	  in	  the	  pursuance	  of	  internationalised	  jurisdiction.109	  The	  two	  share	  a	  
premise	   that	   BITs	   are	   effective	   in	   regulating	   transnational	   investment	  
relationship.110	  	   However,	   rather	   than	   envisioning	   a	   future	   convergence,	   An	  
Chen	   goes	   on	   to	   probe	   the	   fault	   lines	   within	   such	   effectiveness	   and	   their	  
implications	  for	  a	  developing	  country	  such	  a	  China.	  His	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  negative	  
dynamic	   of	   home/host	   distribution	   of	   obligations,	   whereby	   the	   higher	   the	  
protection	   afforded	   to	   the	   former,	   the	   heavier	   the	   duties	   imposed	   on	   the	  
latter. 111 	  	   Invoking	   China’s	   ‘bitter	   historical	   lessons	   over	   100	   years’, 112	  
Argentina’s	  move	   to	   limit	   her	   involvement	  with	   international	   tribunals	   in	   the	  
wake	   of	   the	   claims	   triggered	   by	   measures	   taken	   at	   a	   time	   of	   economic	  
distress,113	  and	   the	  US	  and	  Canada’s	   recent	   recoil	   from	  extensive	  openness,114	  
he	   warns	   against	   hasty	   liberalisation.	   Prudence,	   says	   An	   Chen,	   dictates	   the	  
preservation	  of	  what	  he	  identifies	  as	  the	  ‘Four	  Great	  Safeguards’	  provided	  in	  the	  
ICSID	   Convention	   and	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Laws	   of	   Treaties	   1969	  
(Vienna	   Convention),	   but	   dismantled	   in	   the	   US	   and	   Canada	  Model	   BITs.	   Such	  
safeguards	   comprise	   four	   rights.	   That	   is,	   (i)	   exhaustion	   of	   local	   remedies	   in	  
ICSID	  Article	  26	  (ii)	  consent	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  in	  ICSID	  Article	  25(1)	  (iii)	  
the	  right	  to	  apply	  the	  host	  country’s	  laws	  in	  ICSID	  article	  42(1)	  and	  (iv)	  the	  right	  
to	   invoke	   national	   security	   exceptions	   in	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   Article	  
62(1).115	  Accepting	   the	   paradigm	  of	   the	   powerful,	   he	   concludes,	   does	   not	   suit	  
China’s	   current	   circumstances	   as	   a	  major	   recipient	   of	   FDI.	   In	   support	   of	   this	  
conclusion,	   he	   points	   to	   the	   disconnect	   between	   FDI	   flow	   and	   BITs,	   as	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  China	  does	  not	  have	  a	  treaty	  with	  the	  US,	  yet	  the	  US	  
often	   tops	   the	   list	   of	   her	   foreign	   investors.116	  	   This	   cautionary	   note	   proved	  
somewhat	  prophetic.	  For	   two	  years	   later	  Chen	  Huiping	  was	  able	   to	  point	   to	  a	  
revival	  of	  the	  Four	  Great	  Safeguards	  or	  what	  he	  terms	  the	  ‘four	  safety	  valves’.117	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For	   a	   while,	   points	   Chen,	   developing	   countries,	   China	   included,	   abandoned	  
these	  safely	  valves	  to	  follow	  the	  NAFTA	  type	  highly	  protective	  investment-­‐state	  
dispute	   resolution	  mechanism.118	  	  However,	   the	   resulting	   flood	  of	   ICSID	   cases	  
and	  the	  level	  of	  compensation	  awarded	  triggered	  a	  withdrawal	  from	  excessive	  
protection	  and	  a	  return	  to	  safety.	  Thus,	  Guatemala	  for	  example	  notified	  ICSID	  in	  
2003	   that	   her	   consent	   would	   be	   subject	   to	   exhaustion	   of	   local	   remedies;	  
Ecuador	  excluded	  certain	  types	  of	  disputes	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  her	  consent,	  and	  
Bolivia	  withdrew	  her	  consent	  altogether	   in	  2007.119	  China,	  Chen	  recommends,	  
should	   follow	   suit.120 	  	   Interestingly,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   sponsored	   his	  
research.121	  
Three	  points	  merit	  highlighting.	  First,	  An	  Chen	  does	  not	  attribute	  to	  China	  the	  
power	   on	   which	   Cai	   seems	   to	   rely.	   Writing	   against	   the	   background	   of	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  China-­‐Germany	  BITs	  2003	  with	  its	  unreserved	  acceptance	  of	  
ICSID	   arbitration,	   An’s	   main	   preoccupation	   is	   with	   the	   risk	   associated	   with	  
yielding	   to	   external	   pressures.	   Indeed,	   contrary	   to	   Schill’s	   notion	   of	   equal	  
bargaining	   power,	   he	   observes	   that	   ‘when	   China	   now	   negotiates	   with	   some	  
foreign	   countries	   to	   conclude	   new	   BITs	   or	   to	   revise	   existing	   ones,	   such	  
countries	  provide	   the	  US	  Model	  BIT	  or	   its	  variations	  as	   the	  negotiation	  model	  
and	   require	   to	   negotiate	   with	   China	   on	   this	   basis’.122	  Similarly,	   Chen	   Huiping	  
links	   the	   renouncement	   of	   the	   Four	   Safety	   Valves	   to	   US	   dominance	   and	  
developing	  countries’	  lack	  of	  choice.123	  Second,	  reformative	  analysis	  tends	  to	  be	  
undertaken	  with	  one	  eye	  to	  the	  developed	  countries’	  BITs	  practice.	  The	  aim	  is	  
to	   reach	   a	   consensus	   rather	   than	   engage	   in	   conflict.	   Absent	   is	   a	   Sachs’	   type	  
sense	  of	  newly	  accumulated	  power.	  Thus,	  Cai’s	  postulation	  of	  possible	  reforms	  
is	   premised	   on	   the	   shrinking	   differences	   between	   China	   and	   the	   US.	   Chen	  
similarly	   deduces	   a	   potential	   for	   an	   emerging	   consensus	   in	   the	   direction	   of	  
greater	   sovereignty,	   and	   the	   conversion	   of	   state-­‐investor	   into	   state-­‐state	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arbitration.124	  	  Third,	  An	  Chen’s	  note	  of	  caution	  against	  excess	   liberalisation	   is	  
founded	   on	   an	   empirical,	   statistics-­‐based	   assertion	   that	   China	   remains	   a	  
predominantly	  capital	  importing,	  developing	  country.	  	  But	  what	  if	  the	  statistics	  
were	  to	  change?	  What	  if	  China	  is	  to	  go	  up	  the	  ladder	  to	  become	  a	  predominantly	  
capital	   exporting	   strong	   country?	   An	   Chen’s	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   is	   to	   be	  
found	   in	   his	   article	  written	   three	   years	   later	   in	  which	   he	   joins	   Dong	   Chen	   in	  
conceptualizing	   the	   country	   as	   a	   leader	   state	   and,	   putting	   consensus	   aside,	  
boldly	  reminds	  her	  of	  past	  association	  with	  the	  NIEO:	  
	  
As	   the	   largest	  developing	  country	  peacefully	  rising	   in	   the	  world,	  
China	   should	   play	   important	   role	   in	   the	   historical	   course	   of	  
establishing	   the	   NIEO.	   Under	   such	   background,	   strategically	  
positioning	   China’s	   role	   in	   participating	   international	   economic	  
activities	  and	  establishing	  the	  NIEO	  will	  not	  only	  be	  expected	  by	  
the	   international	   community	   but	   also	   needed	   by	   China	   herself	  
who	  is	  to	  realize	  her	  strategic	  perspective	  of	  Peaceful	  Rising.125	  
	  
Such	  NIEO	  will	   be	   ‘just,	   fair	   and	   reasonable’,	   one	   in	   the	   creation	  of	  which	   the	  
coalition	  of	  the	  weak	  will	  participate,	  and	  into	  which	  China	  will	  bring	  not	  only	  
her	  modernity,	  but	  also	  her	  historical	  heritage.126	  	  The	  year	  is	  2009	  and	  China	  is	  
already	   well	   into	   her	   ODI	   ambition.	   Yet,	   An	   Chen	   and	   Dong	   Chen	   remain	  
stubbornly	   anchored	   in	   the	   developed/developing	   dichotomy	   and	   in	   a	   search	  
for	  a	  new	  order	  capable	  of	  addressing	  global	  inequities.	  	  
The	  impact	  of	  these	  critical	  voices	  on	  China’s	  BITs	  practice	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  
For	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  class	  and	  foreign	  capital	  interests	  that	  inhabit	  the	  country	  
since	   the	   introduction	   of	   her	   open	   door	   policies,	   raises	   the	   possibility	   of	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outcomes	   being	   shaped	   by	   power.	   Fewsmith	   attributes	   such	   power	   to	   public	  
intellectuals	  of	  the	  Chinese	  so-­‐called	   ‘New	  Left’	  when,	  somewhat	  mistrustfully,	  
he	   points	   to	   the	   Hu	   Jintao’s	   leadership’s	   active	   backing	   for	   their	   critique	   of	  
neoliberal	   globalisation.127	  	   By	   contrast,	   however,	   and	   reminiscent	   of	   policy	  
formation	  processes	   in	  neoliberal	  regimes	  generally,	  He	  Qinglian	  observes	   the	  
crystallization	  of	  new	  elites	  that	  strive	  to	  acquire	  a	  commanding	  position	  within	  
China’s	   political,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   life.128	  Consequently,	   ‘more	   and	  more	  
economic	   policies	   are	   based	   not	   on	   considerations	   of	   any	   overall	   national	  
interest,	  but	  on	  a	  nexus	  of	  benefits	  to	  a	  specific	  social	  group’.129	  	  Similarly,	  Hung	  
refers	   to	   coastal	   export	   sectors’	   vested	   interests	   in	   perpetuating	   the	   current	  
growth	  model.	  130	  	  Thus,	   in	  appending	  their	  reformative	  hopes	  to	  an	  emergent	  
new	   global	   consensus,	   Cai	   and	   Chen	   may	   have	   overlooked	   elites’	   counter	  
pursuit	   of	   constancy	   and	   expansion	   of	   the	   current	   order.	   Cai	   nevertheless	  
asserts	   that	   a	   ‘balanced	   paradigm’	   is	   on	   its	   way.131	  An	   example,	   he	   argues,	   is	  
Article	   154	   of	   the	   China-­‐New	   Zealand	   FTA,	   which	   provides	   for	   some	  
preliminary	  procedures	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  abuse	  of	  procedural	  rights.132	  	  An	  
emergent	  new	  balance	  may	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	   ‘fork	  in	  the	  road’	  provision	  in	  
Article	   15	   (5)	   of	   the	   Japan,	   China,	   and	   Korea	   trilateral	   investment	   treaty	  
2012.133	  In	   addition,	   there	   is	   a	   three	   year	   time	   limit	   for	   the	   institution	   of	  
arbitration	   proceedings,134	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   and	   prudent	   measures	  
relating	  to	  financial	  services	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  consent	  to	  investor-­‐
state	  arbitration,135	  the	  state	  party	  may	  require	  the	  investor	  to	  submit	  first	  to	  a	  
domestic	   administrative	   review136	  and	   the	   introduction	   or	   maintenance	   of	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special	   formalities	   in	   connection	   with	   investment	   activities	   are	   permitted.137	  	  
Yet,	  the	  Four	  Great	  Safeguards	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  been	  fully	  re-­‐instated:	  the	  
consent	  is	  not	  on	  a	  ‘case	  by	  case’	  basis	  and	  the	  right	  to	  require	  the	  application	  of	  
domestic	  law	  is	  not	  exercised.138	  	  Overall,	  the	  trend	  towards	  balance	  appears	  to	  
be	   more	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   cautionary	   compromise	   rather	   than	   a	   push	   for	   a	  
substantive	   NIEO	   style	   divergence.	   Perhaps	   even	   more	   significant	   is	   China’s	  
recent	   enlisting	   of	   private	   capital	   to	   the	   task	   of	   reinventing	   the	   country	   as	   a	  
global	  player.139	  	  For,	   as	  we	  saw	   in	  previous	  chapters,	   if	   the	  experience	  of	   the	  
West	  is	  anything	  to	  go	  by,	  capital	  is	  amenable	  to	  forming	  a	  parallel	  power	  base,	  
one	  that	  lobbies	  for	  the	  rolling	  back	  of	  the	  state’s	  regulatory	  space.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  
secure	  spatial	  freedom	  and	  internationalised	  protection	  for	  investments.	  These	  
combined	   elements	   of	   freedom	   and	   internationalisation	   form	   part	   of	   what	  
Sornarajah	   classifies	   as	   TNCs	   and	   home	   states’	   ‘free	   market	   paradigm’.140	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   preamble	   to	   the	   ICSID	   Convention	   emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   private	  
investment	   in	   international	   cooperation	   for	   economic	   development.141	  	   From	  
this	   perspective,	   China’s	   conscription	   of	   private	   ODI	   may	   prove	   her	   most	  
momentous	  turn	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  paradigm.	  	  	  
	  
BITs	  –	  A	  Pathway	  to	  Integration	  
Historical	  background	  
The	  watershed	  
By	  the	  late	  20th	  century,	  China	  appeared	  ready	  to	  actively	  participate	  in	  global	  
capital	  accumulation.142	  Yet,	  not	  so	  long	  ago,	  she	  was	  an	  active	  promoter	  of	  the	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  accessed	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  2012.	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NIEO	  movement.143	  	  It	  was	  only	  with	  Chairman	  Mao’s	  death	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
launching	   of	   open	   door	   policies	   in	   the	   late	   70s,	   that	   her	   anti-­‐systemic,	  
revolutionary	  period	  is	  said	  to	  have	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  In	  parallel,	  her	  interaction	  
with	  foreign	  investment	  underwent	  a	  metamorphosis.	  	  	  
Thus,	   in	  what	   is	  broadly	  alluded	   to	  as	   the	  pre-­‐1979	  period,144	  China	  endorsed	  
Egypt’s	   right	   to	  nationalise	   the	  Suez	  Canal,	  describing	  such	  right	  as	  both	   legal	  
and	  moral.145	  	  As	  late	  as	  April	  1974,	  at	  the	  Special	  Session	  of	  the	  UN	  Assembly,	  
Deng	   Xiaoping	   declared	   China’s	   support	   for	   developing	   countries’	   permanent	  
sovereignty	  over	  their	  natural	  resources	  and	  their	  right	  to	  control	  and	  regulate	  
all	   foreign	   investment,	   including	   the	   unconditional	   right	   to	   nationalise	   it.146	  	  
Chinese	   scholars	   endorsed	   the	   exclusion	   of	   IL	   from	   the	   CERDS.147	  	   Both	   the	  
inviolability	   of	   private	   property	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   state	   responsibility	   for	  
injury	   to	   aliens	   were	   publicly	   renounced.	   Indeed,	   as	   part	   of	   China’s	   socialist	  
transformation,	   non-­‐public	   ownership	   of	   the	   means	   of	   production	   was	   not	  
recognized	   constitutionally.	   	   The	   state’s	   right	   to	   nationalise	   foreign	   property	  
was	  declared	  an	  inherent	  attribute	  of	  sovereignty.148	  	  Between	  1949	  and	  1957,	  
foreign	   investments	   were	   nationalised	   or	   expropriated	   with	   either	   no	  
compensation,149	  or	   with	   compensation	   that	   was	   limited	   to	   a	   fixed	   rate	   of	  
interest.150	  State	  contracts	  or	  concessions	  were	   to	  be	  preserved,	  except	  where	  
they	   were	   judged	   to	   be	   the	   outcome	   of	   plunder	   under	   unequal	   treaties.	  
Surviving	  contracts	  were	  made	  subject	   to	  a	  sovereign	  right	   to	  re-­‐negotiate,	  or	  
unilaterally	   revise	   in	   response	   to	   a	   change	   in	   circumstances.151	  	   Such	   stance	  
made	   China	   integral	   to	   and,	   according	   to	   Kong	   Qingjiang,	   a	   leader	   of	   and	   a	  
spokesman	   for	   the	   concerted	   move	   by	   the	   new	   countries	   to	   bring	   about	   a	  
NIEO.152	  	  A	  novel	  IL	  was	  to	  replace	  traditional	  principles	  and	  rules	  which,	  in	  the	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words	   of	   the	   late	   Huan	   Xiang,	   senior	   diplomat	   and	   chairman	   of	   the	   Chinese	  
Society	   of	   International	   Law	   ‘	   (…)	   reflected	   the	   interest	   and	   demands	   of	   the	  
bourgeoisie,	  the	  colonialists	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  imperialists’	  and	  was	  used	  by	  
them	  ‘as	  a	  means	  to	  carry	  out	  aggression,	  oppression	  and	  exploitation	  (…)’.153	  
The	   post-­‐1979	   period	   saw	   China’s	   path	   to	   modernity	   turn	   towards	   foreign	  
investment,	  as	  part	  of	  her	  newly	  adopted	  model	  for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  national	  
wealth	  and	  power.	  Her	  first	  treaty	  was	  with	  Sweden	  in	  1982.154	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  
July	   2008,	   BITs	  were	   concluded	  with	   126	   countries,	   including	   76	   per	   cent	   of	  
European	   states,	   over	   half	   of	   African	   countries	   and	   Pacific	   states,	   such	   as	  
Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand.155	  	   In	   addition	   China	   signed	   the	   ICSID	   and	  MIGA	  
treaties	   and	   participated	   in	   the	   negotiations	   for	   a	   multilateral	   investment	  
agreement.156	  	  
The	  evolution	  of	  China’s	  BITs	  program	  
China’s	  recent	  move	  towards	  harnessing	  private	  capital	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  ODI	  
implementation	   testifies	   to	   an	   evolution	   that	   was	   not	   merely	   quantitative.	  
Indeed,	   the	   three	   decades	   since	   the	   inception	   of	   China’s	   BITs	   program	   saw	   it	  
shifting	  from	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘conservative’	  to	  a	  ‘liberal’	  paradigm,157	  to	  a	  quest	  for	  a	  
balance	  between	  the	  two.158	  	  Broadly,	  the	  post	  1979	  period	  may	  be	  sub-­‐divided	  
into	  three	  stages	  –	  China’s	  three	  BITs	  generations	  with	  a	  fourth,	  potentially	  on	  
the	   way. 159 	  Throughout,	   the	   evolution	   of	   her	   investment	   treaties	   was	  
inextricable	  from	  the	  country’s	  own	  institutional	  transformation.	  
Thus,	  in	  line	  with	  China’s	  then	  primary	  aim	  of	  becoming	  a	  FDI	  destination,	  the	  
first	   generation	   (1982-­‐1989)	   focused	   on	   treaties	   with	   capital	   exporting	  
countries.	   	   By	   1985,	   however,	   Chinese	   BITs	   became	   more	   diversified	   and,	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starting	  with	  Thailand,	   targeted	  also	  developing	  countries.	  According	   to	  Kong,	  
this	   reflected	   China’s	   intention	   for	   her	   ‘open	   door’	   policy	   to	   be	   ‘all	  
directional’.160	  	   A	   first	  Model	   BIT	  was	   introduced	   in	   1984.	   It	   was	   followed	   in	  
quick	   succession	   by	   a	   second	   Model	   BIT	   that	   was	   marked	   by	   free	   market	  
paradigm’s	   features	   such	   as	   NT	   (albeit	   one	   that	   was	   subject	   to	   local	   laws),	  
market	  value	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  compensation	  for	  expropriation	  and	  an	  umbrella	  
clause.	   Yet,	   disputes	   remained	   subject	   to	   local	   jurisdiction,	   except	   for	   the	  
amount	  of	  compensation,	  which,	  at	  the	  request	  of	  either	  party	  (i.e.	  on	  a	  case	  by	  
case	   basis)	   could	   be	   submitted	   to	   ad	   hoc	   arbitration.161	  	   These	   innovations	  
notwithstanding,	  BITs	  with	  developing	  countries	  retained	  special	  features.	  The	  
preamble,	  the	  definition	  of	  investment	  and	  the	  consultation	  process	  displayed	  a	  
general	   tone	   of	   comradely	   encouragement.	   Sovereignty	   and	   national	  
jurisdiction	  were	  emphasized.	  The	  legality	  of	  expropriation	  was	  made	  subject	  to	  
local	   jurisdiction,	   and	   flexibility	   was	   introduced	   to	   take	   account	   of	   national	  
needs.162	  For	   investments	   to	   enjoy	   protection	   under	   the	   China-­‐Sri	   Lanka	   BIT,	  
they	  need	  to	  be	  approved	  in	  writing	  and	  be	  undertaken	  upon	  such	  conditions	  as	  
each	  party	  shall	  deem	  fit.163	  	  The	  obligation	  to	  encourage	  and	  promote	  is	  limited	  
to	  investments	  that	  correspond	  to	  general	  economic	  policy.164	  	  Expropriation	  is	  
conditional	  on	  being	  authorised	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  municipal	   law.165	  	  The	  
amount	   of	   compensation	   for	   expropriation	   is	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   local	  
court	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  local	  law,	  though	  a	  dispute	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  ad	  
hoc	  arbitration	  on	  request.166	  	  There	  is	  no	  indirect	  expropriation,	  no	  NT	  and	  the	  
right	  of	  each	  party	  to	  apply	  prohibitions	  or	  restrictions	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
national	  interest	  is	  unlimited.167	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In	   line	  with	   the	   global	   explosion	   in	   the	  number	   of	  BITs	   concluded	  during	   the	  
90s,	  the	  advancement	  of	  China’s	  market	  economy	  and	  the	  country’s	  entry	  into	  
the	   WTO,	   the	   second	   generation	   (1990-­‐1997)168	  saw	   the	   number	   of	   Chinese	  
BITs	  double	   from	  24	   to	  68.169	  	  Beyond	  quantitative	  expansion,	   the	  other	  main	  
feature	   of	   this	   period	   is	   China’s	   accession	   to	   ICSID	   in	   February	   1993.	  
Ratification	  was	  made	  subject	  to	  a	  reservation	  that	  limited	  ICSID	  jurisdiction	  to	  
the	  determination	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  for	  expropriation	  -­‐	  a	  possible	  
explanation	  for	  the	  paucity	  to	  date	  of	  claims	  involving	  China.170	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  
meant	   that	   from	   now	   on,	   her	   BITs	   practice	   could	   include	   an	   unconditional	  
reference	   to	   ICSID.	   This	   evolution	   notwithstanding,	  many	   BITs	   of	   this	   period	  
continued	  to	   follow	  the	   first	  generation	  template	  by	  omitting	  any	  reference	  to	  
the	   Centre’s	   jurisdiction.171	  	   Probably	   the	   first	   BIT	   to	   include	   an	   unrestricted	  
reference	   to	   ICSID	   was	   with	   Lithuania.172	  	   This	   may	   reflect	   the	   diversity	   in	  
treaties	   concluded	   with	   developing	   and	   transition	   countries,	   so	   as	   to	   take	  
account	  of	  the	  divergence	  in	  their	  developmental	  concerns.173	  	  Some	  replicated	  
China’s	  BITs	  with	  developed	  countries	  modelled	  on	  European	  practice.	  Others,	  
however,	   followed	   the	   Asian-­‐African	   Legal	   Consultative	   Committee	   (AALCC)	  
proposed	  Model	  BIT.	  It	  allowed	  for	  greater	  host	  state’s	  control,	  along	  the	  lines	  
envisioned	  by	  the	  UN	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Transnational	  Corporations.174	  
The	   third	   generation	   of	   Chinese	   BITs	   (1998	   onwards)	   saw	   a	   big	   leap	   in	   the	  
direction	  of	  Western	  practice.	  Here,	  the	  word	  ‘Western’	  is	  used	  (rather	  than	  the	  
term	   ‘international’	   or	   ‘general’	   often	   found	   in	   the	   literature)	   to	   allude	   to	   the	  
pluralism	   of	   economic	   IL.	   As	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   economic	   IL	   is	   a	   variegated	  
product	  of	  interaction	  between	  multiple	  sites	  of	  governance.	  The	  non-­‐Western,	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  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  35;	  but	  see	  Cai	  Congyan,	  ibid	  (n	  34)	  459	  which	  places	  the	  
second	  generation	  of	  Chinese	  BITs	  in	  the	  years	  1998-­‐2005.	  	  
169	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  31-­‐32.	  
170	  Guang	  Hong,	  ‘Scope	  of	  Arbitration	  in	  Chinese	  BITs:	  Policies	  &	  Implications’	  
(2009)(unpublished)	  6	  <http://works.bepress.com/guang_hong/1/>	  accessed	  12	  Aug	  2012.	  
171	  ibid	  39.	  
172	  ‘Agreement	  Between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Lithuania	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  
People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  Concerning	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  
Investment	  1993’	  art	  8	  (2)	  b)	  
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_lithuania.pdf>	  accessed	  22	  July	  2012.	  	  
173	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ibid	  (n	  54)	  113.	  
174	  Daniel	  Aguirre,	  The	  Human	  Right	  to	  Development	  in	  a	  Globalized	  World	  (Ashgate	  Publishing	  
1988)	  161;	  ibid.	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developing	  block	  of	  sites	  has	  in	  the	  meantime	  disintegrated	  to	  become,	  at	  least	  
for	  now,	  somewhat	  mute.	  	  Nevertheless,	  much	  as	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  in	  the	  
world-­‐system	   may	   have	   muffled	   the	   voice	   of	   less	   strategic	   actors,	   their	  
contribution	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  global	  legal	  pluralism	  should	  not	  be	  discounted	  
altogether.	   	   The	   PSNR	   and	   the	   CERDS	   resolutions	   continue	   to	   constitute	   a	  
source	  of	  principles	  of	  investment	  IL175	  and	  the	  Calvo	  doctrine	  is	  experiencing	  a	  
revival.176	  	   In	  relation	  to	  China,	   the	  eleven	  BITs	  she	  renegotiated	  in	  the	  2,000s	  
remain	   confined	   to	   European	   countries.177	  	   Thus,	   putting	   aside	   for	   now	   the	  
multiplying	   effect	   of	   the	  MFN	   standard	   of	   treatment	   conjured	   up	   by	  Western	  
BITs	  practice,	  the	  special	  features	  of	  some	  of	  her	  BITs	  with	  developing	  countries	  
remain	  standing.	  	  
Observed	   from	   this	   perspective	   of	   a	   contest	   between	   divergent	   sites,	   China’s	  
recent	  departure	   from	  past	   practices	   indicates	   a	   trajectory	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  
that	   section	   of	   the	   global	   community	   that	   produced	   the	   currently	   dominant	  
BITs	   practice,	   and	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   which	   this	   practice	   operates.	   The	  
proposition	   that	   such	   shift	  may	  be	  normative	   rather	   than	  purely	  pragmatic	   is	  
underscored	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  by	  the	  time	  China’s	  Model	  BIT	  was	  revised	  for	  the	  
third	   time	   and	   substantially	   liberalised,	   the	   country	   was	   enjoying	  
unprecedented	   levels	   of	   FDI.178	  	   If	   BITs	   are	   indeed	   no	   more	   than	   a	   practical	  
device	   for	   attracting	   FDI,	   she	   had	   no	   need	   to	   liberalise.	   It	   is	   possible	   other	  
factors	  were	  at	  work	   -­‐	   the	   surge	   in	  China’s	  own	  ODI,	   the	   consolidation	  of	  her	  
market	  economy,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  interstate	  
competition	  for	  FDI.179	  	  Be	  it	  as	  it	  may,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  her	  third	  generation	  BITs	  
China	   appeared	   ready,	   at	   least	   prima	   facie,	   to	   signal	   her	   willingness	   to	   be	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  See	  for	  example	  M.	  Sornarajah,	  The	  International	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  (3rd	  edn,	  CUP	  
2010)	  84;	  Iain	  Brownlie,	  Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  (7th	  edn,	  OUP	  2008)	  15.	  
176	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  ‘Calvo	  Doctrine,	  State	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Changing	  Landscape	  of	  
International	  Investment	  Law’	  in	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  Penelope	  Simons	  and	  Dalvinder	  Singh	  (eds),	  
Redefining	  Sovereignty	  in	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (Studies	  in	  International	  Trade	  Law,	  Hart	  
Publishing	  2008)	  248.	  
177	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  32.	  
178	  ibid	  40.	  
179	  ibid	  41.	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incorporated	   into	   the	   prevailing	   order	   and	   accept	   ‘a	   particularly	   American	  
conception	  of	  investment	  rights’.180	  	  
Notable	   in	   this	   signal	   is	   the	   wider	   access	   granted	   to	   international,	   including	  
ICSID	   arbitration,	   for	   all	   investor-­‐state	   disputes.	   The	   Third	   Model	   BIT	   does,	  
however,	   retain	   some	   specific	   Chinese	   characteristics.	   To	   be	   covered	  
investment	  has	  to	  be	  legally	  and	  regulatory	  compliant,	  the	  standards	  of	  national	  
and	   non-­‐discriminatory	   treatments	   and	   monetary	   transfers	   are	   similarly	  
subject	  to	  lawfulness,	  the	  measure	  of	  compensation	  for	  expropriation	  makes	  no	  
direct	   reference	   to	   the	   ‘Hull	   formula’	   of	   ‘adequate,	   prompt,	   and	   effective’	  
recompense,	   and	   the	   dispute	   resolution	   clause	   contains	   a	   ‘fork	   in	   the	   road’	  
provision.181	  	  Taken	  together,	  the	  repeated	  allusions	  to	  domestic	  law	  indicate	  an	  
enduring	  attachment	  to	  sovereignty,	  albeit	  one	  that	  is	  now	  curtailed.	  	  According	  
to	   Gallagher	   and	   Shan,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   first	   treaty	   to	   be	   based	   on	   the	   third	  
Model	   BIT	   prototype	   was	   with	   Barbados	   -­‐	   a	   developing	   country	   -­‐	   may	   have	  
been	  ‘pure	  coincidence’.182	  	  Forty-­‐four	  new	  and	  re-­‐negotiated	  treaties	  followed.	  	  
Most,	   but	   not	   all	   allow	   for	   ICSID	   jurisdiction.183	  	   In	   particular,	   the	   revised	  
treaties	   with	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Germany	   shed	   off	   some	   the	   Model	   BIT’s	  
Chinese	   characteristics.	   It	   is	   of	   little	   surprise	   that	   they	   were	   heralded	   as	   a	  
‘breakthrough’	   in	   China’s	   BITs	   practice184	  and	   ‘a	   fundamental	   change	   in	   the	  
country’s	   foreign	   economic	   policy’.185	  	   For	   the	   practitioner	   Aaron	   Chandler,	  
innovations	   such	   as	   a	  NT	   that	   is	   not	   qualified	   by	   a	   requirement	   to	   adhere	   to	  
local	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  and	  an	  ICSID	  arbitration	  provision	  that	  is	  stripped	  of	  
its	   ‘fork	   in	   the	   road’	   constituent	   evidence	   ‘a	   huge	   step	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	  
economic	  system	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   international	   investment	   law:	  capitalism	  (…)’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  James	  Petras	  and	  Henry	  Veltmeyer,	  Multinationals	  on	  Trial:	  Foreign	  Investment	  Matters	  
(Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd	  2007)	  111.	  
181	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  43-­‐46,	  439-­‐51;	  a	  fork	  in	  the	  road	  provision	  operates	  to	  
preclude	  an	  investor	  who	  has	  elected	  one	  of	  the	  prescribed	  dispute	  resolution	  options	  from	  
exercising	  the	  other	  option.	  	  
182	  ibid	  40.	  
183	  ibid	  41;	  one	  exception	  is	  the	  Qatar	  BIT	  that	  contains	  a	  first	  generation	  type	  dispute	  
resolution	  provision	  and	  makes	  no	  reference	  to	  ICSID.	  ‘Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  
the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Qatar	  Concerning	  the	  
Encouragement	  and	  Protection	  of	  Investments’	  (04/99)	  art	  9	  
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_qatar.pdf>	  accessed	  22	  July	  2012.	  	  
184	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  67)	  217.	  
185	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  76.	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China,	  he	  elaborates,	  ‘knows	  the	  MFN	  clauses	  function	  like	  a	  “one-­‐way	  ratchet”	  
(…)’.186	  	   Once	   one	   treaty	   has	   been	   liberalised	   all	   other	   follow	   suit	   at	   least	  
substantively.	  	  
‘In	  between’	  BITs	  –	  an	  overview	  
The	  measured	  pace	  of	  China’s	  internal	  and	  external	  transmutations	  meant	  that	  
the	  progression	   of	   her	  BITs	  program	  was	   equally	   gradual.	   	   Consequently,	   her	  
network	   of	   investment	   treaties	   may	   be	   said	   to	   reflect	   a	   shifting	   spectrum	   of	  
policy	   and	   practice.	   The	   possibility	   that	   policy	   guides	   implementation	   is	  
underscored	  by	   fact	   that	  at,	   least	   to	  date,	   revisions	   focus	  on	  BITs	  with	  capital	  
exporting	   countries,	  whereas	  many	   of	   the	   country’s	   South-­‐South	  BITs	   remain	  
‘conservatively’	   fashioned.	   	   This	   is	   notwithstanding	   the	   greater	   bargaining	  
power	   attributed	   to	   the	   country.	   In	   other	  words,	   China’s	   BITs	   program	   casts	  
doubt	   over	   Schill’s	   proposition	   that	  with	   strength	   came	   compliance,	   and	   that	  
such	   compliance	   vindicates	   his	   assertion	   of	   BITs’	   non-­‐hegemonic	  
multilateralism.	   In	   reality,	   China	   did	   not	   use	   her	   position	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	  
developmentalism	  to	  extract	  greater	  concessions.	  Indeed,	  writing	  in	  1998,	  Kong	  
Qingjiang	   points	   to	   guiding	   principles	   in	   the	   management	   of	   the	   country’s	  
economic	   co-­‐operation.	   These	   in	   essence	   replicate	   the	   ‘Five	   Principles	   of	  
Peaceful	   Co-­‐existence’,	   first	   formulated	   in	   the	   50s:	   sovereignty,	   equality	   and	  
mutual	  benefit.187	  Since	  then,	  a	  general	  trajectory	  towards	  greater	  liberalisation	  
along	  Western	  lines	  may	  be	  observed.	  However,	  a	  more	  careful	  analysis	  reveals	  
a	   residue	   of	   specific	   features.	   Adopting	   Sornarajah’s	   classification	   of	   two	  
conflicting	   paradigms,	   she	   seems	   to	   be	   walking	   a	   winding	   path	   that	   brings	  
together	  elements	  of	  both.	  	  In	  some	  treaties	  she	  adopts	  constituents	  of	  the	  ‘free	  
market	  paradigm’	  with	  its	  contractual	  sanctity,	  compensation	  for	  the	  taking	  of	  
foreign	   property	   and	   international	   arbitration.	   In	   others,	   she	   espouses	   the	  
opposing	  developing	  countries	  paradigm,	  e.g.	  localisation	  of	  foreign	  investment	  
contract.	   In	   all	   of	   her	   treaties	   she	   restricts	   the	   entry	   of	   foreign	   investment,	  
thereby	  rejecting	  the	  principle	  of	  capital	  movement	  that	  is	  entirely	  liberated.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  Aaron	  M.	  Chandler,	  ‘BITs,	  MFN	  Treatment	  and	  the	  PRC:	  The	  Impact	  of	  China’s	  Ever-­‐Evolving	  
Bilateral	  Investment	  Practice’	  (2009)	  43	  no	  3	  The	  International	  Lawyer	  1301.	  
187	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ibid	  (n	  54)	  110.	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most,	   she	   shies	   away	   from	   the	   IMS,	   also	   a	   constituent	   of	   the	   free	   market	  
prototype.188	  
Still,	  the	  pluralism	  identified	  in	  China’s	  BITs	  program	  may	  be	  overridden	  by	  the	  
operation	  of	   the	  MFN	  clause,	   as	  well	   as	   arbitral	  practice.189	  	   In	   relation	   to	   the	  
latter,	  the	  expansive	  interpretation	  applied	  by	  the	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  tribunal	  to	  the	  
scope	   of	   consent	   and	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘indirect	   investment’,	   the	   arbitrators’	  
repeated	   emphasis	   on	   the	   overriding	   purpose	   of	   the	   BIT	   to	   promote	  
investment190	  and	   their	   refusal	   to	   draw	   inferences	   from	   provisions	   in	   other	  
treaties,191	  all	  point	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  interactions	  with	  a	  transnational	  site	  
of	  governance	  might	  cloak	  her	  BITs	  with	  a	  veil	  of	  uniformity.192	  	  This	  point	  will	  
be	  returned	  to	  later.	  For	  now,	  let	  us	  say	  that	  in	  light	  of	  imposed	  uniformity,	  Cai	  
may	  be	  unduly	  concerned	  about	  ineffective	  protection	  for	  China’s	  ODI	  by	  reason	  
of	   a	   mismatch	   between	   her	   treaties	   and	   the	   patterns	   of	   her	   overseas	  
investment.193	  	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  this	  section	  will	  now	  proceed	  to	  summarise	  some	  of	  the	  main	  
BITs	  provisions	  as	  they	  appear	  in	  Chinese	  treaties.	  The	  subject	  is	  wide,	  making	  
a	  comprehensive	  review	  impossible.	  The	  focus	  is	  therefore	  on	  those	  provisions	  
that	  most	   illustrate	   the	   plurality	   of	   China’s	   BITs	   policy	   and	   practice,	   and	   the	  
interplay	  between	  her	  interior	  and	  the	  exterior.	  
Preamble	  	  
Chinese	  preambles	  generally	  follow	  a	  pattern	  comprising	  three	  main	  principles:	  
(i)	  facilitation	  and	  attraction	  of	  investment;	  (ii)	  contribution	  to	  the	  prosperity	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  two	  paradigms	  see	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  77-­‐83.	  
189	  For	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  MFN	  should	  be	  extended	  also	  to	  procedural	  rights	  in	  Chinese	  BITs	  
see,	  for	  example,	  Chandler,	  ibid	  (n	  186)	  1304-­‐09.	  
190	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/07/6	  (19	  June	  2009)	  Decision	  on	  
Jurisdiction	  and	  Competence	  paras	  103,	  108.	  
191	  ibid	  paras	  109-­‐1110.	  
192	  There	  is	  no	  principle	  of	  precedents,	  but	  several	  tribunals	  have	  acknowledged	  relying	  on	  
earlier	  awards.	  
193	  Cai	  Congyan,	  ibid	  (n	  33)	  generally.	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both	  contracting	  parties;	  and	  (iii)	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit.194	  	  The	  last	  two	  
reflect	   the	   three	  policy	   principles	   identified	   by	  Kong.	   Their	   effect	   is	   to	   curtail	  
pro-­‐investment	  interpretive	  presumptions.	  Some	  preambles	  veer	  on	  the	  side	  of	  
the	   host	   state	   by	   expressly	   recognizing	   that	   investments	   should	   be	   made	   in	  
accordance	  with	  domestic	   laws	  and	  regulations.	  The	  preamble	   in	  the	  Trinidad	  
and	  Tobago	  and	  Guyana	  BITs	  (2002	  and	  2003	  respectively)	  contain	  ‘exception	  
clause’	  relating	  to	  health,	  safety	  and	  environmental	  measures.195	  Another	  China	  
specific	   feature	   is	   that,	   to	   date,	   the	   preamble	   avoids	   any	   reference	   to	   private	  
investment.	   This	   reflects	   the	   dominance	   of	   public	   ownership	   in	   her	   domestic	  
arena.196	  It	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   observe	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   country’s	   recent	  
policy	   of	   encouragement	   of	   private	   capital	   ODI	   on	   this	   feature.	   Notably,	   the	  
trilateral	   investment	   treaty	   with	   Japan	   and	   Korea	   2012	   already	   refers	   to	  
liberalisation	  of	   investment	  as	  conductive	   to	   ‘stimulating	  business	   initiative	  of	  
the	  investors	  and	  increase	  prosperity	  (…)’.197	  
Investment	  	  
Most	  Chinese	  BITs	  adopt	  a	  broad	  assets-­‐based	  definition	  of	  ‘investment’	  that	  is	  
followed	  by	  an	  illustrative	  list	  of	  such	  assets.	  	  The	  definition	  is	  qualified	  only	  by	  
a	  requirement	   for	  the	   investment	  to	  be	   lawful	  and	  regulatory	  compliant.	   	  This	  
qualification	  was	  removed,	  however,	  from	  some	  recent	  BITs,	  notably	  the	  2003	  
Germany	   and	   2004	   Uganda	   BITs.	   Another	   innovation,	   first	   introduced	   in	   the	  
Gabon	  BIT	  1997,	   concerns	   the	   introduction	  of	   ‘indirect	   investment’.	  The	  2003	  
Germany	  BIT	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  ‘invested	  indirectly’	  as	  investment	  made	  by	  an	  
investor	  in	  the	  home	  country,	  but	  operated	  via	  a	  subsidiary	  in	  the	  host	  state.	  198	  
In	  Tza	  Yap	  Shun	   the	  Tribunal	   considered	  whether	   the	  Peru	  BIT	   that	   does	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  But	  the	  third	  principle	  has	  been	  omitted,	  for	  example,	  from	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  2003	  
Germany	  BIT	  and	  the	  2012	  trilateral	  investment	  treaty	  with	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  ‘Agreement	  
between	  the	  People’s	  republic	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  on	  the	  
Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investment	  2003’	  
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_germany.pdf>	  accessed	  2	  Aug	  2012;	  
treaty	  with	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  ibid	  (n	  133).	  
195	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  49-­‐51.	  
196	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ibid	  (n	  54)	  116.	  
197	  Treaty	  with	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  ibid	  (n	  133).	  
198	  ibid	  54-­‐69;	  see	  also	  Wei	  Shen,	  ‘The	  Good,	  The	  Bad	  or	  the	  Ugly?	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Decision	  on	  
Jurisdiction	  and	  Competence	  in	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v	  The	  Republic	  of	  Peru’	  (2011)	  10	  1	  Chinese	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  55	  at	  70-­‐71.	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expressly	  protect	   indirect	   investments	  covered	  Mr	  Tza’s	   indirect	  ownership	  of	  
the	  Peruvian	  company	  through	  an	  offshore,	  non-­‐Chinese	  entity.	  The	  arbitrators	  
exercised	   the	   wide	   discretion	   available	   to	   them	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   absence	   of	  
definition	  of	  investment	  in	  Article	  25(1)	  of	  the	  ICSID	  Convention	  to	  rule	  that	  it	  
did.199	  	   It	   refused	   to	  draw	  a	   contrary	   inference	   from	   the	  explicit	  protection	  of	  
indirect	  investments	  in	  other	  treaties.200	  
Fair	  and	  equitable	  treatment	  	  
In	   line	  with	   general	   practice,	   FET	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   substantive	   provisions	   in	  
most	  Chinese	  treaties.201	  Yet,	  given	  FET’s	  potential	  intrusion	  into	  domestic	  rules	  
making	   and	   proceedings,	   it	   remains	   controversial	   among	   Chinese	  
commentators. 202 	  Yu	   Jingsong	   and	   Liang	   Danni,	   for	   example,	   call	   for	   the	  
exclusion	   of	   FET-­‐based	   claims.203	  	   Chen	   Huiping	   and	   Huang	   Yumei	   want	   the	  
standard	   removed	   altogether	   from	   new	   BITs.204 	  	   Han	   Xiuli	   alerts	   Chinese	  
scholars	   and	   authorities	   to	   the	   inclusion	   in	   FET	   of	   an	   expansive	   principle	   of	  
proportionality	  the	  impact	  of	  which,	  he	  argues,	  is	  to	  afford	  excessive	  protection	  
to	  private	  property	  and	  infringe	  the	  state’s	  regulatory	  discretion.205	  
This	  sense	  of	  wariness	  towards	  FET	  permeates	  China’s	  BITs	  program.	  Whether	  
or	  not	  the	  treatment	  extends	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  admission	  is	  not	  made	  clear	  in	  her	  
third	  Model	  BIT.206	  Further,	  most	  Chinese	  FET	  clauses	  do	  not	  contain	  an	  express	  
interpretive	   criterion.	   Where	   they	   do,	   criteria	   are	   diverse.	   Some	   allude	   to	  
domestic	   law,	   others	   refer	   to	   the	   treaty	   or	   treaties	   concluded	   by	   the	   parties,	  
generally	   recognised	   principles	   of	   IL	   accepted	   by	   both	   parties	   and,	   more	  
recently,	  universally/commonly	  recognised	  principles	  of	   IL.207	  	  Up	   to	  now,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  ibid	  (n	  190)	  para	  107;	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  see	  Wei	  Shen,	  ibid	  63-­‐71.	  
200	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  ibid	  paras	  109-­‐1110.	  
201	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  126.	  
202	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  105-­‐06.	  
203	  Yu	  Jingsong	  and	  Liang	  Danni,	  ‘Latest	  Trends	  of	  F&E	  Treatment	  and	  Countermeasures	  of	  
Chinese	  Government’	  (2007)	  6	  Jurists	  Review	  151.	  
204	  Chen	  Huiping	  and	  Huang	  Yumei,	  ‘New	  Developments	  of	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Treatment	  
Standard	  in	  international	  Investment	  Treaties’	  (2006)	  13	  3	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Economic	  Law	  1.	  
205	  Xiuli	  Han,	  ibid	  (n	  80)	  635.	  	  
206	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  126.	  
207	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  127,	  128.	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application	  of	   the	   IL	  criterion	   to	  FET	  was	  exceptional.	   In	   those	   treaties	  where	  
this	  test	  was	  adopted,	  it	  was	  qualified	  by	  a	  requirement	  that	  its	  principles	  had	  
to	  be	  accepted	  by	  both	  parties.	  In	  particular,	  the	  IMS	  was	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  in	  
the	  BITs	  negotiations	  with	  the	  US.208	  	  It	  is	  altogether	  absent	  from	  China’s	  Third	  
Generation	   treaties,	   including	   the	   Germany	   BIT	   2003.209	  	   This	   testifies	   to	   an	  
enduring	   wariness	   of	   customary	   IL	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   which	   China	   did	   not	  
participate.210	  	   However,	   even	   here,	   reforms	   produced	   diversity.	   	   Most	   novel	  
until	   recently	   was	   the	   Mexico	   BIT	   2008	   in	   which,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   China	  
accepted	  the	  IMS:	  clause	  5	  of	  this	  treaty	  appears	  to	  follow	  the	  FET	  clause	  in	  the	  
US	   Model	   BIT.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   avoids	   using	   the	   term	   ‘customary	   IL’.211	  	   The	  
Canada	   BIT	   overtook	   such	   novelty	   in	   September	   2012.	   	   By	   its	   Article	   4	   it	  
establishes	   IL	   as	   the	   criterion	   for	   determining	   FET	   and,	   in	   addition,	   specifies	  
that	   a	   breach	   does	   not	   require	   treatment	   beyond	   the	   IMS.	   	   The	   IMS	   is	   then	  
defined	   as	   ‘state	   practice	   accepted	   as	   law’.212	  	   Similarly,	   the	   requirement	   of	  
‘acceptance’	   has	   been	   removed	   from	   some	   recent	   treaties,	   such	   as	   the	  
Seychelles	   BIT	   2007.	   	   At	   least	   for	   now,	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   BITs	  
network	   itself	   amounts	   to	   customary	   IL	   remains	   debatable.213	  	   Most	   Chinese	  
commentators	   reject	   this	   proposition	   alluding,	   inter	   alia,	   to	   the	   operation	   of	  
power	  and	  compulsion	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  many	  treaties.214	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  (2008)	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  no	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  of	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  Financial	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  (2009)	  1	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  <www.transnational-­‐dispute-­‐
management.com/article.asp?key=1417>	  accessed	  2	  Aug	  2012.	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  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments	  (2012)’	  art	  4	  1.	  2	  
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-­‐agreements-­‐accords-­‐commerciaux/agr-­‐acc/fipa-­‐
apie/china-­‐text-­‐chine.aspx>	  accessed	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  2013.	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  Dumberry,	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International	  Law	  in	  International	  Investment	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  (2010)	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  4	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Review	  675.	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FET	  is	  an	  absolute	  standard	  of	  treatment.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  not	  contingent	  on	  
the	  treatment	  granted	  to	  other	  investors.	  Its	  normative	  content	  is	  vague	  and	  its	  
parameters	  fluid,	  with	  different	   interpretive	  approaches	  running	  through	  BITs	  
practice.	   	   The	   standard	   is	   often	   linked	   to	   notions	   of	   rule	   of	   law,	   legality,	   due	  
process,	   denial	   of	   justice	   and,	   at	   the	   level	   of	   IL,	   to	   the	   IMS.215	  	   	   The	   effect	   of	  
coupling	   a	   FET	   clause	   with	   IL	   is	   to	   subject	   national	   legal	   institutions	   to	  
examination	  by	  reference	  to	  external	  rules.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  normative	  and	  
procedural	  content	  of	   legislation	   in	  national	  sites	  of	  governance	  are	  appraised	  
by	  reference	  to	  their	  compliance	  with	  a	  notion	  of	  justice	  that	  is	  said	  to	  reside	  in	  
the	  global	  arena.	  	  	  
The	   notion	   that	   sites	   of	   governance	   are	   accountable	   to	   an	   international	  
repertoire	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Global	  Judicial	  Integrity	  Principles	  (JIP).	  The	  
JIP	  was	  compiled	   from	  a	  research	  of	  an	  array	  of	  national	   ‘best	  practices’.216	  	   It	  
reflects	   a	   counter	  pluralistic	   approach	   that	   assumes	   a	   global	   consensus	   about	  
what	   amounts	   to	   best	   practice.217	  	   	   In	   Henderson’s	   view,	   countries	   should	  
‘embrace,	  adapt,	  prioritize,	  and	  implement’	  such	  consensus	  ‘in	  a	  holistic	  manner	  
(…)’.218	  In	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  another	  demonstration	  of	  China’s	  willingness	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  global	  juridical	  discourse,	  she	  took	  part	  in	  the	  JIP	  research.219	  	  
This	  involvement	  points	  to	  the	  inculcation	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  abstraction	  into	  her	  
internal	  discourse.	  Given	  the	  relevance	  of	  such	  inculcation	  to	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  FET	  standard,	  this	  statement	  merits	  expansion.	  
It	  is	  said	  that	  China’s	  internalisation	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  came	  about	  in	  response	  to	  
the	  violent	  upheaval	  of	   the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  Routinely	  enforced	   lawfulness	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  (2006)	  Institute	  for	  International	  Law	  and	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Working	  Paper	  2006/6	  (Global	  Administrative	  Law	  Series)	  
<http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-­‐6-­‐GAL-­‐Schill-­‐web.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  Aug	  
2012.	  
216	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  critique	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  does	  not	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  of	  local	  cultural	  
and	  political	  context	  see	  Antoine	  Garapon,	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  New	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  for	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  Judicial	  
Independence’	  in	  Randall	  Peerenboom	  (ed),	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  China:	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  for	  Global	  
Rule	  of	  Law	  Promotion	  (CUB	  2010)	  37-­‐51.	  
217	  Keith	  E.	  Henderson,	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  China’s	  Rule	  of	  Law	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  the	  Global	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  Independence,	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  Judicial	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  in	  ibid	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was	   to	   replace	   political	   campaigns	   as	   agent	   of	   societal	   progress.220	  	   This	   not	  
uncommon	   narrative	   appears	   to	   posit	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   rule	   of	   law	   as	   a	  
product	   of	   popular	   demand	   for	   the	   stability	   that	   comes	  with	   rules	  making.	   It	  
also	  seems	  to	  infer	  that	  China’s	  previous,	  anti-­‐systemic	  stage	  was	  either	  devoid	  
of	   juridical	   structures	  or	   that	   such	   structures	   -­‐	  being	  brokers	  of	   that	  which	   is	  
predictable	   and	   stable	   -­‐	   were	   incompatible	  with	   policies	   that	   sought	   to	   raise	  
political	   consciousness	   through	   mass	   participation.221	  	   A	   full	   analysis	   of	   this	  
discourse	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   work.	   Two	   points,	   however,	   may	   be	  
observed:	  first,	  it	  is	  anchored	  in	  the	  liberal	  paradigm,	  whereby	  law	  is	  accorded	  
centrality	  of	  universal	  dimensions.	  Implied	  in	  it	  is	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  sole	  
commendable	   form	   of	   societal	   organisation	   is	   juridical.	   Second,	   the	   discourse	  
skims	   over	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   encounter	   between	   Chinese	   traditional	  
concepts	  of	  societal	  interactions	  and	  Romano-­‐Germanic	  conventions.	  Central	  to	  
the	  former	  was	  harmony	  that	  was	  founded	  on	  communality	  and	  reconciliation.	  
Law	   occupied	   only	   a	   residual,	   last	   resort	   space.222	  	   In	   the	   latter,	   by	   contrast,	  
private	   relationships	   are	   primarily	   regulated	   by	   juridical	   rules. 223 	  	   The	  
iconoclasm	   that	   emerged	   out	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   semi-­‐colonialisation	   and	  
China’s	   concomitant	   courting	   of	   modernity,	   saw	   the	   country	   turn	   to	   the	  
Romano-­‐Germanic	  juridical	  family	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1911	  nationalist	  revolution.224	  	  
The	  Civil	  Code	  1929-­‐1931,	  the	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  1932	  and	  the	  Land	  Code	  
1930	   all	   testified	   to,	   at	   least,	   surface	   Europeanisation	   of	   Chinese	   relationship	  
with	   law. 225 	  	   Contrary	   to	   the	   discourse	   referred	   to	   above,	   this	   juridical	  
importation	   persisted	   in	   the	   post-­‐1949	   revolutionary	   period.	   Thus,	   ‘Socialist	  
legality’	   found	  expression	  in	  a	  constitution	  and	  an	  institutional	  structure.226	  	   It	  
was	  only	  when,	  independently	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Model,	  China	  embarked	  on	  a	  search	  
for	  her	  own	  socialist	  path,	  that	  one	  discerns	  a	  return	  to	  ancient	  norms.	  	  Rather	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  however	  thin	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  ibid	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Republic	  of	  China	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  Free	  Press	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  ibid	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than	   law,	   education	   and	   persuasion	   (including	   through	   mass	   movements)	  
became	   the	   primary	   framework	   for	   resolving	   societal	   contradictions.	   Law,	  
declared	  Mao	  in	  1957,	  amounted	  to	  dictatorship	   formerly	  thought	  suitable	   for	  
barbarians	   only. 227 	  	   Thus,	   paradoxically,	   it	   was	   at	   the	   height	   of	   China’s	  
revolutionary	  period	  that	  past	  traditions	  made	  their	  way	  back	  into	  the	  country’s	  
version	  of	  Westernised	  modernity.	  
Yet,	  once	  China	  embarked	  on	  a	  development	  model	   that	  had	  foreign	  capital	  at	  
its	   core,	   for	   it	   to	   work,	   she	   was	   compelled	   to	   implement	   that	   which	   foreign	  
capital	   requires	   –	   strong	   state	   institutions	   capable	   of	   enforcing	   property	  
rights.228	  	   Ironically,	  much	   like	   the	   proposition	   that	   BITs	   bring	   foreign	   capital	  
and	   through	   it	   development,	   empirical	   and	   analytical	   study	   indicate	   that	   the	  
propagated	   linkage	   between	   economic	   growth	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   more	  
dogma	   than	   fact.229	  	   From	   this	   perspective,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   BITs,	   China’s	  
adoption	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  may	  have	  less	  to	  do	  with	  progress,	  and	  more	  with	  a	  
perceived	  need	  to	  signal	  incorporation	  and	  secure	  acceptance.	  	  
Implicit	   in	   the	   proposition	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   operates	   essentially	   as	   an	  
imported	  signalling	  mechanism	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  variegated	  implementation.	  
For	  absent	  a	  true	  process	  of	  identification,	  the	  likelihood	  is	  that	  cultural	  beliefs	  
will	  persist	   in	  seeping	  through.	   	  The	  Chinese	  construct	  may	  well	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  
Janus	   like	   twin-­‐faced	   creation,	   with	   one	   face	   looking	   to	   the	   internal	   and	   the	  
other	  observing	  the	  external.	  For	  the	  country’s	  internal	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  
rule	   of	   law	   remains	   disparate.	   One	   may	   point,	   for	   example,	   to	   a	   distinction	  
between	   this	   concept	   and	   that	   of	   legality.230	  	   The	   two	   are	   identical	   when	  
transcribed	  into	  pinyin	  (fa	  zhi),	  but	  the	  characters	  for	  zhi	  are	  different.	  	  Legality	  
operated	  throughout	  revolutionary	  times.	   It	  denotes	   law	  that	   is	  an	   instrument	  
in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  By	  contrast,	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  the	  law	  itself	  is	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  Suisheng	  Zhao,	  ‘The	  China	  
Model:	  Can	  It	  Replace	  the	  Western	  Model’	  (2010)	  19	  65	  Asian	  Pacific	  Business	  Journal	  419;	  see	  
also	  Jacques,	  ibid	  (n	  64)	  221	  who	  defines	  ‘rule	  by	  law’	  as	  a	  process	  of	  determining	  issues	  in	  
accordance	  with	  a	  legal	  code	  while	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  applies	  irrespective	  of	  the	  view	  of	  the	  
government	  and	  is	  to	  be	  found	  only	  in	  10-­‐20%	  of	  cases.	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the	  sovereign.231	  	  In	  China,	  rule	  of	  law	  as	  a	  concept	  first	  emerged	  formally	  in	  the	  
90s.	   	  Yet,	  even	   then,	   the	  phrase	  coined	  –	  state	  by	  means	  of	   law	  (yi	  fa	  zhi	  guo)	  
points	   to	   a	   strong	   element	   of	   legality.	   Unlike	   in	   the	   liberal	   paradigm	   where	  
juridical	  structures	  are	  constructed	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  limiting	  governmentality,	  in	  
China	  they	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  state	  power	  is	  exercised.232	  Thus,	  at	  least	  for	  
now,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  models	  of	  Western	  liberalism	  where	  norms	  of	  individual	  
liberty	   and	   economic	   efficiency	   impose	   limits	   on	   the	   state,	   the	   Chinese	   state	  
remains	   central	   to	   the	   mediation	   of	   private	   relationships.233	  Zhu	   Xiuli,	   at	   the	  
time	  of	  writing	  dean	  of	  the	  Peking	  University	  School	  of	  Law,	  acknowledges	  the	  
far-­‐reaching	   influence	   –	   albeit	   one	   that	   is	   more	   complex	   and	   limited	   than	  
generally	   perceived	   -­‐	   exercised	   by	   the	   CCP	   on	   the	   country’s	   juridical	  
institutions.	   Such	   control,	   he	   argues	   is	   essentially	   positive	   and	   necessary.234	  
Peerenboom	  concurs.	  For	  him,	  the	  success	  of	  Chinese	  reforms	  owes	  much	  to	  the	  
selective	   adoption	   and	   adaptation	   of	   ‘the	   ideologically	   driven	   prescriptions	  
offered	  by	  Western	  states	  and	  international	  donor	  agencies’.235	  	   It	  may	  be	  said	  
that	   such	   variegated	   implementation	   encapsulates	   the	   essence	   of	   true	  
universalism	  as	  understood	  by	  Kleinfeld	  and	  Nicolaidis.	  That	  is,	  a	  dynamic	  that	  
is	   predicated	   on	   reciprocal	   influences. 236 	  	   Further,	   and	   paradoxically,	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  juridical	  structure	  aimed	  specifically	  at	  foreign	  investors	  may	  
act	  as	  a	  buffer	  zone	  that	  separates	  and	  to	  an	  extent	  shields	  local	  norms	  from	  the	  
effects	  of	  integration.	  	  
National	  treatment	  	  
NT	  is	  a	  relative,	  anti-­‐discriminatory	  standard	  of	  treatment	  that	  is	  contingent	  on	  
the	   treatment	   granted	   to	   domestic	   investors.	   It	   is	   aimed	   at	   securing	   a	   ‘level	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  Moody,	  ibid	  (220)	  2.	  
232	  Pittman	  B.	  Potter,	  ibid	  (n	  13)	  63;	  on	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  liberal	  governability	  see	  also	  Michel	  
Senellart,	  Francois	  Ewald	  Michael	  &	  Allessandro	  Fontana	  (eds)	  (tr),	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Birth	  
of	  Biopolitics:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  De	  France	  1978-­‐1979	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2008)	  1-­‐26.	  
233	  Potter,	  ibid	  67.	  
234	  Zhu	  Xiuli,	  ‘The	  Party	  and	  the	  Courts’	  in	  Peerenboom,	  ibid	  (n	  216)	  52-­‐68;	  see	  also	  Benjamin	  L	  
Liebman,	  China’s	  Courts:	  Restrictive	  Reform	  and	  Shen	  Kui,	  ‘Commentary	  on	  “China	  Court’s:	  
Restrictive	  Reforms’	  in	  Clarke,	  ibid	  (n	  13)	  66-­‐89.	  
235	  Randall	  Peerenboom,	  ‘Judicial	  Independence	  in	  China’	  in	  Peerenboom,	  ibid	  91.	  
236	  Rachel	  Kleinfeld	  and	  Kalypso	  Nicolaidis,	  ‘Can	  a	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Power	  Export	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law?	  
Elements	  of	  a	  General	  Framework’	  in	  Gianluigi	  Palombella	  and	  Neil	  Walker	  (eds),	  Relocating	  the	  
Rule	  of	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2009)	  144-­‐145.	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playing	  field’	  between	  local	  foreign	  and	  investors,	  posited	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  
equal	  competition’.237	  	  However,	  its	  focus	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  foreign	  investors.	  	  
In	   this	   it	   differs	   from	   the	   Calvo	   Doctrine	   and	   the	   NIEO.	   These	   are	   concerned	  
with	  equality	  of	  treatment	  for	  domestic	  investors,	  one	  that	  does	  not	  fall	  short	  of	  
that	  accorded	  to	  foreign	  capital.238	  	  For	  about	  ten	  years	  China	  resisted	  demands	  
for	   the	   introduction	   of	   NT	   into	   her	   BITs.	   Consequently,	   only	   less	   than	   half	   of	  
them	   contain	   this	   standard.239	  	   Reluctance	  was	   partially	   anchored	   in	   a	   typical	  
developing	   country’s	   concern	   about	   the	   ability	   of	   its	   national	   industries	   to	  
compete	  with	  powerful	   foreign	   corporations.240	  	   Partially,	   it	  was	   linked	   to	   the	  
specific	  characteristics	  of	  a	  centrally	  planned	  economy	  with	  public	  ownership	  at	  
its	   core.	   At	   the	   time	   China	   entered	   the	   BITs	   arena,	   state	   and	   collective	  
ownership	   were	   treated	   differently,	   with	   the	   small,	   private	   sector	   dealt	   with	  
differently	  again.	  Thus,	  SOEs	  were	  charged	  with	   implementing	  state	  economic	  
plans.	   Special	   privileges	   were	   made	   available	   to	   them	   in	   return	   for	   meeting	  
workers’	  welfare	  requirements.	  Such	  function	  could	  not	  be	  expected	  of	  foreign	  
investors.	  Private	  domestic	   investors	  were	  excluded	   from	  many	  sectors	  of	   the	  
economy.	   	   It	   meant	   that	   the	   comparator	   of	   ‘like	   investor’	   required	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  establishing	  NT	  was	  impossible	  to	  identify.241	  	  Thus,	  the	  introduction	  
of	   NT	   into	   Chinese	   BITs	   is	   inextricable	   from	   processes	   of	   privatisation	   and	  
marketisation,	   and	   the	   corresponding	   construction	   of	   Western	   style	   legal	  
structures.	  The	  Company	  Law	  of	   the	  PRC	  1993	  and	   the	  Foreign	  Trade	  Law	  of	  
the	   PRC	   2004	   expressly	   adopted	   NT.	   Indeed,	   starting	   in	   1993	   the	   Chinese	  
government	   repeatedly	   proclaimed	   –	   both	   internally	   and	   externally	   -­‐	   its	  
commitment	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  NT	  friendly	  conditions.242	  
Broadly,	   China’s	   NT	   provisions	   follow	   European	   treaties	   in	   excluding	  
investments	   at	   their	   pre-­‐admission	   stage,	   and	   North	   American	   treaties	   in	  
including	  a	  ‘in	  like	  situation/circumstance’	  qualification.243	  	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  
observe	   six	   different	   approaches.	   They	   illustrate	   the	   plurality	   engendered	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  94.	  
238	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  157;	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (140)	  82.	  
239	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  ibid	  165,	  166.	  
240	  ibid	  165.	  
241	  ibid	  166;	  Jian	  Zhou,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  47-­‐48,	  85,	  115-­‐16.	  
242	  Jian	  Zhou,	  ibid	  116,	  145-­‐48.	  
243	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  158.	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negotiations,	   and	   the	   innovative	   formulations	   created	   in	   the	   course	   of	  
incremental	   quest	   for	   a	   path	   within	   the	   world	   order.	   They	   include	   (i)	   ‘best	  
efforts	   NT’	   (UK	   BIT	   1986);	   (ii)	   ‘substantially	   qualified	   NT’	   (compliance	   with	  
laws	   and	   regulations	   is	  moved	   to	   the	   preamble	   and	   is	   complemented	  with	   a	  
stipulation	  that	  NT	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  host	  country’s	  economic	  policy	  -­‐	  Japan	  BIT	  
1988,	  Czechoslovakia	  BIT	  1991	  and	  the	  Korea	  BIT	  1993);	  (iii)	  NT	  that	  is	  subject	  
to	  local	   law	  (Spain	  BIT	  1992	  and	  now	  a	  standard	  formulation);	  (iv)	   ‘subject	  to	  
grandfather	  clause	  NT’,	  typically	  supplemented	  by	  a	  ‘best	  effort’	  commitment	  to	  
progressively	   remove	   non-­‐conforming	   measures	   (Cyprus	   BIT	   2001,	   Germany	  
BIT	  2003);	  (iv)	  Least	  popular	  ‘full	  post-­‐admission	  NT’;	  (v)	  ‘non	  -­‐reciprocal	  NT’,	  
which	  grants	  NT	  to	  Chinese	   investors	  only	  (Peru	  1994,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Syria	  
1996).	  The	  exclusion	  of	  the	  black	  empowerment	  scheme	  from	  the	  NT	  obligation	  
in	  the	  South	  Africa	  BIT	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  ICSID	  
claim,	   brought	   by	   European	   investors	   in	  November	   2006,	   on	   the	   ground	   that	  
the	  scheme	  amounted	  to	  expropriation	  and	  breach	  of	  the	  FET	  and	  NT	  standards	  
of	   treatment.244	  The	   Syria	   BIT	   compensates	   for	   the	   non-­‐reciprocal	   NT	   with	   a	  
non-­‐reciprocal	   MFN	   clause,	   whereby	   this	   treatment	   is	   granted	   to	   Syrian	  
investors	  only.245	  
NT	   proved	   the	   most	   contentious	   issue	   throughout	   the	   China-­‐US	   BIT	  
negotiations.246	  	   The	   latter	   insisted	   on	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   pre-­‐admission	  NT	   in	  
accordance	  with	  her	  Model	  BIT.247	  	  China	   resisted.	  A	  pre-­‐admission	  NT	  would	  
have	  required	  an	  overhaul	  of	  her	  investment	  regime,	  whereby	  investments	  are	  
filtered	   through	   a	   process	   of	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   approval.	   She	  would	   have	   had	   to	  
further	  decentralize	  such	  approval,	  over	  time	  increase	  the	  threshold	  for	  central	  
government	  review,	  and	  open	  up	   to	  US	   investors	  sectors	  currently	  dominated	  
by	  or	  reserved	  for	  SOEs.248	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  The	  claim	  was	  dismissed	  by	  consent.	  
245	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  167-­‐71.	  
246	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ‘US-­‐China	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty	  Negotiations’	  (2012)	  7	  1	  Asian	  Journal	  
of	  WTO	  &	  International	  Health	  Law	  and	  Policy	  181.	  
247	  ibid	  181.	  




In	  the	  exchanges	  between	  the	  Mexican	  and	  US	  governments	  following	  Mexico’s	  
agrarian	  reform	  in	  1914	  and	  the	  nationalization	  of	  her	  oil	  industry	  in	  1938,	  the	  
Mexican	   government	   distinguished	   between	   general	   and	   impersonal	  
expropriation	  and	  the	  individual	  taking	  of	  property.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  first,	  she	  
argued,	  there	  was	  no	  universally	  accepted	  obligation	  to	  compensate.	  	  Since	  the	  
issue	   remains	   undecided,249	  one	  may	  question	  Gallagher	   and	   Shan’s	   sweeping	  
statement	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  is	  well	  recognized	  in	  IL.250	  	  Be	  it	  as	  
it	   may,	   this	   principle	   is	   uniformly	   accepted	   in	   BITs	   practice	   and,	   having	  
loosened	   her	   association	   with	   the	   NIEO,	   China	   is	   no	   exception.	   Her	   treaties	  
provide	   for	   expropriation	   that	   is	   wide	   in	   scope,	   and	   goes	   as	   far	   as	   including	  
contractual	   rights.251	  	   Indirect	   expropriation	   is	   absent	   from	   her	   Model	   BITs.	  
However,	   it	   takes	   on	   various	   formulations	   in	   actual	   treaties,	   including	   an	  
express	  provision	  in	  the	  German	  BIT	  2003.252	  	  The	  four	  substantive	  restrictions	  
that	   determine	   the	   legality	   of	   expropriation	   –	   it	   has	   to	   be	   undertaken	   in	   the	  
public	   interest,	   in	   accordance	   with	   due	   process	   of	   law,	   carried	   out	   in	   a	   non-­‐
discriminatory	   manner	   and	   against	   compensation	   -­‐	   appear	   in	   China’s	   Model	  
BITs	   and	   in	   nearly	   all	   her	   treaties.253	  	   By	   way	   of	   a	   footnote,	   as	   seen	   above,	  
historically,	   at	   least	  within	   the	   developing	   camp	   including	   China,	   the	   right	   to	  
expropriate	   was	   understood	   as	   intrinsic	   to	   sovereignty. 254 	  	   Thus,	   China’s	  
acceptance	   of	   a	   distinction	   between	   lawful	   and	   unlawful	   expropriation	  
implicates	  acquiescence	  to	  reduced	  sovereignty.	  	  
Such	   acquiescence	   may	   however	   not	   as	   yet	   be	   complete.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	  
criterion	   for	   due	   process,	   all	   three	   Model	   BITs	   require	   that	   expropriation	  
comply	  with	  domestic	  law.	  An	  exception	  is	  the	  Korea	  BIT	  2007,	  which	  expressly	  
refers	  to	  IL	  standards,	  and	  a	  few	  treaties,	  which	  are	  silent	  on	  the	  applicable	  law.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249	  See	  Chapter	  2	  text	  to	  n	  194-­‐207	  pp	  75-­‐77;	  Sornarajah	  places	  the	  right	  to	  compensation	  in	  the	  
free	  market	  paradigm	  only.	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  80-­‐81.	  
250	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  256.	  
251	  ibid	  268;	  In	  Vivendi	  v	  the	  Argentinean	  Republic	  Case	  no.	  ARB/97/3	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  
contract	  rights	  were	  capable	  of	  being	  expropriated.	  	  
252	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  260-­‐63.	  
253	  ibid	  271.	  
254	  Schill,	  Tearing	  Down	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  78;	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  295.	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Silence,	  however,	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  investors	  to	  argue	  the	  application	  of	  IL.255	  	  
Further,	   the	   combination	   of	   domestic	   law	   and	   international	   standards	   of	   due	  
process,	   previously	   unique	   to	   the	   Korea	   BIT,	   has	   now	   been	   repeated	   in	   the	  
China,	   Japan	  Korea	   trilateral	   investment	   treaty	  2012.256	  	   Still,	   the	  German	  BIT	  
omits	  altogether	  the	  due	  process	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  requirements.	  It	  gives	  
the	  investor	  the	  option	  of	  submitting	  both	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  expropriation	  and	  
the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  to	  review	  by	  national	  courts.257	  
In	   relation	   to	   the	  measure	  of	   compensation	   for	   expropriation,	   China	  does	  not	  
expressly	  adopt	  the	  widely	  used	  Hull	  formula	  of	  adequate,	  prompt	  and	  effective	  
compensation.258	  Her	  refusal	   to	   follow	  this	  prescription	  was	   indeed	  one	  of	   the	  
reasons	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   her	   treaty	   negotiations	   with	   the	   US	   in	   the	   80s.259	  
However,	  since	  then	  a	  variety	  of	  measures	  were	  adopted,	  including	  appropriate	  
or	   reasonable	   compensation	   (UK	   BIT	   and	   others),	   actual,	   real,	   genuine	   value,	  
market	  value,	  fair	  market	  value	  immediately	  before	  expropriation	  (Netherland	  
BIT)	  and	  ‘for	  the	  purpose	  of	  placing	  the	  investor	  in	  the	  same	  financial	  position	  
as	  that	  in	  which	  it	  would	  have	  been	  prior	  to	  the	  expropriation’	  (Sweden	  BIT).260	  
Their	  adoption	  points	  to	  a	  convergence	  with	  Western	  practice.	  In	  this	  practice,	  
endorsed	   by	   the	   World	   Bank,	   the	   market	   value	   measure	   is	   most	   commonly	  
used.261	  	  Of	  the	  ten	  older	  Chinese	  BITs,	  reference	  to	  market	  value	  is	  found	  only	  
in	  the	  1992	  Korea.	  However,	  since	  2006,	  over	  50%	  of	  Chinese	  BITs	  introduced	  a	  
fair	  market	  value	  requirement	  that	  is	  habitually	  combined	  with	  an	  obligation	  to	  
pay	  without	   delay.	   	   The	  World	   Bank	   Guidelines	   on	   the	   Treatment	   of	   Foreign	  
Direct	  Investment	  equate	  this	  term	  with	  adequate	  payment.262	  	  ‘Prompt’	  is	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  280-­‐83.	  
256	  	  Treaty	  with	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  ibid	  (n	  133)	  art	  11	  (1).	  
257	  China-­‐Germany	  BIT	  2003,	  ibid	  (n	  194)	  art	  4	  (2).	  
258	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  280.	  	  
259	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  84.	  
260	  ibid;	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  280-­‐83.	  
261	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  281.	  
262	  ‘Adequate’	  means	  that	  payment	  is	  to	  be	  made	  in	  convertible	  currency.	  Rudolf	  Dolzer	  and	  
Christoph	  Schreuer,	  Principles	  of	  International	  Investment	  Law	  (OUP	  2008)	  92.	  Both	  the	  US	  
Model	  BIT	  2004	  and	  2012	  define	  the	  ‘adequate’	  constituent	  of	  the	  Hull	  formula	  as	  the	  fair	  
market	  value	  of	  the	  investment	  immediately	  before	  it	  was	  expropriated.	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understood	  as	  ‘without	  undue	  delay’.263	  	  Thus,	  at	  least	  at	  the	  textual	  level,	  Hull’s	  
three	   stipulations	   appear	   to	   have	   now	   been	   incorporated	   into	   China’s	   third	  
Model	   BIT	   and	   into	   much	   of	   her	   more	   recent	   BITs	   practice.	   This	   led	   some	  
Chinese	   commentators	   to	   opine	   that,	   in	   fact,	   the	   Hull	   formula	   has	   been	  
accepted.264	  	  Even	  where,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Mauritius,	  the	  BIT	  provides	  for	  ‘just’	  
compensation	   explained	   as	   ‘genuine	   value’,	   the	   tribunal	   in	   the	   CME	   case	  
equated	  such	  measure	  with	  fair	  market	  value.265	  	  
It	   is	   thus	   possible	   to	   point	   to	   a	   trajectory	   away	   from	   developing	   countries’	  
traditional	  standard	  of	  appropriate	  compensation	  -­‐	  a	  flexible	  measure,	  pursuant	  
to	   which	   assessment	   takes	   into	   account	   a	   number	   of	   factors.	   These	   include	  
profits	   made	   by	   the	   investor	   up	   to	   expropriation	   and	   the	   duration	   of	   the	  
investment.	   	   The	   extent	   of	   such	   progression	   is	   brought	   into	   relief	   when	   one	  
considers	  that,	  as	  recently	  as	  1984,	  Yuan	  Zhenmin,	  then	  director	  of	  the	  Law	  and	  
Treaty	  Department	  at	  the	  PRC	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  explained	  China’s	  refusal	  
to	  adopt	  developed	  countries’	  Hull	  formula	  by	  reason	  of	  it	  being	  unreasonable.	  
Expropriation	   and	   nationalisation,	   he	   explained,	   are	   sovereign	   behaviour.	  
Further,	   China	   was	   a	   signatory	   to	   the	   CERDS	   and	   could	   not	   violate	   its	  
stipulations.266	  	  
From	   this	   trajectory	   Ye	   Ji	   extrapolates	   a	   prediction	   of	   permanence.267	  	   She	  
correlates	   this	   prediction	   to	   an	   observed	   unison	   between	   treaty	   practice	   and	  
domestic	  reforms.	  Westernised	  rules	  of	  compensatory	  expropriation	  have	  now	  
been	  internalised	  to	  form	  a	  new	  official	  understanding	  of	  property-­‐sovereignty	  
relationship,	   whereby	   private	   property	   protection	   is	   equated	   with	   enhanced	  
human	  rights	  and	  correspondingly	  limited	  governmental	  power.268	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263	  ‘World	  Bank	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  Treatment	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment’	  IV	  (3)	  31	  
international	  Legal	  Materials	  1379,	  1382	  <http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf>	  
accessed	  11	  Aug	  2012.	  	  
264	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  85.	  
265	  CME	  Czech	  Republic	  v	  Czech	  Republic	  (2003)	  UNCITRAl	  Final	  Award	  Para	  493.	  I	  Brownlie	  
dissented.	  
266	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  84	  citing	  Yuan	  Zhenmin	  in	  (1984)	  11	  China	  Market	  (Zhongguo	  shichang).	  
267	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  83.	  
268	  ibid	  95.	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In	  sum,	  the	  evolution	  of	  China’s	  BITs	  practice	  implicates	  the	  internalisation	  of	  a	  
discourse	   that	   (i)	   is	   external;	   (ii)	   originates	   from	   the	   Western	   site	   of	  
governance;	   (iii)	   is	   informed	   by	   coalescing	   principles	   of	  markets,	   sovereignty	  
and	   human	   and	   property	   rights	   (iv)	   is	   legitimised	   by	   top	   to	   bottom	   gradual	  
transformations	  of	   the	  eco-­‐political-­‐juridical	  ensemble	   in	  the	  domestic	  sphere.	  
The	  process	  was	  gradual.	  Thus,	  restricted	  expropriation	  and	  the	  entitlement	  to	  
compensation	   were	   first	   exclusive	   to	   FDI.269	  	   It	   was	   only	   after	   the	   Central	  
Committee	  of	   the	  CCP	  had	  proclaimed	  in	  1992	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  socialist	  
market	   economy,	   that	   these	   principles	   were	   incorporated	   into	   the	   internal	  
landscape	  through	  legislative	  and	  constitutional	  changes.270	  	  Private	  ownership	  
was	  expanded	  so	  as	  to	  attract	  a	  right	  to	  protection,	  and	  to	  make	  the	  lawfulness	  
of	  expropriation	  contingent	  on	  public	   interest,	  due	  process	  and	  compensation.	  
These	   principles	   were	   first	   affirmed	   in	   China’s	   2004	   constitution271	  and	   re-­‐
affirmed	  in	  the	  Property	  Rights	  Law	  2007	  (2007	  Law).272	  	  Academic	  discourse	  
followed	   suit,	   inter	   alia	   elevating	   restricted	   expropriation	   to	   the	   status	   of	  
customary	  IL.273	  	  
Yet,	   Ye’s	   allusion	   to	   Westernisation	   as	   a	   coherent	   phenomenon	   may	   be	   too	  
broad	   brushed,	   overlooking	   the	   potential	   differences	   between	   imported	  
convergence	  and	  an	  organic	  continuum.	  If	  Western	  property	  rights	  hark	  back	  to	  
Roman	   law	   and	   the	   Roman	   Empire,	   whereby	   power	   and	   wealth	   were	  
represented	  by	  ownership,	  in	  the	  Chinese	  empire	  power	  and	  wealth	  resided	  in	  
high	   position	   within	   the	   bureaucratic	   structures	   of	   the	   state.274	  True	   riches	  
derived	   from	  office.	   Further,	   the	   imperial	   state	   had	   an	   interest	   in	   obstructing	  
the	   growth	   of	   the	   landed	   aristocracy,	  while	   preserving	   peasant	   possession	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269	  ‘Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  on	  ‘Foreign	  Capital	  Enterprise’’	  (1986)	  art	  5	  
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/investment/36754.htm>	  accessed	  10	  Aug	  2012.	  	  
270	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  88-­‐89.	  
271	  Constitution	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (2004)	  art	  13	  
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm>	  accessed	  10	  Aug	  2012.	  	  
272	  Property	  Rights	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (2007)	  art	  42	  and	  44	  (unofficial	  
translation)<http://www.lehmanlaw.com/fileadmin/lehmanlaw_com/laws___regulations/Prop
oerty_Rights_Law_of_the_PRC__LLX__03162007.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  Aug	  2012.	  
273	  Ye	  Ji,	  ibid	  (n	  8)	  90-­‐91;	  but	  see	  Gong	  Xiantian,	  ‘A	  Property	  Law	  (Draft)	  That	  Violates	  the	  
Constitution	  and	  Basic	  Principles	  of	  Socialism’	  [2005]	  Links	  International	  Journal	  of	  Socialist	  
Renewal	  <http://links.org.au/node/221>	  accessed	  17	  Aug	  2012	  arguing	  that	  the	  Property	  Law	  
of	  the	  PRC	  is	  unconstitutional	  in	  that	  it	  violates	  socialist	  principles.	  
274	  Potter,	  ibid	  (13)	  60.	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land	  as	  a	  source	  of	  taxation.275	  	  From	  the	  outset,	  therefore,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  
principles	  of	  property	  rights	   implicated	  a	  process	  of	  borrowing,	   first	   from	  the	  
former	   USSR,	   and	   then	   from	   Europe	   and	   the	   German	   legal	   tradition	   in	  
particular.	  Both	  influences	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  2007	  Law	  but	  with	  a	  layer	  of	  
innovations	  that	  cater	  for	  indigenous	  circumstances.276	  	  The	  outcome	  is	  an	  on-­‐
going	  dynamic	  involving	  normative	  tension	  between	  globalised	  liberal	  ideology	  
and	   local	   legal	   and	   political	   culture.277	  	   Potter	   conceptualises	   this	   dynamic	   as	  
‘selective	  adaptation’	  to	  describe	  the	  interplay	  between	  acceptance	  of	  external	  
regimes	   and	   their	   interpretation	   by	   local	   communities.278	  	   Challenging	   the	  
propensity	   to	   view	   global	   convergence	   as	   uniform,	   his	   analysis	   looks	   to	   the	  
dynamics	   of	   perception,	   complementarity	   and	   legitimacy,	   to	   explain	   the	   way	  
international	  rules	  are	  mediated	  by	  local	  norms.	  In	  contrast	  to	  liberal	  principles,	  
whereby	  the	  realm	  of	  private	  property	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  independent	  of	  the	  
state,	   Chinese	   commentary	   emphasizes	   the	   priority	   of	   state’s	   policies	   and	   its	  
role	   in	   the	   mediation	   of	   private	   property	   relations.	   In	   other	   words,	   private	  
property	   rights	   may	   be	   expanding.	   Yet,	   they	   remain	   anchored	   in	   the	   public	  
arena,	   and	   are	   constraint	   by	   the	   requirements	   of	   socialist	   development.279	  	   In	  
consequence,	   national	   perception	   of	   liberal	   discourses	   is	   somewhat	   selective.	  
Its	   draws	   upon	   notions	   of	   economic	   utility,	   but	   simultaneously	   avoids	  
unqualified	   embrace	   of	   political	   implications.280	  	   Complementary	   is	   similarly	  
limited.	   Legitimacy	   too	   is	   undermined	   by	   the	   tension	   between	   individual	  
property	   rights	   and	   collective	   rights	   to	   development.	   Thus,	   the	   1991	   White	  
Paper	  on	  Human	  Rights	  posits	  the	  right	  to	  subsistence	  rather	  than	  ownership	  as	  
the	  primary	  right	  from	  which	  all	  others	  derive.281	  	  The	  2004	  amendments	  to	  the	  
constitution	  and	  the	  2007	  Law	  reveal	  that	  norms	  protective	  of	  social	   interests	  
remain	  strong,	  notwithstanding	  the	  shift	  among	  legal	  and	  policy	  elites	  towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275	  Ellen	  Meiskins	  Wood,	  Empire	  of	  Capital	  (Verso	  2005)	  31.	  
276	  Albert	  H.	  Y.	  Chen,	  ‘The	  Law	  of	  Property	  and	  the	  Evolving	  System	  of	  Property	  Rights	  in	  the	  
Development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Legal	  System’	  in	  Guanghua	  Yu	  ibid	  (n	  13)	  91.	  
277	  Potter,	  ibid	  (n	  13)	  51.	  
278	  ibid	  59;	  Potter,	  in	  Clarke,	  ibid	  (n	  13)	  147-­‐49.	  
279	  For	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  conceptualized	  in	  official	  discourse	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  socialist	  development	  see	  
White	  Paper,	  ‘The	  Socialist	  System	  of	  Laws	  With	  Chinese	  Characteristics’	  [Oct	  2011],	  
Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  
<http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-­‐08/17/content_24165.htm>	  accessed	  21	  Aug	  2012.	  	  
280	  Potter,	  ibid	  (n	  13)	  60;	  see	  for	  example	  Gong	  Xiantian,	  ibid	  (n	  273)	  generally.	  
281	  Potter,	  ibid	  61-­‐62.	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liberal	  notions	  of	  property	   rights.282	  	   Ye	   Ji	   is	   correct	   to	  observe	   that	   the	  2007	  
Law	   provides	   for	   equality	   of	   treatment	   between	   China’s	   three	   types	   of	  
ownership	   –	   state,	   collective	   and	   private.	   Yet,	   she	   overlooks	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  
nonetheless	  keeps	  all	  three	  within	  an	  overall	  framework	  of	  the	  need	  to	  uphold	  
and	  regulate	  a	   socialist	  economic	  system.283	  	  Further,	   the	  exercise	  of	  property	  
rights	   is	   made	   subject	   to	   social	   morality,	   public	   interest	   and	   the	   legitimate	  
rights	  and	   interests	  of	  others.284	  	  This	  provision	  may	  appear	  somewhat	  vague.	  
Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   incongruent	   with	   the	   absolutist	   approach	   found	   in	   BITs	  
practice.285	  	   Furthermore,	   even	   this	   partial	   assimilation	   triggers	   critique	   and	  
resistance.	  Thus,	  writes	  Gong:	  
	  
To	   the	   labouring	   masses	   and	   all	   Chinese	   Citizens,	   the	   public	  
ownership	  system	  and	  state	  property	  provide	  the	  most	  important	  
and	  fundamental	  protection	  and	  are	  also	  the	  material	  expression	  
of	   the	   property	   right	   of	   each	   of	   them.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   the	  
property	  right	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  collective,	  the	  property	  right	  of	  
individual	  citizens	  has	  not	  chance	  of	  being	  realized.	  However,	   in	  
our	   country,	   there	   are	   people	  who,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   have	   been	  
scheming	   ceaselessly	   to	   remove	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   sanctity	   of	  
public	  property	  under	  socialism	  from	  our	  constitution	  and,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand,	   have	   been	   seeking	   to	   replace	   it	   with	   the	   spirit	   and	  
principle	  of	  the	  sanctity	  of	  private	  property.286	  
	  
How	  does	  this	  partiality	  in	  absorption	  work	  in	  practice?	  The	  interaction	  among	  
China’s	   three	   forms	  of	  ownership	   is	   formulated	   through	   the	  concept	  of	  yongyi	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282	  ibid	  68.	  
283	  Property	  Rights	  Law,	  ibid	  (n	  273)	  arts	  1,	  3,4.	  
284	  ibid	  art	  7.	  
285	  M	  Sornarajah,	  ‘The	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Agenda	  in	  Investment	  Arbitration:	  Its	  Rise,	  Retreat	  and	  
Impact	  on	  State	  Sovereignty’	  in	  Shan,	  Simons	  and	  Singh,	  ibid	  (n	  176)	  202.	  
286	  Gong	  Xiantian,	  ibid	  (n	  273).	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wu	  quan	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘user	   rights’	   -­‐	   the	   right	   to	  possess,	   use	   and	  
derive	  benefit	  from	  property	  owned	  by	  another.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  ownership	  in	  
land	  cannot	  be	  privately	  held,	  but	  enters	  the	  market	  through	  user-­‐rights.	  	  Chen	  
considers	  this	  the	  most	  original	  feature	  of	  the	  2007	  Law,	  one	  that	  distinguishes	  
the	  socialist	  market	  economy	  from	  other	   jurisdictions,	  and	  which	   ‘was	  grafted	  
onto	   the	   socialist	   ownership	   to	   create	   a	   synthesis	   of	   socialist	   and	   private	  
property’.287	  	  China’s	  experimentation	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  balance	  between	  
private	  and	  collective	  property,	  suggests	  Alison	  Clarke,	  may	  provide	  important	  
lessons	  for	  other	  countries,	  particularly	  for	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  communities	  who	  wish	  
to	   avoid	   the	   wholesale	   privatisation	   of	   their	   traditional	   culture	   of	   communal	  
property.288	  
Investor-­‐State	  dispute	  resolution	  	  
Referred	   to	   as	   the	   ‘ultimate’	   protection’,	   investor-­‐state	   dispute	   resolution	   is	  
perceived	  as	  the	  most	  important	  of	  all	  other	  substantive	  protections	  proffered	  
by	  BITs.289	  	  As	  seen	  above,	  China’s	  policy	  towards	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration	  was	  
initially	   restrictive,	   then	   liberalised	   over	   time.	   Here	   again,	   liberalisation	   is	  
aligned	  with	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  internal	  economic	  landscape.290	  	  
Ad	  hoc	  arbitration	  under	  UNCITRAL	  rules	  remains	  the	  most	  prevalent	  dispute	  
resolution	  mechanism	  in	  Chinese	  BITs	  practice.291	  	  Yet,	  many	  of	  her	  treaties	  also	  
contain	   ‘case	  by	  case’	   consent	   to	   ICSID	  arbitration	   for	  quantum	  disputes.292	  In	  
some,	  such	  consent	  is	  combined	  with	  an	  option	  to	  refer	  non-­‐quantum	  disputes	  
to	   arbitration. 293 	  About	   thirty	   ‘third	   generation’	   BITs	   provide	   for	   ICSID	  
arbitration	   for	   all	   disputes.	   Notably,	   the	   current	   Model	   BIT	   adopts	   the	   pro-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287	  Chen,	  ibid	  (n	  276)	  103.	  
288	  Alison	  Clarke,	  ‘Integrating	  Private	  and	  Collective	  and	  Rights:	  Can	  China	  Achieve	  the	  
Impossible?’	  talk	  at	  the	  Law,	  Governance	  and	  Development:	  The	  Transformation	  of	  Property	  
Rights	  in	  Land	  and	  Property	  Law	  in	  China	  workshop	  held	  by	  the	  Centre	  of	  East	  Asian	  Law	  &	  
Centre	  of	  Chinese	  Studies	  11-­‐12	  May	  2012.	  
289	  Rudolf	  Dolzer	  and	  Magrete	  Stevens:	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  (The	  International	  Centre	  
for	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  Kluwer	  Law	  International	  1995)	  generally;	  An	  Chen,	  An	  
Chen’s	  Series	  of	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (Fudan	  Press	  University	  2008)	  Vol	  1	  459.	  
290	  Guang	  Hong,	  ibid	  (n	  170)	  2,	  17-­‐25.	  	  	  
291	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  302.	  
292	  ibid	  304-­‐06,	  313.	  
293	  ibid	  318-­‐19.	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investors	   approach,	   whereby	   only	   they	   have	   the	   option	   to	   commence	  
arbitration.	  However,	  mostly	  such	  option	  may	  be	  exercised	  only	  after	  investors	  
have	   first	   availed	   themselves	   of	   the	   domestic	   administrative	   review	  
procedure.294	  	  
The	  dispute	  resolution	  provision	  in	  the	  Peru	  BIT	  was	  considered	  in	  the	  Tza	  Yap	  
Shum	  case.	  This	  treaty	  adopts	  a	  restrictive	  arbitration	  clause	  pursuant	  to	  which	  
ICSID	  jurisdiction	  is	   limited	  to	  disputes	  involving	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  
for	  expropriation.	   Jurisdictional	  extension	   is	  possible,	  but	  made	  contingent	  on	  
consent	  and	   the	  absence	  of	  prior	  adjudication	  by	   the	  host	   country’s	   courts.295	  
Mr	   Tza	   commenced	   ICSID	   proceedings	   claiming	   that	   the	   Peruvian	   tax	  
authorities	   breached	   investment	   protection	   standards.	   Peru	   challenged	  
jurisdiction	   on	   a	   number	   of	   grounds,	   including	   the	   limited	   consent	   to	   ICSID	  
arbitration.	  The	  tribunal	  considered	  whether	  the	  prescribed	  consent	  precluded	  
jurisdiction	   to	   determine	   whether	   an	   expropriation	   had	   occurred	   in	   the	   first	  
place.	   In	   considering	   this	   question	   it	   adopted	   a	   ‘textual	   or	   pro-­‐arbitration	  
interpretative	   methodology’. 296 	  	   Thus,	   it	   applied	   the	   ‘good	   faith,	   ‘ordinary	  
meaning’	  and	  a	  treaty’s	   ‘object	  and	  purpose’	  guidance	  contained	  in	  the	  Vienna	  
Convention	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  parties’	  consent	  to	  arbitration	  should	  be	  given	  
the	  broadest	  interpretation.297	  	  Such	  interpretation,	  it	  reasoned,	  was	  most	  likely	  
to	   give	   effect	   to	   the	   treaty’s	   preamble.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   attract	   investors	   and	  
confer	   on	   them	   envisioned	   benefits.298	  	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   tribunal	   held,	   the	  
dispute	   resolution	   provision	   in	   the	   Peru	   BIT	   extended	   to	   ’any	   other	   issues	  
normally	   inherent	   to	   an	   expropriation,	   including	   whether	   the	   property	   was	  
actually	  expropriated	  (…)’.299	  It	  was	  not	  persuaded	  by	  evidence	  that	  China	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294	  ibid	  320-­‐22.	  
295	  ‘Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Peru	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  
People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  Concerning	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments	  
1995’	  art	  8	  (1-­‐3)	  <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_china.pdff>	  accessed	  12	  
Aug	  2012.	  	  
296	  Wei	  Shen,	  ibid	  (n	  198)	  73.	  
297	  ‘Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  1969’	  art	  31	  
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf>	  accessed	  
12	  Aug	  2012.	  
298	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  ibid	  (n	  190)	  ibid	  paras	  151-­‐53.	  
299	  ibid	  paras	  174-­‐88	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rejected	   Peru’s	   attempt	   to	   broaden	   the	   dispute	   resolution	   provision. 300	  	  
Similarly,	   it	  declined	  to	  draw	  inferences	  from	  China’s	  reservation	  contained	  in	  
her	   ratification	   of	   the	   ICSID	   Convention,	   finding	   that,	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   the	  
declaration	   was	   not	   conclusive.301	  	   The	   implications	   of	   these	   findings	   remain	  
uncertain,	   since	   the	   decisions	   of	   ICSID	   private	   arbitrators	   have	   persuasive	  
rather	   than	  precedential	   force	   and	   are	   altogether	   a	   low	  order	   source	   of	   IL.302	  	  
Further,	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  the	  legal	  implications	  of	  a	  notification	  filed	  at	  
the	   time	   of	   ratification.303	  	   Furthermore,	   case	   law	   on	   the	   construction	   of	   a	  
quantum	   restriction	   is	   divided.	   Thus,	   the	   Saipem	   and	   Telenor	   Mobile	  
Communications	   AS	   awards	   articulated	   a	   broad	   interpretation	   that	   extends	  
jurisdiction	  to	  the	  existence	  and/or	  lawfulness	  of	  an	  expropriation.304	  	  Similarly,	  
in	   European	   Media	   Ventures	   the	   tribunal	   agreed	   that	   the	   phrase	   ‘concerning	  
compensation’	   restricted	   jurisdiction.	  The	  arbitrators	  nevertheless	  held	   that	   it	  
was	   broad	   enough	   to	   allow	   a	   decision	   on	  whether	   expropriation	   in	   fact	   took	  
place.305 	  	   By	   contrast,	   however,	   the	   tribunals	   in	   RosInvest	   and	   Berschader	  
reached	  an	  opposite	  conclusion,	   restricting	   their	   jurisdiction	   to	   the	  amount	  of	  
compensation.306 	  	   The	   Tza	   Yap	   Shum	   tribunal	   bypassed	   disagreements	   by	  
asserting	   that	   the	   restriction	   in	   the	   Peru	   BIT	   did	   not	   prove	   a	   firm	   national	  
policy.307	  Unpersuasive	   as	   this	   reasoning	   may	   be,	   the	   Tza	   Yap	   Shum	   decision	  
demonstrates	   the	   way	   by	   which	   an	   expansionist	   tribunal	   that	   is	   intent	   on	  
promoting	   a	   desired	   practice,	   may	   undermine	   China’s	   public	   policy	   aimed	   at	  
shielding	  her	  sovereignty	  from	  transnational	  incursion.308	  	  
The	  tribunal’s	  finding	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  ‘fork	  in	  the	  road’	  
provision,	  and	  the	  objective	  meaning	  technique	  it	  applied	  to	  this	  end,	  similarly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  ibid	  paras	  135-­‐6,	  170-­‐1.	  
301	  ibid	  163-­‐5.	  
302	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  175)	  84.	  
303	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	  see	  Wei	  Shen,	  ibid	  (n	  198)	  82-­‐83;	  Guang	  Hong,	  ibid	  (n	  170)	  11-­‐
12.	  
304	  Saipem	  S.p.A.	  v	  Bangladesh	  ICSID	  Case	  No.	  ARB/05/07,	  Decision	  on	  Jurisdiction	  21	  March	  
2007;	  Telenor	  Mobile	  Communications	  A.S.	  v	  Hungary	  [2006]	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/04/15	  Award	  
13.	  
305	  European	  Media	  Ventures	  v	  Czech	  Republic	  [2007]	  EWHC	  2851	  (Comm),	  UNCITRAL	  Award	  15	  
May	  2007	  (unpublished).	  
306	  Berschader	  v	  The	  Russian	  Federation	  Stockholm	  SCC	  Case	  No.	  V080/2004	  Award	  21	  April	  
2006;	  RosInvest	  Co.	  UK	  v	  The	  Russian	  Federation	  SCC	  Case	  No	  V070/2005	  Award	  October	  2007.	  
307	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  ibid	  (n	  190)	  paras	  174-­‐76.	  
308	  Wei	  Shen,	  ibid	  (n	  198)	  74.	  
174	  
	  
indicate	  what	  Wei	  Shen	  describes	  as	  a	  functionalist	  interpretative	  methodology,	  
-­‐	   one	   that	   is	   driven	   by	   a	   pre-­‐set	   goal	   of	   producing	   expansive	   jurisdiction.309	  	  
Peru	  argued	   that	   the	   three	  dispute	   resolution	  options	   in	  Article	  8	  of	   the	  Peru	  
BIT	  were	   intended	   to	   operate	   as	   a	   three-­‐step	   vertical	   process,	   whereby	   each	  
option	   was	   to	   follow	   the	   other	   chronologically.	   Once	   pursued,	   such	   option	  
became	  exhausted.310	  	  The	  tribunal	  pointed	  to	  the	  word	  ‘may’	  in	  Article	  8(2)	  of	  
the	   Peru	   BIT	   to	   find	   the	   argument	   weak.	   This	   was	   notwithstanding	   that	   the	  
word	  in	  the	  prevailing	  English	  text	  was	  a	  mandatory	  ‘shall’.	  It	  characterised	  the	  
‘fork	  in	  the	  road’	  process	  as	  horizontal,	  thereby	  rendering	  the	  court	  procedure	  
provided	   for	   in	  Article	  8(2)	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   arbitral	  mechanism	   in	  Article	  
8(3).	   Mr	   Tza	   was	   entitled	   to	   arbitrate	   without	   having	   to	   first	   exhaust	   the	  
preceding	   local	   courts	   option.311 	  	   In	   reaching	   this	   conclusion,	   the	   tribunal	  
abandoned	  the	  ‘plain	  meaning’	  method	  of	  construction	  in	  favour	  of	  establishing	  
the	   ‘objective	  meaning’	   of	   Article	   8	   in	   the	   overall	   context	   of	   the	   BIT.312	  	   Once	  
again	  it	  invoked	  the	  treaty’s	  function	  to	  promote	  investment.	  Since	  the	  investor	  
could	  have	   instituted	   local	  court	  proceedings	   in	  any	  event,	   it	  reasoned,	  Article	  
8(2)	  was	  ‘unnecessary’.	  Thus,	  the	  purported	  ‘objective	  meaning’	  of	  Article	  8	  was	  
to	   ‘extend	   the	   rights	   and	   protections	   of	   investors	   (…)	   by	   incorporation	   of	  
protections	   of	   international	   law’.313	  	   It	   followed	   that,	   were	   Article	   8	   to	   be	  
construed	  as	  a	  three-­‐step	  vertical	  process,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  treaty	  would	  have	  
been	   defeated.	   Given	   the	   persuasive	   force	   of	   arbitral	   awards,	   it	   is	   possible	  
China’s	   ‘fork	   in	   the	   road’	   policy	  may	   be	   circumvented	   by	  what	   appears	   to	   be	  
private	  arbitrators’	  tortuous	  reasoning	  en	  route	  to	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  
Finally,	   it	   fell	   to	   the	   tribunal	   to	   consider	   the	   multiplying	   effect	   of	   the	   MFN	  
standard	   in	   relation	   to	   procedural	   rights.	   Awards	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  
operation	  of	   the	  MFN	  clause	  extends	  to	  arbitration	  agreements	  are	  divided.314	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  ibid	  78.	  
310	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  ibid	  (n	  190)	  para	  158.	  
311	  ibid	  para	  149.	  
312	  ibid	  para	  187.	  
313	  ibid.	  
314	  See	  for	  example	  Emilio	  Agustin	  Maffezini	  v	  Kingdom	  of	  Spain,	  ICSID	  Case	  No	  ARB/97/7	  and	  
Plama	  Consortium	  Limited	  v	  Bulgaria,	  ICSID	  Case,	  No	  ARB/03/24;	  in	  the	  first	  the	  tribunal	  held	  




In	  this	  case	  the	  tribunal	  found	  that	  the	  evidence	  adduced	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Peru	  
BIT	  negotiations	  did	  not	  sustain	  Peru’s	  argument	  of	  a	  categorical	  agreement	  to	  
a	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  the	  MFN	  provision.	  It	  held	  that	  the	  clause	  ‘seems	  to	  
be	   open	   to	   broader	   interpretation,	   which	   may	   include	   access	   to	   procedural	  
protections	   more	   favourable	   for	   alleged	   violation	   (…).’ 315 	  	   However,	   it	  
concluded,	  the	  specific	  provision	  relating	  to	  arbitration	  of	  expropriation	  claims	  
superseded	   the	   general	   MFN	   clause,	   thereby	   precluding	   the	   application	   of	  
arbitration	  provisions	  from	  other	  BITs.316	  	  
In	  sum,	  ICSID	  was	  instituted	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  World	  
Bank	   participates	   in	   structural	   adjustment	   programs.	   These	   propagate	   strong	  
contract	   and	   private	   property	   institutions,	   so	   as	   to	   shape	   national	   regulatory	  
interiors.317	  Arguably,	   therefore,	   it	  has	  a	  rules	  making	  capacity,	  albeit	  one	  that	  
may	  appear	   informal,	   possibly	   indirect	   and	  not	   always	   immediately	   apparent.	  
As	  the	  Bank	  also	  possesses	  a	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanism,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  to	  fall	  
within	  Snyder’s	  definition	  of	  a	  site	  of	  governance.	  	  The	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  case	  thus	  
may	   be	   taken	   to	   constitute	   an	   instance	   of	   a	   dialogue	   between	   three	   sites	   of	  
governance,	  those	  of	  China,	  Peru	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  China	  and	  Peru	  brought	  
to	   the	   table	   a	   treaty	   instrument	   that	   was	   reflective	   of	   their	   desire	   for	   co-­‐
operation,	  and	  the	  balance	  they	  wanted	  to	  strike	  between	  this	  desire	  and	  other	  
policy	  related	  considerations.	  The	  Bank	  via	  the	  tribunal	  proffered	  its	  own	  pro-­‐
investors	  perspective.318	  	  What	  followed	  was	  not	  a	  process	  of	  cross-­‐fertilisation.	  
Rather,	   the	   tribunal	   appeared	   at	   pains	   to	   impose	   on	   the	   treaty	   before	   it	   a	  
desired	  normative	  content,	  so	  as	  to	  potentially	  shape	  the	  litigants’	  BITs	  practice.	  
This	   is	   of	   course	   only	   one	   case.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   serves	   to	   demonstrate	   that	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  ibid	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  para	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  ibid	  paras	  213-­‐16,	  220;	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  tribunal’s	  reasoning	  see	  Andrew	  Newcombe	  
‘Another	  Misapplication	  of	  MFN?	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v	  The	  Republic	  of	  Peru’	  [21	  Oct	  2009]	  Kluwer	  
Arbitration	  Blog;	  Wei	  Shen,	  ibid	  (n	  198)	  84-­‐88.	  
317	  Janet	  Dine,	  Companies,	  International	  Trade	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  
Corporate	  Law,	  CUP	  2005)	  157-­‐161;	  Dani	  Rodrik,	  ‘Goodbye	  Washington	  Consensus,	  Hello	  
Washington	  Confusion?	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  the	  1990s:	  Learning	  
from	  a	  Decade	  of	  Reform’	  (2006)	  XLIV	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Literature	  978-­‐979;	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  
(n	  285)	  206.	  
318	  World	  Bank	  ‘Articles	  of	  Agreement	  ‘art	  1	  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,
contentMDK:50004943~menuPK:64020045~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:2
78036,00.html>	  accessed	  17	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  2012.  
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dialogues	   between	   sites	   of	   governance	   are	   not	   necessarily	   conducive	   to	  
pluralism	  and	  may	  in	  reality	  flow	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	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CHAPTER	   5:	   Harmony	   with	   Chinese	   Characteristics	   –	   Unity	   in	   Diversity	  
and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Profit	  
Introduction	  
In	  June	  2008,	  Lin	  Yifu,	  a	  Chinese	  economist	  and	  founding	  director	  of	  the	  Beijing	  
University	   China	   Centre	   for	   Economic	   Research	   became	   the	   first	   developing	  
country	   national	   to	   be	   appointed	   chief	   economist	   of	   the	  World	  Bank.1	  	   To	   his	  
new	  position	  he	  brought	  a	  PhD	  in	  economics	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  the	  
cradle	   of	   American	   neoliberalism,	   and	   ‘The	   Great	   Harmony’,	   a	   scroll	   of	  
Confucian	   wisdom.2	  	   From	   Milton	   Friedman,	   Lin	   said,	   he	   acquired	   valuable	  
methodology.3	  Confucius	  philosophy,	  he	  told	  the	  Financial	  Times	  a	  few	  months	  
later,	  was	  the	  inspiration	  for	  his	  vision	  of	  a	  World	  Bank	  that	  is	  at	  the	  service	  of	  a	  
strife	   free	   human	   community	   in	   which	   everyone	   cares	   for	   and	   trusts	   each	  
other.4	  	  
Three	  years	  earlier,	  as	  private	  capital	  was	  being	  carved	  an	  ever-­‐greater	  role	  in	  
China’s	  economy,	  the	  CCP	  launched	  a	  campaign	  to	  revive	  the	  study	  and	  research	  
of	  Marxist	  literature.5	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  redefine	  Marxism	  and	  formulate	  policies	  
capable	  of	  addressing	  what	  the	  then	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  leader	  Hu	  
Jintao	  described	  as	  ‘changes,	  contradictions	  and	  problems	  in	  all	  fields’.6	  Yet,	  the	  
year	  2005	  also	  saw	  the	  Hu	  Jintao-­‐Wen	  Jiabao	  leadership	  launch	  the	  Harmonious	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Society	  and	  Harmonious	  World	  paradigms.7	  The	  former	  addressed	  issues,	  such	  
as	   internal	   wealth	   polarisation,	   inadequate	   welfare	   and	   growing	   social	  
tensions.8	  	   The	   latter	   introduced	   the	   themes	   of	   worldwide	   ‘lasting	   peace	   and	  
common	   prosperity’	   to	   include	   principles,	   such	   as	   interstate	   equality	   and	   co-­‐
operative	  development.9	  	  These	  themes	  and	  principles	  notwithstanding,	  against	  
a	  backdrop	  of	  US	  growing	  encirclement	  and	  declared	  policy	  of	  naval	  build	  up	  in	  
the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   region,	   on	   8	   November	   Hu	   announced	   to	   the	   Chinese	  
Communist	   Party	   (CCP)	   18th	   National	   Congress	   the	   importance	   of	   China	  
acquiring	  maritime	  capabilities,	  such	  that	  can	  protect	  her	  national	  interest	  and	  
are	  commensurate	  with	  her	  international	  standing.10	  	  Some	  three	  weeks	  earlier,	  
on	   19	   September	   2012,	   China’s	   biggest	   financial	   services	   company,	   Ping	   An	  
Insurance	   made	   history	   when	   it	   became	   the	   first	   mainland	   company	   to	   file	  
ICSID	   arbitration	   proceedings.	   Ping	   An	   is	   claiming	   against	   Belgium	   a	   loss	   of	  
US$2.3	  billion	  occasioned	  by	   the	   financial	  crisis-­‐induced	  nationalisation	  of	   the	  
Belgium-­‐Dutch	   bank,	   Fortis.11	  	   According	   to	   the	   New	   York	   Times,	   the	   biggest	  
source	  of	  the	  US$2.7	  billion	  fortune	  amassed	  by	  the	  family	  of	  China’s	  premier,	  
Wen	  Jiabao	  	  -­‐	  equivalent	  to	  the	  GDP	  of	  Burundi	  -­‐	  came	  from	  investments	  in	  Ping	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  accessed	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  (2012)	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  ARB/12/29.	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An.12	  More	  recently,	  the	  family	  of	  China’s	  new	  leader,	  Xi	  Jinping	  was	  reported	  to	  
be	  worth	  hundreds	  of	  millions.13	  
These	   facts	  may	  appear	  disparate.	  Yet,	   they	   invoke	  a	  sense	  of	  perplexity.	   	  Can	  
neoliberal	   methodology	   and	   practice,	   as	   manifested	   in	   the	   convergence	   of	  
capitalist	  and	  political	  elites,	  ICSID	  proceedings	  and	  participation	  in	  IFIs,	  inhabit	  
a	  world	  of	  equal	  and	  sovereign	  development;	  can	  socialism	  exist	  cheek	  by	  jowl	  
with	  marketisation	  and	  privatisation;	  is	  lasting	  peace	  congruent	  with	  interstate	  
competition?	  
In	  the	  face	  of	  the	  intricacies	  of	  reforms,	  confusion	  seems	  to	  have	  pervaded	  the	  
considerable	   literature	   spawned	   by	   the	   Chinese	   phenomenon.14	  Harvey,	   for	  
example,	   concludes	   that	   the	   country	   has	   definitely	  moved	   in	   the	   direction	   of	  
economic	   neoliberalisation	   and	   towards	   the	   reconstitution	   of	   class	   power.15	  	  
For	   Amin,	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘socialist	   market	   economy’	   masks	   a	   passage	   to	   a	  
capitalist	  institutional	  order.	  However,	  for	  him,	  as	  long	  as	  equal	  access	  to	  land	  is	  
maintained,	  such	  passage	  remains	  incomplete	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  on-­‐going	  social	  
struggles.16	  	  Echoing	  Amin’s	  focus	  on	  direct	  producers’	  control	  over	  the	  means	  
of	   production,	   Arrighi	   posits	   that	   the	  marketization	   of	   China’s	   economy	   does	  
not	  necessarily	  signify	  adherence	  to	  Washington	  Consensus	  prescriptions.	  17	  	  In	  
contrast,	  Lemos’	  field	  research	  leads	  him	  to	  surmise	  that	  the	  PRC	  is	  now	  run	  by	  
the	  wealthy	  for	  the	  wealthy.18	  	  The	  triumph	  of	  Chinese	  capitalism,	  postulates	  Li	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  Future	  (Yale	  
University	  Press	  2012)	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Mingqi,	  was	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   the	   longevity	   of	   global	   neoliberalism,	   and	  
prolonged	  what	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  a	  short-­‐lived	  project.19	  	  China	  is	  not	  
and	  will	  not	  be	  a	  conventional	  status	  quo	  country,	  argues	  Pan	  Zhongqi.	  Rather,	  
she	   has	   gradually	   evolved	   from	   a	   challenger	   to	   a	   supporter	   and	   ‘proactive	  
shaper’	  of	  the	  world	  order.	  20	  	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  vast	  accumulation	  of	  private	  
capital	   and	  deceptively	   familiar	   capitalist	   features,	  Fan,	  Morck	  and	  Yeung	  say,	  
China	  did	  not	   embrace	   capitalism.	   She	   emulates	   institutional	   forms	  of	  market	  
economy,	   but	   remains	   at	   heart	   socialist,	   with	   Lenin’s	   commanding	   heights	  
firmly	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	   CCP.	   She	   is	   a	   ‘to	   date	   successful	   stir-­‐fry	   of	  
markets,	   socialism	  and	   traditional	   China	   that	   is	   fully	   none	  of	   the	   three	   (…)’.21	  	  
Frank	   doubts	   whether	   there	   is	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   capitalism.	   He	   invites	   us	   to	  
remove	  our	  Eurocentric	  lenses,	  so	  as	  to	  observe	  the	  cyclical	  continuities	  of	  the	  
world-­‐system,	  whereby	  parts	   of	   East	  Asia	  were	  dominant	   until	   1800	   and	   any	  
ascent	  is	  in	  fact	  that	  of	  the	  West,	  one	  that	  ‘came	  late	  and	  was	  brief’.22	  	  
Perhaps,	   in	   a	   topography	   that	   is	   strained	   by	   contingencies	   and	   fissures,	   such	  
confusion	  is	  both	  inevitable	  and	  functional.	  It	  spurs	  us	  to	  follow	  a	  spectrum	  of	  
threads	  in	  the	  intricate	  tapestry	  that	  is	  China’s	  progress	  from	  a	  subaltern	  at	  the	  
periphery	  of	  the	  modern	  world-­‐system	  to	  a	  strategic	  semi-­‐peripheral	  state	  with	  
a	   predicted	   advance	   to	   the	   core.23	  	   For	   a	   country	   is	   approaching	   the	   inner	  
sanctum	  of	  global	  governance	  whose	  story	  unfolded	  for	  a	  long	  time	  outside	  the	  
historical	   trajectory	   of	   global	   capitalism,	   one	   that	  was	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   a	   non-­‐
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  Zhao,’	  The	  China	  Model:	  
Can	  It	  Replace	  the	  Western	  Model’	  (2010)	  19	  issue	  65	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  China	  419;	  for	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  world	  system	  see	  generally	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein,	  World-­‐System	  Analysis:	  An	  
Introduction	  (Duke	  University	  Press	  2004).	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Roman	  type	  ancient	  empire,	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  ashes	  of	  being	  partially	  colonised	  
and,	   who	   for	   a	   while	   at	   least,	   sought	   her	   national	   salvation	   within	   the	   non-­‐
capitalist	  camp.	  A	  stranger	  and	  the	  other,	  she	   is	  also	   familiar	  –	  she	  appears	  to	  
speak	  the	   language	  of	   transnational	  capitalism	  and	  to	  adopt	   its	  aspirations,	  as	  
well	  as	  concomitant	  economic	  and	  juridical	  arrangements.	  	  Yet,	  simultaneously	  
she	  invokes	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  her	  ways	  and	  challenge	  orthodoxies	  of	  which	  she	  
is	  an	  unexpected	  consequence.24	  	  
Further,	   it	   seems	   the	   complexities	   of	   deciphering	   transformations	   are	   not	  
confined	  to	  onlookers.	  The	  China	  observed	  by	  Shambaugh	  is	  a	  conflicted	  nation,	  
one	  that	  is	  engaged	  in	  an	  unparalleled	  self-­‐reflection.25	  	  Consequently,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Chinese	  BITs,	  here	   too,	  one	  encounters	  a	  discursive	  plurality	   that	   cuts	  
across	   official,	   semi-­‐official	   and	   unofficial	   school	   of	   thoughts	   about	   the	  
implications	  of	  being	  a	  rising	  power.26	  Wang	  Yiwei,	  for	  example,	  points	  to	  four	  
identities	   in	   need	   of	   harmonious	   fusion	   -­‐	   socialist,	   oriental,	   developing	   and	  
emerging	  power.27	  	  The	  love-­‐hate	  relationship	  that	  seems	  to	  permeate	  Western	  
literature	   about	   the	   country	   is	   reproduced	   in	   Chinese	   intellectuals’	  
introspection.	  The	  US	   is	   conceptualised	  as	  a	   leader	   in	   the	  art	  of	  modernity	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  and	  an	  empire	  that	  threatens	  world	  peace	  on	  the	  other.28	  	  Much	  
as	   the	   HWP	   embodies	   a	   general	   consensus	   around	   issues	   such	   as	   China’s	  
peaceful	   intentions,	   culture	   and	   normative	   leadership,	   it	   also	   proved	   more	  
contested	   than	   previous	   themes	   in	   the	   CCP	   charter:29	  for	   the	   Chinese	   right	   it	  
essentially	   represents	   a	  declaration	  of	   support	   for	   globalisation,	  while	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Jinhua	  Dai,	  ‘Forward’	  in	  Xiaomei	  Chen,	  Occidentalism:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Counter-­‐Discourse	  in	  Post-­‐
Mao	  China	  (2nd	  ed,	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield	  Publishers	  Inc.	  2002)	  ix;	  	  
25	  David	  Shambaugh,	  ‘Coping	  with	  a	  Conflicted	  China’	  (2011)	  34	  1	  The	  Washington	  Quarterly	  7	  
at	  8	  <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11wintershambaugh.pdf>	  accessed	  22	  Aug	  2012.	  	  
26	  ibid	  8,	  9.	  
27	  Wang	  Yiwei,	  ‘Clash	  of	  Identities:	  Why	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  Unharmonious	  in	  Global	  
Governance’	  (2010)	  No	  24	  UNISCI	  Discussions	  Papers	  101	  at	  103-­‐04.	  
28	  William	  A.	  Callahan,	  Contingent	  States:	  Greater	  China	  and	  Transnational	  Relations	  (University	  
of	  Minnesota	  Press	  2004)	  xvii.	  
29	  Yongnian	  Zheng	  and	  Sow	  Keat	  Tok,	  ‘“Harmonious	  Society”	  and	  “Harmonious	  World”:	  China’s	  
Policy	  Discourse	  under	  Hu	  Jintao’	  (2007)	  Briefing	  Series	  –	  Issue	  26	  The	  University	  of	  
Nottingham	  China	  Policy	  <Institute	  
http://nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-­‐26-­‐harmonious-­‐society-­‐and-­‐
harmonious-­‐world.pdf>	  accessed	  27	  Oct	  2012.	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left	   its	   focal	   point	   is	   China’s	   response	   to	   inequalities,	   and	   support	   for	  
redistribution	  and	  sustainability.30	  	  
It	   is	   perhaps	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   discursive	   hold	   enjoyed	   by	   Westerncentric	  
perspectives	   that	   the	  tide	  of	  commentaries	  about	  China’s	   impact	  on	  the	  world	  
order	  has	  relatively	   little	   to	  say	  about	   the	  country’s	  own	  search	   for	  a	  place	   in	  
this	  order.31	  	  Yet,	  it	  is	  arguably	  this	  search	  that	  should	  be	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  
understanding	   the	   potential	   for	   change.	   This	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   step	   into	   the	  
lacuna	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   country’s	   paradigm	   and	   the	   various	   interpretive	  
possibilities	  it	  conjures	  up.	  
The	   first	   section	   of	   this	   work	   looked	   at	   ODI’s	   institutional	   and	   discursive	  
underpinnings.	  The	  neoliberal	  paradigm	  and	  BITs	  appeared	  broadly	  consistent	  
and	   mutually	   legitimising.	   Both	   are	   predicated	   on	   asymmetric	   incorporation	  
into	  developmentalism	  that	   is	  anchored	   in	  the	  political,	   financial,	   juridical	  and	  
ideological	  arrangements	  conceptualised	  as	  the	  globalised	  West.	  	  In	  the	  second	  
section	  of	  this	  enquiry	  the	  gaze	  turned	  to	  China.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  second	  
section,	   the	   Chinese	  BITs	   network	  was	   examined.	   It	  was	   found	   to	   be	   diverse,	  
though	  with	  a	  trajectory	  towards	  the	  Western	  practice.	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  I	  
now	   turn	   my	   attention	   to	   the	   imperatives	   of	   the	   Chinese	   paradigm	   -­‐	   the	  
discursive	   logic	   that	   ordinarily	   would	   coalesce	   with	   law,	   in	   the	   mutually	  
legitimising	   embrace	   that	   animates	   Foucault’s	   eco-­‐political-­‐juridical	  
ensemble.32	  	  	  
The	  previous	  chapter	   focused	  on	  China’s	   interface	  with	   the	  world	  beyond	  her	  
borders,	   viewed	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   outward	   direct	   investment	   (ODI)	   related	  
treatification.	  Correspondingly,	   the	   interest	  of	   this	  chapter	   lies	   in	   the	  outward	  
projections	   of	   her	   paradigmatic	   logic.	   In	   other	   words,	   of	   the	   three	   questions	  
posited	   above,	   it	   is	   the	   first	   and	   the	   third	   that	   primarily	   engage	   us.	   I	   say	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Jean-­‐Marc	  F.	  Blanchard	  and	  Sujian	  Guo,	  ‘“Harmonious	  World”	  and	  China’s	  New	  Foreign	  Policy’	  
in	  Sujian	  Guo	  and	  Blanchard,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  9;	  Yongnian	  Zheng	  and	  Tok,	  ibid.	  
31	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian	  
(eds),	  China	  and	  the	  New	  International	  Order	  (Routledge	  2008)	  3.	  
32	  Michel	  Foucault	  (tr),	  The	  Birth	  of	  Biopolitics:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  De	  France	  1978-­‐1979	  
(Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2008)	  162.	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‘primarily’	  because,	  as	  noted	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  history	  testifies	  to	  a	  degree	  of	  
transference	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  systemic	  arrangements.	  China	  is	  no	  
exception.	  The	  HWP	  is	  the	  ‘alter	  ego’	  of	  a	  Harmonious	  Society	  paradigm.33	  	  Both	  
are	   predicated	   on	   national	   configurations	   that	   are	   conducive	   to	  
interdependency.	   The	   nuances	   of	   China’s	   integration	   into	   capitalist	  
globalisation	  are	   inextricable	   from	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   she	  herself	  
has	  rotated	  towards	  a	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  development.	  Indeed,	  Wang	  and	  Zheng	  
identify	  in	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  domestic	  and	  the	  international	  arenas	  an	  
instance	  of	  historical	  continuity,	  whereby	  intertwinement	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  
China’s	   tributary	  system	  -­‐	  a	   time	  when,	  according	  to	  Fairbank,	   ‘external	  order	  
was	   so	   closely	   related	   to	   her	   internal	   order	   that	   one	   could	   not	   long	   survive	  
without	   the	   other’.34	  	   Thus,	   examination	   of	   the	   country’s	   outward	   projections	  
necessitates	  at	  least	  some	  consideration	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  her	  domestic	  scene.	  
The	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  China’s	  positioning	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideas	  and	  
norms.35	  	  Its	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  Chinese	  official	  paradigm	  rather	  than	  on	  its	  Western	  
conceptualisation	  in	  Ramo’s	  notion	  of	  a	   ‘Beijing	  Consensus’.36	  	  The	  designation	  
of	  a	  consensus	  may	  assist	  in	  positing	  Ramo’s	  exposition	  as	  a	  counter	  discourse	  
to	   the	   Washington	   Consensus.	   	   However,	   it	   also	   points	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	  
different	  understandings.	  For	  the	  word	  signifies	  a	  hegemonic	  meeting	  of	  minds,	  
a	  universal	  rationality	  that,	  argues	  Mouffe,	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  liberal	  parlance.	  In	  
other	  words,	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   reconciled	   societies,	   the	   conflictual	   dimension	  
that	   is	   constitutive	   of	   collective	   life	   is	   delegitimised.37	  	   In	   its	   translation	   into	  
Chinese	   (gongshi),	   consensus	   conveys	   a	   slightly	   different	  meaning.	   It	   denotes	  
common	   or	   mutual	   recognition	   rather	   than	   agreement	   per	   se.	   Thus,	   gongshi	  
allows	   space	   for	   the	   coexistence	   of	   differences,	   a	   central	   theme	   of	   the	   HWP.	  
Indeed,	  China’s	  government	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  emphasize	  that	  it	  does	  not	  promote	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Yongnian	  Zheng	  and	  Tok,	  ibid	  (n	  29)	  3.	  
34	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ibid	  (n	  31)	  4-­‐5.	  
35	  Zhongqi	  Pan,	  ibid	  (n	  20)	  55.	  
36	  Joshua	  Cooper	  Ramo,	  The	  Beijing	  Consensus:	  Notes	  on	  the	  New	  Physics	  of	  Chinese	  Power	  (The	  
Foreign	  Policy	  Centre	  2004)	  60.	  
37	  Arif	  Dirlik,	  ‘Beijing	  Consensus:	  Beijing	  “Gongshi.”	  Who	  Recognizes	  Whom	  and	  to	  What	  End’	  
Globalization	  and	  Autonomy	  1	  
<http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/position.jsp?index=PP_Dirlik_BeijingConsensus.xml>	  
accessed	  9	  Nov	  2012;	  Chantal	  Mouffe,	  On	  the	  Political	  (Routledge	  2005)	  2.	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prescriptive	  prototype,	  or	   in	   the	  words	  of	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  to	  Ghana’s	  president	  
Jerry	   Rawlings	   in	   1985:	   ‘Please	   don’t	   try	   to	   copy	   our	   model.	   If	   there	   is	   an	  
experience	  on	  our	  part,	  it	  is	  to	  formulate	  policies	  in	  light	  of	  one’s	  own	  national	  
conditions’.38	  	  
The	   contingencies	   that	   arise	   on	   the	   way	   to	   implementation	   mean	   that	  
developments	   on	   the	   discursive	   level	   may	   prove	   unreliable	   indicators	   of	  
realities.39	  	   Indeed,	   the	   inevitability	  of	   change	   is	  one	  of	   the	  HWP’s	  premises.40	  	  
However,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   discourse	   is	   not	   deserving	   of	   attention.	   For	  
within	   it	   lies	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	  particularities	  of	   a	  power	   structure.	  At	   the	  
time	  of	  writing,	  we	  may	  be	  witnessing	  the	  unfolding	  of	  Arrighi’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  
US	   as	   entrapped	   in	   a	   state	   of	   financialisation,	   the	   last	   stage	   in	   the	   rise	   and	  
decline	   of	   systemic	   cycles	   of	   accumulation	   (SCAs).41	  	   With	   the	   US	   hegemonic	  
path	   increasingly	   veering	   towards	   exploitative	   domination	   and	   away	   from	  
adjustment	  and	  accommodation,	  China’s	  rise	  has	  arguably	  become	  ‘an	  essential	  
condition	   for	   a	   non-­‐catastrophic	   transition	   to	   a	   new	   world	   order’. 42 	  The	  
direction	  her	  ascent	  may	  take	  is	  as	  yet	  uncertain.	  The	  country’s	  internal	  special	  
interests	   reconstitution,	   and	   external	   integration	   into	   the	   neoliberal	   agenda,	  
may	  already	  be	  too	  far	  gone	  for	  her	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  solutions	  to	  systemic	  
predicaments.43	  	  However,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  HWP	  offers	  a	  starting	  point,	  an	  
attempt	  at	  theorising	  some	  key	  issues.	  	  
With	   this	   in	   mind,	   this	   chapter	   will	   begin	   with	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   main	  
constituents	   of	   the	   HWP.	   It	   will	   then	   seek	   to	   contextualise	   it	   historically	   by	  
invoking	   the	   theme	   of	   the	   continuities	   and	   ruptures	   that	   played	   a	   role	   in	   its	  
formation.	   It	  will	   argue	   that	  China’s	  watershed	  point	  was	  not	  Deng’s	   reforms,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Justin	  Yifu	  Lin,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  xvii;	  see	  also	  Barry	  Sautman	  and	  Yan	  Hairong,	  ‘Friends	  and	  Interests:	  
China’s	  Distinctive	  Links	  with	  Africa’	  in	  Dorothy-­‐Grace	  Guerrero	  and	  Firoze	  Manji	  (eds),	  China’s	  
New	  Role	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  South:	  A	  Search	  For	  a	  New	  Perspective	  (Fahamu-­‐	  Networks	  for	  Social	  
Justice	  2008)	  100.	  
39	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  12.	  
40	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ibid	  (n	  31)	  7.	  
41	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  The	  Long	  Twentieth	  Century:	  Money,	  Power	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Times	  
(new	  edn,	  Verso	  2010)	  277-­‐308	  and	  generally.	  
42	  Giovanni	  Arrighi	  and	  Beverley	  J.	  Silver,	  Chaos	  and	  Governance	  in	  the	  Modern	  System	  




but	  rather	  the	  violent	  encounter	  of	  the	  Opium	  Wars.	  It	  was	  this	  trauma	  that,	  in	  
the	  vein	  of	  neoliberal	  shock	  therapies,	   ‘depatterned’	  China’s	  identity	  and	  made	  
her	  receptive	  to	  a	  new	  one,	  this	  time	  constructed	  for	  her	  by	  the	  West.44	  	  Against	  
this	  background,	  the	  HWP	  will	   then	  be	  problematised	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  way	  it	  
interfaces	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  order,	  including	  through	  the	  BITs	  program.	  	  
	  
Harmonious	  World	  	  
Peace	  and	  prosperity	  in	  process	  
It	  may	  be	  telling	  that	  the	  HWP	  (hexie	  shijie)	  was	  internationally	  inaugurated	  not	  
at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   world-­‐system,	   but	   at	   its	   periphery	   and	   semi-­‐periphery	   -­‐	   a	  
mention	   at	   the	   Jakarta	   Asian-­‐African	   Summit	   in	   April	   2005	   and	   in	   a	   joint	  
statement	  issued	  by	  China	  and	  Russia	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  Hu’s	  visit	  there	  some	  
two	  months	  later.45	  	  The	  periphery	  and	  semi-­‐periphery	  were	  followed	  in	  quick	  
succession	  by	  a	  stage	  of	  international	  governance	  -­‐	  Hu	  Jintao’s	  speech	  to	  the	  UN	  
in	  September	  2005,	  and	  more	  recently,	  his	  December	  2011	  key	  address	  to	  the	  
General	   Debate	   of	   the	   64th	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   entitled	   ‘Work	   Together	   to	  
Build	   a	   Common	   Future’.46	  	   It	   seems	   a	   direct	   pitch	   to	   the	   core	  was	   bypassed	  
altogether,	  albeit	  that	  in	  the	  US	  the	  HWP	  went	  on	  to	  form	  part	  of	  foreign	  policy	  
debates.47	  	  The	  place	  of	  diffusion	  appears	  congruent	  with	  substantive	  content.	  
For	   at	   its	   core,	   the	   HWP	   is	   a	   discrete	   treatise	   about	   the	   political	   economy	   of	  
globalisation,	  about	  the	  systemic	  inequality	  in	  access	  to	  the	  world’s	  wealth,	  and	  
the	   capacity	   of	   transformations	   to	   take	   place	   peacefully.48	  	   It	   is	   a	   rising,	   yet	  
developing	   power’s	   promise	   to	   avoid	   the	   road	   of	   expansion	   and	   aggression	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  On	  ‘depatterning’	  in	  shock	  therapy	  see	  Naomi	  Klein,	  The	  Shock	  Doctrine:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Disaster	  
Capitalism	  (Allen	  Lane	  2007)	  25-­‐38.	  
45	  Sienho	  Yee,	  ‘Toward	  a	  Harmonious	  World:	  The	  Roles	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  of	  Co-­‐
Progressiveness	  and	  Leader	  States’	  (2008)	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  7	  (1)	  99.	  
46	  ibid	  100;	  ‘Working	  Together	  to	  Build	  a	  Harmonious	  World	  Is	  Socialist	  China’s	  World	  Outlook’	  
[1	  December	  2011]	  People’s	  Daily	  Online	  
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/100668/102793/102813/7662583.html>	  accessed	  29	  Oct	  
2012.	  	  
47	  Dongsheng	  Di,	  ‘Continuity	  and	  Changes:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  of	  China’s	  New	  Grand	  Strategy’	  
(2007)	  12	  Historia	  Actual	  Online	  7.	  	  
48	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  289-­‐95.	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trodden	   by	   its	   predecessors.49	  	   Within	   the	   developed/developing	   dichotomy	  
that	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  globalised	  contradictions,	  China	  positions	  herself	  firmly	  in	  
the	  developing	  camp	  with	  which	  she	  declares	  solidarity,	  where	  she	  will	  remain	  
‘for	  a	   long	   time	   to	  come’,50	  and	   from	  where,	  being	   the	  biggest	  of	   them	  all,	   she	  
calls	   for	  a	  Confucian	   ‘unity	  without	  uniformity’	   in	   the	  collaborative	  endeavour	  
of	  reconstituting	  an	  order	  of	  ‘commonly	  prosperous	  world’.51	  
Thus,	  the	  HWP’s	  preoccupation	  is	  with	  the	  historically	  well-­‐rehearsed	  issues	  of	  
development	   and	   peace.	  However,	   it	   is	   neither	   a	   Kantian	   prescription	   for	   the	  
establishment	   of	   peace	   where	   the	   ‘natural	   state	   is	   one	   war’,52	  nor	   is	   it	   the	  
neoliberal	  discourse	  of	  Fukuyama’s	  end-­‐point	  of	  historical	  evolution.53	  	  Rather,	  
it	   is	   a	   less	   ambitious	   theorem	   about	   where	   we	   are	   now,	   and	   what	   we	   may	  
potentially	  achieve	  by	  acting	  in	  harmony	  with	  existing	  dispositions.	  	  Where	  we	  
are	   now	   is	   not	   a	   reflection	   of	   a	   universalised	   law	   of	   nature.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   a	  
product	   of	   ‘the	   international	   balance	   of	   power’	   that	   is	   currently	   changing	   ‘in	  
favour	  of	  the	  maintenance	  of	  world	  peace’,	  but	  the	  immanent	  dynamic	  of	  which	  
may	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  disposition.54	  	  For	  ‘[i]n	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  world	  of	  today,	  
all	  doctrines,	  systems,	  models	  and	  paths	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  test	  of	  the	  time	  and	  
practice’.55	  	  What	  we	  may	  potentially	  achieve	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  for	  peace	  that	  
is	  inextricable	  from	  the	  right	  to	  subsistence	  –	  the	  primary	  right	  from	  which	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  ibid	  291;	  ‘What	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  Means	  to	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World’	  in	  ‘China’s	  
Peaceful	  Development’	  (2011)	  White	  Paper	  Chinese	  Government	  Official	  Web	  Portal	  Gov.cn	  
<http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-­‐09/06/content_1941354_2.htm>	  accessed	  20	  Aug	  2011.	  
50	  ‘China’s	  Path	  to	  Peaceful	  Development	  is	  a	  Choice	  Necessitated	  by	  History’	  in	  White	  Paper,	  
ibid	  (n	  49)	  1.	  
51	  ‘Working	  Together	  to	  Build	  a	  Harmonious	  World’,	  People’s	  Daily,	  ibid	  (46).	  
52	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  ‘Perpetual	  Peace:	  A	  Philosophical	  Sketch	  1795’;	  But	  see	  Samuel	  S	  Kim	  ‘China	  
and	  Globalization:	  Confronting	  Myriad	  of	  Challenges	  and	  Opportunities’	  (2009)	  33	  3	  Asian	  
Perspectives	  41	  at	  55	  <http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm>	  accessed	  22	  Aug	  
2012;	  Dongsheng	  Di,	  ibid	  (n	  47)	  13.	  
53	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  ‘The	  end	  of	  History?’	  (Summer	  1989)	  The	  National	  Interest	  
<http://courses.essex.ac.uk/GV/GV905/IR%20Media%202010-­‐
11/W4%20Readings/Fukuyama%20End%20of%20History.pdf>	  accessed	  3	  July	  2011;	  Francis	  
Fukuyama,	  The	  End	  of	  History	  and	  The	  Last	  Man	  (Penguin	  Books	  1992)	  xii,	  xv.	  
54	  Hu	  Jintao,	  Report,	  ibid	  (n	  9);	  but	  Hu	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  however	  the	  international	  disposition	  
might	  change	  ‘the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  people	  will	  always	  pursue	  common	  development,	  
cooperation	  and	  a	  peaceful,	  independent	  foreign	  policy’.	  
55	  White	  Paper,	  ibid	  (n	  49)	  1.	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other	   rights	   derive. 56 	  	   In	   other	   words,	   ‘peace	   and	   development’	   is	  
conceptualised	  as	  a	  current	  trend,	  a	  choice	  between	  wellbeing	  and	  perishing,57	  
and	  the	  object	  of	  the	  global	  undertaking.	  Peace	  is	  both	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  and	  the	  
outcome	  of	  development	  transiting	  to	  a	  stage	  of	  ‘common	  prosperity’.58	  	  
In	   this	   structural	   triangulation	   -­‐	   present	   conditions,	   the	   strategy	   that	   these	  
conditions	   call	   for	   and	   the	   end	   result	   of	   its	   successful	   implementation	   –	  
resonates	   the	   triangular	   logic	   of	   what	   Qin	   terms	   Chinese	   ‘harmonious	  
dialectics’: 59 	  a	   process	   of	   appropriate	   responses	   that	   implicates	   relational	  
identities,	  situational	  dispositions	  and	  the	  immanence	  of	  change.	  Understanding	  
this	   reasoning,	   argues	   Qin,	   is	   pivotal	   to	   grasping	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   HWP	  
discourse.60	  	   Central	   to	   it,	   he	   says,	   is	   the	  differentiation	  between	   the	  Hegelian	  
concept	  of	  a	  fixed	  being	  and	  the	  Chinese	  notion	  of	  becoming	  –	  The	  fluid	  process	  
through	   which	   society	   and	   institutions	   are	   constantly	   shaped	   and	   re-­‐shaped	  
through	   their	  mutual	   interactions.	   If	   in	  Hegelian	  dialectics,	  A	   and	  B	   represent	  
separate,	  determinate	  and	  independent	  entities,	  engaged	  in	  a	  conflictual	  contest	  
that	   can	   only	   be	   resolved	   through	   domination	   or	   annihilation,	   in	   Chinese	  
dialectics	  A	  is	  inclusive	  of	  non-­‐A,	  so	  that	  one	  evolves	  into	  the	  other	  through	  an	  
evolutionary	   dynamic	   of	   engagement. 61 	  	   Being	   interdependent	   and	  
complementary,	   essential	   properties	   are	   not	   self-­‐standing.	   Rather,	   they	   are	  
determined	   by	   the	   constant	   and	   transformative	   motion	   that	   is	   forever	   in	  
process.62	  	   This	   reconciliatory,	   non-­‐zero	   gaming	   relational	   process,	   in	   which	  
each	  includes,	  complements	  and	  absorbs	  the	  other,	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  harmonic	  
systemic	   whole.63 	  	   Thus,	   China’s	   instigation	   of	   market	   economy	   does	   not	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represent	  a	  conflictual	  departure	  from	  planned	  economy.	  Market	  economy	  and	  
central	  planning	  are	  mutually	   inclusive	  opposites	   that	  are	   free	  of	   an	  either	  or	  
logic.	  A	  ‘socialist	  market	  economy’	  is	  not	  an	  oxymoron	  because,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  
Deng	   Xiaoping,	   ‘there	   are	   elements	   of	   market	   economy	   in	   socialism	   and	  
elements	  of	  planned	  economy	  in	  capitalism’.64	  	  It	  follows	  that	  any	  encounter	  is	  
not	  ‘necessarily	  violent	  and	  confrontational,	  unless	  we	  make	  it	  so’.65	  	  
‘We	  make	   it	   so’	  when	   the	   relational	  process	  departs	   from	  three	  key	  concepts:	  	  
harmony,	  the	  situational	  disposition	  and	  becoming.	  
The	  premise	  of	  harmony	  (he)	  
Here	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  ‘any	  two	  opposites	  in	  a	  process	  are	  fundamentally	  
non-­‐conflicting,	  and	  that	  contradictions	  can	  be	  solved	  through	  complementary	  
interaction	   before	   a	   new	   synthesis	   is	   born’.66	  	   Importantly,	   harmony	   is	   the	  
opposite	   of	   uniformity.	   For	   it	   arises,	   not	   out	   of	   sameness,	   but	   from	   the	  
interconnectedness	   of	   complementary	   differences,	   to	   form	  what	   Angle	   terms	  
‘engagement	   despite	   distinctiveness’. 67 	  	   Harmony	   is	   similarly	   averse	   to	  
uncritical	  obedience.	   Since	   the	  welfare	  of	  people	   is	   the	  government’s	  ultimate	  
aim	   and	   the	   sole	   test	   of	   its	  morality,68	  its	   long-­‐term	  harmoniousness	   requires	  
active	   disapproval	   of	   bad	   decisions	   and	   mistreatment.69	  	   In	   the	   words	   of	  
Confucius:	  ‘The	  gentleman	  agrees	  with	  others	  without	  being	  an	  echo;	  the	  small	  
man	   echoes	  without	   being	   in	   agreement’.70	  	   The	   echo	   of	   disagreement	   in	   the	  
HWP	  may	   be	   found	   in	   its	   conceptualisation	   of	   globalisation	   as	   a	   cooperative	  
endeavour,	   one	   that	   strives	   for,	   and	   is	   legitimised,	   by	   peoples’	   welfare	   –	  
improved	   international	   trade	   and	   financial	   systems,	   fairness,	   justice	   and	  
continuing	   solidarity	   with	   developing	   countries. 71 	  Thus,	   China	   remains	  
committed	   to	   increasing	   market	   access,	   in	   accordance	   with	   internationally	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recognized	   economic	   and	   trade	   rules,72	  and	   to	   advancing	   the	   liberalisation	   of	  
trade	   and	   investment.73	  	   Yet,	   she	   also	   appears	   to	   distance	   herself	   from	   the	  
neoliberal	  notion	  of	  an	   interstate	  system	  that	   is	  driven	  by	  competition,	  and	   in	  
which	   welfare	   has	   been	   made	   subsidiary	   to	   market	   compulsions.74	  	   In	   other	  
words,	   as	   underscored	   by	   Stiglitz,	   in	   the	   Chinese	   paradigm,	   trade	   and	  
investment	  liberalisation	  is	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  
the	  end	  –	  peoples’	  welfare	  –	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.75	  
Situational	  disposition	  (shi)	  
Zhu	  Liqun	  posits	  the	  concept	  of	  situational	  disposition	  as	  key	  to	  understanding	  
China’s	   relationship	  with	   the	   external.76	  	   Lin	   Yifu	   gave	   it	   a	  modern	  makeover	  
when	   he	   talked	   about	   the	   principle	   of	   adapting	   to	   a	   changing	   environment.77	  	  
Shi	  refers	  to	  the	  disposition	  of	  things.	  It	  is	  a	  disposition	  that	  permanently	  sways	  
between	   the	   static	   and	   the	   dynamic,	   but	   the	  movement	   of	  which	   has	   little	   in	  
common	  with	  Western	  understanding	  of	   ‘cause	  and	  effect’,	   ‘means	   to	  an	  end’,	  
Hegelian	   thesis/antithesis	   and	   aspirations	   for	   a	   final	   truth.78	  	   Its	   state	   of	  
perpetual	   movement	   originates	   from	   its	   inherent	   potential	   for	   change	   rather	  
than	  from	  human	  initiative.79	  	  It	  follows	  that	  ‘the	  only	  proposition	  that	  does	  not	  
change	   is	   that	   everything	   else	   is	   subject	   to	   change’.80	  For	   Deng	   and	   Moore,	  
China’s	   assessment	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   global	   transformation	   is	   premised	   on	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confidence	   in	  the	   international	   interstate	  system’s	  ability	   to	  accommodate	  her	  
upward	   mobility. 81 	  	   This	   observation	   may	   however	   be	   misreading	   the	  
paradigm’s	   tenor	   of	   transformative	   spontaneity	   -­‐	   the	   unavoidable	   movement	  
that	  is	  independent	  of	  external	  intervention,	  yet	  calls	  for	  corresponding	  action.	  
It	  is	  not	  that	  China	  seeks	  to	  rise	  and	  influence,	  or	  that	  she	  is	  endowed	  with	  US	  
style	   exceptionalism.82	  	  Rather,	   being	   ‘the	  biggest	   developing	   country’	   to	   have	  
made	   the	   correct	   strategic	   choice	   of	   following	   the	   new	   path	   of	   ‘peaceful	  
development	  and	  mutually	  beneficial	  cooperation’,	  and	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  
globalised	   disposition,	   her	   historical	   role	   cannot	   but	   be	   such,	   that	   its	   impact	  
‘will	  manifest	  itself	  over	  time’.83	  	  	  
The	   shi	   calls	   for	  understanding	   the	   international	   system’s	  distinctive	   features,	  
its	   power	   configuration	   and	   the	   direction	   of	   its	   historical	   movement.84	  	   Seen	  
through	   the	   lens	  of	   the	  HWP,	   three	  main	   themes	  emerge:	  peace,	  development	  
and	   cooperation,	   the	   pursuit	   of	   which	   forms	   the	   ‘irresistible	   trend	   of	   the	  
times;85	  the	   related	   ‘irreversible’	   progress	   toward	   a	   multipolar	   world	   that	   is	  
attendant	   upon	   deepening	   globalised	   interdependence	   and	   technological	  
advances;86	  and	  the	  residual	  threat	  to	  peace	  and	  development	  that	  is	  associated	  
with	   the	  operation	  of	   hegemonic	  power	  politics	   and	   its	   concomitant	   conflicts,	  
imbalances	  and	  ever	  widening	  North-­‐South	  gap.87	  	  
Thus,	   China’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   current	   international	   configuration	  
articulates	   an	   understanding	   of	   globalisation	   as	   a	   ‘double	   edge	   sword’,	  
dialectical	   process.88	  	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   peace	   promoting	   development	   and	  
reformative	   opportunities	   are	   opened	   up	   by	   a	   technologically	   innovative,	  
integrated	   and	   internationalised	   system	   of	   production.89	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Yong	  Deng	  and	  Thomas	  G.	  Moore,	  ‘China	  Views	  Globalization:	  Towards	  a	  New	  Great-­‐Power	  
Politics?’	  [2004]	  The	  Washington	  Quarterly	  117	  at	  121.	  
82	  On	  American	  exceptionalism	  see	  for	  example,	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr,	  The	  Irony	  of	  America’s	  
History	  (The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  1952.	  
83	  ‘What	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  Means	  to	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World’,	  ibid	  (n	  49)	  1.	  
84	  Zhu	  Liqun,	  ibid	  (n	  76)	  17-­‐18.	  
85	  Hu	  Jintao,	  Report	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  16;	  ‘China’s	  Foreign	  Policies	  for	  Pursuing	  Peaceful	  Development’	  
in	  White	  Paper	  ibid	  (n	  49).	  
86	  Hu	  Jintao,	  Report	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  16.	  
87	  ibid.	  
88	  Deng	  and	  Moore,	  ibid	  (n	  81)	  118-­‐21.	  
89	  ‘What	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  Means	  to	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World’,	  ibid	  (n	  49)	  1.	  
191	  
	  
developing	   countries	   are	   increasingly	   impoverished,	   marginalised	   and	  
subjugated	   because	   this	   same	   globally	   integrated	   production	   system	   is	   under	  
the	  hegemonic	  control	  of	  developed	  counties	  and	  their	  TNCs’.90	  	  In	  other	  words,	  
globalisation	   as	   a	   peace	   enhancing	   co-­‐operative	   endeavour	   is	   posited	   against	  
the	   residues	   of	   imperialist	   and	   exploitative	   past,	   the	   remains	   of	   the	   unethical	  
rule	  of	  might	  that	  once	  inflicted	  such	  great	  sufferings	  on	  the	  Chinese	  people.91	  
For	   Long	   Yongtu,	   deputy	   foreign	   trade	   minister	   who	   was	   responsible	   for	  
negotiating	   China’s	   entry	   into	   the	   WTO,	   hegemonism	   and	   globalisation	  
combined,	  represent	   ‘a	  worldwide	  industrial	  restructuring’.	  Such	  restructuring	  
is	   implemented	   by	   developed	   countries	   through	   the	   agency	   of	   their	   TNCs.92	  
Developing	   economies	   are	   placed	   in	   a	   subordinate	   position,	   whereby	   the	  
survival	   of	   their	   economies	   is	   put	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   others.93 	  	   This	   rather	  
unremarkable	  observation	  is	  rendered	  more	  interesting	  when	  accompanied	  by	  
the	  proposition	  that,	  neither	  hegemonism	  and	  big	  powers	  politics	  nor	  unequal	  
development,	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  globalisation.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  how	  
globalisation	  is	  managed.94	  	  
New	  management	  necessitates	  a	  change	  to	  power	  configurations.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  
a	  multipolar	  power	  dynamic	   is	  posited	  as	  a	  solution,	  and	  the	  route	  away	  from	  
the	  conflicts	  attendant	  upon	  the	  hegemon’s	  propensity	  to	   flatten	  differences.95	  	  
The	   emergence	   of	   new	   centers	   of	   decision	   thus	   facilitates	   pluralistic,	   non-­‐
conflictual	   globalisation,	   opens	   up	   opportunities	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   new	  
partnerships,96	  and	  enables	  structural	  and	   institutional	   reforms	   from	  within.97	  	  
It	  provides	  the	  framework	  necessary	  for	   ‘winning	  without	  fighting’.98	  	  Further,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Jenny	  Clegg,	  China’s	  Global	  Strategy:	  Towards	  a	  Multipolar	  World	  (Pluto	  Press	  2009)	  84-­‐85.	  
91	  Zhu	  Liqun,	  ibid	  (n	  76)	  23.	  
92	  Clegg,	  ibid	  (n	  90)	  84-­‐85	  citing	  from	  Thomas	  Moore,	  ‘China	  and	  Globalisation’	  in	  Samuel	  S.	  Kim	  
(ed)	  East	  Asia	  and	  Globalization	  (Rowan	  and	  Littlefield	  2000)	  116;	  but	  see	  Kim,	  ibid	  (n	  52)	  52	  
arguing	  that	  by	  2001	  multipolarity	  has	  become	  disconnected	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  globalisation.	  
93	  Clegg,	  ibid.	  
94	  Clegg,	  ibid	  (n	  90)	  105;	  Deng	  and	  Moore,	  ibid	  (n	  81)	  122.	  
95	  Jacques,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  142;	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  Chinese	  debates	  on	  hegemonism	  see	  Zhu	  Liqun,	  
ibid	  (n	  76)	  23-­‐26.	  
96	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  China’s	  partnerships	  diplomacy	  see	  Su	  Hao,	  ibid	  (n	  58)	  37-­‐47.	  
97	  Deng	  and	  Moore,	  ibid	  (n	  81)	  121-­‐25.	  
98	  Clegg,	  ibid	  (90)	  71;	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  multipolarisation	  see	  Zhang	  Yongjin,	  ‘Understanding	  
Chinese	  Views	  of	  the	  Emerging	  Global	  Order’	  in	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ibid	  (n	  31)	  
150-­‐52;	  see	  also	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Cabestan,	  ‘Learning	  from	  the	  EU?	  China’s	  changing	  outlook	  toward	  
multilateralism’	  in	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ibid	  (n	  31)	  203-­‐10.	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multipolarity	  is	  not	  static.	  Its	  immanent	  dynamism	  will	  eventually	  turn	  it	  into	  a	  
multilateral	   order	   that	   is	   similarly	   centred	   on	   co-­‐operative	   harmonious	  
diversity.99	  	   ‘Multilateralism,	  mutually	  beneficial	   co-­‐operation	  and	   the	  spirit	  of	  
inclusiveness’,	  Hu	  Jintao	  told	  the	  Plenary	  Meeting	  of	  the	  UN,	  ‘should	  be	  upheld	  
in	   realizing	   common	   security	   and	   prosperity	   and	   in	   building	   a	   harmonious	  
world’.100	  	  This	  view	  of	  multipolarity	  as	  the	  route	  to	  a	  truly	  free	  and	  pluralistic	  
world	  was	  articulated	  in	  2004	  by	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	  multipolarisation	  of	  the	  world	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  diversity	  
of	   the	  world.	   The	  world	   is	   a	   colorful	   and	   varied	   in	  posture,	   and	  
the	   mode	   of	   development	   is	   diversified.	   There	   should	   not	   and	  
cannot	  be	  such	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  when	  ‘my	  flowers	  blossom,	  a	  
hundred	   other	   flowers	   will	   wither	   away’	   (….).	   Imposing	   a	  
country’s	   concept	   of	   value	   and	   mode	   of	   development	   on	   other	  
countries	   and	   pushing	   this	   through	   by	   force	   is	   bound	   to	   trigger	  
conflicts	  with	  other	   countries	   and	   civilizations.	  This	   can	  only	  be	  
the	   way	   of	   causing	   disorder.	   The	   fact	   is	   that	   world	  
multipolarisation	  (….)	  has	  brought	  to	  view	  its	  contour:	  A	  unified	  
Europe	  is	  rising;	  the	  fallen	  Russia	  is	  regaining	  its	  vital	  energy;	  the	  
ASEAN	  countries	  are	  forging	  ahead	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand;	  India	  and	  China	  
are	  undergoing	  rapid	  development;	  Africa	  has	  also	  begun	  to	  take	  
off	   and	  march	   towards	  unity	   and	   self-­‐improvement.	  Only	   this	   is	  
the	   balance	   favourable	   to	   peace	   and	   the	   democratization	   of	  
international	   relations,	   and	   is	   the	   developmental	   trend	   of	  
history.101	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Zhu	  Liqun,	  ibid	  (n	  76)	  27.	  
100	  Jiang	  Zhuqing,	  ‘Hu	  calls	  for	  harmonious	  world’	  [16	  September	  2005]	  China	  Daily	  
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-­‐8836323.html>	  accessed	  15	  Nov	  2012;	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  
China’s	  embrace	  of	  multilateral	  institutions	  see	  Kai	  He,	  ‘China	  Peaceful	  Rise	  and	  Multilateral	  
Institutions:	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Harmonious	  World’	  in	  Sujian	  Guo	  and	  Blanchard,	  ibid	  (n	  7)	  65-­‐78.	  




Here,	   actors	   and	   institutions	   transform	   and	   are	   transformed	   as	   part	   of	   their	  
interactive	   identity	   formation,	   and	   in	   line	   with	   the	   disposition	   of	   the	  
situation.102	  	  Thus,	  China’s	  integration	  into	  the	  global	  order	  represents	  a	  fitting	  
response	   to	   the	   post-­‐cold	  war	  world	   period,	   a	   time	  when	   no	   single	   power	   is	  
wholly	   independent	  and	  capable	  of	  unilateral	  problems	  solving.	  Consequently,	  
cooperation	  replaced	  conflict	  as	   the	  appropriate	  dispositional	   response.	  China	  
reacted	  accordingly	  by	  opening	  up,	  and	  replacing	  the	  policy	  of	  ‘be	  prepared	  for	  
war’	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   economic	   development	   and	   interaction	   with	   the	  
international	  community.103	  She	  changed.	  By	  so	  doing,	   she	   is	   transforming	   the	  
world	  around	  her.	  	  
Peace	  and	  prosperity	  –	  diverse	  international	  community	  
In	   sum,	   Hu	   Jintao	   conceptualised	   his	   vision	   of	   a	   harmonious	   world	   in	   eight	  
characters	   –	   daijiu	   heping,	   gongtong	   cairong	   meaning	   ‘lasting	   peace	   and	  
common	   prosperity’.104	  	   Implicit	   in	   this	   conceptualisation	   is	   an	   emphasis	   on	  
economic	   imperatives.	   	   Countries	   and	   their	   people	   are	   bound	   together	   by	   a	  
consciously	  shared	  value	  system.	  At	   its	  core	   lies	   the	  aspiration	  to	  realise	  their	  
sovereign	   right	   to	   economic	   prosperity.105	  	   Within	   this	   overarching	   common	  
interest	   in,	   and	   entitlement	   to	   development,	   diverse	   civilizational	   values	   and	  
national	  permutations	  will	  continue	  to	  operate	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  right	  –	  ‘the	  right	  
of	  the	  peoples	  of	  each	  State	  to	  freely	  choose	  their	  social	  system	  and	  their	  path	  of	  
development’	   without	   external	   interference. 106 	  	   In	   this	   recognition	   of	   the	  
existence	   of	   an	   internationally	   shared	   values	   system	   the	   HWP	   meets	   Bull’s	  
definition	  of	  an	  international	  society,	  and	  articulates	  one	  of	  the	  two	  limbs	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Qin	  Yaqing,	  ibid	  (n	  59)	  144,	  149.	  	  
103	  ibid	  148.	  
104	  Blanchard	  and	  Sujian	  Guo,	  ibid	  (n	  30)	  3.	  
105	  Hu	  Jintao,	  Report,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  17.	  




for	   Bederman	   are	   essential	   to	   understanding	   the	   process	   of	   globalisation.107	  	  
Yet,	  it	  is	  a	  shared	  values	  system	  that	  shies	  away	  from	  normative	  universalism	  as	  
in	   Kant’s	   notion	   of	   ubiquitous	   Western	   representative	   democracies	   and	  
Fukuyama’s	   ‘end	   of	   history’.108	  	   On	   the	   contrary,	   peace	   and	   development	   are	  
contingent	   on	   the	   preservation	   of	   cultural,	   economic	   and	   political	  
particularities.	  	  
Similarly,	   the	  HWP	   appears	   to	   distance	   itself	   from	   the	   state-­‐centric	   approach	  
that	   forms	   the	   second	   limb	   of	   Bull’s	   definition	   and	   Bederman’s	   essential	  
understanding	   of	   international	   community. 109 	  	   The	   language	   mostly	   used	  
instead	   is	   one	   of	   nations	   and	   people.	   This	   choice	   of	   words	   may	   be	   seen	   as	  
serving	   two	   purposes.	   	   First,	   it	   bypasses	   the	   Westerncentric	   discourse	   that	  
posits	  sovereignty	  and	  globalisation	  as	  exclusive	   to	   the	  European	   invention	  of	  
nation-­‐states,	   while	   ancient	   states	   are	   repudiated	   as	   polities	   lacking	   in	   self-­‐
determination.110	  	   Thus,	   the	   Silk	   Road	   and	   Zheng	   He’s	   seven	   voyages	   to	   the	  
Western	   seas	   during	   the	   Ming	   Dynasty	   can	   be	   advanced	   as	   examples	   of	  
globalised	   dealings	   that	   go	   back	   to	   antiquity.	   They	   testify	   to	   China’s	   ancient	  
national	   identity	   and	   essential	   capacity	   for	   peaceful,	   co-­‐operative,	   respectful	  
and	   exchange-­‐based	   interactions	   with	   people	   of	   different	   civilizations. 111	  
Second,	   it	   supports	   an	   understanding	   of	   rights	   as	   collective	   rather	   than	  
individual	   –	   the	   collective	   right	   of	   people	   to	   self-­‐determined	   national	  
configurations,	  to	  material	  wellbeing	  and	  to	  equal,	  just	  and	  fair	  treatment.	  	  
Implicit	   in	  the	  notions	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  shared	  values	  is	  the	  recognition	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  world	  order	  to	  which	  China	  is	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  integral.112	  
It	  is	  an	  order	  in	  process,	  one	  in	  which	  change	  is	  inevitable,	  and	  where	  individual	  
nations	   and	   the	   order	   they	   produce	   are	   mutually	   transformative.113 	  	   This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Hedley	  Bull,	  The	  Anarchical	  Society:	  A	  Study	  of	  Order	  in	  World	  Politics	  (Macmillan	  1977)	  13;	  
David	  J.	  Bederman,	  Globalization	  and	  International	  Law	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2008)	  3;	  Hu	  Jintao	  
Report,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  17.	  
108	  Bederman,	  ibid	  16.	  
109	  Bederman,	  ibid;	  Hu	  refers	  to	  ‘states’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  equal	  participation	  in	  and	  
democratization	  of	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  
110	  	  ibid	  4.	  
111	  ‘China’s	  Path	  to	  Peaceful	  Development	  is	  a	  Choice	  Necessitated	  by	  History’,	  ibid	  (n	  57)	  1.	  	  
112	  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ibid	  (n	  31)	  6,	  10.	  
113	  ibid	  6-­‐7,	  10;	  Wang	  Gungwu,	  ibid	  (n	  80)	  23.	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fluidity	  may	  offer	  at	  least	  a	  partial	  explanation	  for	  the	  high	  level	  of	  abstraction	  
and	  corresponding	  in-­‐built	  manoeuvrability	  that	  typifies	  China’s	  worldview.114	  	  
Contingencies	   are	   thus	   accommodated	   through	   congenital	   flexibility	   within	  
which	   progressive	   adjustments	   can	   take	   place.	   However,	   the	   implications	   of	  
fluidity	  go	  further	  than	  that.	  If	  all	  doctrines,	  systems,	  models	  and	  paths	  merely	  
rest	  on	  temporary	  dispositions	  –	  nothing	  is	  forever	  so	  to	  speak	  –	  at	  first	  blush	  
the	  HWP	  seems	  to	  distance	  itself	  from	  doctrinal	  thinking.	  Rather,	  as	  suggested	  
by	  Clegg	  and	  Deng	  and	  Moore,	  it	  appears	  confined	  to	  being	  a	  prototype	  for	  the	  
management	  of	  the	  global	  space,115	  Van	  Ness’s	  model	  of	  collaborative	  order	  and	  
win-­‐win	   negotiated	   solutions,	   to	   be	   contrasted	   with	   the	   US	   led	   competitive,	  
zero-­‐	  sum	  order	  with	  its	  prescriptive	  neoliberal	  policies.116	  	  
Striking	  in	  Van	  Ness’s	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  two	  models	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  they	  converge	  in	  their	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  process	  of	  management.	  It	  
is	  arguable	   that	   the	  HWP	  does	  not	  altogether	   foreclose	  Mouffe’s	  sphere	  of	   the	  
political.	   It	   does	   envision	   a	   new	   power	   design	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   pluralistic	  
multipolarity.117	  	   In	   addition,	   in	   its	   focus	   on	   people,	   one	   may	   even	   detect	   a	  
residue	  of	  Marxist	  solidarity	   that	   transcends	  nation-­‐states	   in	   the	  pursuance	  of	  
workers	  led	  polities.118	  Yet,	  the	  central	  question,	  to	  which	  Wallerstein	  attributes	  
the	   difficulties	   encountered	   by	   socialist	   movements	   in	   power,	   remains	  
unanswered.119	  	  That	  is,	  which	  of	  the	  various	  groups	  that	  form	  the	  collective	  is	  
to	  constitute	   the	   ‘people’	   -­‐	  might	   they	  be	   the	  neoliberal	  consumers	  of	  Chicago	  
School	   orthodoxy?120	  	   Might	   it	   be	   that,	   again	   in	   a	   neoliberal	   vein,	   it	   is	   their	  
purchasing	  power	  that	  occupies	  morality’s	  commanding	  heights?	  Further,	  what	  
will	   constitute	   justice	   and	   fairness?	   The	   HWP	   is	   assisted	   in	   hedging	   these	  
questions	   by	   invoking	   the	   harmonic	   logic	   of	   perpetual	   transformation.	   Yet,	   at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Su	  Hao,	  ibid	  (n	  58)	  29.	  
115	  Clegg,	  ibid	  (n	  90)	  88;	  Deng	  and	  Moore,	  ibid	  (n	  81)	  122.	  
116	  Clegg,	  ibid	  63;	  Peter	  Van	  Ness,	  ‘Conclusion’	  in	  Mel	  Gurtov	  and	  Peter	  Van	  Ness	  (ed),	  
Confronting	  the	  Bush	  Doctrine:	  Critical	  Views	  from	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  (Routledge	  Curzon	  2005)	  266;	  
Simon	  Bromley,	  ‘American	  Power	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  International	  Order’	  in	  William	  Brown,	  
Simon	  Bromley	  and	  Suma	  Athreye	  (eds),	  Ordering	  the	  International:	  History,	  Change	  and	  
Transformation	  (Pluto	  Press	  in	  association	  with	  the	  Open	  University	  2004)	  180.	  
117	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  52.	  
118	  Bederman,	  ibid	  (n	  107)	  16;	  the	  word	  used	  in	  the	  Chinese	  version	  is	  ‘renmin’	  which	  refers	  to	  a	  
collective	  rather	  than	  individual	  notion	  of	  people.	  
119	  ibid	  81.	  
120	  Chapter	  3	  text	  to	  n	  146-­‐47	  pp	  108.	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the	   same	   time,	   the	   technical	   management	   of	   the	   world	   order	   appears	   to	   be	  
excluded	  from	  such	  logic.	  Processwise,	  we	  are	  told,	  it	  is	  the	  system	  as	  it	  is,	  that	  
is	   to	   inform	   the	  way	  power	   is	   exercised	  and	   rights	   are	   to	  be	   realised.	  Thus,	   a	  
market	  economy	  with	  increasing	  interdependency	  at	  all	  levels,	  and	  a	  liberalised	  
trade	   and	   investment	   regime,	   represent	  not	   only	  where	  we	  are	  now,	  but	   also	  
the	  parameters	  within	  which	  future	  changes	  are	  to	  be	  affected.121	  It	  is	  here	  that	  
the	  issues	  identified	  at	  the	  outset	  resurface.	  	  
Before	   turning	   our	   attention	   to	   these	   issues,	   to	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   an	  
understanding	  that	  is	  limited	  to	  short	  term	  contingencies,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  first	  
examine	  the	  historical	  landscape	  that	  China	  traversed	  on	  her	  way	  to	  the	  HWP.	  
Historical	   contextualisation	  may	   help	   to	   throw	   better	   light	   on	   the	   two	   forces	  
that	  animate	  the	  country’s	  attempts	  at	  dealing	  with	  the	  external,	  and	  underpin	  
the	  possibility	  of	  being	  simultaneously	  the	  same	  and	  different,	  incorporated	  and	  
reformist	   –	   China’s	   ancient	   identity	   and	   the	   process	   of	   its	   adaptation	   to	  
Westernised	  modernity.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Watershed	  
Harmony	  incorporated	  	  
The	  power	  of	  gunboats	  
The	  polemic	  associated	  with	  the	  temporal	  designation	  of	  beginnings	  surfaced	  in	  
earlier	   chapters,	   when	   I	   examined	   the	   capitalist	   order’s	   progression	   towards	  
neoliberalism	   and	   the	   related	   emergence	   of	   the	   BITs	   network.	   	   The	   view	  
canvassed	  was	  that	  neither	  represents	  revolutionary	  occurrences.	  Rather,	  they	  
embody	   innovative	   inflections	   in	   a	   historical	   continuum,	   the	   foundations	   of	  
which	   can	  be	   traced	  back	   to	   the	  Roman	  Empire,	   but	   in	   the	   course	  of	  which	   a	  
specific	   capitalist	   civilization	   came	   into	   being.122	  	   I	   followed	   Foucault	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Wang	  Gungwu,	  ibid	  (n	  80)	  28.	  	  
122	  Chapter	  2	  text	  to	  n	  14-­‐20	  pp	  45-­‐46;	  chapter	  3	  text	  to	  n	  31-­‐57	  pp	  92-­‐95.	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Polanyi	   in	   attributing	   the	   origins	   of	   this	   specificity,	   and	   its	   evolvement	   into	   a	  
full-­‐fledged	  dogma	  of	  market	  liberalism,	  to	  the	  18th	  19th	  centuries.123	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  
nature	  of	  historical	  chronicles	  that	  this	  dating	  should	  be	  controversial.124	  	  Still,	  
it	  provides	  a	   fitting	   temporal	   framework	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  discussion.	   It	  
was	  around	  this	  time	  that	  capitalism	  matured	  into	  its	  industrialised	  form.125	  	  It	  
was	   also	   the	   moment	   when	   Polanyi’s	   ‘Great	   Transformation’	   collided	   with	  
China’s	   ‘Great	   Divergence’,	   and	   propelled	   the	   country	   via	   a	   ‘century	   of	  
humiliation’	   towards	   her	   own	   rupture:126	  from	   the	   centre	   to	   the	   periphery	   of	  
the	  world-­‐system,	  from	  a	  thriving	  and	  innovative	  civilization	  to	  the	  ‘sick	  man	  of	  
East	  Asia’	  and	  from	  a	  diffuser	  to	  a	  recipient	  of	  norms	  and	  structures.127	  
The	  effect	  of	  this	  rupture	  on	  China	  was	  profound.	  Indeed,	  the	  view	  taken	  here	  is	  
that	   it	   represented	   the	   beginning	   of	   China’s	   own	   Great	   Transformation,	   a	  
watershed	   point	   at	   which	   the	   course	   of	   her	   development	   changed	   in	   a	  
fundamental	   way.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   was	   a	   break	   of	   exogenous	   and	   forcible	  
origins	   that	   triggered	   a	   spectrum	   of	   indigenous	   responses,	   revolutionary	   and	  
otherwise.	   Such	   responses	   were	   in	   turn	   shaped	   to	   a	   great	   degree	   by	   the	  
encounter	   that	   precipitated	   them.	   It	   is	   therefore	   the	  moment	   by	   reference	   to	  
which,	  what	  came	  before	  and	  what	  was	  to	  follow	  is	  to	  be	  posited.	  	  That	  moment,	  
says	  Li	  Mingqi,	  was	  the	  Opium	  Wars	  (1839-­‐42	  and	  1856-­‐60),	  when	  a	  defeated	  
and	   humiliated	   China	   was	   first	   drawn	   into	   the	   orbit	   of	   the	   capitalist	   world-­‐
economy.128	  	   It	   is	   a	   fitting	  point	   at	  which	   to	   start,	   since	   it	   brings	   together	   the	  
three	  forces	  that	  combined	  to	  turn	  into	  a	  violent	  rupture	  what,	  according	  to	  the	  
HWP,	   could	   have	   been	   an	   instance	   of	   a	   non-­‐conflictual	   interactive	   identity	  
formation:	  capitalism	  and	  its	  related	  processes	  of	  war	  and	  incorporation.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Chapter	  3	  text	  to	  n	  52-­‐53	  p	  95;	  but	  see	  Frank	  questioning	  the	  existence	  and	  meaning	  of	  
capitalism.	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  330-­‐32.	  
124	  Samir	  Amin,	  Global	  History:	  A	  View	  From	  the	  South	  (Pambazuka	  Press	  2011)	  12;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  
(n	  41)	  37-­‐48;	  Ellen	  Meiskins	  Wood,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Capitalism:	  A	  Longer	  View	  (Verso	  2002)	  3;	  
Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  328-­‐29.	  
125	  Wood,	  ibid.	  
126	  Jacques,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  72.	  
127	  Li	  Xing,	  ‘Introduction	  The	  Rise	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Capitalist	  World	  Order:	  The	  “Four-­‐China”	  
Nexus’	  in	  Li	  Xing	  (ed),	  The	  Rise	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Capitalist	  World	  Order	  (Ashgate	  2010)	  5;	  the	  
term	  ‘Great	  Divergence’	  was	  coined	  by	  Ken	  Pomeranz	  to	  denote	  the	  divergence	  in	  the	  political	  
and	  economic	  fortunes	  of	  Europe	  and	  East	  Asia.	  Kenneth	  Pomeranz,	  The	  Great	  Divergence:	  
Europe,	  China	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Modern	  World	  Economy	  (Princeton	  University	  Press	  2000).	  
128	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  6;	  see	  also	  Wang	  Yiwei,	  ibid	  (n	  27)	  102.	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Of	  these	  three	  constituents,	   it	   is	  the	  second	  that	  is	   least	  contested.	  Even	  Frank	  
acknowledges	   that	   the	   culmination	   of	   China’s	   decline	   passed	   via	   the	  military	  
campaigns	  and	  conquests	  of	  the	  Opium	  Wars.129	  	  Indeed,	  for	  Arrighi	  as	  for	  Marx,	  
it	   was	   real	   gunboats	   rather	   than	   the	   artillery	   of	   cheap	   commodities	   that	  
ultimately	  was	  the	  ‘true	  “midwife”’	  of	  China’s	  subordination	  to	  the	  imperatives	  
of	  the	  “endless”	  accumulation	  of	  Western	  Capital’.130	  	  
Continuities	  and	  ruptures	  
The	  remaining	  two	  elements	  are	  more	  problematic.	  For	  Frank	  for	  example	  the	  
rise	   of	   the	   West	   and	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   East	   were	   systemically	   related	  
occurrences.	  Both	  were	  the	  product	  of	  contingencies	  and	  inflections	  in	  a	  cyclical	  
and	  integrated	  world	  economy	  rather	  than	  the	  manifestation	  of	  any	  qualitative	  
rupture	  of	  European	  innovative	  origins.	   In	  reality,	  he	  argues,	  there	  has	  always	  
been	  a	  single	  system,	  of	  which	  for	  two	  thousand	  years	  China	  (together	  with	  the	  
rest	   of	   Asia)	   was	   the	   predominant	   region.131	  	   She	   was	   never	   a	   world	   into	  
itself.132	  	   The	   tale	   of	   her	   withdrawal	   from	   international	   trade	   from	   the	   15th	  
century	  onwards,	  adds	  Hobson,	  is	  no	  more	  than	  a	  Eurocentric	  myth.133	  	  Rather,	  
Chinese	  markets	  and	  trade-­‐based	  productive	  system	  remained	  at	  the	  forefront	  
of	  world	  development	  until	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  country	  suffered	  ‘a	  relatively	  
brief	   but	   deeply	   felt	   eclipse’. 134 	  	   Industrialisation	   was	   thus	   not	   European	  
specific.	   It	   occurred	   in	   China	   some	   six	   hundred	   years	   ahead	   of	   Britain.135	  
Thereafter,	  conditions	  conflated	  to	  displace	  it	  from	  the	  East	  to	  the	  West.136	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  274;	  see	  also	  for	  example	  Michael	  Howard,	  ‘The	  Military	  Factor	  in	  
European	  Expansion’	  in	  Hedley	  Bull	  &	  Adam	  Watson,	  The	  Expansion	  of	  International	  Society	  
(Clarendon	  Press	  1985)	  33-­‐40.	  
130	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  ‘China’s	  Market	  Economy	  in	  the	  Long	  Run’	  in	  Ho-­‐fung	  Hung	  (ed),	  China	  and	  
the	  Transformation	  of	  Global	  Capitalism	  (The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press	  2009)	  24	  citing	  
from	  Karl	  Marx,	  Capital	  (Foreign	  Languages	  Publishing	  House	  1959)	  751.	  	  
131	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  5.	  
132	  ibid	  108.	  
133	  John	  M.	  Hobson,	  Eastern	  Origins	  of	  Western	  Civilization	  (CUP	  2004)	  61-­‐74.	  
134	  Gilbert	  Rozman,	  ‘The	  East	  Asian	  Region	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective’	  in	  Gilbert	  Rozman	  (ed),	  
The	  East	  Asian	  Region:	  Confucian	  Heritage	  and	  its	  Modern	  Adaptation	  (Princeton	  University	  
Press	  1991)	  6.	  
135	  Hobson,	  ibid	  (n133)	  51-­‐61.	  
136	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  283-­‐94.	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Focusing	  on	  Frank’s	  account,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  circular	  processes	  in	  which	  specificity	  
is	   absorbed	   into	   a	   notion	   of	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	   flow.	   Such	   flow	   is	   in	   turn	  
conceptualised	   as	   of	   greater	   magnitude	   and	   as	   more	   deserving	   of	   attention.	  
Indeed,	   a	   footprint	   of	   the	   HWP	   logic	  may	   be	   identified	   in	   his	   assertions	   that	  
continuity	   does	   not	   mean	   uniformity	   and	   uniformity	   does	   not	   exclude	  
diversity.137	  	   Instead,	  an	   integral	   system	  exists,	   the	  actors	  of	  which	  define	  and	  
are	  being	  defined	  through	  reciprocal	   influences.138	  	  Capitalism	  as	  an	  analytical	  
unit	   is	  rejected.	  Obsessing	  about	   its	  origins	  or	  even	   its	  existence,	  he	  argues,	   is	  
both	   futile	   and	   pointless.	   There	   was	   no	   linear	   progression	   of	   modes	   of	  
production.	   Rather,	   all	   along,	   they	   coexisted	   and	   intermingled	   within	   and	  
outside	  national	  borders.139	  	  It	  follows	  that	  any	  talk	  about	  China’s	  incorporation	  
into	   the	  world	  order	   is	  no	  more	   than	  an	  expression	  of	  misguided	  Eurocentric	  
historical	  imaging,	  one	  that	  views	  the	  rest	  as	  entrapped	  behind	  closed	  doors	  of	  
stagnation	  or,	  in	  modern	  parlance,	  lack	  of	  development.	  	  	  
There	   is	   much	   that	   is	   attractive	   in	   this	   world-­‐system	   approach	   to	   regional	  
interactions.	   First,	   it	   is	   supported	   by	   detailed	   empirical	   research	   that	   puts	   to	  
rest	   the	   Marxist/Weberian’s	   type	   chronicle,	   whereby	   Chinese	   history	   was	  
reconstructed	   using	   European	   victor’s	   terms	   of	   reference	   and	   deemed	   an	  
evolutionary	  failure.140	  	  The	  Frank	  type	  narrative	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  starts	  from	  
an	  analytical	  basis	  that	  avoids	  the	  privileging	  of	  European	  categorization.	  In	  this	  
respect,	  he	  (as	  do	  Hobson	  and	  Wong)	  fulfils	  the	  function	  of	  a	  truth-­‐teller,	  whose	  
account	   invites	   us	   to	   contest	   and	   resist	   a	   hegemonic	   discourse.	   Second,	   such	  
narrative	  avoids	  the	  erraticism	  associated	  with	  an	  analytical	  model	  that	  posits	  
China	   as	   a	   secluded	   civilizational	   totality	   to	   be	   contrasted	   with	   the	  
exceptionalism	   of	   a	   Western	   totality.	   Particularly	   when	   viewed	   through	   the	  
cultural	   lens	   of	   Confucianism	   and	   so-­‐called	   Confucian	   Capitalism,	   the	   China	   v	  
the	  West	   narrative	   tends	   to	   fluctuate	   between	   the	   ‘negative	   and	   positive	   and	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  ibid	  347,	  357,	  359.	  
138	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  25.	  
139	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  xxiv,	  331.	  
140	  R.	  Bin	  Wong,	  China	  Transformed:	  Historical	  Change	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  European	  Experience	  
(Cornell	  University	  Press	  1997)	  2,	  4,	  14-­‐15;	  Hobson,	  ibid	  (n	  133)	  1-­‐28;	  for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  
changes	  in	  Western	  discourse	  of	  China	  see	  Gregory	  Blue,	  ‘China	  and	  Western	  Social	  Thought	  in	  
the	  Modern	  Period’	  in	  Gregory	  Blue	  and	  Timothy	  Brook	  (eds),	  China	  and	  Historical	  Capitalism:	  
Genealogies	  of	  Sinological	  Knowledge	  (Studies	  in	  Modern	  Capitalism	  Series,	  CUP	  1999)	  57-­‐109.	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back	  again’:	  China	  as	  a	  place	  where	  tradition	  inhibited	  the	  dynamics	  of	  change,	  
as	  opposed	  to	  China	  as	  the	  land	  of	  opportunity,	  as	  against	  China	  as	  a	  challenger	  
and	  the	  ‘other’	  in	  Huntington’s	  clash	  of	  civilizations.141	  	  	  
Yet,	   detailed	   as	   it	   is,	   Frank’s	   exposition	   suffers	   from	   incompleteness.	   First,	  
focusing	  on	  similarities	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  distinctive	  dynamics	  risks	  a	  level	  of	  
abstraction	  that	  leaves	  out	  qualitative	  mutations	  in	  developmental	  paths.	  	  True,	  
all	   history	   is	   human	   and	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   imbued	   with	   a	   universality	   of	  
recurring	  exploitation	  and	  wars.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  
of	   qualitative	   ruptures	   that	   every	   so	   often	   interrupt	   quantitative	   processes.	  
Such	   ruptures	   operate	   to	   inject	   a	   new	   rationality	   into	   the	   motion	   of	  
accumulative	  development,	  so	  as	  to	  divert	  it	  in	  a	  new	  direction.	  In	  his	  analysis	  
of	   globalisation	   and	   its	   relations	   with	   IL,	   Bederman,	   for	   example,	   observes	   a	  
circular	  historical	  movement	  between	  globalisation	  and	  its	  reversal.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  
same	   time	   he	   also	   acknowledges	   the	   operation	   of	   linear,	   qualitatively	  
transformative	  processes	  from	  an	  age	  of	  empire,	  to	  the	  age	  of	  beliefs	  to	  the	  age	  
of	  imperialism	  and	  finally,	  to	  the	  contemporary	  age	  of	  universalism.142	  	  There	  is	  
a	   fundamental	   difference,	   observes	  Ardent,	   between	   the	   localised,	   predictable	  
power	  politics	   of	   national	   conquests	   and	   imperialism’s	   limitless	   accumulation	  
of	  power	  for	  accumulation	  sake.143	  	   	  Second,	  Frank’s	  account	   is	  essentially	  one	  
of	  an	  economist	  who	  challenges	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  real	  object,	  and	  seeks	  to	  
invalidate	   its	   discursive	   construct	   by	   proffering	   a	   new	   version	   of	   economic	  
knowledge.	  It	  is	  silent,	  however,	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  
our	  education.144	  	  It	  invites	  us	  to	  question	  our	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  place	  in	  
the	  world,	  but	  does	  not	  confront	  the	  origins	  and	  purpose	  of	  this	  understanding.	  
In	   other	   words:	   first,	   the	   premise	   of	   a	   symbiotic	   link	   between	   the	  West	   and	  
progress	   cannot	   be	   fully	   displaced	   without	   also	   addressing	   the	   power	   that	  
constructed	  this	  link	  in	  the	  first	  place;	  second,	   it	  was	  possible	  for	  a	  qualitative	  
break	  to	  have	  occurred	  even	  within	  an	  overarching	  framework	  of	  circuitry;	  and	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  Callahan,	  ibid	  (n	  28)	  xvii;	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  Confucian	  Capitalism	  see	  10-­‐11.	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  Bederman,	  ibid	  (n	  108)	  xi	  -­‐51.	  
143	  Hanna	  Ardent,	  Imperialism:	  Part	  Two	  of	  the	  Origins	  of	  Totalitarianism	  (A	  Harvest/HBJ	  Book)	  
v,	  vi.	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  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  knowledge,	  language	  and	  discourse	  see	  Michel	  Foucault	  (tr),	  
Archeology	  of	  Knowledge	  (Routledge	  Classics	  2002).	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third,	   the	   fixation	   of	   such	   rupture	   on	   a	   superiority/inferiority	   dichotomy	  
represented	   a	   hegemonic	   discursive	   construct	   formulated	   by	   the	   power	  
structures	  born	  out	  of	   this	   same	  rupture.	   	   Such	   tailored	  discourse/knowledge	  
was	   then	   presented	   for	   acceptance	   to	   its	   subjectivities,	   both	   European	   and	  
Chinese.	   As	  will	   be	   seen	   later,	   implicated	   in	   this	   acceptance	  was	   a	   process	   of	  
internalisation	   that	   functioned	   not	   only	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   legitimisation	   and	  
domination	  at	  the	  specific	  moment	  of	  rupture,	  but	  continues	  to	  animate	  China’s	  
soul	   searching	   about	   her	   place	   in	   the	   world.	  Wang	   Hui’s	   observation	   on	   this	  
point	  was	  made	  as	  a	  commentary	  on	  history	  that	  is	  constructed	  by	  reference	  to	  
Confucianism.	  However,	  it	  applies	  in	  this	  context	  too.	  History	  that	  is	  constructed	  
purely	  by	  reference	  to	  circular	  continuities,	  he	  says,	  ‘obscures	  the	  unbreakable	  
connection	   between	   the	   entire	   process	   of	   modernization	   and	   the	   history	   of	  
colonialism’.145	  	  Masked	  is	  ‘the	  basic	  motive	  power	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  modern	  
history:	   the	   regulation	  and	  standardization	   imposed	  by	  global	  markets	  on	   the	  
economic	  relationships	  of	  nations-­‐states’.146	  	  
Capitalist	  conquest	  
It	   was	   thus	   that,	   in	   reality,	   up	   to	   early	   19th	   century,	   the	  world	   economy	  was	  
Asian	  based	  with	  the	  European	   ‘	  very	  belatedly,	  slowly,	  and	  marginally’	   trying	  
to	  ‘attach	  themselves	  to	  the	  Asian	  economic	  train.’147	  	  Endless	  wars	  were	  fought	  
for	  control	  over	  sea-­‐lanes	  to	  the	  East,	  perceived	  not	  only	  as	  the	  path	  to	  wealth,	  
but	  also	  the	  key	  to	  domination	  over	  the	  entire	  commercial	  world.148	  	  It	  was	  only	  
in	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  that	  capital,	  amassed	  by	  means	  of	  profits	  repatriation	  
from	   free	   slave/cheap	   indigenous	   labour	   and	   mining	   investments	   in	   the	  
Americas	   finally	   facilitated	  a	  European	  economic	   ‘take	  off’.	  A	  periphery	  of	   the	  
world-­‐system	   until	   then	   and	   now	   awashed	   with	   money,	   Europe	   was	   in	   a	  
position	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	   a	  period	  of	   systemic	  destabilization	  engendered	  
by	   preceding	   economic	   dislocation	   in	   China,	   so	   as	   to	   rise	   to	   the	   centre.149	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  Wang	  Hui,	  China’s	  New	  Order:	  Society,	  Politics,	  and	  Economy	  in	  Transition	  (Harvard	  
University	  Press	  2003)	  162.	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  ibid.	  
147	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  277.	  
148	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  130)	  26-­‐27.	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  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	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Further,	  China’s	  18th	  century	  peace,	  prosperity	  demographic	  growth,	  ethics	  and	  
institutions	   were	   an	   inspiration	   to	   the	   leading	   figures	   of	   European	  
Enlightenment,	   inspiration	   which	   the	   great	   leap	   forward	   in	  Western	  military	  
power	   reversed	   and	   ultimately	   forcibly	   resolved	   in	   Europe’s	   favour.150	  	   China	  
also	  led	  the	  way	  in	  innovations,	  science,	  technology	  and	  medicine.151	  	  Yet,	  in	  the	  
discourse	   that	   was	   constructed	   around	   European	   colonialist/imperialist	  
ambitions,	  her	   technological	   repertoire	  and	   its	   important	   contributions	   to	   the	  
development	   of	  modern	   European	   science	  were	  marginalised.152	  	   Denied	  was	  
the	   fact	   that	   rather	   than	   a	   testimony	   to	   European	   superiority	   or	   capitalist	  
advantage,	   Europe’s	   ascent	   in	   the	   world-­‐system	   implicated	   climbing	   ‘up	   the	  
Asian	  shoulders’.153	  	  	  Such	  shoulders	  included,	  not	  only	  the	  provision	  of	  markets	  
to	  absorb	  the	  silver	  mined	  in	  the	  Americas,	  but	  also	  the	  assimilation	  of	  Eastern	  
technologies,	  ideas	  and	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  appropriation	  of	  land,	  labour	  
and	  markets.154	  	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Hobson,	  the	  West’s	  economic	  ‘take	  off’	  would	  
have	  been	  inconceivable	  without	  the	  East.155	  	  
And	   so,	   a	   19th	   century	   design	   emerges	   of	  West	   to	   East	   flow	   that	   consisted	   of	  
military	  conquests	  and	  a	  discourse,	  in	  which	  a	  ‘pristine	  West’	  was	  posited	  at	  the	  
centre	  stage	  of	  progress.	  The	  East	  was	  relegated	  to	  a	  place	  of	  irrelevancy.156	  	  But	  
what	  engendered	  and	  was	  served	  by	  this	  discursive	  design?	  Further,	  what	  were	  
its	  implications	  for	  its	  Chinese	  recipients?	  
These	  questions	  take	  us	  back	  to	  Wang	  Hui’s	  observation	  about	  the	  specificity	  of	  
modernity’s	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  universalisation	  of	  economic	  relations	  and	  
the	   power	   employed	   to	   this	   end.	   In	   other	   words,	   wars	   and	   discourse	   were	  
merely	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  Rather	  than	  an	  irrelevancy	  as	  suggested	  by	  Frank,	  the	  
real	   export	   was	   that	   of	   capitalist	   modernity.	   Implicit	   in	   this	   statement	   are	   a	  
number	   of	   propositions.	   Namely,	   that	   capitalism	   represent	   a	   specific	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  3-­‐4;	  Li	  Xing,	  ibid	  (n127)	  3.	  
151	  ibid.	  
152	  ibid	  4.	  
153	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  277-­‐83.	  
154	  See	  generally	  Hobson,	  ibid	  (n	  133).	  
155	  ibid	  2-­‐3.	  
156	  ibid	  1-­‐5.	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historically	  unique	   system	  of	   social	   relations	  with	   its	   singular	   logic;157	  that	   its	  
creation	   and	   expansion	   are	   products	   of	   agency	   rather	   than	   the	   natural	   and	  
unavoidable	   evolution	  of	   commercial	   activities;158	  and	   that	   at	   the	  point	  of	  her	  
encounter	  with	   the	  West,	   China	  was	   a	  non-­‐capitalist	   society.159	  	  This	   is	  not	   to	  
say	  that	  the	  pre-­‐Opium	  Wars	  Middle	  Kingdom	  did	  not	  have	  markets	  or	  that	  she	  
did	  not	  engage	  in	  international	  trade.	  As	  seen	  above,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  Europe	  
was	   the	   backwater	   of	   the	   world-­‐system,	   China	   already	   enjoyed	   advanced	  
commercial	   networks,	   highly	   developed	   trading	   systems	   and	   innovative	  
institutions	   and	   technologies,	   all	   of	   which	   were	   responsive	   to	   market	  
opportunities.160 	  	   Indeed,	   a	   tradition	   of	   trade	   and	   markets	   formation	   was	  
integral	   to	   her	   historical	   development,	   no	   less	   than	   that	   of	   Europe.	   Hobson	  
concludes	   that	   ‘East	   and	   West	   have	   been	   fundamentally	   and	   consistently	  
interlinked	  through	  globalisation	  ever	  since	  500	  ce’.161	  	  Fast	   forwarding	  to	  the	  
17th	  century,	  after	  a	  short	  and	  temporary	  decline,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  that	  century	  the	  
commercial,	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  expansion	  of	  China	  was	  again	  fuelled	  by	  
imports	   of	   Spanish,	   American	   and	   Japanese	   silver.	   They	   created	   thriving	  
markets	  in	  cash	  crops,	  rice	  and	  handicrafts	  along	  the	  Yangzi	  River	  and	  in	  South	  
and	  Southeast	  China.	   In	  Guangdong	  province	  the	  expansion	  of	  commercialised	  
agriculture	  meant	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  imported	  rice.162	  	  Further,	  China	  
was	   unrivalled	   in	   the	   exportation	   of	   porcelain	   and	   silk,	   and	   since	   the	   Ming	  
dynasty’s	   discontinuation	   of	   money	   paper	   to	   avoid	   the	   inflationary	  
consequences	  of	  overprinting,	  became	  the	  ‘sink’	  for	  the	  world’s	  silver.163	  	  
Non-­‐capitalist	  empire	  
Yet,	  systemic	  similarities,	  and	  the	  operation	  in	  China	  between	  the	  16th	  and	  19th	  
centuries	  of	  what	  both	  Arrighi	  and	  Wong	  identify	  as	  Smithian	  processes,	  did	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  See	  for	  example	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  2-­‐3,	  6-­‐7,	  75-­‐80,	  189,	  194-­‐95.	  
158	  For	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘commercialisation	  model’	  see	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  10-­‐34;	  for	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  beginnings	  of	  capitalism	  see	  Wood,	  ibid	  74-­‐165;	  Robert	  Brenner,	  
‘Agrarian	  Class	  Structure	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  Pre-­‐Industrial	  Europe’	  (1976)	  70	  Past	  
and	  Present;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  41)	  86-­‐148.	  
159	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  6.	  	  
160	  Wong,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  9.	  
161	  	  Hobson,	  ibid	  (n	  133)	  2;	  Li	  Xing,	  ibid	  (n	  127)	  3-­‐4.	  
162	  Wong,	  ibid	  (n	  140).	  
163	  Frank,	  ibid	  (n	  22)	  111.	  
204	  
	  
produce	   the	   same	   trajectory	   as	   that	   found	   in	   Europe.164	  	   Understanding	   this	  
divergence,	   argues	   Arrighi,	   requires	   that	   capitalism	   and	   markets	   formation	  
processes	   be	   distinguished.165	  	   For,	   the	   capitalist	   market	   is	   a	   specific	   device	  
marked	  by	  its	  own	  particularities.	  It	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  historically	  unique	  type	  
of	   contract-­‐based	   social	   relations,	   one	   in	  which	   access	   to	   the	  means	   of	   life	   is	  
contingent	   on	   entering	   into	   market	   interactions. 166 	  	   It	   is	   charged	   with	   a	  
supervisory	   role	   over	   the	   production	   of	   all	   goods	   and	   services,	   down	   to	   the	  
most	   essential	   necessities	   of	   life,	   and	   over	   all	   distribution	   and	   investment	  
processes	   previously	   conducted	   other	   than	   via	   a	   market. 167 	  	   It	   mediates	  
between	  producers	  and	  their	  means	  of	  production,	  starting	  with	  the	  separation	  
between	  peasants	  and	  land	  and	  corresponding	  commodification	  of	  labour.168	  	  In	  
other	   words,	   the	   capitalist	   market	   is	   a	   theoretical	   construct,	   the	   function	   of	  
which	   goes	   beyond	   that	   of	   a	   place	   where	   profitable	   exchanges	   take	   place.169	  	  
Rather,	   it	   represents	   a	   specific	   institutional	   rationality	   -­‐	   society’s	   site	   of	   truth	  
reproduction,	   whereby	   all	   relations	   and	   practices	   are	   embedded	   in	   the	  
economy.170	  The	  political	   and	   ideological	   are	   correspondingly	  marginalised.171	  	  
By	   contrast,	   in	   what	   Amin	   classifies	   as	   a	   family	   of	   tributary	   systems,	   it	   was	  
mostly	  the	  religious	  in	  its	  broad	  sense	  that	  occupied	  the	  systemic	  commanding	  
heights.172 	  	   Thus,	   in	   the	   Middle	   Kingdom	   Confucian	   ideas	   formed	   a	   ‘state	  
orthodoxy’	   that	   was	   then	   disseminated	   downwards	   in	   a	   process	   of	  
transformative	  moral	   instruction.173	  	  A	  body	  of	  ethics	  dictated	  social	  relations.	  
Governability	  was	   guided	  by	   the	  moral	   principle	   of	   people’s	  welfare.	   The	   aim	  
was	   to	   promote	   social	   harmony	   through	   proper	   instruction	   for	   elites	   and	  
common	   people	   alike,	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   material	   aid	   at	   the	   level	   of	   local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Wong,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  15,	  17-­‐22;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  13-­‐68.	  
165	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  24.	  
166	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  6-­‐7.	  
167	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein,	  Historical	  Capitalism	  (Verso	  1983)	  15;	  ibid	  2.	  
168	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  2-­‐3.	  
169	  But	  see	  P	  Schouten,	  ‘Theory	  Talk	  13:	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein	  on	  World-­‐Systems,	  The	  
Imminent	  End	  of	  Capitalism	  and	  Unifying	  Social	  Science’	  arguing	  that	  the	  capitalist	  market	  is	  a	  
hypothesis	  that	  does	  not	  really	  exist	  in	  the	  capitalist	  system	  [2008]	  Theory	  Talks	  	  
<http://www.iwallerstein.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/docs/THYTLK13.PDF>	  accessed	  1	  Feb	  
2012.	  
170	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  32;	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  23.	  
171	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  15.	  
172	  ibid	  27,	  32;	  for	  a	  general	  discussion	  of	  tributary	  systems	  see	  31-­‐48.	  
173	  Patricia	  Ebrey,	  ‘The	  Chinese	  Family	  and	  The	  Spread	  of	  Confucian	  Values’	  in	  Rozman,	  ibid	  (n	  
134)	  45;	  Lau,	  ibid	  (n	  68)	  32-­‐37.	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communities.	   An	   example	   is	   the	   Qing	   dynasty’s	   granaries	   system	   aimed	   at	  
counteracting	  cyclical	  market	  price	  fluctuations.174	  	  It	  was	  a	  society	  premised	  on	  
the	   rule	   of	   virtue	   rather	   than	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   economics,	   a	   civilization	   in	  
which	   social	   harmony	   took	   precedence	   over	   competition,	   and	   where	   wealth	  
accumulation	  was	  made	  subject	  to	  state	  supervision.175	  	  	  
Turning	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  access	   to	   the	  means	  of	  production,	  European	  peasants	  
were	   dispossessed	   of	   their	   customary	   use	   rights	   to	   communally	   held	  
resources.176	  	   In	   China,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   many	   peasants	   remained	   direct	  
producers	  and	  active	  participants	   in	  market	  exchanges.	  Most,	  either	  owned	  or	  
rented	   land	   that	  was	   in	   turn	  worked	   primarily	   at	   the	   household	   level.	   It	  was	  
within	   this	   institutional	   framework	   that	   industrialisation	   and	   technological	  
innovations	   –	   China’s	   ‘industrious	   revolution’	   -­‐	   took	   place.177 	  	   Indeed,	   the	  
Imperial	  centre	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  preserving	  peasants’	  possession	  of	  their	  land,	  
so	  as	  to	  circumvent	  potential	  challenge	  from	  powerful	  landed	  classes.178	  	  Rather	  
than	  power	  being	  a	  derivative	  of	  accumulated	  wealth,	   in	   the	  Middle	  Kingdom,	  
wealth	   derived	   from	   the	   power	   of	   office.179	  	   This	   difference	   represented	   a	  
systemic,	  non-­‐contingent	  divergence.	  	  For,	  through	  notions	  of	  productivity	  and	  
exchange	   value	   as	   depositors	   of	   rights	   to	   ownership,	   European	   capitalist	  
dispossession	   acquired	   two	   distinct	   features:	   first,	   it	   was	   absolute.	   That	   is	   to	  
say,	  though	  legally	  free,	  direct	  producers	  became	  wholly	  dependent	  on	  owners	  
for	   their	  survival.	  Second,	  appropriation	  of	  surplus	  was	  executed	  by	  economic	  
means.180	  	   This	   difference	   between	   appropriation	   by	   economic	   means	   –	   the	  
opaque	  process	  of	   the	  seizure	  of	  profit	  or	   rent	  by	  dominant	  capital	   	   -­‐	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Wong,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  117;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  328.	  
175	  Ebrey,	  ibid	  (n	  173)	  45;	  Lau,	  ibid	  (n	  68)	  32-­‐37;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  329,	  332;	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  
virtue	  and	  justice	  in	  Confucian	  philosophy	  see	  Erin	  M.	  Cline,	  Confucius,	  Rawls,	  and	  The	  Sense	  of	  
Justice	  (Fodham	  University	  Press	  2013)	  119-­‐67.	  
176	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  108-­‐15.	  
177	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  163;	  Wong,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  45;	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  96,	  105-­‐15;	  on	  China’s	  
‘industrious	  revolution’	  see	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  33-­‐35;	  on	  the	  enclosures	  in	  England	  see	  Karl	  
Polanyi,	  The	  Great	  Transformation:	  The	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Time	  (Beacon	  
Press	  1957)	  36-­‐39.	  
178	  Ellen	  Meiskins	  Wood,	  Empire	  of	  Capital	  (Verso	  2003)	  27-­‐28.	  
179	  ibid	  27;	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  13.	  
180	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  96.	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transparent	   exercise	   of	   tributary	   taxation	   for	   distribution	   by	   political	   power,	  
argues	  Amin,	  is	  ‘qualitative	  and	  decisive’.181	  
Similarly	  ‘qualitative	  and	  decisive’	  is	  capitalism’s	  immanent	  compulsion	  for	  self-­‐
expansion.	  With	  endless	  capital	  accumulation	  as	  the	  primary	  and	  arguably	  the	  
only	  objective	  of	  economic	  activity,	  ‘capitalism	  can	  and	  must	  constantly	  expand	  
in	  ways	  and	  degrees	  unlike	  any	  other	  social	  form’.182	  	  As	  observed	  in	  relation	  to	  
markets,	  here	  too,	  expansion	  is	  made	  distinct,	  not	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  its	  existence	  but	  
by	   its	   logic.	   In	   what	   Arrighi	   conceptualises	   as	   territorial	   logic,	   power	   is	  
identified	  with	   the	   extent	   of	   its	   geographical	   and	  populous	  domain.	  Wealth	   is	  
either	   the	   means	   for,	   or	   the	   by-­‐product	   of	   expansion.	   	   By	   contrast,	   in	   the	  
capitalist	   logic,	   territorial	   acquisitions	   are	   the	   means	   and	   by-­‐product	   of	   the	  
dictates	  of	  capital	  accumulation.183	  	  Consequently,	   it	   is	  not	  the	  size	  of	  Giddens’	  
‘container	   of	   power’	   that	   matters.	   Rather,	   size	   is	   subsidiary	   to	   content,	   e.g.	  
resources	   and	  markets.184	  	   Yet,	   the	   endlessness	  of	   capitalist	   accumulation,	   the	  
fact	  that	  it	  has	  no	  aim	  other	  than	  its	  own	  self-­‐enlargement	  also	  means	  that	  ‘[i]t	  
can	   and	   must	   constantly	   accumulate,	   constantly	   search	   out	   new	   markets,	  
constantly	  impose	  its	  imperatives	  on	  new	  territories	  and	  new	  spheres	  of	  life,	  on	  
all	   human	   beings	   and	   the	   natural	   environment’.185	  	   The	   quest	   for	   territorial	  
control	   must	   not	   only	   continue	   uninterrupted	   but,	   is	   of	   little	   use	   unless	   the	  
controlled	   territory	   is	   also	   prized	   open	   and	   transformed	   –	   closed	   doors	   are	  
unlocked	   in	   the	   name	   of	   ‘improvement’	   so	   as	   to	   prevent	   impediments	   to	   the	  
spatial	  flow	  of	  capital.186	  	  To	  this	  end,	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  means	  -­‐	  military	  conquests,	  
structural	   adjustments,	   economic	   warfare,	   hegemonic	   discourse	   -­‐	   consent	   is	  
constructed,	   voluntariness	   is	   imposed,	   alternatively	   coercion	   applied,	   so	   as	   to	  
implant	   capitalism	   and	   its	   political	   and	   legal	   institutions	   on	   non-­‐capitalist	  
societies.	  And	  so,	  one	  by	  one	  divergent	  developmental	  paths	  were	  truncated.187	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  161-­‐62.	  
182	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  97;	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  167)	  14.	  
183	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  41)	  34-­‐35.	  
184	  ibid	  34.	  
185	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  97.	  
186	  David	  Harvey,	  The	  New	  Imperialism	  (OUP	  2003)	  139-­‐40;	  on	  the	  ideology	  of	  ‘improvement’	  
see	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  156-­‐61.	  
187	  Wood,	  ibid	  153,	  195;	  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  160;	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  consent	  
see	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (15)	  39-­‐63.	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The	  outcome	  is	  a	  world	  empire	  of	  unprecedented	  size	  and	  uniformity,	  albeit	  one	  
that	  is	  occasionally	  variegated	  and	  often	  resisted.	  	  
It	  is	  this	  absence	  of	  capitalist	  logic	  of	  power,	  rather	  than	  lack	  of	  capabilities,	  that	  
for	  Arrighi	   explains	  why	  Zheng	  He’s	   voyages	   –	   now	  advanced	  by	   the	  HWP	  as	  
evidence	  of	   cultural	  attributes	  and	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  different	   form	  of	  global	  
interaction	  -­‐	  did	  not	  progress	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  conquests.188	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  
European	  on-­‐going	  expansionist	  drive	  and	  overreach,	  by	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  
15th	   century,	   China’s	   territorial	   logic	   dictated	   that	   neither	   geographical	  
enlargement,	  nor	  East-­‐West	  long	  distance	  trade	  and	  their	  associated	  cost	  were	  
systemically	   essential	   to	   self-­‐reinforcement.189	  	  Thus,	   once	  military	   campaigns	  
achieved	   the	   objectives	   of	   securing	   and	   pacifying	   peripheral	   borders,	   by	   the	  
1760s	  territorial	  expansion	  ceased.190	  From	  then	  on,	  self-­‐reinforcement	  was	  to	  
be	   found	   in	   the	   building	   of	   an	   integrated	   national	   economy,	   capable	   of	  
functioning	   as	   a	   political	   centre	   to	   its	   vassal	   states	   on	   whose	   allegiance	   and	  
integration	   systemic	   stability	   depended.191	  	   Such	   allegiance	   was	   constructed	  
around	  co-­‐operative	  exchanges,	  and	  bound	  together	  by	  a	  balanced	  combination	  
of	   normative	   communality	   and	   states’	   autonomy.192	  Absent	  was	   the	  European	  
structural	   dynamic	   of	   incessant	   interstate	   military	   competition	   and	   overseas	  
systemic	   expansion.193	  Nor	   did	   extraction	   of	   surplus	   define	   core/peripheries	  
exchanges.	   The	   cost	   expended	   by	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   in	   the	   purchase	   of	  
allegiance	  exceeded	  the	  value	  of	  tributes	  paid	  by	  vassal	  states.	  The	  Qin	  and	  Han	  
dynasties	  did	  not	  engage	  in	  tax	  collection,	  notwithstanding	  the	  unified	  taxation	  
system	  they	  established.	  With	  the	  sole	  exception	  of	  the	  Yuan	  dynasty,	  after	  the	  
Tang	   dynasty	   vassal	   states’	   gifts	   were	   merely	   symbolic.194	  	   Thus,	   in	   reality,	  
tributary	  relations	  were	  more	  reciprocal	  than	  the	  word	  tribute	  suggests.	  This	  is	  
not	   to	   say	   that	   homogenisation	   of	   conditions	   throughout	   the	   Empire	  was	   not	  
actively	   pursued.	   However,	   it	   did	   mean	   that	   the	   acute	   core/periphery	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  41)	  35-­‐37.	  
189	  	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  130)	  25-­‐26;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  37.	  
190	  Arrighi	  (n	  130)	  25.	  
191	  ibid	  27.	  
192	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  314-­‐15.	  
193	  ibid	  315,	  316.	  
194	  ibid	  324.	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polarisation	  inherent	  to	  the	  modern	  capitalist	  system	  was	  not	  produced.195	  	  The	  
outcome	   was	   a	   system	   of	   innovative	   capacity	   to	   respond	   to	   threats	   and	  
difficulties,	  one	   that	  delivered	  exceptional	   stability,	   and	  continuous	  peace	  and	  
prosperity	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  twenty	  centuries.196	  
Harmony	  incorporated:	  the	  power	  of	  discourse	  
Reversed	  consensus	  	  
The	   encounter	   between	   China	   and	   the	   West	   went	   beyond	   issues	   of	   trade	  
balancing,	   to	  encompass	  a	  contest	  between	  civilizational	  rationalities.	  Further,	  
for	  the	  rationality	  that	  won	  this	  contest,	  conquest	  was	  incomplete	  unless	  it	  was	  
attended	  by	   the	   imposition	  of	   its	   imperatives	  on	   the	   conquered	   land.	  Military	  
success	   was	   thus	   supplemented	   by	   the	   construction	   and	   diffusion	   of	   a	   new	  
discourse,	   one	   that	  was	   reflective	  of	   the	   rising	  power’s	   aims	  and	  priorities.197	  
Like	  Wang	  Hui,	  Blue	  assigns	  the	  reversal	  in	  European	  consensus	  about	  China	  to	  
the	  era	  of	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism.198	  The	  shift	  was	  not	  one	  of	  a	  qualitative	  
change	   in	   knowledge	   but	   one	   of	   a	   perspective	   –	   China’s	   deviation	   from	   a	  
purported	   Western	   model.199	  	   Thus,	   her	   negative	   identity	   was	   produced	   by	  
reference	   to	   the	   idealisation	   of	   capitalism	   as	   a	   pinnacle	   of	   development,	   a	  
testament	   to	  Western	  civilization’s	  unique	  advance	   to	  which	  all	  others	   should	  
aspire.200	  A	  novel	  emphasis	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  progress	  was	  used	  to	  depict	  China’s	  
temporary	   weakness	   as	   an	   inherent	   condition,	   a	   permanent	   state	   of	  
backwardness	   that	   was	   the	   antithesis	   of	   historically	   codified	   Western	  
advancement.201	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  Amin,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  162-­‐63.	  
196	  ibid,	  50,	  168;	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  327.	  
197	  Blue,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  57.	  
198	  ibid	  70.	  
199	  ibid	  71,	  73.	  
200	  Gregory	  Blue	  and	  Timothy	  Brook,	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Blue	  and	  Brook,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  5;	  Gregory	  
Brook,	  ‘Capitalism	  and	  the	  Writing	  of	  Modern	  History	  in	  China’	  in	  Blue	  and	  Brook,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  
113.	  
201	  Blue,	  ibid	  (n	  140)	  74,	  77;	  Brook,	  ibid	  114.	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It	  was	  a	  discursive	  strategy	  of	  negativity	  with	  a	  purpose.202	  	  The	  production	  of	  a	  
non-­‐European	   inferior	   identity	   enabled	   a	   corresponding	   construction	   of	   a	  
superior	   European	   identity,	   a	   superiority	   that	   in	   turn	   could	   be	   used	   to	  
legitimise	   colonial	   and	   imperialist	   expansion,	   universalise	   its	   imperatives	   and	  
posit	   the	   European	   nation-­‐state	   as	   the	   bearer	   of	   capitalist	   modernity	   and	  
political	  unity.203	  	  It	  was	  a	  tool	  of	  domination,	  whereby	  the	  colonised	  other	  was	  
to	  import	  and	  internalise	  a	  self-­‐depiction	  that	  was	  constructed	  for	  them	  by	  the	  
coloniser.204	  	   An	   orientalised	   Orient	   was	   created	   in	   Europe	   and	   transported	  
back	  to	  the	  East.205	  	  Indeed,	  statements	  about	  Oriental	  peoples	  being	  barbarians	  
or	   children	   despite	   their	   antiquity	   were	   typical	   weapons	   in	   the	   armoury	   of	  
European	   expansive	   motion. 206 	  	   Precisely	   because	   China	   was	   not	   as	   yet	  
subordinated	   to	   colonial	   domination,	   she	   ‘became	   the	   object	   of	   heavy	  
ideological	   onslaught	   as	   India	   was	   being	   brought	   under	   Western	   control	  
politically	  and	  militarily.207	  
When	   administered	   to	   a	   patient	   shocked	   by	   defeat	   and	   related	   societal	  
disintegration,	  the	  force	  of	  this	  discursive	  therapy	  was	  considerable.	  For	  China,	  
the	  rupture	  occasioned	  by	  her	  encounter	  with	   the	  Great	  Transformation	  went	  
beyond	  poverty,	  opium	  and	   forcible	  subjugation,	   to	  encompass	  a	  civilizational	  
trauma,	   far	   in	   excess	   of	   the	   relatively	   modest	   foreign	   presence	   in	   her	  
territory.208	  	  As	  Europe	  was	  rewriting	  Chinese	  history	  by	  reference	  to	  her	  own	  
reinvention,	  China	  responded	  by	  engaging	  in	  a	  similar	  exercise,	  only	  the	  other	  
way	  round.	  	  The	  country	  was	  now	  revisiting	  her	  past	  and	  reviewing	  her	  present	  
by	   reference	   to	  European	  discourse	   of	   capitalism	   and	  modernity.209	  	   A	   search	  
was	  on	  for	  the	  source	  of	  power	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world.210	  	  Implicated	  in	  this	  
search	   was	   complicity	   with	   a	   European	   methodology	   that	   posited	   history	   as	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  Michael	  Hardt,	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Empire	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  University	  Press	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  ibid	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  Arrighi,	  ibid	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  See	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  Edward	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  Vintage	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  Edition	  
1979).	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  ibid	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  China	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comprising	   universalised	   stages	   of	   evolutionary	   progress	   towards	   science-­‐	  
based	   material	   prosperity.	   In	   this	   rationality,	   the	   West	   was	   accorded	   a	   core	  
position.	  China	  was	  relegated	  to	  the	  periphery	  as	  a	  place	  plagued	  by	  evolution	  
inhibitors,	   such	   as	   the	   ‘Asiatic	  Mode	   of	   Production’	   and	   ‘despotism’.211	  	   From	  
there	   it	   was	   only	   a	   short	   distance	   to	   a	   conclusion	   that	   the	   past	   had	   to	   be	  
transcended.	   To	   enable	   China	   to	   be	   written	   into	   this	   version	   of	   history,	  
traditional	  values	  and	  culture	  were	  first	  discarded	  and	  later	  condemned	  as	  the	  
roots	  of	  the	  country’s	  peculiarities.212	  	  From	  the	  Christian	  egalitarianism	  of	  the	  
Taipei	  Rebellion	  of	  1850-­‐1864,	  to	  the	  New	  Culture	  Movement’s	  call	  for	  the	  total	  
destruction	   of	   tradition	   and	   past	   values	   (1915-­‐1919),	   to	   the	   science	   and	  
democracy	  slogan	  of	   the	  Fourth	  May	  Movement	  (1919),	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	  
Marxism	  and	  Darwinism	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century,	   to	   the	   campaign	   against	   Lin	  
Biao	  and	  Confucius	  in	  the	  early	  70s,	  Western	  theories	  and	  ideologies	  were	  made	  
the	   main	   protagonists	   in	   an	   iconoclastic	   project	   of	   new	   consciousness	   and	  
national	   regeneration.213	  	  Western	   ideas	  of	  progress,	   struggle	   and	   conquest	  of	  
nature	   were	   hailed	   by	   Yan	   Fu	   and	   Liang	   Qiqiao,	   spokesmen	   for	   the	   Chinese	  
intelligentsia	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   as	   the	   key	   to	   the	   harnessing	   of	  
individual	  energies,	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  economic	  growth.214	  	  New	  words	  to	  denote	  
capitalism	   (zibenzhuyi)	   and	  modernisation	   (xiandaihua)	  were	   introduced	   into	  
the	  Chinese	  language.	  They	  conveyed	  a	  break	  from	  a	  pre-­‐modern	  past	  that	  was	  
posited	  as	  essentially	  different	  from	  European	  modernity’s	  ‘grand	  narrative’	  of	  
linear	  progression.215	  	   In	  search	  of	  reform	  and	  self-­‐strengthening,	  and	  so	  as	  to	  
combat	  Western	  military	  might,	   the	  Qin	  government	  diffused	  Western	  science	  
and	   technology	   through	   translation	   bureaus	   and	   language	   schools.	   In	   the	  
process,	   China’s	   intellectuals	   also	   learnt	   about	   Western	   social	   and	   political	  
institutions. 216 	  Of	   these,	   modernity’s	   signatory	   institution	   was	   the	   nation-­‐
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(Lexington	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  (Verso	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state.217	  	  For	  it	  was	  within	  this	  apparatus	  of	  capitalist	  organisation,	  so	  went	  the	  
European	  discourse,	  that	  technology	  and	  material	  wealth	  prospered.	  Further,	  it	  
was	  by	  reference	  to	  such	  technological	  and	  material	  advances	  that	  a	  nation	  was	  
to	  be	  ranked	  in	  the	  international	  order.218	  	  Less	  emphasized	  were	  China’s	  pre-­‐
modern	   scientific	   and	   technological	   contributions,	   or	   for	   that	   matter,	   the	  
technological	   repertoire	   of	   all	   societies	   that	   did	   not	   reach	   a	   nation-­‐state	  
capitalist	  denouement.219	  	  Thus,	  Chinese	  nationalism	  was	  born	  out	  of	  imported	  
ideologies	   and	   itself	   was	   an	   imported	   concept.220 	  	   Contrary	   to	   nationalist	  
movements’	   inherent	   propensity	   to	   celebrate	   a	   glorified	   past,	   Chinese	  
nationalism	  sought	  to	  bury	  it.221	  	  It	  was	  also	  an	  intensely	  statist	  one.222	  	  Against	  
the	  threat	  of	  partition,	  it	  was	  a	  nation-­‐state,	  modern	  and	  sufficiently	  developed	  
to	  have	  a	  foothold	  on	  the	  international	  hierarchical	  order,	  that	  was	  to	  guarantee	  
national	   survival	   in	   ‘a	   world	   dominated	   by	   predatory	   imperialist	   nations-­‐
states’.223	  
We	  may	  want	  to	  pause	  here	  to	  make	  two	  further	  observations.	  First,	  iconoclasm	  
was	  not	  the	  only	  response	  to	  the	  violence	  and	  humiliation	  of	  China’s	  encounter	  
with	   the	  West.	   From	   the	   1904	   anti-­‐modernist	   Society	   for	   the	   Preservation	   of	  
National	  Essence,	  to	  young	  liberals	  in	  search	  of	  communality	  between	  Chinese	  
traditions	   and	   Western	   development,	   to	   the	   1930s	   Confucianism	   of	   the	  
Guomindang,	   the	   search	   for	   identity	   in	   the	   face	   of	   foreign	   penetration	   also	  
produced	  nativist	  reactions.224	  	  Even	  post-­‐1949,	  discourse	  was	  interwoven	  with	  
the	  language	  of	  Confucian	  harmonious	  logic.225	  	  We	  find	  it	  for	  example	  in	  Mao’s	  
treatise	  on	  the	  handling	  of	  contradictions:	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Marxist	  philosophy	  holds	  that	  the	  law	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  opposites	  is	  
the	  fundamental	  law	  of	  the	  universe	  (….).	  Between	  the	  opposites	  
in	  a	  contradiction	  there	  is	  at	  once	  unity	  and	  struggle,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  
that	  impels	  things	  to	  move	  and	  change	  (…).226	  
	  
Second,	  it	  was	  a	  view	  from	  the	  periphery.	  From	  where	  China	  stood	  at	  the	  point	  
of	   encounter,	   the	   landscape	   to	  which	   she	  was	   exposed	  was	   as	  menacing	   as	   it	  
was	   enticing.	   Incorporation	   thus	   implicated	   processes	   of	   both	  mimicking	   and	  
defiance,	   with	   the	   result	   that	   ‘the	   intellectual	   allegiance	   to	   Marxism	   was	   as	  
much	   a	   way	   of	   entering	   the	  Western-­‐defined	  modernity	   as	   of	   resisting	   it’.227	  	  
Perhaps	  because	  the	  conquest	  of	  China	  was	  never	  complete,	  the	  battle	  was	  not	  
for	   the	   dismantling	   of	   the	   rationale	   that	   underpinned	   European’s	   superiority.	  
Rather,	   it	   was	   a	   campaign	   that	   sought	   a	   place	   within	   this	   rationale,	   yet	  
simultaneously	   articulated	   the	   struggle	   of	   the	   oppressed	   other.228	  	   Thus,	   the	  
liberal	   tenor	   of	   the	   May	   Fourth	   movement	   had	   to	   be	   jettisoned	   by	   virtue	   of	  
liberalism’s	  association	  with	   imperialism.229	  	  By	   contrast,	   the	   socialist	   critique	  
of	   imperialism	   offered	   a	   niche	   in	   which	   Western	   rationality	   could	   be	  
simultaneously	  absorbed	  and	  disputed.230	  	  There	  is	  disagreement	  as	  to	  whether,	  
as	   argued	   by	   Schwartz	   and	   Meisner,	   Chinese	   communism	   articulated	   an	  
indigenous	   anti-­‐imperialist	   nationalism,	   or	   whether,	   as	   maintained	   by	   Dirlik	  
and	   Cold	  War	   narratives,	   it	   implicated	   active	   intervention	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  
Soviet	   Union.231	  	   Whatever	   the	   truth	   of	   it,	   as	   expressed	   in	   Mao’s	   slogan	   that	  
‘only	  socialism	  can	  save	  China’,	  the	  country’s	  main	  concern	  was	  one	  of	  national	  
regeneration.232	  	   Regeneration	   was	   in	   turn	   bound	   with	   socialism,	   now	   re-­‐
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conceptualised	   in	   a	   non-­‐Marxist	   fashion	   as	   a	   superior	   route	   for	   speedy	  
development.233	  
The	  quest	  for	  modernity	  
It	   was	   the	   impulse	   for	   collective	   survival	   by	   reference	   to	   modernity,	  
industrialisation	  and	  national	  wealth	   and	  power	   -­‐	   the	   transformation	  of	  mass	  
mobilisation	   for	   liberation	   to	  mobilisation	   for	   production	   -­‐	   that	  was	   to	   prove	  
the	  more	  enduring	  strand	  of	  continuity.234	  	  Thus,	  unlike	  the	  utopian	  vision	  that	  
characterised	  the	  Russian	  revolution,	  a	  strong	  state	  and	  economic	  construction	  
were	  the	  CCP’s	  primary	  aims	  from	  the	  outset.	  The	  relegation	  of	  socialist	  ideals	  
to	  an	  unspecified	  future	  could	  already	  be	  found	  in	  the	  50s.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  arguable	  
that	  not	  much	  separated	  the	  policies	  instituted	  by	  the	  CCP	  in	  its	  early	  days	  from	  
the	  ‘social	  policy’	  type	  socialism	  that	  characterised	  the	  thinking	  of	  Sun	  Yatsen’s	  
followers	  in	  the	  preceding	  Guomindang	  government,	  and	  that	  of	  Jiang	  Kanghu,	  
founder	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Socialist	  Party.235	  Chinese	  capitalism	  was	  to	  be	  allowed	  
to	  remain,	   so	  as	   to	  hasten	  economic	  development.	  Yet,	   it	  was	   to	  be	  controlled	  
and	  kept	  within	  egalitarian	  boundaries.236	  	  China,	  declared	  Mao	  ‘must	  utilize	  all	  
elements	  of	  urban	  and	   rural	   capitalism	   that	   are	  beneficial	   and	  not	  harmful	   to	  
the	   national	   economy	   (…).	   Our	   present	   policy	   is	   to	   control,	   not	   to	   eliminate,	  
capitalism’.237	  	   For	   Wang	   Hui,	   the	   ‘fantasy	   of	   development’	   and	   the	   ‘myth	   of	  
transition’	   serve	   the	   purpose	   of	  masking	   current	   inequality.	   This	   strategy,	   he	  
says,	  remains	  ‘the	  crucial	  unspoken	  premise	  of	  the	  contemporary	  discourse	  on	  
Chinese	  society’.238	  	  
The	   coalescence	   of	   conformity	   and	   resistance	   produced	   a	   fault	   line	   that	  
manifested	   itself	   in	   an	   on-­‐going	   simmering	   conflict	   between	   opposing	   camps	  
within	   the	   CCP.	   There	   was	   Mao’s	   camp	   of	   collectivised,	   egalitarian,	   anti-­‐
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bureaucratic,	   socialist	   modernity,	   in	   which	   society	   was	   to	   be	   constantly	  
renewed	   through	  perpetual	   revolution.	   	   Then	   there	  was	   the	  CCP	  bureaucracy	  
for	   whom,	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   Western	   social	   democracy	   traditions,	   these	   goals	  
represented	  no	  more	  than	  reckless	  utopianism.239	  	  It	  was	  a	  hidden	  fissure	  that	  
came	   to	  a	  head	  with	   the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  campaign,	   torn	   the	  CCP	  apart	   in	  
the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  and,	  in	  what	  Li	  Mingqi	  alludes	  to	  as	  a	  coup	  instigated	  by	  
Hua	   Guofeng	   and	   involving	   the	   arrest	   of	   Maoist	   leaders,	   brought	   about	   a	  
reversal	   in	   power	   upon	  Mao’s	   death.240	  	  With	   the	   coup	   came	   a	   turnaround	   in	  
discourse.	   A	   new	   consensus	   was	   constructed	   around	   a	   critique	   of	   radicalism	  
and	   a	   narrative	   of	   inefficient	   SOEs,	   privileged	   workers	   and	   failed	   Maoist	  
socialism.241	  	  	  
Yet,	   throughout	  and	  for	  all,	  at	   issue	  was	  the	  best	  way	  for	  catching	  up	  with	  the	  
West	  rather	  than	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  need	  to	  catch	  up,	  ideological	  conceptualisation	  
of	   science	   and	   technology	   rather	   than	   the	   necessity	   for	   a	   technological	  
revolution,	  and	   the	   form	  of	  modernity	   rather	   than	  modernity	   itself.	  The	  Great	  
Leap	   Forward	   campaign,	   for	   example,	   was	   intended	   to	   bring	   about	   the	  
industrialisation	  of	   the	  countryside,	  and	  a	  technological	  revolution	   ‘so	  that	  we	  
may	   overtake	   England	   in	   15	   years’. 242 	  	   In	   this	   closing	   of	   the	   gap	   type	  
developmentalism	  Woodrow	  Wilson’s	  plans	   for	   the	  Third	  World	  met	   those	  of	  
Lenin.243	  	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   Great	   Leap	   Forward	   and	   present	   day	  
emphasis	  on	   technology	   is	   that	   for	  Mao,	   it	  was	   intertwined	  with	   self-­‐reliance.	  
The	  capital	  that	  was	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  technological	  revolution	  was	  to	  be	  found	  
in	   the	   energy	   of	   the	   masses	   rather	   than	   foreign	   investment.244	  	   	   Wang	   Hui	  
summarises	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  Chinese	  revolution	  as	  follows:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  145)	  149;	  Meisner,	  ibid	  (n	  210)	  149;	  Hobsbawm,	  ibid	  (n	  233)	  9-­‐10,14.	  
240	  Hersh,	  ibid	  (n	  211)	  41;	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  28,	  60;	  Meisner,	  ibid	  (n	  210)	  149.	  
241	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  x.	  
242	  Mao	  Zedong,	  [1	  June	  1958]	  Red	  Flag	  (hongqi)	  3.	  	  
243	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein,	  After	  Liberalism	  (The	  New	  Press	  1995)	  13-­‐14.	  




The	   Chinese	   socialist	  movement	  was	   one	   of	   resistance,	   but	  was	  
also	   one	   of	   modernization	   that	   unfolded	   via	   a	   nation-­‐building	  
movement	   and	   the	   process	   of	   industrialization,	   so	   its	   historical	  
experiences	   and	   lessons	   are	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   process	   of	  
modernization	   itself	   (…).	   Thus	   we	   cannot	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  
critique	  and	  reject	  our	  socialist	  history	  while,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
use	   this	   same	   critique	   and	   rejection	   to	   justify	   our	   process	   of	  
modernization	  in	  the	  contemporary	  period.245	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  encounter	  onwards,	  capitalist	  modernity	  was	  
a	   constituent	   of	   China’s	   transformation,	   albeit	   one	   that	   proved	   profoundly	  
dialectical.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   imperialist	   penetration	   triggered	   a	   nationalist	  
revolutionary	   response.	   On	   the	   other,	   it	   was	   nationalism	   that	   sought	   its	   own	  
substitution.246	  	  So,	  by	  the	  time	  Mao	  and	  Deng’s	  advocated	  a	  ‘particular	  Chinese	  
road	  to	  socialism	  and	  communism’	  ‘Chineseness’	  was	  already	  contaminated	  by	  
Western	  normativity,247	  such	   that	   embroiled	  China	   in	   a	   disciplinary	   regime	  of	  
first,	   socialist	   modernisation	   and	   later,	   the	   global	   capitalist	   markets.	   ‘China’s	  
perception	  of	  its	  own	  international	  role,’	  says	  Zhu	  ‘is	  driven	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  by	  
outside	  factors’.248	  	  Examples	   include	  notions,	  such	  as	  being	  a	  stakeholder	  and	  
having	   responsibility	   for	   the	   global	   interstate	   system,	   both	   of	   which	   were	  
formulated	  in	  the	  exterior	  and	  then	  incorporated	  into	  Chinese	  official	  and	  non-­‐
official	   discourse.249	  	   Thus,	   Westad’s	   reference	   to	   the	   internationalisation	   of	  
China	  over	  the	   last	  250	  years	   is	   in	  reality	  an	  allusion	  to	  her	  Westernisation250	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  145)	  133,	  134.	  
246	  Meisner,	  ibid	  (n	  210)	  4.	  
247	  Xiaomei	  Chen,	  ibid	  (n	  24)	  1.	  
248	  Zhu	  Liqun,	  ibid	  (n	  76)	  39.	  
249	  ibid	  39-­‐40;	  the	  allusion	  to	  China	  as	  a	  ‘stakeholder’	  originated	  from	  Robert	  Zoellick,	  former	  US	  
Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  president	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  




or,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Wang	  Hui,	  her	  eventual	  ‘amalgamation	  into	  the	  America-­‐led	  
economic	  order’.251	  
I	   say	   ‘on	   the	   face	   of	   it’	   because,	   as	   we	   saw,	   even	   when	   propelled	   by	   the	  
operation	  of	  power,	  civilizational	  interactions	  implicate	  processes	  that	  are	  more	  
complex	   than	   immediately	   apparent	   from	   their	   surfaces.	   They	  mesh	   together	  
similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  a	  manner	  difficult	  to	  decipher.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  
the	  debate	  as	   to	  which	   -­‐	  as	  between	  psychological	   innovation	  and	  a	  change	   in	  
the	  realities	  of	  power	  -­‐	  constitutes	  the	  initial	  prerequisite	  for	  systemic	  change.	  
This	   debate	   cuts	   across	   geographical	   and	   ideological	   boundaries. 252 	  The	  
Cultural	   Revolution	   provides	   an	   example.	   This	   campaign	   was	   constructed	  
around	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  desired	  human	  consciousness	  that	  is	  to	  be	  created	  by	  the	  
power	  of	   ideas	   and	   experiences.	   Yet,	   such	  notion	  was	  not	   a	  Maoist	   invention.	  
The	   Chinese	   New	   Culture	  Movement	   of	   early	   20th	   century	   also	   looked	   to	   the	  
power	   of	   ideas.	   For	   them	   too,	   changes	   in	   consciousness	   had	   to	   precede	  
economic	   and	   political	   transformations.253	  	   Going	   further	   back	   in	   time,	   it	  was	  
also	   found	   in	   the	   process	   of	   moral	   instruction	   that	   characterized	   the	  
Confucianisation	  of	  ancient	  Chinese	  society.	  Moving	  westward,	  it	  was	  similarly	  
an	   essential	   part	   of	   Hayek’s	   neoliberal	   grand	   strategy.254	  	   The	   HWP	   offers	  
another	   example.	   Its	   themes	   of	   sovereign	   autonomy	   and	   peaceful	   interstate	  
cooperation	   can	  be	   traced	  back	   to	  China’s	   tributary	   system.	  Then	  as	  now,	   the	  
country	   is	   designated	   a	   leadership	   position	   by	   virtue	   of	   her	   size	   and	   relative	  
sophistication	   of	   her	   national	   economy,	   rather	   than	   the	   strength	   of	   her	  
industrial-­‐military	  complex.255	  	  
It	   is	   thus	   that	   the	   paradigm	   shift,	   which	   followed	   on	   from	   Mao’s	   death	  
implicated	   a	   re-­‐positioning	   of	   varied	   historical	   legacies,	   both	   indigenous	   and	  
exogenous.256	  	  As	  the	  country	  once	  again	  grows	  in	  power	  and	  global	  influence,	  
her	  heritage	  of	  Confucian	  rationality	  is	  moved	  to	  the	  centre	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  formulate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  145)	  75.	  
252	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  debate	  see	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  68-­‐7.	  
253	  Meisner,	  ibid	  (n	  210)	  13,	  295.	  
254	  F.A.	  Hayek,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Liberty	  (Routledge	  Classics	  2006)	  97-­‐99.	  
255	  Arrighi,	  ibid	  (n	  6)	  346.	  
256	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  215)	  xviii;	  Dirlik,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  6.	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a	   unique	  model	   of	  modernisation	   that	   bypasses	   the	   theoretical	   confrontation	  
between	   capitalism	   and	   socialism,	   and	   raises	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   non-­‐
Westernised	  path	  to	  modernisation.257	  	  	  The	  country’s	  Marxist	  tradition	  became	  
an	   oppositional	   group	   within	   the	   CCP	   research	   institutes	   and	   academia.258	  	  
From	  there,	   it	  articulates	  an	  attachment	  to	  the	  socialist	   legacy	  that	  has	  played	  
such	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   success	   of	   the	   reforms	   era,	   and	  which	   refuses	   to	   go	  
away	  despite	  efforts	  to	  erase	  it.259	  	  
By	  proffering	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  reformed	  world	  order,	  one	  that	  is	  expressed	  by	  
reference	  to	  the	  specificity	  of	  Chinese	  traditional	  logic,	  the	  HWP	  appears	  to	  seek	  
to	   divert	   the	   one	   directional	   flow	   by	   which	   China’s	   contemporary	   encounter	  
with	  the	  West	  was	  characterised.	  In	  other	  words,	  she	  is	  not,	  she	  says,	  Anghie’s	  
self-­‐reforming	   native	   who	   has	   consented	   to	   seek	   her	   own	   transformation.260	  	  
Nor	  is	  she	  Wallerstein’s	  peripheral	  country	  engaged	  in	  a	  compliant	  struggle	  for	  
a	   foothold	   on	   the	   next	   rung	   of	   a	   hierarchical	   interstate	   ladder.261	  	   Rather,	   in	  
operation	   is	   Chen	   Xiaomei’s	   Occidentalism	   –	   the	   phenomenon	   whereby	  
importation	   of	   normative	   constructs	   provokes	   active	   modifications	   and	  
adaptations	   so	   as	   to	   produce	   indigenous	   parlance,262	  and	   the	   dynamics	   of	  
Potter’s	  ‘selective	  adaptation.263	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  enquiry,	  in	  issue	  is	  not	  the	  
sincerity	   of	   this	   endeavour,	   but	   rather	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   adaptations	   may	  
deliver	  real	  difference.	  If	  they	  do,	  can	  the	  reforming	  power	  of	  a	  rising	  China	  be	  
peacefully	  reconciled	  with	  a	  capitalist	  hegemony?	  	  It	  is	  to	  these	  questions	  that	  I	  
now	  turn	  my	  attention.	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  Wang	  Gungwu	  and	  Zheng	  Yongnian,	  ibid	  (n	  31)	  29;	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  145)	  163.	  
258	  Shambaugh,	  ibid	  (n	  25)	  10;	  David	  Shambaugh,	  China	  Goes	  Global:	  The	  Partial	  Power	  (OUP	  
2013)	  26-­‐30.	  
259	  Dirlik,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  2;	  for	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  Maoist	  legacy	  contributed	  to	  the	  success	  of	  
China’s	  reforms,	  see	  Alvin	  Y	  So,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Chinese	  Developmental	  Miracle’	  in	  Ho-­‐fung	  
Hung,	  ibid	  (n	  130)	  50-­‐64.	  
260	  Antony	  Anghie,	  Imperialism,	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  International	  Law	  (CUP	  2005)	  
146.	  
261	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  23)	  56.	  
262	  Xiaomei	  Chen,	  ibid	  (n	  24)	  2.	  
263	  Pittman	  B.	  Potter,	  ‘Public	  Regulation	  of	  Private	  Relations:	  Changing	  Conditions	  of	  Property	  
Regulation	  in	  China’	  in	  Guanghua	  Yu	  (ed)	  The	  Development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Legal	  System:	  Change	  
and	  Challenges	  (Routledge	  2011)	  51-­‐681.	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Harmony	  and	  the	  Neoliberal	  Order	  
Same	  bed….	  	  
It	  seems	  then	  that,	  much	  like	  its	  predecessors,	  the	  HWP	  has	  remained	  anchored	  
in	  the	  systemic	  framework.	  This	  time	  however	  paradigm	  has	  shed	  off	  its	  radical,	  
revolutionary	   twist.	   If,	   for	   Mao,	   the	   unity	   of	   opposites	   was	   ‘conditional,	  
temporary	  and	  transitory,	  and	  hence	  relative,	  whereas	  the	  struggle	  of	  opposites	  
is	  absolute’,	  264	  now	  the	  unity	  of	  opposites	  enjoys	  permanence	  that	  is	  predicated	  
on	   ideological	   fluidity.	   Such	   fluidity	   includes	   the	   convergence	   of	   people’s	  
common	  wellbeing	  with	  globalised	  markets.	  In	  other	  words,	  China	  can	  remain	  a	  
leader	   of	   the	   developing,	   and	   a	   country	   in	   the	   primary	   stage	   of	   socialism	   -­‐	   a	  
working	   class-­‐led,	   workers	   and	   peasants	   alliance-­‐based	   people’s	   democratic	  
dictatorship.265	  	   Simultaneously,	   she	   can	   also	   be	   a	   member	   of	   the	  WTO,	   sign	  
BITs,	   invite	   foreign	   capital	   into	   her	   SOEs,	   merge	   them	   in	   line	   with	   the	  
competitive	   crusade	   for	   economics	   of	   scale,	   and	   dispatch	   private	   capital	   on	   a	  
profit-­‐making	  mission	  overseas.266	  	  In	  the	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  
the	  HWP	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	   either	   capitalism	  or	  neoliberalism.	  Nor	  does	   it	  
proffer	   any	   analysis	   of	   their	   constitutive	   structures,	   the	   social	   capacities	   they	  
generate,	   the	   power	   that	   underscores	   them,	   and	   the	   resistance	   they	   provoke.	  
And	   so,	   much	   of	   the	   way	   the	   HWP	   is	   understood	   implicates	   a	   degree	   of	  
conjecture.	   	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   let	  me	   start	  by	   examining	   the	  proposition	  of	   a	  
fluid	   conflation	   between	   two	   different	   types	   of	   social	   relations,	   that	   of	  
capitalism	  and	  socialism.	  
Managing	  capitalism	  
As	  seen	  above,	  ideas	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  capitalism	  
and	  socialism	  that	  is	  non-­‐conflictual	  and	  amenable	  to	  political	  management	  are	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  Mao	  Zedong,	  ibid	  (n	  226).	  
265	  ‘Judicial	  Reform	  in	  China’	  [Oct	  2012]	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  The	  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China	  1,	  2.	  
266	  Belén	  Balanyá	  and	  others,	  Regional	  &	  Global	  Restructuring	  &	  the	  Rise	  of	  Corporate	  Power	  
(new	  edn	  Pluto	  Press	  2003)	  9-­‐10,	  20;	  ‘China	  Unveils	  Merger	  Targets	  to	  Upgrade	  Industry’	  [23	  
Jan	  2013]	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency	  <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-­‐
01/22/c_132120613.htm>	  accessed	  24	  Feb	  2013.	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not	   unique	   to	   post-­‐reforms	   China.	   Arguably,	   they	   occupied	   a	   place	   in	   official	  
discursive	  space	  longer	  than	  the	  two	  decades	  or	  thereabout	  of	  Mao’s	  version	  of	  
‘permanent	   revolution’.267	  	   Nor	   for	   that	   matter	   are	   they	   China	   specific.	   The	  
Marxist	   bequest,	   points	   Hobsbawm,	   naturally	   bifurcated	   into	   reformist	   and	  
revolutionary	  responses.268	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  China’s	  notion	  of	  market	  socialism	  –	  
the	  suggestion	  that	  state	  legislation	  and	  social	  rights	  implementation	  open	  up	  a	  
sphere	   of	   choice	   between	   the	   benefits	   of	   markets	   and	   their	   destructive	  
consequences	   –	   fits	   into	   a	   wider	   20th	   century	   debate	   about	   what	   socialist	  
economies	   should	   look	   like.269	  	   In	   practice,	   we	   now	   have	   the	   benefit	   of	   some	  
past	   experiences,	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	   improvisation	  by	  which	   the	   realisation	  of	  
socialist	   ideology	   was	   first	   characterised.	   We	   know,	   for	   example,	   that	   once	  
revolutionary	  movements	  were	  seized	  of	  state	  power,	  they	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  
resist	  the	  co-­‐opting	  pressures	  exerted	  on	  them	  by	  the	  capitalist	  ecology	  within	  
and	  outside	  their	  borders.270	  	  We	  also	  know	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Western	  type	  
democracies,	   once	   social	   democratic	   parties	   became	   parties	   of	   government,	  
most	   settled	   into	   operating	   within	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   capitalist	   economy,	  
subject	   to	   acting	   as	   parliamentarian	   spokesmen	   for	   narrowly	   defined	   trade	  
unionism.271	  	   In	   other	  words,	   their	   identity	  was	   formulated,	   not	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  
positive	   and	   homogenised	   deference,	   but	   by	   reference	   to	   equivalence	   with	  
surrounding	   structures	   and	   norms.272	  	   As	   Mao	   Zedong	   bemoaned	   in	   a	   letter	  
written	   to	   his	   wife,	   Jiang	   Qing	   in	   1966:	   ‘There	   are	   more	   than	   one	   hundred	  
[communist]	  parties	  in	  the	  world,	  most	  no	  longer	  believe	  in	  Marxism-­‐Leninism.	  
Marx,	  Lenin,	  have	  been	  broken	  into	  pieces,	  not	  to	  say	  ourselves	  (…)’.273	  	  Further,	  
even	   reformative	   inflections	   such	   as	   the	   Keynesian	   welfare	   state	   and	   the	   US	  
New	  Deal	  triggered	  a	  counter-­‐response	  on	  the	  part	  of	  capital,	  one	  that	  diffused	  a	  
sense	  of	  risk	  and	  the	  pathos	  of	  freedom	  to	  propel	  capitalism	  towards	  its	  current	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  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Mao’s	  version	  of	  ‘permanent	  resolution	  see	  Meisner,	  ibid	  (n	  210)	  191-­‐
202.	  
268	  Hobsbawm,	  ibid	  (n	  233)	  6.	  
269	  ibid	  7;	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  196-­‐97.	  
270	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  243)	  5;	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  167)	  69,	  87,	  109.	  
271	  Hobsbawm,	  ibid	  (n	  233)	  10.	  
272	  For	  a	  review	  of	  social	  democracy	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  ‘relations	  of	  equivalence’	  see	  Ernesto	  
Laclau	  and	  Chantal	  Mouffe,	  Hegemony	  and	  Socialist	  Strategy:	  Towards	  a	  Radical	  Democratic	  
Strategy	  (2nd	  edn,	  Verso	  1985)	  71-­‐75,	  127-­‐34.	  
273	  Lu	  Shui	  (ed),	  ‘Guanyu	  Wuchanjieji	  Wenhua	  Geming	  de	  Zhongyao	  Zhishi’	  (Important	  
Propositions	  of	  Chairman	  Mao	  on	  the	  Proletariat	  Great	  Revolution)	  (Henan	  Federation	  of	  Trade	  
Union	  1976)	  cited	  in	  Li	  Mingqi,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  66.	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neoliberal	   progression.274	  Thus,	   the	   hegemonic	   discourse	   with	   which	   China’s	  
HWP	   is	   to	   engage	   is	   one	   that	   has	   already	   excluded	   the	   role	   that	   workers’	  
resistance	  historically	  played	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  capitalism.	  All	  substitutions	  –	  be	  
it	   revolutionary	   or	   reformative	   –	   are	   designated	   failures	   and	   despotic	  
impediments	   to	   the	   free	  expansion	  of	  markets	  based	  commodification.275	  	  The	  
aim	  is	  to	  bring	  capitalism	  back	  to	  form.	  	  
Such	  reversal	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  power.276	  	  And	  so,	  
neoliberalism’s	   spatial	   advance	   was	   inextricable,	   not	   only	   from	   productive	  
power	   in	   the	   form	   of	   manufactured	   discourse,	   but	   also	   from	   compulsory	  
power.277	  	  Its	  expansion	  was	  attendant	  by	  crises,	  was	  ‘written	  in	  shocks’278	  and	  
implicated	  both	  overt	  and	  covert	  intervention,	  such	  as	  the	  neutralization	  of	  the	  
UK	  labour	  party	  between	  1979	  and	  1997,279	  and	  the	  bloody	  experimentation	  in	  
its	  imposition	  on	  South	  America	  in	  the	  70s.280	  	  At	  a	  time	  when	  China	  signals	  her	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  IL	  as	  a	  governing	  institution	  of	  the	  global	  arena,	  in	  the	  
high	   command	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   order,	   IL	   is	   already	   taking	   a	   back	   seat,	  
alternatively	  manipulated.	  Calls	  are	  made	   for	  a	  return	  to	  global	  governance	  of	  
colonial	  or	  imperial	  rule,281	  an	  organisation	  of	  the	  global	  eco-­‐political	  space	  that	  
is	   increasingly	  militarised,282	  a	   commercialised	   campaign	  of	   ‘war	  without	  end’	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  Kean	  Birch	  &	  Vlad	  Nykhnenko	  (eds)	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Neo-­‐liberalism:	  The	  Collapse	  of	  an	  
Economic	  Order?	  (Zed	  Books	  2010)	  3.	  
275	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  167)	  117-­‐18;	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  workers	  resistance	  see	  for	  example	  
Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  273)	  79-­‐85.	  
276	  Mark	  Laffey	  and	  Jutta	  Welds,	  ‘Policing	  and	  Global	  Governance’	  in	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  
Raymond	  Duvall	  (eds),	  Power	  in	  Global	  Governance	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  International	  
Relations:	  98	  CUP	  2008)	  60.	  
277	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall,	  ‘Power	  in	  Global	  Governance’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  
ibid	  3-­‐4.	  
278	  Naomi	  Klein,	  ibid	  (n	  44)	  19.	  
279	  David	  Miller,	  ‘How	  Neoliberalism	  Got	  Where	  It	  is:	  Elite	  Planning,	  Corporate	  Lobbying	  and	  the	  
Release	  of	  the	  Free	  Market’	  in	  Birch	  &	  Nykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  275)	  27-­‐33.	  
280	  Klein,	  ibid	  (n	  44)	  75-­‐97.	  
281	  Himadeep	  Muppidi,	  ‘Colonial	  and	  Postcolonial	  Governance’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  
277)	  275.	  
282	  But	  see	  Nye’s	  argument	  that	  the	  use	  military	  force	  is	  increasingly	  costly	  for	  states	  to	  use.	  
Joseph	  S.	  Nye	  Jr,	  The	  Future	  of	  Power	  (Public	  Affairs	  2011)	  29.	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in	   which	   assassinations	   by	   drones	   are	   posited	   as	   a	   moral	   advance,283	  and	   a	  
convergence	  of	  state,	  war	  and	  profit-­‐making	  that	  is	  ever	  more	  intimate.284	  
The	  HWP	  problematised	  
All	  of	  which	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  HWP’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  
contemporary	  ‘shi’,	  and	  what	  catching	  up	  is	  actually	  likely	  to	  implicate.285	  	  It	  is	  
perhaps	   this	   latter	  question	   that	  most	   fundamentally	  problematises	   the	  HWP.	  
For	  if	  one	  is	  to	  accept,	  as	  I	  do	  here,	  that	  (i)	  capitalism	  is	  a	  distinct	  and	  a	  specific	  
form	   of	   social	   relations;	   (ii)	   its	   essential	   and	   irreducible	   nature,	   indeed	   its	  
survival,	   is	   contingent	   on	   the	   endless	   opening	   up	   of	   new	   frontiers	   within	   a	  
hierarchical	   structure	   of	   statist	   centres	   of	   capital	   accumulation;	   (iii)	   such	  
opening	  up	  necessitates	  a	  uniform	  imposition	  of	  its	  economic	  imperatives;	  and	  
(iv)	   its	   immanent	   compulsion	   for	   value	   producing	   commodification	   imposes	  
strict	  limits	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  operate	  in	  any	  other	  way,	  then	  the	  proposition	  of	  
flexible	  responses	  to	  situational	  dispositions	  emerges	  as	  an	  existential	  barrier.	  
Thus,	   the	   attempt	   to	   explain	   capitalist	   globalisation	   by	   reference	   to	   the	  
Confucian	  notion	  of	  Great	  Harmony	  (da	  tong)	  is	  taxing.286	  	  A	  harmonious	  unity	  
without	   uniformity	   and	   central	   control	   capable	   of	   tolerating	   peripheral	  
autonomy	   may	   have	   been	   possible	   in	   China’s	   non-­‐capitalist	   empire,	   with	   its	  
absence	   of	   capitalist	   compulsions	   for	   intrasystemic	   military	   competition	   and	  
extrasystemic	   expansion.	   However,	   one	   will	   be	   hard	   pressed	   to	   point	   to	  
manifestations	  of	  Da	  Tong	   in	  historical	  capitalism.	  As	  pointed	  by	  Silver	  and	  Lu	  
Zhang	   ‘where	   capital	   goes	   conflict	   follows’	   and,	   as	   opined	   by	   Wallerstein,	   ‘it	  
would	  be	  a	  very	  curious	  reading	  of	  historical	  capitalism	  that	  suggested	  that	  the	  
outcome	  has	  been	  harmony’.287	  	  To	  revisit	  Qin	  Yaqing’s	  elucidations,	  Confucius’	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<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16f12f74-­‐717c-­‐11e2-­‐9056-­‐
00144feab49a.html#axzz2KZdZcUge>	  accessed	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  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  imperialism	  and	  ‘war	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  example,	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  178)	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  A	  view	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  war	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  Deng	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harmonious	   diversity	   and	   Hegel’s	   conflictual	   thesis	   and	   antithesis	   represent	  
different	  civilizational	  rationalities	  that	  are	  in	  all	  probability	  non-­‐transferrable	  
and	  may	  well	  implicate	  a	  choice	  between	  one	  or	  the	  other.	  	  For,	  more	  often	  than	  
not,	   the	  motivations	  and	  interests	  that	  guide	  agents	  of	  capitalist	   logic	  contrast	  
with	  those	  of	  territorial	  logic	  and,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  operational	  elusiveness	  are	  
less	  amenable	  to	  political	  control.288	  	  	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  let	  me	  now	  examine	  the	  HWP.	  China’s	  strategy,	  she	  asserts,	  is	  
one	  of	  ever	  deepening	  opening	  up	  and	  integration,	  but	  such	  that	  produces	  win-­‐
win	  solutions.289	  	  Implicit	  in	  the	  promise	  of	  win-­‐win	  solutions	  is	  the	  proposition	  
that	  global	  wealth	  polarisation	  is	  a	  management	  issue,	  not	  an	  immanent	  feature	  
of	   the	   ‘law	   of	   globalised	   value’.290 	  Poverty,	   explains	   Lin	   Yinfu,	   represents	  
countries’	   individual	   malaise.291	  	   Solutions,	   he	   posits,	   must	   be	   market-­‐based,	  
free	   from	  protectionist,	   inward-­‐looking	   impediments,	   and	   led	  by	  government-­‐	  
capital	   cooperation	   that	   operates	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   a	   modern	   state	  
structure.	  292	  	  To	  this,	  the	  HWP	  adds	  a	  layer	  of	  global	  organisational	  reforms,	  so	  
as	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   equalisation	   of	   the	   core-­‐periphery	   power	   asymmetry.	  
Overlooked	   is	   the	   possibility	   that	   asymmetry	   is	   structural,	   including	   the	  
transfer	   of	   surplus	   from	  peripheral	   producers	   in	   the	  Global	   South	   to	   the	   core	  
monopolies	  of	  the	  North.293	  	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  cannot	  remain	  rich	  unless	  the	  
other	   remains	  poor.	  Yet,	   the	  HWP	  declares	   its	   support	   for	   the	  preservation	  of	  
developed	   countries’	   prosperity.294	  	   Further,	   profit	   imperatives	   dictate	   that	  
capitalist	  power	  cannot	  be	  confined	  to	  prescribed	  limits.	  As	  Arendt	  points	  out,	  
the	   never-­‐ending	   accumulation	   of	   property	   necessitates	   structures	   that	  
facilitate	  the	  never-­‐ending	  accumulation	  of	  power.295	  	  
This	  contest	  between	  capital’s	  compulsions	  and	  their	  political	  management	  can	  
already	   be	   observed	   in	   China.	   For	   example,	   administration	   of	   ODI	   projects	   is	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  ibid	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  ibid	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  chapter	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found	   in	   a	   licensing	   system	   that	   seeks	   to	   regulate	   the	   conduct	   of	   Chinese	  
corporations	  overseas.	  They	  are	  required	  to	   ‘be	  well	   informed	  of	  and	  abide	  by	  
the	  relevant	  laws,	  regulations,	  rules	  and	  policies	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  and	  
comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  benefit’.296	  	  This	  is	  repeated	  in	  China’s	  12th	  
Five	   Year,	   pursuant	   to	   which	   ‘The	   enterprises	   that	   are	   going	   out	   and	   their	  
overseas	   cooperation	   projects	   should	   bear	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   in	  
mind	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  benefits	  to	  the	  local	  people’.297	  	  Yet,	  a	  question	  arises	  as	  
to	   how	   corporate	   conduct	   is	   to	   be	   controlled,	   now	   that	   public	   ownership	   is	  
increasingly	  fused	  with	  capital.	  Further,	  all	  the	  while,	  capital’s	  quest	  for	  control	  
over	  profit	  generation	  intensifies.	  The	  All	  China	  Private	  Enterprises	  Federation	  
(ACPEF)	  is	  already	  lobbying	  for	  structural	  changes	  that	  will	  facilitate	  its	  greater	  
bite	   of	   the	   cherry.298	  	   Externally,	   petroleum	   transnational	   corporations	   are	  
warning	  against	   the	   implications	   for	  FDI	  of	  China	  adopting	  binding	  targets	   for	  
environmental	  protection.299	  
Furthermore,	   as	   marketisation	   gathers	   momentum,	   the	   separation	   between	  
government	  and	  special	  interest	  groups	  that	  enabled	  the	  pursuance	  of	  common	  
interests	   during	   China’s	   socialist	   period,	   is	   being	   replaced	   with	   greater	  
closeness	   between	   the	   two.300	  	   In	   the	   state	   apparatus,	   economic	   and	   political	  
elites	  –	  altogether	  some	  seven	  million	  people,	  equivalent	  to	  a	  mere	  1	  per	  cent	  of	  
the	  working	  population	  –	  are	  gradually	  fusing	  through	  organised	  lobbying	  and	  
political	   appointments.301 	  	   The	   CCP	   has	   remained	   relatively	   isolated	   from	  
economic	  activities.302	  	  Yet,	  even	  there,	   Jiang	  Zemin’s	   ‘three	  represents’	   theory	  
opened	   the	   party	   doors	   to	   capitalists,	   now	   classified	   as	   ‘the	   most	   advanced	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  Direct	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  a	  discussion	  of	  corporate	  social	  
responsibility	  (CSR)	  in	  China	  see	  generally	  Jingchen	  Zhao,	  CSR	  in	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(manuscript	  to	  Corporate	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  in	  Contemporary	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  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  
Ltd	  2014).	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  entrepreneurs	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  recommended	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  People’s	  Congress	  above	  county	  level,	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  than	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  and	  eight	  
entered	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  National’s	  People	  Congress	  itself.	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  ibid	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  166-­‐68.	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productive	   forces’.303	  	   By	   2012,	   145	   entrepreneurs	   were	   selected	   as	   party	  
delegates	   for	   the	   18th	   National	   Congress	   of	   the	   CCP.	   This	   represented	   52	   per	  
cent	  of	  all	  newcomers.304	  
Furthermore,	   Chinese	   and	   Western	   media,	   think	   tanks	   and	   academia	  
increasingly	  converge	   in	   the	   formulation	  of	  discourse.	  Transnational	   capital	   is	  
seeping	  into	  the	  country’s	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  fabric,	  as	  well	  
into	   her	   legislative	   processes.305 	  	   The	   way	   such	   seeping	   is	   mediated	   was	  
observed	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter.	   In	   the	  US	  Model	  BIT	  2012,	   the	  discourse	  of	  
transparency	   is	   used	   to	   legitimise	   foreign	   capital’s	   participation	   in	   internal	  
legislative	   processes.306 	  	   Similarly,	   the	   pressure	   to	   extend	   NT	   to	   the	   pre-­‐
establishment	  stage	   threatens	   to	  dismantle	  an	  administrative	  construct	  aimed	  
at	  preserving	  sovereign	  control	  over	  the	  entry	  of	  FDI.	  
Finally,	  successful	  penetration	  notwithstanding,	  China	  does	  not	  readily	   fit	   into	  
Western	  framework	  of	  understanding.307	  	   Internally,	  with	  a	  strengthened	  state	  
fiscal	   and	   managerial	   capacity,	   and	   the	   introduction	   in	   2005-­‐6	   of	   ‘building	   a	  
new	  socialist	  countryside’	  and	  ‘harmonious	  society’	  policies,	  she	  appears	  to	  be	  
retreating	  from	  the	  neoliberal	  dogma	  of	  Jiang	  Zemin’s	  presidency.308	  	  Externally,	  
she	  projects	  a	  sense	  of	  shallow	  integration	  that	  is	  all	  the	  more	  disturbing	  for	  the	  
fact	  of	  her	  rising	  power.309	  	  Uneasiness	   is	  already	  being	   translated	   into	  power	  
posturing	   through	   increased	  military	   attention	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	  US,310	  and	   a	  
promise	   of	   resistance	   on	   the	   part	   of	   China.311	  Ruan	   Rongze,	   an	   influential	  
foreign	   policy	   adviser,	   reiterated	   the	   country’s	   commitment	   to	   peaceful	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dialogue	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  brewing	  tension,	  and	  stated	  
that	   China	   did	   not	   see	   her	   rise	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   US	   demise.	   Yet,	  
simultaneously,	   he	   also	   asserted	   the	   imperative	   of	   military	   self-­‐
strengthening. 312 	  	   Thus,	   for	   all	   China’s	   efforts	   to	   draw	   a	   line	   under	   the	  
turbulence	  engendered	  by	  her	   initial	   encounter	  with	   the	  West,	   and	   signal	  her	  
shift	   from	   resistance	   to	   peaceful	   accommodation,	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   the	  
neoliberal	  world	  order	   she	   is	   joining	  are	   such,	   that	   the	   country	  may	  well	   find	  
herself	  once	  again	  an	  unwilling	  actor	  in	  conflictual	  relationships.	  For	  the	  words	  
of	  an	  anonymous	  Chinese	  author	  written	  in	  1836	  ring	  as	  true	  now	  as	  they	  did	  
on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  first	  Opium	  War:	  	  
	  
There	  is,	  probably,	  at	  the	  present	  no	  more	  infallible	  a	  criterion	  of	  
the	  civilization	  and	  advancement	  of	  societies	  than	  the	  proficiency	  
which	  each	  has	  attained	  in	  ‘the	  murderous	  art’,	  the	  perfection	  and	  
variety	  of	   their	   implements	   for	  mutual	  destruction,	  and	   the	  skill	  
with	  which	  they	  have	  learnt	  to	  use	  them.313	  
	  
It	   appears	   then	   that	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   campaign	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   an	  
oligopolised	   transmission	   belt	   of	   globalised	   value,	   even	   partial	   integration	  
attracts	   conflictual	   and	   power	   based	   responses.	   Incorporation	   that	   is	   strewn	  
with	   instances	   of	   adaptations,	   and	   talk	   about	   a	   new	   non-­‐hegemonic	  
globalisation	   raise	   the	   spectre	   of	   loss	   of	   privileges	   and	   a	   break	   with	   the	  
practices	  and	  structures	  that	  underpin	  them.	  Such	  loss	  of	  privileges	  is	  unlikely	  
to	   be	   legitimised	   through	   peaceful	   co-­‐existence	   or	   two-­‐way	   relational	  
redefinitions.314 	  	   Shambaugh’s	   latest	   exposition	   on	   what	   he	   terms	   China’s	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partial	  power	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Shambaugh	  distinguishes	  his	  work	  by	  pointing	  
to	   its	   comprehensiveness	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional	   exploration	  of	   the	  horizontal	  
spread	  of	  China’s	  power	  rather	  than	  her	  vertical	  ascent.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  book	  
remains	   anchored	   in	   the	   dominant	   discourse,	   one	   that	   assesses,	   measures,	  
evaluates	  and	  pronounces	  on	  the	  power	  implications	  of	  China’s	  rise.	  Much	  like	  
in	   the	   18th	   century,	   Western	   narrative	   tends	   to	   overlook	   what	   can	   be	   learnt	  
from	   China’s	   experiences,	   how	   might	   we	   be	   enriched	   by	   her	   difference	   and	  
experimentation,	  or	  for	  that	  matter,	  what	  it	  tells	  us	  about	  ourselves.	  Rather,	  its	  
preoccupation	  is	  with	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  her	  power	  is	  such,	  that	  she	  may	  
no	   longer	   fit	   into	   the	  agenda	  of	   a	  Western	  capitalist	  model;	   alternatively,	   that	  
her	   difficulties	   are	   such,	   that	   she	   is	   unlikely	   to	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   hegemonic	  
expansion.315	  	   It	   should	   perhaps	   come	   at	   no	   surprise	   that	   the	   HWP	  was	   first	  
addressed	  to	  the	  periphery,	  and	  it	  is	  there	  that	  one	  may	  now	  find	  echoes	  of	  its	  
worldview,	   as	   in	   the	   late	   Chavez’s	   letter	   written	   from	   his	   sickbed	   on	   the	  
occasion	  of	  the	  second	  annual	  summit	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Latin	  American	  and	  
Caribbean	  States	  (CELAC).	   ‘We	  are’	  he	  wrote,	   ‘(…)	  an	  example	  for	  the	  world	  of	  
unity	  in	  diversity,	  for	  justice,	  social	  well-­‐being,	  and	  happiness’.316	  	  
Different	  dreams	  	  
Non-­‐capitalist	  vision	  
The	   power	   responses	   that	   difference	   seems	   to	   attract	   within	   the	  
capitalist/neoliberal	  logic	  invite	  a	  further	  unpacking	  of	  the	  divergence	  that	  the	  
HWP	   purports	   to	   invoke.	   The	   proposition	   that	   it	   derives	   from	   a	   conflation	  
between	   capitalism	   and	   socialism	   was	   examined	   above.	   But	   there	   is	   another	  
possibility.	   Namely,	   that	   no	   such	   conflation	   is	   intended,	   and	   that	   the	  
globalisation	  contemplated	   is	   in	   fact	  a	  non-­‐capitalist	  one.	   In	  other	  words,	   that	  
the	  marketisation	  envisioned	  by	  the	  HWP	  will	  be	  of	  a	  type	  that	  is	  subordinate	  to	  
non-­‐economic	   imperatives,	   and	   does	   not	   involve	   societal	   subjugation	   to	   the	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command	   of	   an	   ever-­‐growing	   army	   of	   fictitious	   commodities.317 	  	   Such	   an	  
understanding	   is	   congruent	   with	   Wood’s	   negation	   of	   the	   commercialisation	  
model,	  and	  the	  distinction	  drawn	  by	  Arrighi	  between	  markets	  and	  capitalism.	  It	  
follows	  that	  the	  mere	  removal	  of	  impediments	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  markets	  does	  
not	  in	  itself	  signify	  a	  capitalist	  social	  relations.	  	  
A	  number	  of	  the	  HWP’s	  tenets	  appear	  to	  point	  in	  this	  direction.	  Indeed,	  its	  core	  
themes,	   those	   of	   peace	   and	   development	   and	   balanced	   globalisation,	   seem	   to	  
invoke	   the	  attributes	  of	   the	  Chinese	  empire	  and	  China’s	   socialist	  period	  more	  
persuasively	   than	   the	   crises,	   imbalances	   and	   dispossession	   of	   the	   world’s	  
neoliberal	   interlude.318	  	   For	   such	   crises,	   imbalances	   and	   dispossession	   do	   not	  
represent	   unintended	   consequences.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   non-­‐economic	  
constraints,	   the	   compulsion	   of	   endless	   accumulation	   necessitates	   perpetual	  
expansion	   that	   in	   turn	   disrupts	   any	   inclination	   towards	   equilibrium. 319	  	  
Particularly	   at	   a	   point	   of	   over	   accumulation,	  when	   capital	   risks	   idleness,	   new	  
assets	  must	   be	   brought	   on	   stream,	   so	   as	   to	   be	   put	   into	   profitable	   use.	   Profit	  
imperatives	  require	  that	  such	  new	  assets	  be	  first	  devalued.	  This	  in	  turn	  signifies	  
processes	   of	   dispossession	   in	   some	   form	   or	   another.	   Thus,	   the	   system	   is	  
periodically	  rationalised	  through	  orchestrated	  crises.320	  
Turning	   to	   the	   HWP’s	   appeal	   for	   cooperative	   interactions,	   here	   we	   are	  
reminded	  of	   the	   cooperation,	   reciprocity	   and	  obligation	   to	   foster	  welfare	   that	  
delivered	   the	   remarkable	   peacefulness	   and	   stability	   of	   interstate	   relations	   in	  
the	  Chinese	  empire.	   	  Thus,	  non-­‐capitalist	  markets	  were	  complementary	  rather	  
than	   competitive.321	  	   Such	   complementarity	   was	   encouraged	   and	   competition	  
on	  the	  whole	  deliberately	  eliminated,	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  stability	  and	  avoid	  trade	  
disarray. 322 	  The	   discursive	   equation	   between	   competition	   and	   disruption,	  
violence	   and	   undesired	   outcomes	   of	   human	   quest	   for	   material	   gain,	   can	   be	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found	   in	   the	  political	  philosophy	  of	  China’s	  pre-­‐Qin	   thinkers	   such	  as	  Xunzi.323	  	  
Like	  Confucius	  and	  Mencius,	  Xunzi	  saw	  peace	  as	  contingent	  on	  human	  rapacity	  
being	   constrained	   through	   systemic	   norms	   of	   morality.324	  	   In	   other	   words,	  
whether	  or	  not	  boundless	   rapacity	  was	   inherent	   to	  human	  nature,	   a	   point	   on	  
which	   opinions	   differed,325	  for	   pre-­‐Qin	   thinkers,	   as	   indeed	   for	   Aristotle,	   co-­‐
existence	  required	  that	  the	  motive	  of	   limitless	  gain	  not	  be	  divorced	  from	  non-­‐
economic	   social	   relations,	   so	   that	   they	   may	   restrain	   it. 326 	  Similarly,	   if	  
analytically	   different,	   denunciation	   of	   competition	   is	   shared	   by	   all	   socialist	  
school	  of	  thoughts,	  and	  was	  integral	  to	  China’s	  socialist	  period.327	  	  
Concomitant	   with	   cooperation	   was	   the	   Confucian	   virtue	   of	   reciprocity.328	  	   It	  
signified	   fairness,	   inclusiveness	   and	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   concerns	   and	  
circumstances	   of	   others.	  When	   combined	   with	   the	   virtue	   of	   righteousness,	   it	  
formed	  a	  constituent	  of	  a	   sense	  of	   justice.329	  	  This	   infusion	  of	   reciprocity	  with	  
moral	  normativity	  offered	  a	  framework	  within	  which,	  economic	  productive	  and	  
distributive	  activities	  were	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  a	  host	  of	  motives.	  These	  were	  made	  
subject	   to	   general,	   non-­‐economic	   and	   non-­‐bilateral	   behavioural	   principles.330	  	  
Further,	  reciprocity	  did	  not	  necessarily	  implicate	  equality	  of	  bargain.	  As	  posited	  
by	  Arrighi,	  tributary	  interstate	  relations	  were	  predicated	  on	  what	  Keohane	  and	  
Kapestein	  term	  ‘diffused	  reciprocity’	  –	  an	  unequal	  exchange	  pursuant	  to	  which,	  
distribution	   of	   benefits	   is	   reflective	   of	   difference.	   It	   is	   guided	   by	   the	  
requirements	  of	  justice,	  fairness	  and	  stability,	  rather	  than	  equality	  as	  a	  primary	  
consideration.331	  	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  contemporary	  Yang	  Xuetong	  calls	  on	  China	  
to	  abandon	  the	  false	  and	  conflict	  producing	  narrative	  of	  equal	  reciprocity.	  The	  
correct	   structure,	   he	   argues,	   will	   dispense	   with	   absolute	   equality,	   and	   will	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replace	   it	   with	   norms	   that	   take	   into	   account	   the	   special	   needs	   of	   weaker	  
states.332	  	  
In	   contrast,	   competition	   is	   immanent	   to	   capitalist/neoliberal	   property	  
relations. 333 	  Theorised	   as	   the	   only	   route	   to	   best	   outcomes,	   it	   forms	   an	  
indispensable	  condition	  for	  accumulation.334	  	  Further,	  by	  divorcing	  competition	  
from	   non-­‐economic,	   non-­‐bilateral	   social	   norms,	   the	   interaction	   engendered	  
cannot	  but	  be	  polarised	  between	  losers	  and	  winners	  -­‐	  a	  zero-­‐game	  mechanism	  
for	   distribution	   in	   reverse. 335 	  With	   unrestrained	   accumulation	   and	  
corresponding	   unrestrained	   commodification	   as	   the	   overarching	   purposes	   of	  
competitive	  behaviour,	   true	  welfare	  becomes	   an	   impediment.	   	  Welfare	   that	   is	  
not	   confined	   to	   consumers’	   wellbeing	   implicates	   a	   process	   of	   de-­‐
commodification.	   Certain	   areas	   of	   social	   and	   economic	   activities	   are	   placed	  
outside	   the	   realm	   of	   competition,	   and	   thereby	   impose	   limits	   on	   its	   free	  
operation.336	  	   As	   underscored	   by	   China’s	   ancient	   philosophers	   and	   socialist	  
analysts,	   the	   consequence	   is	   a	   susceptibility	   to	   crisis	   and	   conflict.	   	   For	   the	  
endless	   search	   for	   competitive	   advantages	   generates	   ‘a	   state	   of	   perpetual	  
motion	  and	  chronic	   instability	   in	  the	  spatial	  distribution	  of	  capitalist	  activities	  
as	   capitalists	   search	   for	   superior	   (i.e.	   lower	   costs)	   locations’.337	  	   Further,	   once	  
the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  hegemon	  and	  competing	  states	  is	  disturbed,	  
international	  competition	  is	   likely	  to	  translate	  into	  geopolitical	  confrontations,	  
beit	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	  military	   clash	   or	   trade	   and	   currency	  wars.338	  	   China	   is	   a	  
case	  in	  point.	  Through	  the	  release	  of	  a	  massive	  amount	  of	  assets	  hitherto	  kept	  
by	   the	   state,	   and	   the	   offer	   of	   an	   army	   of	   cheap	   labour,	   China’s	   opening	   up	  
restored	   the	   global	   profit	   rate,	   and	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   global	  
triumph	  of	  neoliberalism.339	  	  Yet,	  as	  her	  competitive	  successes	  appear	  to	  exceed	  
systemically	  acceptable	  limits,	  her	  share	  of	  surplus	  and	  resources	  threatens	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332	  Yang	  Xuetong,	  ibid	  (n	  324)	  213-­‐14.	  
333	  ibid	  36,	  97.	  
334	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  4.	  
335	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  186)	  37.	  
336	  Ronnie	  D.	  Lipschutz,	  ‘Global	  Civil	  Society	  and	  Global	  Governmentality’;	  ‘The	  Search	  For	  
Politics	  and	  the	  State	  Amidst	  the	  Capillaries	  Of	  Social	  Power’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  279)	  
233.	  
337	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  186)	  95.	  
338	  ibid	  124;	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  (n	  15)	  23.	  
339	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  186)	  149;	  Mingqi	  Li,	  ibid	  16,	  27	  69,	  91.	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bite	  into	  that	  of	  the	  hegemon,	  her	  ODI	  expands	  globally,	  and	  harmonious	  society	  
policies	  corrode	  TNCs’	  profit	  margins,	  cheer	  leading	  is	  giving	  way	  to	  notions	  of	  
containment.	  Thus,	  as	  well	   as	  a	  military	  muscles	   flexing	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	  US	  
pacific	   pivot,	   the	   Transatlantic	   Trade	   Partnership	   (TTP)	   excludes	   China.	   The	  
free	  trade	  agreement	  offered	  by	  Obama	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  early	  February	  2013	  is	  said	  
to	   prescribe	   how	   third	   party	   countries	   such	   as	   China	   be	   dealt	   with.	   Both	  
agreements	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  defensive	  moves	  against	  her	  ascent.340	  	  
Finally,	  there	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  multipolar	  world.	  What	  form	  multipolarity	  is	  to	  
take	   and	   what	   will	   be	   its	   essential	   constituents	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   unveiled.341	  
However,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   a	   harmonious	   world,	  
multipolarity	   points	   to	   a	   political	   space	   that	   comprises	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  
autonomous,	  yet	  interactive,	  decisions	  centres.342.	  China,	  say	  Wang	  Zonglai	  and	  
Hu	  Bin,	   ‘opposes	  any	  restrictions	  on	  State	  sovereignty	  that	  are	  non-­‐reciprocal,	  
non	   voluntary	   and	   based	   on	   power	   politics’.343	  	   Institutionally,	   neoliberal	   key	  
ideas	   that	   currently	   structure	   the	   way	   the	   global	   sphere	   is	   organized	   and	  
regulated344	  will	   presumably	   make	   way	   to	   a	   diversity	   of	   voices.	   However,	   it	  
would	   be	   a	   non-­‐antagonistic	   political	   space.	   For,	   the	   HWP’s	   proposition	   that	  
internationally	   shared	   values	   and	   human	   common	   destiny	   can	   and	   should	  
accommodate	   the	   autonomy	   to	   be	   different,	   cuts	   across	   space	   and	   time.	   It	  
invokes	  both	   the	   formula	   that	  made	  China’s	   tributary	  system	  so	  successful,	  as	  
well	   as	   Mouffe’s	   ‘agonism’.	   Here,	   challenges	   and	   conflicts	   take	   place,	   but	   the	  
challenger	  is	  a	  legitimate	  adversary	  rather	  than	  an	  enemy.345	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340	  On	  the	  US	  Asia	  ‘pivot’	  see	  for	  example	  Bonnie	  G.	  Glaser,	  ‘Prepare	  for	  Unintended	  
Consequences’	  [2012]	  Global	  Forecast	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  International	  Studies	  22	  
<http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_glaser.pdf>	  accessed	  19	  Feb	  2013;	  on	  the	  TTIP	  
see	  DB	  Research,	  ‘An	  Early	  Good	  Luck	  to	  the	  US-­‐EU	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement’	  Deutsche	  Bank	  
<http://www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?addmenu=false&document=PROD00000
00000301841&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_DE-­‐>	  accessed	  26	  Feb	  
2013.	  	  
341	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  different	  perspectives	  of	  multipolarity	  see	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  90-­‐118.	  
342	  ibid	  116.	  
343	  Wang	  Zonglai	  and	  Hu	  Bin,	  ibid	  (n	  310)	  197.	  
344	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  (n	  278)	  7;	  since	  opening	  up	  China’s	  participation	  in	  international	  
organisations	  has	  increased	  from	  20	  to	  130.	  Wang	  Zonglai	  and	  Hu	  Bin,	  ibid	  (n	  310)	  193.	  
345	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  20.	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The	  depth	  of	  normative	  and	  institutional	  change	  envisioned	  by	  the	  HWP	  is,	  as	  
yet,	   a	  matter	   for	   speculation.	  Ren	  Xiao,	   for	   example,	   views	  China	   as	   a	   ‘reform	  
minded	   status-­‐quo	   power’	   that	   seeks	   to	   change	   only	   the	   unjust	   and	  
unreasonable	   components	   of	   the	   system.346	  Yan	   Xuetong,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  
predicts	   that	   ‘in	   the	   future	  she	  will	  prefer	   to	  establish	  new	   institutions	  rather	  
than	  reform	  existing	  ones.’	  347	  Some	  indicators	  as	  to	  the	  country’s	  intentions	  are	  
already	  available,	  such	  as	  her	  promise	  to	  reform	  international	  financial	  services	  
and	   rationalise	   the	   international	   currency	   system.348	  	   	   More	   generally,	   the	  
additional	   responsibilities	   that	   are	   congruent	   with	   China’s	   status	   of	   an	  
emerging	  ‘leader	  state’,	  say	  Yee	  and	  Chen,	  mean	  that	  the	  formulation	  of	  policies	  
in	   the	   country’s	   interior	   must	   take	   into	   account	   their	   impact	   on	   others	   and	  
ensure	  that	  it	  is	  a	  positive	  one.349	  
It	   is	   perhaps	   in	   its	   promotion	   of	   pluralistic	   multipolarity	   that	   the	   HWP	   is	  
potentially	  at	  its	  most	  contesting,	  since	  both	  multipolarity	  and	  diversity	  proffer	  
the	  possibility	  of	  a	  new	  design	  of	  diffused	  power	  and	  non-­‐consensual	  politics.	  
The	   contrasting	   capitalist/neoliberal	   dependency	   on	  power	   accumulation	   and	  
related	  spatial	  spread	  of	  a	  pseudo-­‐universal	  single	  system,	  have	  been	  discussed	  
at	   some	   length	   before.350	  	   I	   would	   however	   want	   to	   expand	   on	   the	   role	   of	  
institutions/organisations	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   neoliberal	   ecology,	   as	   this	   will	  
lead	   us	   back	   to	   the	   problematisation	   of	   the	   HWP,	   and	   forward	   to	   its	  
consideration	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  BITs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  Ren	  Xiao,	  ‘A	  Reform	  Minded	  Status	  Quo	  Power?	  China,	  the	  G-­‐20	  and	  Changes	  in	  the	  
International	  Monetary	  System’	  (2012)	  RCCPB	  Working	  Paper	  25	  Indiana	  University	  Research	  
Center	  for	  Chinese	  Political	  and	  Business	  
<http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/pdf/Ren%20RCCPB%2025%20G20%20Apr%202012.pdf>	  
accessed	  16	  Feb	  2013.	  
347	  Yan	  Xuetong,	  ‘Chinese	  Views	  of	  China’s	  Role	  in	  Global	  Governance’	  [Aug	  2011]	  Lecture	  at	  the	  
George	  Washington	  University	  <http://china.usc.edu/ShowEvent.aspx?EventID=3131>	  
accessed	  16	  Feb	  2013.	  
348	  China	  Twelfth	  Five	  Year	  Plan,	  ibid	  (n	  298).	  
349	  Yee,	  ibid,	  (n	  45)	  at	  103-­‐05;	  Chen	  Zhiming,	  ‘International	  Responsibility	  and	  China’s	  Foreign	  
Policy’	  in	  ‘China	  Shift:	  Global	  Strategies	  of	  the	  Rising	  Power’	  No	  3	  The	  National	  Institute	  for	  
Defence	  Studies	  Joint	  Research	  Series	  61.	  
350	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  167)	  51-­‐52,	  83.	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The	  HWP	  problematised	  -­‐	  institutions	  	  
By	  means	  of	  rule-­‐making	  and	  norms	  dissemination,	  neoliberal	   institutions	  are	  
designed	   around	   organisations	   and	   key	   ideas,	   such	   as	   marketisation,	  
privatisation	  and	  free	  trade	  and	  investment.351	  	  The	  corollary	  is	  a	  process	  of	  de-­‐
politicalisation	  that	  forecloses	  contest,	  reduces	  the	  need	  for	  compulsory	  power	  
and	  replaces	  both	  with	  notions	  of	  consensus.352	  	  Thus,	  alluding	  to	  Haas,	  Muppidi	  
offers	  a	  view	  of	  institutional	  incorporation	  as	  comprising	  a	  process	  of	  locking	  in	  
and	  ensuring	  that	  the	  door	   is	   finally	  shut.353	  	  Power	  then	  becomes	  elusive	  and	  
resistance	  correspondingly	  difficult.	  	  I	  already	  observed	  how	  neoliberal	  policies	  
were	  conceptualised	  as	  derivatives	  of	  consensus,	  one	  that	  had	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  
institutional	   organisations	   of	   the	   US	   Treasury	   and	   the	   US	   dominated	   IFIs.	   As	  
adverse	   outcomes	   threatened	   implementation,	   it	   was	   to	   institutional	   design	  
that	  efforts	  turned,	  this	  time	  at	  the	  national	  level.354	  Similarly,	  when	  multilateral	  
negotiations	   failed	   to	  produce	   the	  outcome	  desired	  by	  core	   states,	   ‘locking	   in’	  
was	  diverted	  towards	  individualised	  trade	  and	  investment	  arrangements.355	  	  
Corresponding	   processes	   may	   be	   identified	   in	   China.	   	   Writing	   for	   the	   World	  
Bank,	  Yang	  Yao	  echoes	  the	  Washington	  Consensus’	  emphasis	  on	  institutions	  as	  
important	   vehicles	   for	   policy	   implementation.	   	   Thus,	   he	   says,	   they	  have	   to	   be	  
adapted	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  motivates	  stakeholders	  to	  buy	  into	  the	  overriding	  task	  
of	   reforming	   the	   country.356	  Also	   in	   the	   name	   of	   reforms	   and	   development,	  
attempts	   at	   dismantling	   socialist	   structures	   in	   the	   face	   of	   popular	   attachment	  
were	  facilitated	  and	  legitimised	  through	  membership	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  a	  prolific	  
BITs	  program.357	  	   Incorporation	   that	  was	  historically	  brought	  about	  by	  means	  
of	  compulsory	  power	  could	  now	  be	  posited	  as	  a	  voluntary,	   indigenous	  choice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351	  For	  the	  role	  of	  TNCs	  in	  restructuring	  the	  EU	  around	  these	  ideas	  see	  generally	  Balanya	  and	  
others,	  ibid	  (n	  267).	  
352	  Mark	  Rupert,	  ‘Class	  Power	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Global	  Governance’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  ibid	  
(n	  278)	  22.	  
353	  Muppidi,	  ibid	  (n	  283)	  279.	  
354	  Chapter	  3	  text	  to	  n	  119-­‐29	  pp	  104-­‐06.	  
355	  Chapter	  2	  text	  to	  n	  36-­‐47	  pp	  49-­‐51.	  
356	  Yang	  Yao,	  ‘What	  Explains	  China’s	  Economic	  Success’	  (2011)	  13	  issue	  1	  Development	  
Outreach	  28	  
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/deor_13_1_26.pdf?expires=1362902433
&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=CA75>	  accessed	  10	  March	  2013.	  	  
357	  Chapter	  4	  text	  to	  n	  37	  p	  130.	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Thereafter,	   institutional	   power	   would	   safeguard	   the	   consequences	   of	   such	  
choice.	   	   In	   terms	   of	   China’s	   worldview,	   the	   HWP	   may	   uphold	   diversity	   and	  
difference,	   but	   at	   least	   for	   now	   the	   country’s	   institutional	   participation	  
unavoidably	   puts	   limits	   on	   the	   normativity	   it	   is	   able	   to	   articulate.	   In	   other	  
words,	  China	  can	  hardly	  be	  a	  WTO	  member	  and	  at	  the	  time	  oppose	  free	  trade.	  
She	  cannot	  sign	  BITs	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  critique	  foreign	  investment,	  or	  resist	  
the	   unhindered	   movement	   of	   capital.	   She	   cannot	   participate	   in	   the	   IFIs	   and	  
simultaneously	   be	   reticent	   about	   the	   benefits	   of	   privatisation	   and	  
marketisation.	  She	  may	  advocate	  the	  primacy	  of	  law	  over	  power,	  but	  as	  argued	  
by	  Anghie,	  what	  is	  IL	  but	  the	  product	  of	  that	  same	  hegemonic	  power	  which	  the	  
HWP	  seeks	  to	  negate?	  Further,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  adaptations,	  institutional	  power	  is	  
brought	  to	  bear	  upon	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  country’s	  integration.	  Real	  responsibility,	  
pointed	  Zoellick,	  requires	  China	  to	  truly	  absorb	  norms	  that	  support	  and	  sustain	  
the	  US	  led	  international	  system	  and,	  to	  this	  end,	  take	  on	  new	  identities.358	  	  
China	  may	   decline	   to	   take	   on	   new	   identities.	   Yet,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   socialism,	  
institutional	  reforms	  are	  designated	  a	  time	  in	  the	  future.	  For	  now,	  they	  remain	  a	  
matter	  for	  conjecture.	  In	  a	  way	  that	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  Western	  social	  democratic	  
parties’	   failure	   to	  assert	  a	  positive	  and	  comprehensive	  distinction,	   the	  HWP	  is	  
short	   of	   homogenised	   discourse	   of	   difference,	   one	   that	   confronts	   analytically	  
the	  logic	  of	  capitalist/neoliberal	  globalisation,	  including	  the	  exploitative	  aspects	  
of	   interdependency,	   the	   social	   movements	   of	   resistance	   it	   produces	   and	   its	  
potential	   for	   participation	   in	   social	   oppression.	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   HWP	  
encapsulates	   Laclau	   and	  Mouffe’s	   logic	   of	   equivalence,	  whereby	   divergence	   is	  
defined	   solely	   by	   reference	   to	   something	   external,	   and	   is	   therefore	   always	  
reversible.359	  
There	   is	  much	   in	   the	   HWP	   that	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   imaging	   of	   a	  
post-­‐political,	  non-­‐conflictual	  order.360	  	  The	  institutions	  advocated	  by	  the	  HWP,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358	  Shambaugh,	  ibid	  (n	  259)	  131;	  Robert	  B.	  Zoellick,	  ‘Whither	  China:	  From	  Membership	  to	  
Responsibility?’	  [Sep	  2005]	  Remarks	  to	  the	  National	  Committee	  on	  the	  US	  and	  China	  Relations	  
<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Vol%2028_2/Zoellick.pdf>	  accessed	  16	  Feb	  
2013.	  	  
359	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  273)	  xiii,	  127.	  
360	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  1.	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e.g.	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  are	  much	  the	  same	  as	  those	  that	  underpin	  Foucault’s	  liberal	  
regime.361	  Further,	   the	   notion	   of	   win-­‐win	   solutions	   that	   favour	   everyone	   is	  
integral	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   parlance	   of	   a	   ‘third	   way’	   and	   consensual	   politics.	  
Negative	   impacts	   on	   matters,	   such	   as	   employment,	   local	   companies	   and	   the	  
environment	   give	   way	   to	   a	   tailored	   success	   narrative.362	  	   The	   promotion	   of	  
innovations	   as	   instruments	   of	   progress	   -­‐	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   increased	  
competitiveness	  and	  improved	  business	  environment	  for	  TNCs	  -­‐	  is	  similarly	  to	  
be	   found	   in	   the	  European	  Roundtable	  of	   Industrialists’	   (ERT)	   lobbying	  efforts	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  EU.’363	  	  Absent	  are	   the	  conflicts	  attendant	  on	  social	  divisions,	  and	  
the	  operation	  of	  power	  in	  designating	  pluralism	  to	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  legitimate/	  
illegitimate	   taxonomy. 364 	  For	   example,	   when	   American	   politicians	   were	  
themselves	   slaves	   owners,	   the	   ‘political	   slavery’	   of	   an	  unrestrained	  monarchy	  
was	   unacceptable,	   while	   property	   relations-­‐based	   slavery	   was.365	  	   	   Corporate	  
power	   enabled	   the	   expansion	   of	   property	   rights	   to	   life’s	   process	   of	  
reproduction,	   while	   farmers’	   property	   rights	   are	   delegitimised	   as	   ‘seeds	  
piracy’.366 	  	   The	   result	   is	   a	   neoliberal	   type	   technical	   approach	   to	   political	  
problems	   and	   a	   systemic	   depiction	   that	   is	   ‘strikingly	   apolitical	   and	   far	   too	  
cosy’.367	  	  
Indeed,	  many	  of	  the	  values	  that	  appear	  to	  delineate	  the	  HWP	  also	  form	  part	  of	  
neoliberal	  pseudo-­‐universal	  discourse	  –	  e.g.	  scientific	  rationality,	  the	  rationality	  
of	  free	  trade,	  developmentalism	  and	  progress.368	  	  Such	  values	  invoke	  capitalist	  
logic:	  progress	  alludes	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  profit-­‐	  yielding	  improved	  productivity;369	  
a	   free	  market	   is	   the	   yardstick	   by	  which	   such	   progress	   is	  measured;	   scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361	  Foucault,	  ibid	  (n	  32)	  32.	  
362	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  37)	  31-­‐32;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  273)	  xiv-­‐xv;	  Balanya	  and	  others,	  ibid	  (n	  
267)	  29	  referring	  to	  the	  1999	  report	  ‘The	  East-­‐West	  Win-­‐Win	  Business	  Experience’	  published	  
by	  the	  ERT	  to	  promote	  the	  eastwards	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
363	  Balanya	  and	  others,	  ibid	  26,	  31-­‐33.	  
364	  See	  for	  example,	  Mouffe’s	  critique	  of	  Rawls	  in	  Chantal	  Mouffe,	  ‘The	  Limits	  of	  John	  Rawls’	  
Pluralism’	  (2005)	  4	  no	  2	  Political,	  Philosophy	  &	  Economics	  221	  
<http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/4/2/221.abstract>	  accessed	  1	  Jan	  2013.	  	  
365	  Domenico	  Losurdo,	  Liberalism:	  A	  Counter	  History	  (Verso	  2011)	  1-­‐7	  and	  generally;	  Laclau	  
and	  Mouffe,	  ibid	  (n	  273)	  xv.	  
366	  Laffey	  and	  Weld,	  ibid	  (n	  277)	  68-­‐69.	  
367	  Andrew	  Hurrell,	  ‘Power,	  Institutions,	  and	  the	  Production	  Of	  Inequality’	  in	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	  
ibid	  (n	  279)	  33.	  
368	  See	  for	  example	  Hu	  Jintao,	  Report	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  5-­‐7.	  
369	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  106-­‐08.	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rationality	   masks	   ‘the	   irrationality	   of	   endless	   accumulation’.370	  	   We	   saw	   how	  
these	   concepts	   were	   grafted	   onto	   the	   Chinese	   society	   in	   what	   Wallerstein	  
identifies	   as	   the	   gift	   of	   universalism	   -­‐	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   powerful	  
bestows	   on	   the	   powerless	   the	   opportunity	   to	   join	   in.371	  As	   with	   institutional	  
participation,	   this	   gift	   has	   now	  been	   reinvented	   as	   an	   independent,	   voluntary	  
choice.	  
BITs	  of	  harmony	  
BITs	  articulate	  the	  HWP’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  production	  systems	  
and	   the	   free	   flow	   of	   globalised	   investment.	   	   These	   are	   to	   take	   place	  within	   a	  
framework	   of	   IL	   that	   is,	   in	   turn,	   promoted	   as	   guarantor	   of	   transparency	   and	  
stability.	   The	   revived	   commitment	   to	   IL	   may	   be	   found,	   for	   example	   in	  
MOFCOM’s	   pledge	   to	   assist	   Chinese	   enterprises	   resolve	   problems	   via	   the	  
country’s	  network	  of	   investment	  treaties.372	  	  Chinese	  BITs’	  reticence	  about	  the	  
application	  of	  IL	  external	  standards	  to	  her	  domestic	  regulatory	  regime	  is	  being	  
gradually	  phased	  out.	  An	  application	  to	  the	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  
Commission	   (NDRC)	   for	   a	   licence	   to	   invest	   overseas	   must	   meet,	   inter	   alia,	   a	  
requirement	   that	   the	   investment	   does	   not	   violate	   IL. 373 	  	   An	   unrestricted	  
commitment	  to	  IL	  has	  also	  made	  its	  way	  into	  the	  recent	  Canada	  BIT.	   	  Further,	  
this	   treaty,	   finally	   signed	   in	   September	   2012	   after	   some	   24	   years	   of	  
negotiations,	   joins	   the	  Mexico	  BIT	   in	   recognizing	   the	   IMS.	   It	   requires	   that	   the	  
FET	   accords	   with	   international	   rather	   than	   municipal	   law,	   and	   limits	   its	  
normative	  content	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  IMS.374	  	  Furthermore,	  disputes	  are	  to	  be	  
governed	  by	  the	  treaty	  and	  applicable	  rules	  of	  IL,	  with	  domestic	  law	  to	  be	  taken	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  Wallerstein,	  ibid	  (n	  167)	  83-­‐85.	  
371	  ibid	  85.	  
372	  MOFCOM,	  ‘Measures	  for	  the	  Administration	  of	  Overseas	  Investment	  2009’	  art	  28.	  
373	  Basil	  H.	  Hwang,	  Le	  Yu	  and	  Salina	  Wong,	  ‘Outbound	  Investments	  from	  China	  –	  the	  Chinese	  




Daily+Newsfeed+2013-­‐03-­‐18&utm_term=>	  accessed	  29	  April	  2013.	  
374	  ‘Agreement	  Between	  the	  Government	  of	  Canada	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  People’s	  republic	  
of	  China	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments	  2012’	  art	  4	  (1)	  (2)	  
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-­‐agreements-­‐accords-­‐commerciaux/agr-­‐acc/fipa-­‐
apie/china-­‐text-­‐chine.aspx?lang=en&view=d>	  accessed	  18	  March	  2013.	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into	   consideration	   only	   ‘where	   relevant	   and	   as	   appropriate’.375	  	   Consent	   to	  
ICSID	   arbitration	   is	   subject	   only	   to	   certain	   essentially	   procedural	   conditions	  
precedent	  and	  a	  qualified	  ‘fork	  in	  the	  road’	  provision.376	  
BITs’	   core	   premise	   that	   the	   imperatives	   of	   free	   flow	   necessitate	   shielding	  
foreign	   capital	   is	   similarly	   echoed	   in	   China’s	   promise	   to	   protect	   the	   rights	   of	  
foreign	  companies.377	  Paradigm	  and	  treaties	  thus	  coalesce	   in	  their	   formulation	  
of	   a	   state-­‐law-­‐market	   relationship,	   in	  which	   the	   state’s	   agreement	   to	   limit	   its	  
regulatory	   powers	   is	   translated	   into	   law	   and	   validated	   by	   the	   imperatives	   of	  
development.	  In	  particular,	  the	  reference	  to	  foreign	  companies	  as	  possessors	  of	  
rights	  invokes	  a	  neoliberal	  type	  discourse,	  pursuant	  to	  which	  corporations	  are	  
abstracted	  as	  persons	  so	  that	  their	  treatment	  may	  be	  assessed	  by	  reference	  to	  
standards	  applicable	  to	  people.378	  	  
Both	   the	  HWP	  and	  BITs	  signal	  greater	   integration	  and	  enhanced	   international	  
participation.	  Yet,	  proclaims	  the	  HWP,	  it	  is	  a	  participation	  that	  does	  not	  exclude	  
reformative	   efforts.	   The	   Canada	   BIT	   for	   example	   introduces	   a	   number	   of	  
interesting	   innovations.	   	   Altogether	   the	   treaty	   is	   longer	   and	   more	   detailed,	  
thereby	   reducing	   the	   typical	   vagueness	   that	   leaves	   so	   much	   room	   for	  
adjudicative	  discretion.	  Notably,	  the	  preamble	  limits	  the	  investment	  the	  parties	  
are	   to	   promote	   to	   ‘investment	   based	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   sustainable	  
development’.379	  	   The	   MFN	   provision	   injects	   clarity	   by	   expressly	   excluding	  
dispute	  resolution	  mechanisms	  from	  its	  scope	  of	  application.380	  In	  and	  of	  itself,	  
the	   fact	   that	   a	   measure	   has	   an	   adverse	   effect	   on	   the	   economic	   value	   of	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375	  ibid	  art	  30	  1.	  
376	  ibid	  art	  21-­‐23,	  Annex	  C.21	  stipulating	  that	  entitlement	  to	  arbitration	  may	  be	  revived	  
provided	  court	  proceedings	  are	  withdrawn	  prior	  to	  a	  judgment	  having	  been	  delivered.	  	  
377	  ‘What	  China	  Aims	  to	  Achieve	  by	  Pursuing	  Peaceful	  Development’	  in	  White	  Paper,	  ibid	  (n	  49)	  
1.	  	  
378	  Under	  China’s	  Company	  Law	  a	  company	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  enterprise	  legal	  person	  [2005]	  art	  3	  
Companies	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  
<http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-­‐2010/2011-­‐
02/11/content_21898292.htm>	  accessed	  18	  March	  2013.	  The	  implications	  of	  people-­‐
corporation	  equalisation	  can	  be	  found	  for	  example	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  IMS	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  
personal	  injury	  to	  investment	  protection.	  	  
379	  But	  see	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  197-­‐98	  arguing	  that	  capitalism	  is	  incapable	  of	  promoting	  
sustainable	  development.	  	  
380	  Canada	  BIT,	  ibid	  (n	  374)	  art	  5	  3.	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investment	   is	   insufficient	   for	   it	   to	   qualify	   as	   indirect	   expropriation. 381	  	  
Arbitrators	  are	  required	  to	  be	  versed,	  inter	  alia,	  in	  public	  IL.382	  The	  stipulation	  
that	   genuine	   health,	   safety	   and	   environmental	   conservation	  measures	   do	   not	  
give	  rise	  to	  credible	  claims	  is	  stronger	  than	  that	  found	  in	  NAFTA.383	  
Such	   innovations	   may	   assist	   in	   dislodging	   the	   prediction	   that,	   as	   China	  
transforms	   into	   a	   home	   country,	   she	   will	   seek	   greater	   protection	   for	   her	  
investors.	   However,	   they	   also	   indicate	   the	   possible	   limits	   of	   reformative	  
attempts.	   Novel	   provisions	   may	   point	   to	   a	   move	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   Cai	  
Congyan’s	   balanced	   paradigm.384	  	   Yet,	   they	   remain	   within	   systemic	   terms	   of	  
reference.	  Indeed,	  the	  continuing	  enlargement	  of	  China’s	  BITs	  program	  signifies	  
reforms	   that	   shy	   away	   from	   withdrawal	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Bolivia385 	  and	  
Ecuador.386	  Nor	  does	  the	  country	  appear	  minded	  to	  follow	  the	  path	  of	  collective	  
challenge	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  incorporation,	  such	  that	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  PSNR	  and	  
CERDS	  resolutions.387	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  in	  this	  shift	  from	  collective	  to	  individualised	  
resistance,	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   type	   approach,	   that	   the	   HWP	  
most	  clearly	  departs	   from	  its	  socialist	  predecessor.	   	   	   Instead,	   it	  coalesces	  with	  
BITs	  and	  their	  underlying	  neoliberal	  paradigm.	  BITs	  with	  developing	  countries	  
may	   be	   guided	   by	   the	   specificity	   of	   divergent	   national	   conditions.388	  	   Both	  
paradigm	  and	  treaties	  may	  adhere	  to	  the	  Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence	  
(the	   Five	   Principles)	   that	   for	   China	   continue	   to	   represent	   the	   overarching	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  ibid	  Annex	  B.10	  2	  (a).	  
382	  ibid	  art	  24	  1	  (a).	  
383	  Mathew	  Kronby,	  ‘Some	  Facts	  and	  Perspectives	  on	  Canada-­‐China	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty:	  
A	  Response	  to	  the	  Doomsayers’	  [31	  Oct	  2012]	  <http://www.ccbc.com/2012/10/some-­‐facts-­‐
and-­‐perspective-­‐on-­‐the-­‐canada-­‐china-­‐bilateral-­‐investment-­‐treaty/>	  accessed	  19	  March	  2013.	  	  	  
384	  Cai	  Congyan,	  ‘China-­‐US	  BIT	  Negotiations	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Investment	  Treaty	  Regime:	  A	  
Grand	  Bilateral	  Bargain	  with	  Multilateral	  Implications’	  (2009)	  12	  (2)	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Economic	  Law	  457	  at	  459.	  




accessed	  7	  March	  2011.	  
386	  Fernando	  Cabrera	  Diaz,	  ‘Ecuador	  prepares	  for	  Life	  After	  ICSID,	  While	  Debate	  Continues	  Over	  
Effect	  of	  Its	  Exit	  from	  Centre’	  [2	  Sep	  2009]	  Investment	  Treaty	  News	  
<http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/08/28/ecuador-­‐prepares-­‐for-­‐life-­‐after-­‐icsid-­‐while-­‐debate-­‐
continues-­‐over-­‐effect-­‐of-­‐its-­‐exit-­‐from-­‐the-­‐centre/>	  accessed	  7	  March	  2011.	  
387	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  Resolutions	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  IL	  see	  chapter	  2	  text	  to	  n	  230-­‐
49	  pp	  80-­‐83.	  
388	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ‘Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties:	  The	  Chinese	  Approach	  and	  Practice	  (1998-­‐
1999)’	  in	  8	  Asian	  Book	  of	  International	  Law	  113.	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norms	   for	   interstate	   relations.389	  	   However,	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   Five	   Principles	   is	  
confined	  to	  transcending	  differences	   in	  social	  systems	  and	   ideologies.390	  	  They	  
thus	   leave	   unanswered	   the	   substantive	   question	   of	   what	   China’s	   leadership	  
within	   such	   diversity	   actually	   means	   -­‐	   in	   what	   way	   does	   it	   extend,	   if	   at	   all,	  
beyond	  an	  obtuse	  promise	  of	  reforms,	  the	  HWP	  and	  BITs’	  assertions	  of	  mutual	  
benefit,	  and	  the	  country’s	  incorporation	  into	  the	  aid	  sector.391	  	  One	  answer	  may	  
be	   found	   in	   An	   Chen	   and	   Dong	   Chen’s	   call	   for	   a	   critical,	   vigorous	   and	  
unequivocal	   self-­‐positioning	   in	   the	  camp	  of	   the	  disadvantaged,	  one	   that	   is	  not	  
confined	  to	  being	  ‘an	  ameliorator	  of	  the	  existing	  order	  or	  an	  intermediary	  of	  the	  
South-­‐North	  contradiction’.392	  	   It	   is	  a	  call	   for	   the	  reconstitution	  of	  a	  NIEO,	  one	  
that	  derives	  from	  a	  South-­‐South	  collective	  self-­‐reliance.	  Such	  self-­‐reliance	  does	  
not	   implicate	   a	   closing	   of	   the	   door.	   Rather,	   it	   introduces	   an	   important	   policy	  
detail	   into	  notions	  of	   incorporation,	  multilateralisation	  and	  democratisation	  of	  
the	  global	  space.	  A	  boundary	  is	  drawn,	  beyond	  which	  incorporation	  transmutes	  
negatively	   into	   dependency.	   For	   An	   Chen	   and	   Dong	   Chen,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
neoliberal	   order	   is	   such,	   that	   actively	   pursuing	   the	   NIEO	   is	   the	   only	   way	   for	  
achieving	  both	   the	   change	   sought	  by	  China	  and	  her	  own	  objective	  of	  peaceful	  
rising.393	  An	  ambiguous	  discourse	  of	  reforms	  will	  not	  do.	  Rather,	  the	  country’s	  
future	   and	   the	   harmonious	   world	   she	   advocates	   are	   contingent	   on	   her	  
resolutely	   following	  her	  own	  path	   through	   the	   ‘smoke	  and	  mirrors’	   that	  mask	  
neoliberalism’s	   sole	   purpose	   of	   furthering	   the	   interests	   of	   transnational	  
monopolies.394	  
Support	   for	   An	   Chen	   and	   Dong	   Chen’s	   observations	   about	   neoliberalism	   and	  
China’s	  stance	   towards	   it,	   can	  be	   found	  to	   the	   internal	  realities	  of	  BITs.	   	  Here,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  ‘China	  Introduction	  of	  the	  
Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Co-­‐Existence’	  [17	  Jan	  2000]	  
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm>	  accessed	  17	  March	  2013;	  Hu	  
Jintao,	  Report,	  ibid	  (n	  9)	  17.	  	  
390	  	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ibid.	  
391	  For	  a	  study	  of	  China	  as	  an	  actor	  in	  the	  aid	  sector	  see	  Paul	  Opoku-­‐Mensah,	  ‘China	  and	  the	  
International	  Aid	  System:	  Transformation	  or	  Cooptation?’	  in	  Li	  Xing,	  ibid	  (n	  127)	  71-­‐86.	  
392An	  Chen	  and	  Dong	  Chen,	  ‘What	  Should	  be	  China’s	  Strategic	  Position	  in	  the	  Establishment	  of	  
New	  International	  Economic	  Order:	  With	  Comments	  on	  Neo-­‐Liberalistic	  Economic	  Order,	  
Constitutional	  Order	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  Economic	  Nationalism’s	  Disturbance	  of	  Globalization’	  
(2009)	  10	  3	  The	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  359	  at	  396.	  
393	  ibid	  359-­‐60.	  
394	  ibid	  382.	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coalescence	  with	  the	  HWP	  turns	  into	  inconsistency.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  HWP’s	  flagship	  
is	  diversity	  and	   the	  peaceful	   co-­‐existence	  of	  differences,	  BITs	  operate	  so	  as	   to	  
lock	   in	   governments	   and	   people	   into	   uniformity,	   and	   facilitate	   optimal	  
universalisation	   of	   economic	   imperatives.395	  	   If	   the	  HWP	   envisions	   a	  world	   of	  
equalised	   progress	   and	   common	   prosperity,	   BITs	   are	   designed	   to	   benefit	   the	  
core	  and	  its	  corporate	  elites.	  If	  the	  HWP	  cherishes	  truly	  independent	  and	  equal	  
sovereignty,	   BITs	   are	   sovereignty	   reducing	   devices.	   They	   do	  mobilise	   nation-­‐
states	   sovereign	   power,	   but	   only	   so	   as	   to	   put	   the	   seal	   of	   consent	   on	   the	  
appropriation	   of	   these	   same	   powers.	   The	   HWP’s	   discourse	   is	   one	   of	   co-­‐
operation	   and	   support.	   Yet,	   BITs’	   systemic	   augmentation	   is	   inextricable	   from	  
the	   fragmentation	  of	  Global	   South	   solidarity,	   and	   the	  pitching	  of	   state	   against	  
state	   in	   competition	   over	   promises	   to	   invest.	   Theirs	   is	   the	   logic	   of	   interstate	  
competitiveness.396	  	   Further,	   since	   they	   impose	  duties	  but	   confer	  no	   rights	  on	  
the	   host	   state,	   their	   claim	   to	   reciprocity	   is	   illusory.	   TNCs	   remain	   a	   shadowy	  
beneficiary,	  one	  that	  has	  no	  obligations	  whatsoever.	  If	  the	  HWP	  underscores	  the	  
importance	   of	   localised	   solutions,	   BITs	   operate	   to	   internationalise	   them.	   	   The	  
HWP	   attributes	   the	   strife	   that	   besieges	   the	   global	   space	   and	   growing	   North-­‐
South	  gap	   to	   the	  operation	  of	  hegemonic	  powers.	  Yet,	  China’s	   integration	   into	  
the	   BITs	   program	   signalled	   her	   incorporation	   into	   and	   acceptance	   of	   a	  
‘particularly	  American	  conception	  of	  investment	  rights’.397	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  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  124)	  22.	  	  
396	  Birch	  &	  Mykhnenko,	  ibid	  (n	  275)	  7.	  
397	  James	  Petras	  and	  Henry	  Veltmeyer,	  Multinationals	  on	  Trial:	  Foreign	  investment	  Matters	  
(Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd	  2007)	  111.	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CHAPTER	  6:	  CONCLUSION	  
The	  Political-­‐Economic	  Dualism	  
A	  recent	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  reported	  on	  the	  success	  of	  Chinese	  investment	  
and	  trading	  in	  post	  invasion	  Iraqi	  oil.1	  The	  article	  records	  two	  main	  facts.	  First,	  
China’s	   share	   is	   approaching	   half	   of	   all	   oil	   accessed,	   and	   is	   set	   to	   increase.2	  
Second,	   Chinese	   corporations	   accept	   contractual	   arrangements	   that	   allow	  
greater	   income	   for	   the	  government	  of	   Iraq,	  notwithstanding	   that	   they	  are	   left	  
with	  minimal	  profits.3	  	  
Let	  us	  consider	  how	  these	  facts	  are	  constituted	  within	  the	  neoliberal	  discursive	  
field.	   One	   aspect	   is	   that	   of	   entitlement	   to	   the	   oil.	   China,	   we	   are	   given	   to	  
understand,	  lacks	  such	  entitlement	  because	  it	  was	  American	  effort	  and	  sacrifice	  
that	   made	   the	   reserves	   accessible.4	  	   Implied	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   access	   is	   the	  
opportunity	   –	   or	   Wood	   would	   say	   compulsion	   -­‐	   for	   a	   commercial	   and	  
productive	   use.	   Here	   we	   are	   reminded	   of	   Lock’s	   proposition	   that	   rights	   to	  
property	   stem	   from	  augmentation	   of	   exchange	   value.5	  	   Also	   comes	   to	  mind	   is	  
Nozick’s	  notion	  that	   justice	  in	  distribution	  is	  founded	  not	  on	  outcomes,	  but	  on	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  entitlement	  to	  the	  holdings	  so	  distributed.6	  	  It	  will	  be	  recalled	  
that	   Lock’s	   philosophical	   musings	   were	   historically	   used	   to	   justify	   not	   only	  
capitalist	  enclosures	  in	  England,	  but	  also	  overseas	  expropriations.	  
Then	   there	   are	   the	   themes	   of	   competition	   and	   profit.	   Chinese	   SOEs	   enjoy	  
governmental	  financial	  support.	  This	  enables	  them	  to	  accept	  lower	  profits	  and	  
thereby	  disadvantage	  competitors.7	  	  Tow	  premises	  may	  be	  extracted.	  First,	  the	  
relationships	  among	  those	  accessing	  Iraqi	  oil,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  them	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Tim	  Arango	  and	  Clifford	  Krauss,	  ‘China	  Is	  Reaping	  Biggest	  Benefits	  of	  Iraq	  Oil	  Boom’	  [2	  June	  
2013]	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/world/middleeast/china-­‐
reaps-­‐biggest-­‐benefits-­‐of-­‐iraq-­‐oil-­‐boom.html?emc=eta1&_r=0>	  accessed	  9	  June	  2013.	  
2	  ibid	  1.	  
3	  ibid	  1-­‐2.	  
4	  ibid.	  
5	  John	  Lock,	  ‘Of	  Property’	  in	  Matthew	  Clayton	  and	  Andrew	  Williams	  (eds),	  Social	  Justice	  
(Blackwell	  Readings	  in	  Philosophy,	  Blackwell	  Publishing	  2004)	  30.	  
6	  Robert	  Nozick,	  Anarchy	  State	  and	  Utopia	  (Basic	  Books	  Inc.	  1974)	  151.	  
7	  ibid;	  the	  statement	  that	  SOEs	  are	  government	  financed	  and	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  profit	  
imperatives	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  be	  discursive	  rather	  than	  truth.	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government	   who	   owns	   it,	   are	   or	   at	   least	   should	   properly	   be	   competitive.	  
Second,	   since	   profit	   maximisation	   is	   the	   overriding	   purpose	   of	   such	  
competition,	  a	  deflective	  mechanism	  must	  be	  in	  operation	  in	  relation	  to	  Chinese	  
corporations.	  It	  is	  identified	  as	  the	  infiltration	  of	  the	  political	  into	  the	  economic.	  
Thus,	  Chinese	  companies	  are	  posited	  as	  the	  creatures	  of	  governmental	  foreign	  
policy	   rather	   than	   truly	   corporatised,	   honest	   brokers	   of	  market	   imperatives.8	  	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  link	  between	  US	  foreign	  policy	  and	  US	  corporate	  entitlement	  is	  
hinted	  at	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  American	  5th	  Fleet	  and	  air	   force,	  but	  
other	   than	   that	   is	   left	  unspoken.9	  Finally,	   implied	   in	   the	  report	   is	  a	  greater	  US	  
prescribed-­‐order	   that	   is	   being	   undermined	   by	   Chinese	   divergence.	   Chinese	  
Collaboration	  with	   the	   Iraqi	   government	  weakens	  Western	   policy	   of	   resisting	  
its	   profit	   expectations	   by	   cutting	   separate	   deals	  with	   Iraq’s	   semi-­‐autonomous	  
Kurdish	  region.10	  	  	  
But	  there	  is	  another	  fact,	  so	  self-­‐evident	  that	  it	  is	  easily	  overlooked.	  It	  takes	  us	  
back	   to	   the	   discourse	   of	   politics	   and	   economics.	   Both	   Western	   and	   Chinese	  
corporations	  are	  in	  Iraq.	  Both	  are	  accessing	  resources	  from	  a	  market	  that	  was	  
forcibly	  prized	  open.	  Both	  are	  nationals	  of	  countries	   that	  profess	  commitment	  
to	  IL.	  Yet,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  opportunity	  for	  resources	  extraction	  was	  secured	  by	  
means	  of,	  at	  best	  legally	  prohibited	  use	  of	  force	  and,	  at	  worse	  an	  international	  
crime,	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   override	   economic	   imperatives.	   	   Implied	   in	   this	  
incongruity	  is	  segregation	  between	  politics	  and	  economy.	  As	  between	  the	  two,	  
the	   latter	  prevails.	   	   For	  Wood,	   it	   is	   this	   that	   constitutes	   the	   specificity	  of	  new	  
imperialism.11	  	  As	   seen	   in	  chapter	  3,	  US	   led	  new	   imperialism	  shies	  away	   from	  
the	   risk	   and	   cost	   of	   colonialist	   naked	   force,	   in	   favour	   of	   informal	   economic	  
impositions.	  To	  maintain	  power	  and	  control,	  economic	  self-­‐determination	  had	  
to	  be	  carved	  out	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  gifted	  to	  the	  colonies.12	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Arango	  and	  Krauss,	  ibid	  (n	  1)	  2.	  
9	  ibid.	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  ibid.	  
11	  Ellen	  Meiksins	  Wood,	  ‘The	  Imperial	  Paradox:	  Ideologies	  of	  Empire’	  	  [11	  April	  2013]	  lecture	  at	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  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies.	  




Power	   thus	   appears	   to	   be	   mediated	   in	   two	   spheres	   that	   are	   constructed	  
discursively	   as	   distinct	   and	   separate.	   Property	   relations	   are	   imbued	   with	  
universalism,	  whereas	   the	   political	   is	   purportedly	   permitted	   a	   degree	   of	   self-­‐
determination.13	  In	  practice,	  the	  two	  are	  symbiotic.	  Since	  states	  must	  be	  put	  at	  
the	   service	   of	   capital,	   it	   follows	   that,	   sooner	   or	   later,	   economic	   constraints	  
cannot	  but	  be	  translated	   into	  political	  ones.	   	  We	  saw	  this	   in	  the	  way	  a	  market	  
fundamentalist	   Washington	   Consensus	   evolved	   into	   a	   second-­‐generation	  
paradigm	   of	   institutional	   fundamentalism,	   so	   as	   to	   penetrate	   the	   political	  
sphere.	  Symbiosis	  also	  revealed	  itself	  in	  private	  authority’s	  cross	  over	  from	  its	  
natural	   habitat	   of	   markets	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   governance	   and	   juridification.	  
Grotius,	  widely	  held	  as	  the	  father	  of	  IL,	  was	  also	  a	  lawyer	  to	  the	  Dutch	  East	  India	  
Company	  and	  wrote	  many	  of	  his	  works	  in	  support	  of	  their	  interests.14	  	  Business	  
lobbies	   such	   as	   the	   ICC	   and	   the	   US	   Council	   of	   International	   Business	  worked	  
alongside	   Western	   governments	   to	   promote	   a	   multilateral	   investment	  
protection	   treaty.15	  	   The	   proposal	   that	   the	   WTO	   remit	   should	   also	   include	   a	  
multilateral	   investment	   code	  was	   put	   forward	   ‘at	   the	   insistence	   of	   influential	  
American	   business	   group’.16	  	   Importantly,	   it	  was	   the	   privately	   led	   1959	  Draft	  
Convention	   on	   Investment	   Abroad	   (also	   known	   as	   the	   Abs-­‐Shawcross	   Draft	  
Convention)	   that,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   introduced	   the	   concept	  of	  direct	   investor-­‐
state	  arbitration.	  It	  is	  generally	  viewed	  as	  the	  progenitor	  of	  contemporary	  BITs	  
program.17	  Hermann	   Abs,	   the	   Director-­‐General	   of	   Deutsche	   Bank	   headed	   the	  
initiative.	   Lord	   Shawcross	   was	   the	   UK	   Attorney	   General.	   Thus,	   by	   means	   of	  
private	   lobbies	   and	   state/corporations	   revolving	   doors,	   TNCs	   are	   able	   to	  
integrate	  state	  decision-­‐making	  with	  capital	  accumulation	  rudiments.18	  	  Within	  
BITs	   practice,	   this	   integrative	   dynamic	   is	   found	   in	   the	   manner	   by	   which	   the	  
treaties	   blur	   IL’s	   traditional	   public-­‐private	   binary	   and	   privatise,	   not	   only	   the	  
management	  of	  investor-­‐state	  interaction,	  but	  also	  the	  state	  itself.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  
jurisprudential	   devices	   are	   employed,	   such	   as	   linguistic	   vagueness	   that	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  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  11).	  
14	  Anghie,	  ibid	  (n	  12)	  224.	  
15	  Gas	  Van	  Harten,	  Investment	  Treaty	  Arbitration	  and	  Public	  Law	  (Oxford	  Monographs	  in	  
International	  Law,	  OUP	  2007)	  19.	  
16	  ibid	  20.	  
17	  ibid	  36;	  see	  also	  Andrew	  Newcombe	  and	  Lluis	  Paradell,	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  Investment	  
Treaties:	  Standards	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  Treatment	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2009)	  20-­‐22.	  
18	  David	  Harvey,	  The	  New	  Imperialism	  (OUP	  2003)	  76-­‐77.	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facilitates	   capacious	   interpretations,	   and	   consent	   that	   is	   detached	   from	   its	  
circumstances,	  so	  as	  to	  enable	  the	  legitimization	  of	  harm.	  
Thus,	   it	   is	  paramount	   that	  nation-­‐states	   toe	   the	   line.	  To	  ensure	  such	   toeing	  of	  
the	   line,	  dominance	   is	  pursued	  by	  means	  of	  Gramscian	  processes	  of	   force	  and	  
consent,	  with	   institutional	   participation	   serving	   as	   a	   final	   lock	   in	  mechanism.	  
The	  outcome	  is	  interstate	  equality-­‐inequality	  dualism,	  the	  sustenance	  of	  which	  
depends	  on	  subterfuge.	  Here	  democracy	  steps	  in.	   	   It	   is	  well	  suited	  to	  this	  task.	  
For,	   it	   holds	   the	   banner	   of	   citizenship	   and	   rule	   of	   law-­‐based	   equality,	   but	   is	  
impervious	  to	  class	  and	  interstate	  differences.19	  	  It	  provides	  a	  construct,	  within	  
which	  economic	  inequality	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  capital	  are	  neutralised	  by	  the	  
formalities	  of	  political	  egalitarianism.20	  	  	  	  	  
Traces	   of	   this	   dualism	   can	   be	   also	   discerned	   in	   the	   HWP.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  
people	  of	  the	  world	  are	  equalised	  through	  their	  collective	  rights	  to	  welfare	  and	  
developmental	   self-­‐determination.	   Countries	   too	   are	   to	   enjoy	   sovereign	  
equality,	  stated	  to	  encompass	  both	  the	  political	  and	  the	  economic	  arenas.	   	  Yet,	  
the	   two	   spheres	   are	   treated	   separately.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   latter	   there	   is,	   in	  
addition,	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  specific	  order	  of	   interdependency	  and	  globalised,	  
market-­‐based	  free	  trade	  and	  investment.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  
the	   same	   order	   that	   poses	   such	   difficulties	   to	   notions	   of	   equality	   and	  
sovereignty.	   By	   now,	   we	   know	   that	   rather	   than	   a	   trickling	   down	   effect,	   this	  
order	   engenders	   wealth	   gap	   both	   within	   and	   among	   states.	   If	   fragmentation	  
was	  previously	  attained	  in	  the	  main	  by	  restricting	  the	  flow	  of	   funds,	  collective	  
action	  difficulties	  are	  now	  exacerbated	  by	  developmental	  differentials,	  and	  the	  
formation	   of	   new	   coalitions.21	  For	   as	   vividly	   illustrated	   by	   the	   BITs	   program,	  
tenets	   of	   unimpeded	   capital	   mobility	   and	   the	   free	   transfer	   of	   profits	   are	  
productive	   of	   power-­‐based	   hierarchies	   and	   wealth	   concentration.	   	   Yet,	  
discursively,	  they	  align	  capitalist	  imperatives	  and	  TNCs’	  interests	  with	  those	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Wood,	  ibid	  (n	  11).	  
20	  ibid.	  
21	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal,	  ‘Counter-­‐Hegemonic	  International	  Law:	  Rethinking	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Developments	  as	  a	  Third	  World	  Strategy’	  in	  Richard	  Falk,	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  &	  
Jacqueline	  Stevens	  (eds),	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  Third	  World:	  Reshaping	  Justice	  (Routledge-­‐
Cavendish	  2008)	  63.	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developing	   countries	   so	   as	   to	   suggest	   a	   win-­‐win	   formula.22	  	   Here,	   continuity	  
may	   be	   identified.	   For	   colonialism	   too	   was	   associated	   with	   a	   discourse	   of	  
mutual	   benefit	   and	  progress	   rather	   than	   conquest	   and	   extraction.	   The	  British	  
Empire	   articulated	   its	   desire	   for	   legalised	   opium	   trade	   as	   an	   aspiration	   for	  
honourable	   commerce	   and	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   Chinese	   nation	   to	  wake	   up	  
from	  a	  deep	  slumber.23	  	  
The	   HWP	   expressly	   acknowledges	   the	   operation	   of	   domination	   and	   power	  
politics	  in	  interstate	  relations.	  It	  rejects	  them	  as	  an	  aberration	  of	  contemporary	  
trends.	  Nor	   can	   the	  paradigm	   itself	  be	   said	   to	  be	  hegemonic.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	  
does	   not	   claim	   to	   be	   enunciating	   any	   principles	   of	   natural	   or	   universal	  
dimensions	   so	   as	   to	   accumulate	   additional	   power.24	  	   The	   vision	   of	   globalised	  
trade	   and	   investment	   interdependency	  does	  not	  purport	   to	  be	   a	   statement	   of	  
truth.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   individual	   national	   commitment.	   In	   other	  
words,	   it	   articulates	   China’s	   position	   as	   things	   stand	   now	   rather	   than	   any	  
hegemonic	  mission.	  Further,	  uniformity	   is	  neither	   required	  nor	  desirable,	   and	  
the	  path	   to	   great	  harmony	   leads	   through	  preserved	  differences.	   Furthermore,	  
the	   HWP	   is	   predicated	   on	   notions	   of	   relational	   fluidity,	   immanently	  
transformative	   situational	   dispositions,	   and	   responses	   that	   must	   therefore	  
retain	  flexibility	  if	  they	  are	  to	  remain	  appropriate.	  	  
Arrighi	   elucidates	   that	   hegemonic	   dominance	   comprises	   not	   only	   power,	   but	  
also	  leadership.	  The	  two	  cross-­‐fertilise	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  power	  is	  attendant	  on	  
the	   ability	   to	   credibly	   propagate	   leadership	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   all.25	  	   The	  HWP	  
does	   claim	   leadership,	   at	   least	   in	   relation	   to	   developing	   countries.	   But	   it	   is	  
leadership	  that	  is	  expressed	  as	  circumstantial	  and	  provisional.	  The	  ultimate	  aim	  
is	  equality,	  to	  be	  attained	  when	  the	  rest	  catch	  up.	  Further,	  the	  world	  order	  best	  
functions	  when	  diversity	  translates	  into	  multiplicity	  of	  balanced	  and	  dialoguing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  James	  Petras	  and	  Henry	  Veltmeyer,	  Multinationals	  on	  Trial:	  Foreign	  investment	  Matters	  
(Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd	  2007)	  129-­‐30.	  
23	  Jane	  Burbank	  and	  Fredrick	  Cooper,	  Empires	  in	  World	  History:	  Power	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Difference	  (Princeton	  University	  press	  2010)	  287;	  Julia	  Lovell,	  The	  Opium	  War	  (Picador	  2011)	  3,	  
12.	  	  
24	  Giovanni	  Arrighi,	  The	  Long	  Twentieth	  Century:	  Money,	  Power	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Times	  
(Verso	  2010)	  29.	  Arrighi	  borrows	  from	  Gramsci’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  hegemony	  but	  adapts	  it	  
to	  interstate	  relations.	  
25	  ibid	  30-­‐31.	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centres	  of	  decisions.	  Viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  Harvey’s	  taxonomy	  of	  power,	  in	  
issue	   is	   the	   application	   of	   collective	   power	   as	   against	   neoliberal	   distributive	  
power.	  The	  latter	  denotes	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  in	  which	  competition	  is	  applied	  so	  
as	   to	   take	   power	   away	   from	   others,	   and	   thereby	   improve	   the	   position	   of	   the	  
hegemon.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  former	  entails	  leadership	  that	  benefits	  all,	  since	  it	  is	  
predicated	  on	  collective	  interactions	  that	  in	  turn	  enhance	  collective	  power.26	  	  
Yet,	   much	   like	   the	   neoliberal	   paradigm,	   the	   HWP	   too	   is	   problematised	   by	   a	  
hierarchical	   division	   between	   politics	   and	   the	   economy.	   When	   historically	  
contextualized,	   this	  division	  may	  be	  posited	  as	  an	   instance	  of	   inflection.	  Mao’s	  
Theory	  of	  the	  Differentiation	  of	  the	  Three	  Worlds	  and	  the	  HWP	  may	  be	  constant	  
in	   their	   opposition	   to	   hegemonism	   and	   war. 27 	  However,	   in	   the	   former,	  
attainment	  of	  peace	  and	  development	  necessitates	  ‘the	  broadest	  possible	  united	  
front	   in	   world-­‐wide	   revolutionary	   struggles	   to	   strike	   the	   chief	   enemy’.28	  	   In	  
other	  words,	  politics	  and	  the	  economy	  are	  inextricable.	  	  As	  between	  the	  two,	  it	  
was	  political	  solidarity	  that	  was	  to	  form	  a	  contesting	  force,	  the	  success	  of	  which	  
would	   deliver	   peace	   and	   related	   economic	   development.	   	   In	   issue	   was	   what	  
Kirby	  describes	  as	  the	  most	  ambitious	  international	  project	  of	  the	  era	  –	  that	  of	  
creating	  a	  worldwide	  socialist	  political	  economy.29	  
By	   contrast,	   in	   Deng’s	   version	   of	   internationalism,	   individual	   national	  
development	  is	  a	  condition	  precedent	  to	  global	  activism.	  Implied	  in	  this	  order	  of	  
priorities	   is	   a	   conflation	  with	   neoliberal	   type	   dualism,	   albeit	   one	   that	  may	   be	  
qualified.	   	   For	   in	   the	   HWP,	   Mouffe’s	   political	   sphere	   cannot	   be	   altogether	  
foreclosed	   if	   the	   envisioned	   economic	   order	   is	   to	   be	   more	   equitable.	  
Nevertheless,	   as	   between	   the	   struggle	   against	   hegemonism	   and	   the	   task	   of	  
modernisation,	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  takes	  precedence.	  Since	  China’s	  international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Harvey,	  ibid	  (n	  18)	  37.	  
27	  Mao	  Zedong,	  ‘Build	  the	  Broadest	  International	  United	  Front	  and	  Smash	  Superpower	  
Hegemonism	  and	  War	  Policies’	  in	  ‘Chairman	  Mao’s	  Theory	  of	  the	  Differentiation	  of	  the	  Three	  
Worlds	  is	  a	  Major	  Contribution	  to	  Marxist-­‐Leninism’	  [1977]	  Editorial	  Department	  of	  Renmin	  
Ribao	  (People’s	  Daily)	  <http://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-­‐5/theory-­‐3-­‐
worlds/section5.htm>	  accessed	  13	  June	  2013.	  
28	  Joshua	  Cooper	  Ramo,	  The	  Beijing	  Consensus	  (The	  Foreign	  Policy	  Centre	  2004)	  60.	  
29	  William	  C.	  Kirby,	  ‘China’s	  Internationalization	  in	  the	  Early	  People’s	  Republic:	  Dreams	  of	  a	  
Socialist	  World	  Economy’	  in	  Julia	  Strauss	  (ed),	  The	  History	  of	  the	  PRC	  (1949-­‐1976)	  (The	  China	  
Quarterly	  Special	  Issues	  series	  No	  7	  CUP	  2007)	  16	  and	  generally.	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role	   is	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   her	   economic	   growth,	   said	   Deng,	   everything	  
depends	  on	  the	  work	  at	  home	  being	  done	  well	  first.30	  	  Iraq	  is	  not	  the	  only	  case	  
in	  point.	  At	  least	  seven	  Chinese	  geological	  agencies	  have	  already	  arrived	  in	  gold	  
rich	  Mali,	  notwithstanding	  that	  her	  opening	  up	  to	  foreign	  resources	  extraction	  
was	  facilitated	  by	  foreign	  intervention.31	  	  BITs	  are	  another	  example.	  For	  China	  
participates	   in	   their	   conclusion,	   even	   though	   they	  are	  non-­‐reciprocal,	  unequal	  
instruments	  of	  global	  hierarchical	  structures	  on	  which	  surplus	  transfer	  relies.	  	  
Qin	  Yaqing	  explains	  this	  inflection	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  transformative	  nature	  of	  
the	   international	   shi.	   Mao’s	   prediction	   of	   inter-­‐hegemonic	   war	   did	   not	  
materialise.	   Instead,	   it	   was	   substituted	   by	   economic	   interdependency	   and	  
multipolarity.	   China	   appropriately	   responded	   by	   focusing	   on	   cooperative	  
economic	  development.	  	  This	  explanation,	  however,	  only	  serves	  to	  highlight	  the	  
dualism	  within	  the	  country’s	  response.	  For,	  the	  collaboration	  the	  HWP	  calls	  for	  
implicates	  complicity	  with	  a	  Western	  design	  in	  which	  economic	  sovereignty	  has	  
been	  carved	  out	  of	  political	  self-­‐determination.	  Further,	  China’s	  immediate	  task	  
is	  to	  climb	  up	  Wallerstein’s	  interstate	  ladder,	  so	  as	  to	  secure	  a	  position	  powerful	  
enough	   to	   enable	   her	   to	  work	   towards	   the	   dismantling	   of	   its	   core/periphery	  
binary.	   It	   follows	   by	   implication	   that	   the	   same	   power	   that	   is	   posited	   as	  
derogatory	  is	  also	  that	  which	  is	  aspired	  to,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  	  
Where	   then	   within	   the	   HWP	   legitimisation	   may	   be	   found?	   Here	   it	   is	   not	  
democracy	  that	  is	  called	  upon.	  Rather,	  IL	  is	  posited	  as	  an	  institutional	  pillar	  of	  
an	  envisioned	  harmonious	  world.32	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  forcible	  intervention	  in	  
Mali	  is	  presumably	  validated	  by	  the	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  that	  authorized	  
it..	   BITs	   are	   presumably	   similarly	   endorsed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   their	   conclusion	  
implicates	  the	  voluntary	  exercise	  of	  sovereignty.	  Here	  we	  are	  reminded	  of	  Wang	  
Zonglai	   and	   Hu	   Bin’s	   assertion	   that	   the	   country	   ‘opposes	   any	   restrictions	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  (tr)	  ,	  Selected	  Works	  of	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  (1975-­‐1982)	  (University	  Press	  of	  the	  
Pacific	  Honolulu	  1983)	  225.	  
31	  ‘Mali	  Gold	  Splendour	  for	  Foreign	  Firms,	  Misery	  for	  Malian	  Miners’	  [10	  June	  2013]	  Russia	  
Today	  <http://rt.com/news/mali-­‐gold-­‐foreign-­‐corporations-­‐450/>	  accessed	  13	  June	  2013.	  	  	  
32	  Hu	  Jintao,	  ‘Hold	  High	  the	  Great	  Banner	  of	  Socialism	  with	  Chinese	  Characteristics	  and	  Strive	  
for	  New	  Victories	  in	  Building	  a	  Moderately	  Prosperous	  Society’	  [15	  Oct	  2007]	  Report	  to	  the	  17th	  
National	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  17	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  accessed	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State	   sovereignty	   that	   are	   non-­‐reciprocal,	   non-­‐voluntary	   and	   based	   on	   power	  
politics’.33	  	  	  
Yet,	   absent	   from	   this	   assertion	   is	   a	   recognition	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	  
voluntariness	  and	  consent.	   If	  democracy	  serves	  well	  the	  neoliberal	  dualism	  by	  
reason	   of	   its	   neutrality	   in	   matters	   such	   as	   class	   and	   economic	   inequality,	  
opposition	   to	   power	   politics	   achieves	   similar	   results	   by	   reason	   of	   power’s	  
capacity	  for	  elusiveness.	  The	  image	  invoked	  by	  the	  WHP	  is	  that	  of	  compulsory	  
power.	  Yet,	  as	  pointed	  by	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall,	   it	  may	  also	  assume	  less	  obvious	  
expressions.34	  In	  particular,	   the	  economic	  sphere	  and	   its	   ‘international	  private	  
regimes’	  lend	  themselves	  to	  surreptitious	  power	  mediation.35	  	  In	  Gallagher	  and	  
Robinson’s	   free	   trade	   imperialism,	   informal	   power	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   trade	   and	  
investment	   are	   superior	   to	  political	   intervention.	  Not	   only	   is	   such	   informality	  
less	  costly	  and	  risky,	  but	  it	  also	  benefits	  from	  the	  illusion	  of	  withdrawal.36	  	  	  
So	   when	  Wang	   and	   Hu	   speak	   of	   opposition	   to	   non-­‐voluntary	   restrictions	   on	  
sovereignty,	   the	   question	   arises	   as	   to	   how	   non-­‐voluntariness	   is	   to	   be	  
understood.	   China’s	   vision	   of	   a	   harmonious	   world	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	  
maintenance	  of	  an	  institutional	  framework,	  albeit	  one	  that	  is	  to	  be	  reformed	  in	  
due	   course.	   Yet,	   participation	   in	   neoliberal	   institutions	   is	   particularly	  
vulnerable	   to	   the	  guise	  of	   voluntariness.	   It	  masks	   the	  power	  differentials	   that	  
lurk	   behind	   signature,	   and	   cloaks	   imposition	   with	   the	   appearance	   of	  
independent,	  consensual	  election.	  Further,	  capitalism	  compulsion	  for	  expansion	  
means	   that	   attempts	   at	   reforms	   are	   likely	   to	   meet	   with	   forceful	   resistance	  
rather	  than	  peaceful	  accommodation.	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  Zonglai	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  Bin,	  ‘China’s	  Reform	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  Opening-­‐up	  and	  International	  Law’	  [2010]	  
Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	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  139	  at	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  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Raymond	  Duvall,	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  Global	  Governance’	  in	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  
Raymond	  Duvall	  (eds),	  Power	  in	  Global	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  (Cambridge	  Studies	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  1-­‐32.	  
35	  A.	  Claire	  Cutler,	  ‘Private	  International	  Regimes	  and	  Interfirm	  Cooperation’	  in	  Rodney	  Bruce	  
Hall	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Biersteker	  (eds),	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Private	  Authority	  in	  Global	  Governance	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  Studies	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  29.	  
36	  John	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  Ronald	  Robinson,	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  Imperialism	  of	  Free	  Trade’	  (1953)	  Second	  Series	  VI	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  Review	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Furthermore,	   in	   the	   interiors	   of	   power,	   the	   economy	   and	   politics	   that	  
neoliberalism	   and	   HWP	   are	   at	   pain	   to	   separate,	   in	   fact	   converge.	   Arguably,	  
nowhere	   is	   this	   convergence	   more	   prominent	   than	   in	   the	   concept	   of	  
development,	   so	   central	   to	   the	   HWP.	   The	   discourse	   of	   development	   resides	  
primarily	   in	   the	   realm	  of	  economic.	  Yet,	   it	   legitimises	  political	   impositions.	  As	  
pointed	  by	  Rajagopal,	   at	   least	   in	   its	  neoliberal	   contextualisation,	  development	  
limits	   capacities	   for	   self-­‐determination	   by	   prescribing	   who	   needs	   to	   be	  
developed	   and	   in	   what	   direction.37	  	   It	   also	   provides	   the	   criterion	   by	   which	  
closeness	   to	   the	   core	   of	   the	   interstate	   power	   hierarchy	   is	   regulated.	   	   Taking	  
Greece	   as	   an	   example,	   in	   2001	   she	   was	   classified	   as	   a	   ‘developed	   country’.	  
Following	   on	   from	   her	   subjugation	   to	   EU	   and	   IMF	   dictates,	   she	  was	   recently	  
downgraded	  to	  the	  status	  of	  ‘emerging	  market’.38	  	  By	  contrast,	  based	  on	  World	  
Bank	  figures,	  US	  external	  debt	  is	  estimated	  at	  99.46%	  of	  GDP.39	  	  Yet,	  there	  is	  no	  
suggestion	  of	  exposing	  this	  country	  to	  external	  compulsions,	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  
downgrading	   her	   status	   of	   a	   leading	   economy.	   It	   is	   telling	   that	   both	   Greece’s	  
original	   positioning	   and	   subsequent	   downgrading	   emanated	   from	   a	   fund	  
manager,	   namely	   the	   private	   sphere. 40 	  	   Thus,	   it	   seems	   that	   a	   country’s	  
classification	   as	   developed	   or	   otherwise	   is	   attendant,	   inter	   alia,	   on	   autonomy	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  international	  institutions,	  or	  in	  Wallerstein’s	  terms	  –	  her	  place	  on	  the	  
ladder	   of	   interstate	   relations,	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   she	   is	   the	   diffuser	   or	  
recipient	   of	   systemic	   dictates.	   Yet,	   autonomy,	   or	   lack	   of	   it	   is	   expressed	   by	  
reference	   to	   a	   discourse	   of	   development	   that	   is	   in	   turn	   advanced	   as	   purely	  
economic.	  	  
Let	  me	  now	  examine	  these	  propositions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  BITs.	   	  Both	  the	  draft	  
statutes	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  foreign	  investment	  arbitral	  tribunal	  or	  court,	  
and	  the	  1949	  ICC	  Code	  originated	  from	  the	  private	  sector.	  They	  have	  not	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal,	  ‘Counter-­‐hegemonic	  International	  Law:	  Rethinking	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Development	  as	  a	  Third	  World	  Strategy’	  in	  Richard	  Falk,	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  &	  
Jacqueline	  Stevens	  (eds),	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  Third	  World:	  Reshaping	  Justice	  (Routledge-­‐
Cavendish	  2008)	  73.	  	  
38	  ‘Greek	  reclassified	  to	  ‘emerging	  market’	  from	  developed’	  [14	  June	  2013]	  The	  Telegraph	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9904969/Greece-­‐reclassified-­‐to-­‐emerging-­‐
market-­‐from-­‐developed.html>	  accessed	  14	  June	  2013.	  
39	  ‘The	  World’s	  Biggest	  Debtor	  Nations’	  CNBC.com	  <http://www.cnbc.com/id/30308959	  >	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2013.	  
40	  ibid	  (n	  38).	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adopted,	   but	   their	   significance	  was	   to	  prove	   long	   lasting.	   For	   they	   signalled	   a	  
conceptual	   shift,	   whereby	   a	   notion	   of	   protection	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
development	  was	   to	   replace	   IL’s	   traditional	   function	   of	   protecting	   aliens	   and	  
their	  property.41	  	  Since	  then,	  the	  discourse	  of	  development	  as	  contingent	  on	  the	  
shielding	   of	   private	   property	   rights	   was	   institutionalised	   in	   the	   preamble	   of	  
BITs	  and	  the	  ICSID	  Convention.42	  	  Such	  institutionalisation	  goes	  beyond	  law	  to	  
form	   a	   political	   premise.	   For,	   as	   pointed	   by	   Sornarajah,	   the	   assumption	   that	  
only	  developing	  states	  are	   in	  need	  of	  development,	  and	  that	  such	  need	   is	  best	  
dealt	   with	   by	   means	   of	   law	   designed	   specifically	   for	   them,	   meant	   that	   the	  
developed/developing	  binary	  itself	  became	  embedded	  in	  IL.43	  	  
The	   HWP	   takes	   issue	   with	   this	   understanding	   of	   development	   and	   seeks	   to	  
substitute	   it	  with	  a	  combination	  of	   individual	  national	  autonomy	  and	  people’s	  
collective	  right	  to	  wellbeing.	  Thus,	  China’s	  participation	  in	  the	  BITs	  program	  is	  
undertaken	   under	   the	   policy	   banner	   of	   the	   ‘Five	   Principles	   of	   Peaceful	   co-­‐
existence’	   to	   include	   sovereignty,	   equality	   and	   mutual	   benefit.44	  	   Investment	  
treaties	  are	  posited	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  South-­‐South	  cooperation,	  one	  that	  has	  
the	   potential	   to	   be	   transformed	   from	   a	   device	   for	   unmitigated	   capital	  
accumulation	  into	  a	  vehicle	  for	  equitable	  development.	  Distributive	  power	  will	  
thus	   transform	   into	   a	   collective	   one.	   This	   proposition	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	  
feasible.	   	   It	   nevertheless	   reveals	   a	   vision,	   in	   which	   profit	   is	   not	   the	   only	  
imperative,	  and	  power	   is	  accumulated	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	  all,	   rather	   than	  at	   the	  
expense	   of	   most.	   	   Further,	   it	   demonstrates	   that,	   within	   the	   HWP,	   the	  
segregation	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political	  is	  not	  hermetic,	  so	  that	  the	  
latter	  persistently	  lurks	  in	  the	  former’s	  wings.	  	  
As	   against	   this,	   it	   is	   also	   the	   case	   that	   Chinese	   treaties	   display	   a	   trajectory	  
towards	  conflation	  with	  neoliberal	  formulations.	  As	  between	  An	  Chen	  and	  Dong	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Newcombe	  and	  Paradell,	  ibid	  (n	  17)	  21.	  
42	  M.	  Sornarajah,	  The	  International	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  (3rd	  edn	  CUP	  2010);	  see	  for	  
example	  the	  Amco	  v	  Indonesia	  award	  in	  which	  the	  tribunal	  held	  that	  ‘to	  protect	  investments	  is	  to	  
protect	  the	  general	  interests	  of	  development	  and	  developing	  countries’.	  Amco	  v	  Indonesia	  	  
[1984]	  ILM	  352	  at	  369	  para	  23.	  
43	  Sornarajah,	  ibid	  (n	  42)	  51.	  
44	  Kong	  Qingjiang,	  ‘Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties:	  The	  Chinese	  Approach	  and	  Practice	  (1998-­‐
1999)’	  in	  8	  Asian	  Book	  of	  International	  Law	  110.	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Chen’s	   call	   for	  a	   return	   to	  a	  NIEO,	  and	  Cai	  Congyan’s	   reformative	  approach	   in	  
the	  direction	  of	  a	  balanced	  paradigm,	  divergence	  appears	   to	  veer	   towards	   the	  
latter.	  Further,	  the	  interconnection	  between	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  spheres	  
means	   that	   the	   former’s	   lurking	   in	   the	  wings	  may	   not	   suffice.	   And	   so	  we	   are	  
back	  to	  Mao’s	  counter	  discourse	  of	  resistance	  and	  collectivist	  responses.	  In	  this	  
respect,	   the	   HWP’s	   abstract	   language	   and	   view	   of	   change	   as	   on	   going	   and	  
determinative,	  mean	  that	  the	  door	  is	  left	  open.	  Reluctant	  as	  China	  may	  be	  at	  this	  
juncture,	  neoliberal	  power	  retaliations	  to	  even	  limited	  reforms	  may	  necessitate	  
a	  change	  in	  response.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  the	  dice	  will	  fall.	  	  
The	  Boundaries	  of	  Resistance	  	  
How	  we	   are	   then	   to	   understand	  what	  may	   be	   described	   as	   China’s	   equivocal	  
stance?	  Or,	  to	  paraphrase	  Bush’s	  famous	  dictate:	  she	  appears	  to	  be	  neither	  with	  
us	   nor	   against	   us.	   She	   appeases	   and	   integrates.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   she	   retains	  
loyalty	  to	  and	  confidence	  in	  her	  national	  specificity	  and	  historical	  normativity.	  
An	   explanation	   often	   found	   in	   Western	   writings	   is	   that	   the	   invocation	   of	   a	  
paradigm	   was	   triggered	   by	   a	   perceived	   need	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   cauldron	   of	  
anxiety	   about	   the	   country’s	   ascent.	   Such	   need	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   importance	   of	  
peace	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  her	  development;	  hence,	  the	  desire	  to	  placate	  and	  
reassure.	   Yet,	   this	   is	   coupled	  with	   a	   growing	   sense	   of	   empowerment.	   Yee	   for	  
example	  argues	  that	  China	  has	  already	  surpassed	  the	  status	  of	  a	  ‘great	  state’	  to	  
become	   an	   emerging	   ‘leader	   state’,	   a	   term	   he	   links	   to	   three	   essential	  
characteristics:	   responsibility	   toward	   the	   international	   system,	   promotion	   of	  
the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  championing	  of	  a	  vision	  for	  the	  global	  order.45	  	  For	  Men	  
Honghua,	   it	   is	   the	   rise	   from	   the	   camp	   of	   the	   developing	   that	   confers	   on	   the	  
country	  a	  role	  in	  the	  reconstitution	  of	  the	  world	  order.46	  	  Chinese	  leaders,	  says	  
Yan	  Xuetong,	  are	  now	  beginning	  to	  think	  about	  what	  kind	  of	   leadership	  China	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Sienho	  Yee,	  ‘Toward	  a	  Harmonious	  World:	  The	  Roles	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  of	  Co-­‐
Progressiveness	  and	  Leader	  States’	  (2008)	  7	  1	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  international	  law	  99-­‐105.	  
46	  Men	  Honghua,	  ‘China	  Rise	  and	  The	  International	  Condition’	  (zhongguo	  jueqi	  yu	  guoji	  zhixu)	  
(2004)	  2	  Pacific	  Journal	  (Taipingyang	  Xuebao)	  11	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can	   provide	   and	   realise	   it	   implicates	   moral	   considerations.	   For,	   beyond	  
structural	  change,	  a	  new	  international	  order	  also	  requires	  new	  norms.47	  	  
China’s	   path	   to	   modernity	   offers	   a	   lens	   through	   which	   such	   norms	   may	   be	  
examined.	   In	   its	   tale	   of	   leadership,	   demise,	   struggle	   and	   renaissance,	   two	  
civilisational	   rationalities	   faced	   each	   other.	   The	   encounter	   that	   followed	   was	  
inharmoniously	  violent	  and	  coercive.	  	  It	  engendered	  identity	  depatterning	  -­‐	  the	  
outcome	  of	  a	  trauma	  of	  gunboats	  and	  orientalist	  discourse	  applied	  in	  unison.	  It	  
was	  to	  prove	  a	  trauma	  of	  long	  lasting	  implications.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  predatory	  
capitalism	  set	  the	  country	  on	  a	  quest	  for	  national	  reinvention,	  such	  that	  would	  
secure	   its	   survival.	   Yet,	   reinvention	   was	   predicated	   on	   self-­‐dislike	   and	   the	  
substitution	   of	   tributary	   identity	   with	   the	   trappings	   of	   capitalist	   modernity.	  
Thus,	   empowerment	   was	   linked	   to	   wealth	   creation	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	  
Western	   logic	   of	   scientific	   rationality,	   improvement,	   progress	   and	   human	  
conquest	   over	   nature.	   Into	   the	   space	   produced	   by	   identity	   disintegration	  
stepped	   the	   predator’s	   attributes.	   Or	   put	   differently,	   the	   boundaries	   of	  
resistance	   were	   mapped	   out	   by	   the	   internalisation	   of	   that	   which	   was	   to	   be	  
resisted.	   Simultaneously,	   for	   resistance	   to	   be	   persuasive,	   it	   had	   to	   be	   also	  
distinguished	  from	  that	  which	  was	  being	  resisted.	  The	  outcome	  was	  a	  process	  
of	   adaptation,	   in	  which	   integration	  was	   fused	  with	   opposition.	   Opposition,	   in	  
turn,	  drew	  on	  both	  exogenous	  and	  indigenous	  interpretive	  methodologies.	  	  
Chinese	   contemporary	   discourse	   about	   hegemony	   may	   serve	   as	   an	   example.	  	  
The	   pejorative	   connotations	   articulated	   in	   the	   HWP	   are	   associated	   with	   the	  
country’s	   bitter	   historical	   experience,	   such	   that	   interrupted	   a	   preceding	  
worldview,	   and	   diverted	   it	   in	   a	   new	   direction.	   In	   tributary	   China,	   hegemonic	  
rule	  was	  accepted	  provided	  it	  was	  not	  a	  negative	  ‘rule	  by	  force’	  (ba	  dao),	  but	  a	  
positive	   ‘rule	   by	   virtue’	   (wang	   dao).48	  	   The	   conflict	   between	   equality	   and	  
dominance	   was	   thus	   legitimised	   through	   a	   commitment	   to	   public	   benefit	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  Yan	  Xuetong	  (ed)	  (tr),	  	  Ancient	  Chinese	  Thought,	  Modern	  Chinese	  Power	  (The	  Princeton-­‐China	  
Series	  Princeton	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abstracted	  as	  a	  ‘mandate	  of	  heaven’.49	  	  Implied	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  mandate	  was	  
a	  notion	  of	  morality-­‐based	  conditionality.	   Simultaneously,	   the	  belief	   in	  human	  
authority	   over	   everything	   under	   heaven	   also	   implied	   a	   claim	   to	   world	  
leadership.50	  	   Following	   the	   country’s	   introduction	   to	   capitalist	   modernity,	   in	  
contemporary	  official	  discourse	  hegemony	  remains	  predominantly	  derogatory.	  
However,	   in	   scholarly	   counter-­‐discourses,	   ancient	   precepts	   seem	   to	   be	  
resurfacing.	  Hegemony	  is	  attributed	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  stabilising	  force	  
that	   is	   judged	   by	   its	   consequences.	   Critique	   focuses	   not	   on	   hegemonic	   power	  
per	  se,	  but	  on	  the	  way	  it	   is	  exercised	  and	  the	  outcomes	  it	  produces.	  Thus,	  IMF	  
led	   privatisation	   is	   proffered	   as	   an	   instance	   of	   US	   dominance	   that	   causes	  
destabilisation	  and	  infringes	  the	  public	  good.	  
Importation	   that	   is	   infused	  with	   traditions	   of	  welfare,	  mutual	   benefit	   and	   the	  
avoidance	  of	  societal	  harm	  was	  also	   identified	   in	  China’s	  understanding	  of	   the	  
BITs	   program	   and	   related	   property	   rights.	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   corporate	   social	  
responsibility	   (CSR)	   similarly	   originates	   from	   the	  West,	   but	   acquires	   distinct	  
content	  when	  posited	  in	  a	  Chinese	  context.	  Here,	  specificity	  is	  attendant	  on	  the	  
active	  role	  imparted	  to	  the	  government,	  an	  underlying	  belief	  that	  the	  aggression	  
of	   economic	   growth	   should	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   override	   popular	   and	  
environmental	  wellbeing,	  a	  desire	   for	  development	   that	  does	  not	   lose	  sight	  of	  
its	  human	  orientation.51	  	  Chinese	  CSR	  is	  further	  animated	  by	  Confucian	  morality	  
that	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   natural	   love	   and	   mutuality	   of	   obligations	   found	   in	  
relations	  of	  kingship.	  Confucian	  ethics	  and,	  presumably	  also	  socialist	  heritage,	  
thus	   impact	  on	  business	  management,	  not	  as	  a	  conflictual	   force	  that	  competes	  
with	  profit	  compulsions	  but	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  a	  values-­‐based	  whole.52	  	  The	  
role	   played	   by	   the	   Chinese	   government	   in	   ensuring	   CSR	   compliant	   conduct	  
overseas	   is	   found,	   for	  example	   in	   the	  Guidelines	   for	  Environmental	  Protection	  
in	  Foreign	  Investment	  and	  Cooperation	  issued	  in	  February	  2014	  by	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Commerce	   (MOFCOM)	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Environmental	   Protection	   (the	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  Jingchen	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Guidelines).53	  	  The	  language	  adopted	  by	  the	  Guidelines	  is	  instructive.	  First,	  ODI	  
is	   invariably	   referred	   to	   together	   with	   cooperation.	   Second,	   environmental	  
protection	   and	   sustainable	   development	   are	   linked	   to	   the	   directive	   of	  mutual	  
benefit.	  Third,	  protection	   is	  conceptualised	  expansively.	   It	  extends	  to	  religious	  
beliefs,	  cultural	  customs	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  labour.	  Companies	  are	  to	  ‘promote	  
harmonious	   development	   of	   the	   local	   economy,	   the	   environment	   and	   the	  
community	  and	  carry	  out	  cooperation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mutual	  benefit’.54	  	  Fourth,	  
companies	   are	   to	   collaborate	   with	   both	   the	   host	   government	   and	   the	  
community	   in	   accordance	   with	   municipal	   law	   and	   international	   guidelines.55	  
Finally,	  CSR	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  national	  interest	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  its	  implications	  for	  
the	  international	  image	  of	  the	  country’s	  enterprises.56	  	  
Liu	  Wenbing’s	  analysis	  of	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation’s	  (Petrochina)	  
2005	   acquisition	   of	   Kazakhstan	   Petroleum	   (Petrokazakhstan)	   provides	   an	  
insight	  into	  the	  way	  Chinese	  style	  CSR	  is	  expressed	  at	  the	  management	  level	  of	  
SOEs.57	  	  Liu	  is	  director	  of	  the	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  bureau	  at	  China’s	  State	  
Assets	   Supervision	   Administration	   Commission	   (SASAC).	   SASAC	   is	   the	  
governmental	  organ	  in	  which	  ownership	  of	  SOEs	  is	  vested.	   It	  can	  therefore	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  the	  two-­‐way	  flow	  of	  national	  and	  corporate	  perspectives.	  	  
This	   finds	  expression	   in	   the	  way	  Liu	  navigates	  a	  path	  between	  capitalist	   style	  
commercial	   imperatives	   of	   competitive	   profitability	   and	   HWP’s	   prescriptions.	  
Prior	  to	  the	  merger,	  Liu	  Wenbing	  elucidates,	  Petrokazakhstan,	  a	  listed	  company	  
incorporated	  in	  Canada	  but	  located	  in	  Kazakhstan,	  had	  enhancement	  of	  shares	  
value	  as	  its	  primary	  aim.	  Her	  acquisition	  by	  Petrochina	  meant	  that	  such	  aim	  had	  
to	   be	   mitigated	   by	   the	   requirements	   of	   mutual	   benefit	   and	   harmonious	  
development,	   taking	   into	   account	   national	   resources,	   CSR	   and	   political	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responsibility.58	  	  Whereas	  Petrokazakhstan’s	  management	  style	  was	  permeated	  
with	   Western	   scientific	   and	   behavioural	   theories,	   he	   argues,	   Chinese	  
management	  is	  predicated	  on	  Confucian,	  Daoist	  and	  other	  divergent	  traditions.	  	  
Commercial	  success	  thus	  necessitated	  cultural	  fusion	  that	  was	  based	  on	  mutual	  
recognition	   and	   respect,	   reciprocity	   of	   learning,	   good	   will	   and	   a	   search	   for	  
communalities.59	  Friendship	   at	   both	   the	   interstate	   and	   individual	   levels	   is	  
posited	  as	  conducive	  to	  the	  efficiency	  of	  commercial	  interaction.60	  	  
Speaking	  about	  the	  thirty	  five-­‐year	  concession	  granted	  to	  China	  Ocean	  Shipping	  
Company	   (COSCO)	   in	   November	   2008	   for	   the	   management	   of	   a	   containers	  
terminal	   at	   the	   port	   of	   Piraeus,	   Liu	   alludes	   to	   COSCO’s	   general	   manager,	   Fu	  
Chengqiu’s	  assurance	  that	  the	  company’s	  true	  aim	  in	  investing	  in	  Greece	  is	  not	  
to	   deprive	   people	   of	   their	   livelihood,	   but	   rather	   to	   introduce	   operational	  
improvements.	  In	  pursuing	  this	  objective,	  COSCO	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  
‘think	  globally	  operate	  locally’.	  It	  meant	  that	  a	  balance	  had	  to	  be	  struck	  between	  
global	  considerations	  and	  local	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  requirements,	  so	  
as	  to	  achieve	  ‘win-­‐win	  development’.61	  
In	   sum,	   the	   trauma	   inflicted	   on	   China	   by	   the	   combined	  means	   of	   compulsory	  
and	   productive	   power	   did	   result	   in	   disintegration.	   However,	   unlike	   the	  
outcomes	  desired	  by	  the	  shock	  doctrine,	  it	  did	  not	  create	  a	  tabula	  rasa	  on	  which	  
compliance	   could	   be	   implanted	   at	   will.	   The	   patient’s	   resistance	   was	   indeed	  
shaped	  by	  being	  subjected	  to	  overwhelming	  power.	  Nevertheless,	  she	  survived	  
forcible	  imposition,	  and	  is	  now	  struggling	  to	  find	  her	  own	  expression.	  A	  process	  
of	   adaptation	   was	   triggered	   by	   a	   historical	   break.	   It	   implicated	   identity	  
searching,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  which	  Chinese	  officialdom	  and	  scholarship	  grappled	  
with	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   indigenous	   and	   Western	   discourses	   and	   counter	  
discourses.62	  	  Thus,	  at	  least	  for	  now,	  Huntington’s	  clash	  of	  civilisations	  appears	  
to	   take	   place	   more	   in	   the	   country’s	   interior	   than	   in	   the	   globalised	   arena	   of	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empire.	   The	   difference	   in	   the	   way	   such	   clash	   is	   to	   be	   managed	   is	   however	  
telling.	  If	  Huntington’s	  polemic	  posits	  clash	  as	  a	  power-­‐based	  contest,	  for	  China	  
it	  invokes	  a	  quest	  for	  harmonious	  resolution.63	  	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  power	  does	  not	  play	  a	  role	  within	  this	  quest.	  For	  Schill’s	  
assumption	  of	  equality	  in	  BITs	  negotiations	  overlooks	  the	  operation	  of	  informal	  
and	  covert	  power	  attendant	  on	   integration,	  e.g.	   the	   impact	   that	  penetration	  of	  
foreign	   investment	   has	   on	   the	   country’s	   political	   and	   cultural	   interior,	   the	  
authority	  of	  domestic	  and	   international	  elites	  converged,	   the	   lock	   in	  dynamics	  
of	  participation	  in	  neoliberal	  institutions,	  and	  the	  general	  pressure	  exerted	  by	  a	  
capitalist	  environment	  that	  is	  immanently	  averse	  to	  divergence.	  It	  may	  be	  said	  
that	  China	  was	  under	  no	  compulsion	  to	  go	  down	  this	  path,	  since	  years	  of	  self-­‐
reliance	  policy	  and	  the	  success	  of	  her	  socialist	  production	  meant	  that	  she	  was	  
not	   externally	   indebted.64	  	   Yet,	   keeping	   apart	   in	   the	   context	   of	   increasingly	  
uniformed	   interstate	  ecology	   implicates	  no	   less	  powerful	  pressures	   that	   those	  
produced	  by	  integration.	  
Thus,	   the	   rupture	   of	   a	   Great	   Transformation	   continues	   to	   manifest	   itself	   in	  
alternating	   dynamics	   of	   continuity	   and	   discontinuity	   that	   veer	   between	  
revolutionary	   socialism	   and	   a	   focus	   on	   national	   economic	   empowerment,	  
submission	  to,	  alternatively	  retreat	  from	  a	  neoliberal	  model.65	  Adaptations	  are	  
not	  easily	  deciphered.	   	  In	  both	  the	  West	  and	  China,	  CSR	  is	  set	  out	  in	  voluntary	  
guidelines.	   Yet,	   in	   each	   instance	   voluntariness	   is	   differently	   contextualised.	   In	  
the	  West	  it	  may	  be	  said	  to	  denote	  a	  soft	  option,	  one	  that	  is	  devoid	  of	  legal	  force	  
and	  consequently	  implicates	  an	  individual	  discretion.	  	  By	  contrast,	  in	  China	  CSR	  
operates	  within	  a	   tradition	  of	  Confucian	  and	  socialist	   instruction.	   Its	  diffusion	  
goes	   beyond	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   to	   encompass	   compulsion	   that	   derives	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Wang	  Yiwei,	  ‘Clash	  of	  Identities:	  Why	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  Unharmonious	  in	  Global	  
Governance’	  (2010)	  No	  24	  UNISCI	  Discussions	  Papers	  101.	  
64	  In	  the	  years	  1952	  to	  1957	  Chinese	  industry	  grew	  at	  an	  annual	  rate	  of	  between	  16-­‐18%.	  
Maurice	  Meisner,	  Mao’s	  China	  and	  After:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  (3rd	  edn	  The	  Free	  
Press	  1977)	  113,	  414.	  
65	  Wang	  Hui,	  ibid	  (n	  63)	  43.	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collective	   tutelage	   in	   morality,	   national	   discipline	   and	   value	   building. 66	  
Voluntariness	   thus	  may	   be	   associated	  with	   compliance	   that	   is	   not	   exclusively	  
dependent	  on	  juridical	  imperatives.	  	  	  
Similarly,	  sustainable	  development,	  now	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Canada	  BIT	  is	  a	  
Western/China	  shared	  concept.	  In	  both	  instances	  its	  ultimate	  aim	  may	  be	  said	  
to	  facilitate	  systemic	  perpetuation	  by	  purporting	  to	  alleviate	  harm,	  and	  thereby	  
take	   the	   edge	   off	   resistance.	   However,	   as	  Wood	   points	   out,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
capitalist	   endless	   accumulation,	   sustainability	   represents	   an	   impossible	   aim.	  
Capitalism	  may	  be	  capable	  of	  producing	  technological	   innovations	  that	  may	  in	  
turn	  assist	  in	  reducing	  the	  strain	  on	  resources.	  However,	  this	  type	  of	  argument	  
overlooks	   a	   core	   issue.	   Namely,	   that	   the	   essential	   obstacle	   to	   sustainable	  
development	   resides	   in	   the	   raison	   d’être	   of	   capitalist	   production,	   being	   the	  
creation	  of	  exchange-­‐value	  rather	  than	  value,	  profit	  rather	  than	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  
people	   or	   the	   earth.67	  	   Thus,	  Western	   corporate	   directors’	   primary	   duty	   is	   to	  
produce	  value	  for	  their	  shareholders.	  	  By	  contrast	  Chinese	  companies	  and	  their	  
board	  of	  directors	  are	  required	  to	  ‘observe	  social	  morality,	  uphold	  principles	  of	  
good	  faith	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  public	  and	  assume	  
social	   responsibility’.68	  	   Similar	   references	   to	   ethics	   and	   the	   preservation	   of	  
social	  harmony	  are	  found	  in	  the	  Shenzhen	  Stock	  Exchanges	  guidelines	  to	  listed	  
companies.69	  	   Further,	   the	   absence	   of	   boundaries	   between	   policymaking	   and	  
processes	   of	   capital	   accumulation	   mean	   that,	   in	   the	   West,	   sustainable	  
development	  has	  become	  a	  ‘new	  battlefield’,	  in	  which	  corporate	  lobbying	  forge	  
partnerships	  with	  international	  institutions.70	  In	  China,	  by	  contrast,	  sustainable	  
development	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  remained,	  at	  least	  for	  now,	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  
state	  commands	  and	  to	  form	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  political	  vision.	  The	  same	  applies	  
to	  the	  country’s	  BITs	  program	  and	  related	  notions	  of	  rule	  of	   law	  and	  property	  
rights.	   Contrary	   to	   neoliberal	   notion	   of	   legitimacy	   as	   detached	   from	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  mass	  campaigns	  in	  1949-­‐1956	  see	  generally	  Julia	  Strauss,	  ‘Morality,	  
Coercion	  and	  State	  Building	  by	  Campaign	  in	  the	  Early	  PRC:	  Regime	  Consolidation	  and	  After,	  
1949-­‐1956’	  in	  Julian	  Strauss,	  ibid	  (n	  29).	  
67	  Ellen	  Meiksins	  Wood,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Capitalism:	  A	  Longer	  View	  (Verso	  2002)	  197.	  
68	  The	  Company	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  2005	  Art	  5.	  
69	  Jingchen	  Zhao,	  ibid	  (n	  52)	  72-­‐73.	  
70	  Belén	  Balanyá	  and	  others,	  Regional	  &	  Global	  Restructuring	  &	  the	  Rise	  of	  Corporate	  Power	  (new	  
edn	  Pluto	  Press	  2003)	  xxi-­‐xxiv,	  150-­‐154.	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outcomes,	   for	   China	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   all	   three	   relates	   to	   and	   indeed	  may	   be	  
determined	  by	  non-­‐economic	  considerations	  of	  equity	  and	  societal	  benefit.	  	  	  	  
Summary	  	  
Can	   the	   HWP	   then	   be	   said	   to	   constitute	   a	   counter-­‐discourse	   to	   the	  
neoliberal/Washington	  Consensus	  hegemonic	  discourse?	  It	  certainly	  appears	  to	  
be	   in	   a	   number	   of	   core	   respects.	   Indications	   may	   be	   found	   in	   a	   different	  
understanding	  of	  universalism,	  such	  that	  is	  not	  equated	  with	  inalterable	  laws	  of	  
nature,	  human	  or	  otherwise.	  Indeed,	  the	  reverse	  is	  true.	  If	  there	  is	  an	  inalterable	  
law,	  it	  is	  that	  all	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  permanence	  of	  change.	  It	  follows	  that	  neither	  
uniformity	   nor	   constancy	   of	   reaction	   are	   desired.	   It	   also	   follows	   that	   the	  
neoliberal	   impulses	   for	   universalised	   uniformity	   stand	   in	   the	   way	   of	  
appropriate	   responses.	  Further,	  harmonious	  convergence	   is	   contingent	  on	   the	  
preservation	  of	  diversity	  rather	  than	  its	  elimination.	  Furthermore,	  the	  ethics	  of	  
profit,	  whereby	  the	  creation	  of	  exchange	  value	  constitutes	  the	  only	  purpose	  of	  
production,	   is	   made	   subordinate	   to	   what	   may	   be	   identified	   as	   the	   ethics	   of	  
values.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	  wealth	  generation	   is	  not	   the	   final	   terminal.	  Rather,	   it	   is	  
only	   a	   stop	   on	   a	   road	   towards	   common	   prosperity.	   In	   all	   these	   respects,	   the	  
HWP	  challenges	  tenets	  that	  go	  to	  the	  essence	  of	  that	  which	  makes	  the	  neoliberal	  
discourse	  what	  it	  is.	  
	  In	   the	   HWP	   power	   is	   conceptualised	   as	   collective	   rather	   than	   distributive.	  
Structurally,	   it	   is	   to	   emanate,	   not	   from	   a	   single	   hegemonic	   core,	   but	   from	  
disparate	  yet	  dialoguing	  centers	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  vision	  of	  structurally	  
diffused	  power	  diverges	  from	  the	  uniformity	  and	  interstate	  hierarchy	  on	  which	  
Wood’s	  empire	  of	  capital	  is	  predicated.	  	  	  	  
Yet,	  the	  HWP	  also	  declares	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  globalised	  order	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  
investment.	   Here	   too	   it	   retains	   a	   claim	   to	   divergence	   by	   maintaining	   that	  
different	  management	  may	  be	  constitutive	  of	  novel	  outcomes.	   In	  other	  words,	  
by	  means	   of	   divergent	  management,	   neoliberal	   globalisation	  may	   be	   inverted	  
from	   poverty	   enhancing,	   environmentally	   harmful,	   predatory	   and	   violent	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interstate	  order	   to	  one	  of	   lasting	  peace	  and	  common	  prosperity.	  The	  way	   this	  
proposition	  problematises	   the	   interior	  of	   the	  HWP	  was	  considered	  above.	  But	  
further	  than	  that,	  it	  weakens	  the	  HWP’s	  counter-­‐discursive	  force	  in	  that	  now	  it	  
has	  one	  foot	  in	  the	  hegemonic	  discourse,	  with	  only	  one	  foot	  remaining	  resistant.	  
This	  weakening	  that	  is	  attendant	  on	  being	  simultaneously	  in	  and	  out	  takes	  me	  
to	   another,	   though	   related	   question.	   	   Put	   simply,	   can	   a	   discourse	   that	   is	   only	  
partially	  ‘counter’,	  so	  to	  speak,	  survive	  the	  ecology	  of	  hegemonic	  power?	  Here	  I	  
find	   myself	   facing	   a	   methodological	   difficulty.	   From	   what	   perspective	   is	   this	  
question	  to	  be	  considered?	  If	  a	  Western	  rationality	  is	  to	  be	  applied,	  examination	  
is	   to	   be	   predicated	   on	   a	   competitive	   ‘either	   or	   logic’,	   whereby	   each	   of	  
neoliberalism	  and	  the	  HWP	  will	  be	  vying	  for	  hegemony	  in	  a	  conflictual	  process	  
of	   domination	   and	   annihilation.	   If	   Confucian	   dialectics	   is	   to	   be	   applied,	   the	  
process	  will	   be	  one	  of	  mutually	   constituting	   interaction.	  The	  Chinese	   solution	  
may	   be	   found	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   adaptation.	   Adaptation	   implicates	   the	   co-­‐
existence	   of	   sameness	   and	   difference,	   and	   as	   seen	   above,	   is	   to	   be	   found	  
throughout	   the	   country’s	   response	   to	   imposed	   transformation.	   	   Yet,	  Western	  
capitalist	   expansionism	   proved	   incapable	   of	   Chinese	   style	   appropriate	  
responses,	  and	  seems	  unable	  to	  be	  anything	  other	  than	  violently	  conflictual.	  	  
And	  so,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  HWP	  so	  desires,	  it	  appears	  an	  encounter	  is	  brewing	  
once	   again.	  As	   the	   capitalist	   crisis	   persists,	   neoliberal	   policies	   deepen.	  As	   yet,	  
Wang	  Yizhou’s	  expectation	  that	  the	  China	  threat	  theory	  would	  naturally	  subside	  
has	   not	  materialised.71	  	   Nor	   is	   there	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   it	  would.	   This	   is	   so,	  
unless	   the	   country	   retreats	   from	   the	   path	   of	   national	   empowerment	   and	  
residual	  divergence	  in	  favour	  of	  unreserved	  integration.	  Such	  integration	  would	  
require	  uniformity,	  financial	  fusion,	  and	  the	  subjugation	  of	  national	  competitive	  
potential	  to	  limits	  dictated	  by	  the	  US.	  	  
The	   trajectory	   of	   the	   Chinese	   BITs	   program	   unveils	   the	   possibility	   of	   China	  
going	   down	   this	   path.	   Such	   trajectory	   is	   reinforced	   by	   the	   recent	   enlisting	   of	  
private	   capital	   to	   the	   task	   of	  ODI,	   and	   the	   promise	   of	   protection	   by	  means	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Susan	  L.	  Shirk,	  China	  Fragile	  Superpower	  (OUP	  2007)	  107.	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more	   BITs.	   Another	   potentially	   indicative	   trajectory	   is	   that	   of	   the	   rise	   in	  
overseas	  M&As,	  particularly	  in	  the	  European	  manufacturing	  sector,	  so	  as	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  depressed	  assets	  value.72	  	  In	  Africa	  China	  has	  already	  become	  the	  
third	  biggest	  M&As	  player.73	  	  As	  observed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  investment	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  M&As	   is	  more	   profitable	   for	   investors,	   but	   less	   conducive	   to	   development.	  
Either	   way,	   it	   is	   a	   far	   cry	   from	   China’s	   solidarity	   based	   pre-­‐reforms	  
infrastructure	   projects	   in	   poor	   countries.	   Further,	   the	   compulsion	   for	  
competitiveness	   that	   underpins	   the	  BITs	   program	  now	   forms	   part	   of	   Chinese	  
ODI	   rationality.	   Thus,	   the	   reasons	   listed	   by	   Liu	   Wenbing	   in	   support	   of	   SOEs	  
going	  global	  focus	  on	  enhanced	  competitiveness.74	  Furthermore,	  competition	  at	  
home	  with	   an	   expanding	   institution	   of	   private	   capital	  means	   that	   SOEs	  must	  
acquire	   overseas	   assets,	   if	   they	   are	   to	   remain	   the	   backbone	   of	   the	   domestic	  
economy.75	  	  The	  analogue	  processes	  of	  home	  and	  abroad	  resurface	  once	  more	  
to	   make	   public	   ownership	   paradoxically	   dependent	   for	   its	   survival	   on	  
acquisitions	  and	  attention	  to	  profit.	  The	  direction	  these	  developments	  will	  take	  
is	  yet	  to	  be	  revealed.	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  Cai	  Xiao,	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  China	  Daily	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  accessed	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  Liu	  Wenbing,	  ibid	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